     _________________________________________________________________
   
   
   
                     THE MASSACRE OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
                                       
A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COVER UP

   
   
    January 28, 1994
    
   
   
By Carol Moore, (c) 1994 [1]

   
   
   In consultation with:
   
       Alan Forschler
       Ian Goddard
       James A. Long
       Richard J. Sanford
       Timothy Seims
       Andrew Williams
       
   
   
   COMMITTEE FOR WACO JUSTICE, P.O. Box 33037, Washington, D.C. 20033,
   202/986-1847 202/797-9877
   
   Please Feel Free to Copy and Distribute! Copying for non-commercial
   distribution encouraged.
   
   
   
   
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   
   
TABLE OF CONTENTS

   
   
   
   
  INTRODUCTION
  
   
    1. The Public Must Know the Truth 
    2. Justice Must Be Done 
    3. Past Wacos: Government's "Historic Interest in Breaking Up Armed
       Groups" 
    4. BATF and FBI Persecution of Randy Weaver 
    5. Government Reliance on "Private Spies" and "Cult Busters" 
    6. The History of the Branch Davidians 
    7. Non-Weapons-Related Allegations Against David Koresh 
       
  BATF-TREASURY DEPARTMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COVERUP:
  THE FEBRUARY 28, 1993 RAID ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
    1. BATF Ignored Branch Davidians' Legal Gun Business 
    2. BATF Found No Evidence Weapons Were Purchased Illegally 
    3. "Probable Cause" Based on Biased Information About Intent 
    4. "Probable Cause" Based on Religious and Political Beliefs 
    5. Other Irregularities in the February 25, 1993 Affidavit 
    6. BATF Ignored Branch Davidian Attempts to Cooperate 
    7. Questionable Grounds for a Paramilitary Raid 
    8. Government Multi-Task Force Makes for "Partners in Crime" 
    9. Dubious Drug Allegations to Obtain Helicopters for Free 
   10. Chronology of the February 28, 1993 BATF Raid 
   11. BATF Used Excessive Force to Serve Warrant 
   12. Allegations BATF Agents Shot First 
   13. Allegations Agents Shot Indiscriminately and from Helicopters 
   14. Allegations Friendly Fire Injured or Killed Some Agents 
   15. BATF Intimidation of the Press 
   16. BATF Coverup 
   17. Treasury Department Coverup 
   18. Committee for Waco Justice Conclusions 
       
   
   
  FBI-JUSTICE DEPARTMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COVERUP:
  THE 51 DAY SIEGE AND APRIL 19, 1993 ASSAULT ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
  
   
    1. FBI Control of the Press and Media 
    2. Possible Illegal Use of Tanks 
    3. FBI Impatient with Conciliatory Measures 
    4. FBI Relied on Experts and Cult Busters Urging Tactical Pressure 
    5. FBI Pressure Tactics Replaced Negotiations 
    6. FBI Destroyed Crime Scene Despite Complaints 
    7. FBI Plan to Gas, Disassemble Mount Carmel 
    8. FBI Refused to Believe Final Koresh Promise to Surrender 
    9. FBI Misled Janet Reno on Need for and Dangers of Assault 
   10. Questions About President Clinton's Hostility Toward the Branch
       Davidians 
   11. Chronology of the April 19, 1993 Gassing, Demolition and Fire 
   12. Fatal Decision to Escalate to Demolition 
   13. Suspicious Activity by FBI Agents 
   14. Lack of Fire Precautions 
   15. Branch Davidian Statements that Demolition Trapped People 
   16. Branch Davidian Statements that Demolition Started the Fire 
   17. FBI Allegations that Branch Davidians Started the Fire 
   18. FBI and BATF Crime Scene Coverup 
   19. "Independent" Fire Investigator Coverup 
   20. Justice Department Coverup 
   21. Committee for Waco Justice Conclusions 
       
   
   
  FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
  
   
    1. The Charges 
    2. Pre-Trial Motions and Jury Selection 
    3. The Prosecution Case 
    4. The Defense Case 
    5. Civil Rights and Wrongful Death Law Suits 
       
   
   
  SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UPHEAVALS AND THE YEAR 2000
  
   
    1. Millennialists and Survivalists 
    2. Drug-Prohibition-Related Violence 
    3. Gun-Prohibition-Related Violence 
    4. Economic Unrest and Tax Rebellion 
    5. Secessionists and Separatists 
       
   
   
  COMMITTEE FOR WACO JUSTICE RECOMMENDATIONS - RESPECT THE BILL OF RIGHTS
  
   
    1. Protect Right to Freedom of Religion, Speech, Press, etc. 
    2. Protect Right to Keep and Bear Arms 
    3. Protect Right to Refuse Quartering of Soldiers 
    4. Protect Right to be Secure Against Unreasonable Searches, etc. 
    5. Protect Right to Indictment by Grand Jury, Trial by Jury, etc. 
    6. Protect Right to a Speedy Public Trial, Impartial Jury, etc. 
    7. Protect Right to Trial By Jury In Civil Suits 
    8. Protect Freedom from Excessive Bail, Excessive Fines, etc. 
    9. Protect Rights Retained by the People 
   10. Protect Powers Reserved to the States or the People 
       
   
   
  CONCLUSION
  
   
   
  DIAGRAMS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (UNFORTUNEATLY, NOT INCLUDED IN THIS FILE)
    1. Treasury Department and BATF Chains of Command
    2. Diagram and Drawing of Mount Carmel Center
    3. White House, Justice Department and FBI Chains of Command
    4. April 19th Diagram of Tank Damage to Mount Carmel
    5. April 19th Infrared Photo of 11:59:16 of
    6. Tank Rammings and Collapsed Gymnasium
    7. April 19th Infrared Photo of 12:10:40 Fires
       
   
   
   
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   
   
   
   
                  THE MASSACRE OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COVER UP
                     THE PUBLIC MUST KNOW THE TRUTH

   
   Several year end television reviews of 1993 portrayed the deaths of 86
   or more members of the Branch Davidian [2] religious group in Waco,
   Texas as a symbol of Attorney General Janet Reno's "heroism" for
   taking responsibility for their fiery deaths. Representative J.J.
   Pickle, chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and
   Means Committee, summed up the feelings of many when he said of David
   Koresh, "The leader of that compound was a nut, and his followers
   agreed to live with a nut." [3] Many Americans consider the Branch
   Davidians to be the religious fanatics, child abusers and violent "gun
   nuts" government and the press have portrayed them as being.
   
   Footnote [2] Six Branch Davidians died during the February 28, 1993
   raid and, at least 80 during the April 19, 1993 fire. According to
   several Branch Davidians, in the last few years the group had come to
   call themselves "Students of the Seven Seals." However, survivors do
   accept the use of the term "Branch Davidian" since it is so well known
   at this point (private communication).
   
   However, many other Americans believe that nothing the Branch
   Davidians did, or were accused of doing, justified either the February
   28 or April 19, 1993 assaults against them. Representative Harold
   Volkmer charged the initial attack on the Branch Davidians was part of
   a pattern of "Gestapo-like tactics" at the bureau. "I fail to see the
   crimes committed by those in the Davidian compound that called for the
   extreme action of BATF on Feb. 28 and the tragic final assault." [4]
   
   Representative John Conyers branded the April 19th gas and tank attack
   a "military operation" and called it a "profound disgrace to law
   enforcement in the United States." He told Janet Reno, "you did the
   right thing by offering to resign. I'd like you to know that there is
   at least one member of Congress who is not going to rationalize the
   innocent deaths of two dozen children." [5]
   
   As the trial of eleven surviving Branch Davidians for "conspiracy to
   murder federal officers" proceeds in San Antonio, Texas, the public
   may finally learn the disturbing and even shocking truth about U.S.
   government violations of rights, excessive use of force and coverup.
   There is a possibility that the jury will be so disgusted by trial
   revelations it will acquit most of the Branch Davidians on most or all
   charges.
   
   The Committee for Waco Justice is a group of individuals committed to
   ensuring that the public does learn the truth about violations of
   rights, use of excessive force and coverup of wrongdoing in the Bureau
   of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' (BATF) initial raid upon, and the
   Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) destruction of, the Branch
   Davidians. Our report--"The Massacre of the Branch Davidians"--is a
   systematic presentation of evidence of government agents' and
   officials' misconduct and crimes. Our sources include the Treasury
   Department's September 30, 1993 report, the Justice Department's
   October 8, 1993 report, Senate and House of Representatives hearings,
   news reports and other published materials, news video tapes,
   conference audio tapes and personal interviews. Our report:
   
   * examines similar government actions towards dissident groups and
   individuals and the government's growing reliance on private spies and
   "cult busters";
   
   * reviews the history of the Branch Davidians and the questionable
   evidence used to support non-weapons allegations against David Koresh;
      
   * outlines the most important current evidence of BATF and FBI
   violations of rights, excessive use of force and the ongoing coverup,
   a coverup in which both the Treasury and Justice Departments are
   participating;
   
   * describes the charges facing the eleven Branch Davidians, their
   expected defenses, and civil suits against the government by surviving
   Branch Davidians and families of the deceased;
   
   * delineates an inevitable rise in the number and variety of dissident
   religious and political groups as we approach the "magic" year 2000;
   
   * offers recommendations to ensure that local, state and federal
   governments end violations of Americans' rights.
   
   Despite the Committee's limited resources, and our primary reliance on
   public sources, we have made some important and startling findings
   which seem to be evidence of official misconduct and crimes against
   the Branch Davidians. Our most disturbing findings are:
   
   * After BATF could find no evidence that weapons were purchased
   illegally, it based its "probable cause" on biased information about
   "intent" from "cult busters" committed to destroying the Branch
   Davidians and former members influenced by them and on words and deeds
   protected by the First Amendment.
   
   * BATF ignored David Koresh's past cooperation with more serious
   investigations as well as Koresh's 1992 invitations to BATF agents and
   the local Sheriff's Department to inspect his guns. BATF also engaged
   in flagrant "undercover" surveillance which may have convinced the
   Branch Davidians that the government was preparing to destroy them and
   that armed defense was their only recourse.
   
   * BATF decided to conduct a paramilitary raid because of the
   overly-aggressive mentality of raid planners, biased information from
   cult busters, shoddy intelligence, a need to bolster BATF's image, and
   the desire to punish a BATF critic.
   
   * BATF knew former tenants probably had set up a methamphetamine lab
   at Mount Carmel and that Koresh had dismantled it years before;
   nevertheless, they used that information to get free support from the
   Texas National Guard.
   
   * Although the magistrate who signed the warrants did not designate
   this a "no knock" raid, BATF had no plan to serve the warrant
   peacefully and even expected a shootout! BATF may have shot first and
   did fire indiscriminately. BATF raid commanders in helicopters may
   have fired from them. Attorney General Janet Reno has not completed an
   investigation into 911 tapes whose time sequence was re- ordered,
   possibly to discredit Davidians' claims helicopters were firing at
   them.
   
   * The savage BATF assault may have convinced some wounded Branch
   Davidians the government meant to slaughter them, so they committed
   suicide or had themselves shot.
   
   * After the raid, BATF intimidated two important witnesses who could
   attest to the Branch Davidians' innocence. They tricked one into
   accepting "protective custody" and then kept him away from the press
   and the FBI; they brushed off another's offer of help and then put him
   on the "armed and dangerous" list when he left town.
   
   * The Justice Department knowingly violated its own interpretation of
   the posse comitatus law by using tanks against the Branch Davidians,
   including in the final, fatal assault; it also misled President
   Clinton about their use.
   
   * The FBI controlled, intimidated and lied to the press and the media.
   
   * Richard M. Rogers, the FBI Hostage Rescue Team Commander at Waco,
   repeatedly sabotaged negotiations by pressuring the siege commander to
   use harassment tactics and later CS gas against the Branch Davidians.
   Rogers is now under investigation and may be indicted for his overly
   aggressive tactics in the 1992 standoff with Randy Weaver in Idaho.
   The FBI's impatience to end the standoff may have been related to
   their fear the upcoming Weaver trial would bring out facts about FBI
   misconduct in that case.
   
   * The FBI and Justice Department covered up its reliance on "cult
   busters"--including a long-time FBI advisor-- because of criticism of
   their use, because one advisor was indicted for "unlawful
   imprisonment," and because of a lawsuit against the FBI and Attorney
   General Janet Reno regarding the FBI's use of the term "cult."
   
   * The FBI convinced Attorney General Reno to approve their plan to gas
   and demolish Mount Carmel by evidently withholding from her David
   Koresh's very credible April 14th letter promising to surrender, even
   as they showed her his defiant April 9th and 10th letters. Evidently
   this letter also was withheld from the press and not mentioned to
   Justice Department outside experts during FBI briefings. It was
   included in the Justice Department report, but mislabeled as a mere
   "request."
   
   * The FBI convinced Attorney General Reno that April 19th would not be
   "D-Day"--that they would proceed with a safe operation and continue to
   negotiate. However, they obtained authority to "return fire" and speed
   up demolition of Mount Carmel and evidently never informed Reno of
   their expectations there would be casualties.
   
   Despite FBI and Justice Department statements to the contrary, FBI
   agents were seen outside their tanks near the building before the
   fire. Under the FBI rules of engagement they had the authority to
   shoot Branch Davidians, may have done so, and now may be covering up
   their acts.
   
   The Justice Department and FBI are refusing to admit that there was an
   order to begin the demolition of Mount Carmel right before noon and
   have not revealed who--FBI ground commanders or FBI or Justice
   officials--gave that order.
   
   Nearly simultaneous FBI tank attacks from three sides trapped Branch
   Davidians in the building and started some or all of the fires from
   which most could not escape. There was no mass suicide; there were
   desperate suicides by a few trapped victims of the fire. If two or
   three despairing Branch Davidians did light fires, as the government
   claims, it was because government assaults had convinced them
   martyrdom was preferable to capture and enslavement by evil
   authorities.
   
   During the April 19th fire, FBI tanks destroyed important evidence by
   bulldozing burning walls into the rubble. BATF and FBI agents were all
   over the "crime scene" during Texas Rangers investigation and may have
   destroyed or even fabricated evidence.
   
   * The BATF-influenced chief fire investigator issued a biased fire
   report blaming the Branch Davidians for their own deaths. The
   government then bulldozed the ruins of Mount Carmel before defense
   attorneys could send in an independent fire investigator.
   
   The Treasury Department and Justice Department reviews of the BATF
   investigation and raid and the FBI siege and final assault contain
   dubious assertions and leave too many questions unanswered. Neither
   "review team" was authorized to take under oath testimony of BATF and
   FBI agents and Treasury and Justice Department officials. Many
   consider these reviews and reports to be little more than systematic
   coverups of official crimes.
   
   * Despite Treasury Department report findings that BATF's February 28,
   1993 raid commanders lied repeatedly to investigators and their
   superiors, and that BATF officials covered up these lies, no one has
   been prosecuted.
   
   * The Justice Department's review team is tainted by conflicts of
   interest regarding Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann, and
   reviewers Edward S.G. Dennis and Willie Williams.
   
   * There are suspicions that cronyism among Arkansans involved in Waco
   decision-making--President Clinton, Webster Hubbell, Bruce Lindsay and
   the late Vince Foster--might extend to covering up any errors or
   crimes related to the massacre of the Branch Davidians.
   
   * The trial of the eleven Branch Davidians is bringing out important
   evidence of coverup such as missing vital evidence, changing
   statements by several BATF agents, and evidence that BATF agents were
   wounded by friendly fire--not to mention prosecutorial misconduct in
   the form of withholding evidence favorable to the defense.
   
JUSTICE MUST BE DONE 
   
   If our small committee could discover so much damning evidence of
   wrongdoing, we believe an Independent Counsel appointed by the
   Attorney General could discover much, much more. The Independent
   Counsel would be empowered to identify and prosecute government agents
   and officials responsible for official misconduct, violations of
   rights, and excessive use of force which resulted in the deaths of
   over 86 people, and for any and all related crimes. She or he would be
   empowered to investigate the actions of Treasury Department and
   Justice Department officials, BATF and FBI officials and agents, and
   officials and agents of any other departments, agencies and law
   enforcement involved in the incident. She or he could also investigate
   White House officials and employees. She or he would have full power
   to subpoena witnesses to give testimony under oath and to grant
   immunity in exchange for evidence of criminal wrongdoing-- power which
   neither the Treasury nor the Justice Department's "review teams" had.
   
   The Committee for Waco Justice believes the facts already available
   provide compelling evidence that BATF and the FBI, through a
   combination of negligence and arrogance bordering on intentionality,
   did indeed massacre the Branch Davidians. No matter how the April 19th
   fires started, those who gassed Mount Carmel Center and rammed it with
   military tanks ultimately are responsible. This would be the largest
   massacre of civilians by federal agents on U.S. soil since the
   slaughter of 300 Native Americans--also mostly women and children--at
   Wounded Knee in 1890. Americans must ensure that law enforcement
   agents never again initiate or participate in another such massacre.
   
PAST WACOS: GOVERNMENT'S "HISTORIC INTEREST IN BREAKING UP ARMED GROUPS" 
   
   The word "Waco" has become synonymous with two opposing scenarios. To
   many Americans--and especially authorities-- it means crazed religious
   fanatics arming themselves to make war on the U.S. government and
   committing mass suicide when they lose the war. However, to other
   Americans "Waco" means a questionable, clearly illegitimate or even
   vicious and murderous government destruction of a dissident group.
   
   Appendix G of the Treasury Department report, "A Brief History of
   Federal Firearms Enforcement," states: "The raid by ATF agents on the
   Branch Davidian compound resulted from its enforcement of contemporary
   federal firearms laws. In a larger sense, however, the raid fit within
   an historic, well-established and well-defended government interest in
   prohibiting and breaking up all organized groups that sought to arm or
   fortify themselves. . .>>>From its earliest formation, the federal
   government has actively suppressed any effort by disgruntled or
   rebellious citizens to coalesce into an armed group, however small the
   group, petty its complaint, or grandiose its ambition. The collection
   of large arsenals by organized groups lent itself, ultimately, to the
   violent use of those weapons against the government itself or portions
   of its citizenry. Indeed, federal agents who tried to disband the
   groups frequently became the targets." (TDR:Appendix G:7)
   
   Footnote [6] >>>From the Report of the Department of the Treasury on
   the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon
   Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh, September, 1993. All
   references from the report will be included within the text, with the
   page number after the colon, e.g., (TDR:#).
   
   The report's history does not mention that both a federal
   statute--Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Sec. 21--and a
   judicial decision--United States vs. Anders, 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir.
   1989) --hold that there is nothing per se wrong with the ownership of
   large numbers of legal arms. Obviously, the decision and the statute
   have not reined in BATF.
   
   Appendix G describes the following as examples of the federal
   government's most successful tax, alcohol and firearm law enforcement
   efforts: suppression of angry farmers facing foreclosure in Shay's
   Rebellion (1786); enforcement of tax and firearms laws during the
   Whiskey Rebellion (1794); enforcement of a tax on houses during Fries
   Rebellion (1799); suppression of those guilty of "fugitive slave
   rescues" during the 1850s; thwarting of John Brown's attempt to steal
   firearms from Harpers Ferry and distribute them to slaves; suppression
   of the Ku Klux Klan during the 1870s; suppression of old west outlaws
   during the 1880s; suppression of "violent" union organizing during the
   1890s; enforcement of the 1918-1933 prohibition of alcohol; and
   enforcement of the National Firearms Act of 1934 (a tax on guns)
   prompted by the Prohibition-related rise in crime and use of firearms.
   In 1972 the Treasury Department created the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
   and Firearms to enforce gun, explosives and arson-related laws.
   
   Appendix G notes that "In recent times, the federal government has
   shown itself even less patient with armed groups than it had
   historically. Radical extremists of both the Right and the Left have
   been pursued aggressively once they began breaking the law."
   (TDR:Appendix G:11.) The appendix lists the following triumphs:
   destruction of the Symbionese Liberation Army in a gun battle and
   house fire that killed all members; pursuit and capture Gordon Kahl, a
   tax protester who killed a police officer, in a gun battle and house
   fire which killed him; pursuit and capture of bank-robber and assassin
   Robert Matthews, leader of "The Order," in a gun battle and house fire
   which killed him; three-day siege of the heavily armed, 80-member
   Covenant of the Sword and Arm of the Lord religious group. The
   appendix closes with the line, "The raid on the Branch Davidian
   compound occurred in the context of that historical background."
   (TDR:Appendix G:4) Evidently, the Branch Davidians' fiery deaths fit
   well within that "historical background" as well. (Local Philadelphia
   police, not federal agents, were responsible for the 1985 fire that
   killed 11 members of the MOVE group and destroyed two city blocks.)
   
   Tony Cooper, a law enforcement consultant on anti- terrorism and
   professor of negotiations and conflict resolution at the University of
   Texas at Dallas, describes "the formation of a curious crusading
   mentality among certain law enforcement agencies to stamp out what
   they see as a threat to government generally. It's an exaggerated
   concern that they are facing a nationwide conspiracy and that somehow
   this will get out of control unless it is stamped out at a very early
   stage." [7]
   
   In its attempt to "stamp out" out fundamentalist Muslim
   "conspiracies," the FBI may have allowed its hired informant to build
   and plant the bomb that exploded at the World Trade Center two days
   before the BATF raid on the Branch Davidians. In tapes he secretly
   recorded, the informant, former Egyptian army officer Emad Salem,
   allegedly tells FBI agent John Anticey that his high April expenses
   were due to the costs of his building the World Trade Center bomb. [8]
   The exact transcript reads: "We was start already building the bomb,
   which is went off in the World Trade Center. It was built, uh, uh, uh,
   supervising, supervision from the Bureau and the DA and we was all
   informed about it. . .And we know that the bomb start to be built. By
   who? By your confidential informant." Defense attorneys say Salem
   drove the van with the bomb in it to the Trade Center garage and then
   stayed nearby until the explosion. [9] (Ironically, in his April 20,
   1993, news conference defending the FBI's assault on the Branch
   Davidians, President Clinton boasted, "This is the same FBI that found
   the people that bombed the World Trade Center in lickety-split, record
   time." [10] )
   
   During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing on Waco,
   then-BATF Director Stephen Higgins defended the tactics used at Waco
   by stating, "In the 18 months prior to the Branch Davidian incident,
   ATF Special Response Teams had carried out 341 actual activations to
   high risk situations," including "diverse sects and survivalists."
   [11] However, many believe these figures are merely evidence that
   BATF is out of control. In April, 1991, 23 BATF agents raided the home
   of Del Knudson, endangering his wife and two young children, but found
   only legal weapons and parts. In December, 1991, BATF agents, with two
   television crews in tow, raided John Lawmaster's home, broke up
   furniture, doors, walls, and gun and filing cabinets. They found
   nothing illegal and left without shutting the door, leaving guns and
   ammunition strewn about the unsecured house. At the request of the
   government, the court sealed the affidavit that led to the search
   warrant and the break-in and denied Lawmaster's request for its
   release. Lawmaster appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals. BATF refused
   to pay damages. [12] In 1991, BATF agents also entrapped Randy Weaver,
   an act which eventually led to the FBI's fatal "standoff" described in
   the following section. On February 5, 1993, the BATF ransacked the
   home of a Portland, Oregon black woman, and terrorized her children
   for several hours in a case of mistaken identity. [13]
   
BATF AND FBI CRIMES AGAINST RANDY WEAVER 
   
   The Justice Department and FBI are now investigating possible criminal
   misconduct on the part of FBI agents and officials in the killing of
   Idaho white separatist Randy Weaver's wife and son. Significantly,
   these are many of the same agents and officials who were in charge of
   the FBI's actions against the Branch Davidians: former FBI Director
   William Sessions, former FBI Deputy Director Floyd I. Clarke,
   Assistant Director for the Criminal Investigative Division Larry Potts
   and Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) Commander Richard M. Rogers. This
   account includes the most recent revelations about their irresponsible
   behavior, much of which was repeated in Waco. [14]
   
   Randy Weaver had retreated to rural Idaho with his wife, four children
   and a family friend, Kevin Harris. In 1990 a BATF undercover agent
   entrapped Weaver into selling him two illegally sawed-off shotguns for
   $300. Weaver alleges BATF charged him after he refused to inform on
   other white separatists. The government then gave him the wrong date
   for a court hearing, March 20 instead of February 20, 1991.
   
   Rather than take immediate action when Weaver failed to appear, U.S.
   Marshals began almost 18 months of surveillance. Finally, on August
   22, 1992, six Marshals, one equipped with an assault rifle with a
   silencer, approached Weaver's cabin and threw rocks at his dog in an
   effort to lure Weaver closer so they could arrest him. When the agents
   shot the dog, Harris and Weaver's 14-year-old son Samuel, not knowing
   who the attackers were, ran towards them shooting. Their shots killed
   U.S. Marshal William Degan. Samuel was shot in the back and killed as
   he retreated. The armed Weaver and Harris then refused to surrender to
   authorities.
   
   The National Guard and the FBI Hostage Rescue Team were called in.
   (The Hostage Rescue Team's motto is "To Save Lives.") According to
   court records, the U.S. Marshals falsely told the FBI that Weaver
   himself had ambushed them and that the Weavers and Harris would kill
   anyone who approached them. U.S. Marshals never did tell the FBI that
   Samuel had been killed by a Deputy Marshal. They did tell them Mrs.
   Weaver was a fanatic capable of killing herself and her own children
   as an end to the siege. However, they provided no evidence of this to
   FBI agents, who took the Marshals on their word. FBI agents admit they
   actually believed the Weavers had killed Samuel.
   
   Finally, U.S. Marshals never told the FBI that they knew that when the
   adults went outside the cabin they always carried weapons. FBI HRT
   Commander Richard M. Rogers authorized "rules of engagement" which
   gave snipers the go- ahead to shoot any adult carrying a weapon
   outside the cabin. (The standard FBI rules of engagement are "Agents
   are not to use deadly force against any person except as necessary in
   self-defense or the defense of another, when they have reason to
   believe they or another are in danger of death or grievous bodily
   harm. Whenever feasible, verbal warnings should be given before deadly
   force is applied." [15] ) However, the FBI never advised the Weavers
   or Harris they would be in jeopardy if the FBI saw them armed on the
   property.
   
   The day after the first shootings, Harris and Weaver, carrying their
   guns, left the cabin to visit Samuel's body. FBI sniper Lou Horiuchi
   first shot Weaver in the shoulder and then tried to shoot Harris.
   However, he accidentally shot Vicki Weaver as she stood in the doorway
   of their cabin holding her baby. She died instantly, dropping the baby
   to the ground. Harris was wounded by shrapnel. During the standoff the
   Rogers Hostage Rescue Team used psychological warfare techniques.
   Court records show that the FBI taunted the Weavers after Vicki
   Weaver's death, calling out over their loudspeakers, "Good morning,
   Mrs. Weaver. We had pancakes for breakfast. What did you have?" [16]
   
   Weaver and Harris surrendered nine days later, after the FBI allowed
   Populist Party presidential candidate Bo Gritz to serve as a "third
   party" negotiator. They were charged with conspiracy to murder federal
   officers. Their trial before a federal jury and U.S. District Judge
   Edward Lodge began five days before the April 19th fire that killed 75
   or more Branch Davidians.
   
   Most of the above disturbing information came to light during the
   trial. It was also revealed that FBI agents had fabricated evidence
   (staged critical photographs), failed to provide the defense with
   information they were legally obligated to give it, and delayed in
   producing requested information and evidence. Weaver's defense
   attorney was Gary Spence, who had won notable trial victories for
   Karen Silkwood's children and Imelda Marcos. Spence did not call any
   witnesses or present a defense, but simply told jurors the government
   had failed to prove its case.
   
   In July, 1993, the jury acquitted Weaver and Harris for Degan's
   murder, saying Harris had acted in self-defense. The jury also
   rejected charges that the two men conspired to provoke a confrontation
   with federal officers. Weaver was convicted of failing to appear for
   the weapons charges trial and was sentenced to 18 months in prison,
   with credit for time already served. Spence told reporters, "A jury
   today has said that you can't kill somebody just because you wear
   badges and then cover up those homicides by prosecuting the innocent."
   Juror Janet Schmierer of Boise, Idaho said, "I think they built their
   whole scenario out of how they perceived someone else should be living
   their lives, and if someone believed differently. . .they must be
   abnormal." Spence also said, "federal law enforcement agents should be
   indicted for murder in the deaths of Mrs. Weaver and Samuel." [17] In
   November, 1993, Judge Edward Lodge rebuked the FBI, saying its
   behavior in fabricating evidence and delaying presentation of crucial
   evidence "served to obstruct the administration of justice." He
   asserted, "the Government, acting through the FBI, evidenced a callous
   disregard for the rights of the defendants and the interests of
   justice."
   
   According to a November 25, 1993, New York Times article, the Justice
   Department inquiry, led by Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann,
   is "focusing on whether officials misjudged the danger the agents
   faced and knowingly violated the agency's limits on the use of deadly
   force by killing Mrs. Weaver. The inquiry is also examining whether
   officials failed to consider less aggressive tactics and later closed
   ranks to avoid scrutiny of their actions." Justice investigators are
   warning "top managers, agents, prosecutors and former officials that
   they could face civil or criminal charges, including obstruction of
   justice and violations of civil rights law." Further, "some FBI
   officials said they also feared that a separate investigation by a
   state prosecutor in Boundary County, Idaho, where the incident took
   place, could lead to homicide charges against FBI agents."
   
   Some members of the Hostage Rescue Team, "including Richard M. Rogers,
   its commander, have refused to cooperate with investigators." Other
   agents have criticized Rogers for being overly aggressive and failing
   to consider negotiations. Larry Potts, the senior FBI official who
   would have had to approve the new rules of engagement, told FBI
   investigators he does not remember giving Rogers a clear go-ahead to
   change them. [18] According to the Washington Times, in December,
   1993, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh told FBI agents that indictments
   against some FBI agents were a "virtual certainty." [19]
   
GOVERNMENT RELIANCE ON "PRIVATE SPIES" AND "CULT BUSTERS" 
   
   Because of government spying upon and disruption of peaceful political
   groups during the 1960s and 1970s, the Justice Department set
   guidelines prohibiting investigations of groups "based solely on
   activities protected by the First Amendment or on the lawful exercise
   of any other rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United
   States." [20] As an agency of the Treasury Department, BATF does not
   work under such restrictions. Both agencies are free to investigate
   groups suspected of engaging in criminal activity.
   
   Once an investigation is underway, most government agencies, including
   BATF and the FBI, seem willing to receive information from such groups
   as the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) and the Cult
   Awareness Network (CAN). These groups, and others like them, clearly
   have their own agendas. They keep copious files of biased and
   prejudicial information on private individuals and organizations and
   share these with law enforcement.
   
   The Anti-Defamation League keeps files on Arab- American, Jewish
   peace, anti-apartheid, and other human and civil rights groups. A
   year-long investigation by the San Francisco District Attorney found
   that the ADL had infiltrated groups, stolen membership lists and other
   private documents, and swapped files with police, sometimes illegally.
   However, the ADL escaped prosecution. "In an unusual procedure,
   (District Attorney) Smith filed a civil suit accusing the ADL and (ADL
   investigator) Bullock of illegally possessing confidential documents,
   then promptly accepted a settlement that contained no admission of
   wrongdoing." Shortly after this, 19 individuals filed a suit seeking
   damages for 1,100 people who allegedly were the targets of illegal
   surveillance and seeking court orders against such surveillance. [21]
   The government's lenience towards ADL suggests it does not frown on
   ADL's spying activities.
   
   The ADL supplied information about the Branch Davidians to federal
   authorities. In a front page article about the ADL, Herb Brin,
   publisher of Heritage, which serves the Los Angeles Jewish community,
   wrote: "U.S. and Texas authorities have precise documentation (from
   ADL, of course) on the Branch Davidian cult in Waco and how it
   operated in the past." [22]
   
   The Cult Awareness Network (CAN) actively urges the press, Congress
   and law enforcement to act against any non- mainstream religious,
   psychological or even political movement which it describes as a
   "cult." After interviewing CAN's executive director Cynthia Kisser, a
   reporter wrote: "no one knows how many destructive cults and sects
   exist in the United States. Kisser's binder holds 1,500 names gleaned
   from newspaper clippings, court documents and thousands of calls to
   the network's hotline. Some of the groups have legitimate purposes,
   Kisser says. But her group's efforts show that most, despite wildly
   diverse beliefs, share stunningly similar patterns of mind control,
   group domination, exploitation and physical and mental abuse." [23]
   CAN critics point out that so-called "mind control" techniques are not
   much different than the techniques used in education and socialization
   efforts used by all schools, churches, ideologies and philosophies.
   
   According to CAN critic Dr. Gordon Melton of the Institute for the
   Study of Religion in Santa Barbara, California, CAN has used a number
   of means to try to destroy small religious groups: they unsuccessfully
   tried to expand "conservatorship" to allow families to remove members
   from "cults"; they unsuccessfully tried to have laws passed against
   "cults"; they unsuccessfully sued the American Psychological
   Association for rejecting their views on "brainwashing." However, they
   have found one successful method of disrupting groups: false anonymous
   charges of child abuse. Anonymous reports are legal under current law.
   [24]
   
   Priscilla Coates, former executive director of CAN, told reporters, "I
   know how these types of groups work and the children are always
   abused." [25] CAN has been on a crusade against the Christian
   religious group The Children of God, known in the United States as
   "The Family." CAN alleges the group practices indiscriminate sex,
   including with children. [26] Many Family members accuse CAN of making
   false child abuse complaints which have resulted in dozens of arrests
   in at least 10 countries. Most of the charges are quickly dropped and
   there have been no convictions. The Family has demanded a
   Congressional investigation of CAN. [27]
   
   The Cult Awareness Network's other successful approach is referring
   relatives of group members to "deprogrammers" who charge thousands of
   dollars for their services and, according to a former national
   director of CAN's predecessor, the Citizens Freedom Foundation, "kick
   back" some of the money to CAN. [28] Deprogramming often includes
   kidnapping individuals, subjecting them to sleep and food deprivation,
   ridicule and humiliation, and even physical abuse and restraint until
   they promise to leave the alleged cult. Because deprogrammers usually
   involve family members in these kidnappings and deprogrammings,
   victims rarely press charges. However, in the last few years 5
   deprogrammers have been prosecuted for kidnapping or "unlawful
   imprisonment." One such deprogrammer is Rick Ross, a convicted jewel
   thief, who has boasted of more than 200 "deprogrammings." CAN
   executive director Cynthia Kisser has praised him as being "among the
   half dozen best deprogrammers in the country." In the summer of 1993
   Rick Ross was indicted in Washington state for unlawful imprisonment.
   
   Nancy Ammerman, a Visiting Scholar at Princeton University's Center
   for the Study of American Religion, was one of the outside experts
   assigned by the Justice Department to evaluate BATF and FBI's handling
   of the Branch Davidians. She was particularly critical of Rick Ross
   and the Cult Awareness Network. "Although these people often call
   themselves `cult experts,' they are certainly not recognized as such
   by the academic community. The activities of the CAN are seen by the
   National Council of Churches (among others) as a danger to religious
   liberty, and deprogramming tactics have been increasingly found to be
   outside the law. . .Mr. Rick Ross, who often works in conjunction with
   the Cult Awareness Network (CAN), has been quoted as saying he was
   `consulted' by the BATF. . .The Network and Mr. Ross have a direct
   ideological (and financial) interest in arousing suspicion and
   antagonism against what they call `cults'. . .It seem clear that
   people within the `anti-cult' community had targeted the Branch
   Davidians for attention." (JDR:Ammerman:1)
   
   Footnote [29] All references from the Justice Department report will
   be included within the text, with the page number after the colon. The
   report consisted of 4 books and an unbound paper. (JDR:#) refers to
   the largest book, the factual report. All other references will
   include the name of each specific contributor, e.g., (JDR:Dennis:#) or
   (JDR:Stone:#).
   
   Nancy Ammerman compared Waco and Jonestown: "There, too, an
   exceptionally volatile religious group was pushed over the edge,
   inadvertently, by the actions of government agencies pushed forward by
   `concerned families.'" (JDR:Ammerman:8) What she may not have realized
   is that CAN's President is Patricia Ryan, daughter of Congressman Leo
   J. Ryan. It was he who threatened and hounded Jim Jones and his
   Peoples' Temple members until they murdered him and committed mass
   suicide in Guyana in 1978. Carrying on what seems to have become a
   family tradition, on April 8, 1993, Patricia Ryan told the Houston
   Chronicle, "Officials should use whatever means necessary to arrest
   Koresh, including lethal force." [30]
   
   Ross definitely deprogrammed one (and possibly more) of the Branch
   Davidians who fed questionable but damaging evidence to BATF. He also
   provided negative information to the Waco Herald-Tribune for its
   February, 1993, series on the Branch Davidians. The paper quotes Ross
   declaring, "The group is without a doubt, without any doubt
   whatsoever, a highly destructive, manipulative cult. . .I would liken
   the group to Jim Jones." The authors write, "Ross said he believes
   Howell (Koresh) is prone to violence. . .Speaking out and exposing
   Howell might bring in the authorities or in some way help those `being
   held in that compound through a kind of psychological, emotional
   slavery and servitude.'" Ross told the Houston Chronicle that Koresh
   is "your stock cult leader. They're all the same. Meet one and you've
   met them all. They're deeply disturbed, have a borderline personality
   and lack any type of conscience. . .No one willingly enters into a
   relationship like this. So you're talking about deception and
   manipulation (by the leader), people being coached in ever so slight
   increments, pulled in deeper and deeper without knowing where it's
   going or seeing the total picture." [31]
   
   CAN representatives made numerous television and radio appearances
   during the siege. Ross bragged on the "Up to the Minute" public
   television program that he "consulted with ATF agents on the Waco sect
   and told them about the guns in the compound." On April 19th he told
   the "Today Show," "I was a consultant offering ideas, input that was
   filtered by their team and used when they felt it was appropriate."
   The Justice Department report mentions a Rick Ross television
   appearance during the siege where he declared he hoped Koresh would be
   a coward and surrender rather than end up as a corpse. (JDR:167) After
   the April 19th fire, CAN associate Louis West said on a MacNeil/Lehrer
   Newshour broadcast that the FBI "knew they were dealing with a
   psychopath. Nobody is more dangerous or unpredictable than a
   psychopath in a trap."
   
   After the fire, CAN "counselor" Brett Bates tried to arrange contacts
   with survivors by meeting with their families. He told the N.Y. Daily
   News, "Before they can become productive witnesses in the prosecution,
   they have to realize they were victims of mind control." Columnist
   Alexander Cockburn wrote, "the deprogrammers are demanding that they
   be allowed to exercise their dark arts on the burned Davidian
   survivors so that they testify correctly and desist from
   maintaining--as they have--that no mass suicide was under way. The FBI
   says `this is worth considering,' but the decision is up to the U.S.
   attorney." [32] The only Branch Davidian to turn state's evidence is
   Katherine Schroeder who was confined in a mental institution after
   leaving Mount Carmel in March, 1993 (private communication.) It is
   unknown if she was "deprogrammed."
   
   After the April 19th fire Methodist Minister Joseph Bettis wrote
   Attorney General Reno, "from the beginning, members of the Cult
   Awareness Network have been involved in this tragedy. This
   organization is widely known for its use of fear to foster religious
   bigotry. The reliance of federal agents on information supplied by
   these people, as well as the whole record of federal activity deserves
   your careful investigation and public disclosure. . .Cult bashing must
   end, and you must take the lead." Larry Shinn, a vice president of
   Bucknell University wrote to the chair of the House Subcommittee on
   Civil and Constitutional Rights, "media, legal institutions, and
   law-makers too often rely on the word of self-styled cult experts like
   C.A.N. whose overly negative agenda often slides into purely anti-
   religious attack." And in early May, a coalition of 16 religious and
   civil liberties organizations, including the American Civil Liberties
   Union, the American Conference on Religious Movements, Americans
   United for Separation of Church and State, the Episcopal Church, the
   General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, the National Association
   of Evangelicals, the National Council of Churches of Christ and the
   Union of American Hebrew Congregations issued a statement which read
   in part, "We are shocked and saddened by the recent events in Waco. .
   .Under the religious liberty provision of the First Amendment, the
   government has no business declaring what is orthodox or heretical, or
   what is a true or false religion. It should steer clear of
   inflammatory and misleading labels. History teaches that today's
   `cults' may be tomorrow's mainstream religions." President Clinton
   seems to have jumped on the anti-cult bandwagon. On April 23, 1993,
   Clinton said, in what some see as a thinly veiled threat, "I hope. .
   .that others who will be tempted to join cults and become involved
   with people like Koresh will be deterred by the horrible scenes they
   have seen. . .There is, unfortunately, a rise in this sort of
   fanaticism all over the world. And we may have to confront it again."
   
   Attorney General Janet Reno also has expressed anti- cult sentiments.
   During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing,
   Representative William Hughes advised Janet Reno to consult groups
   like the Cult Awareness Network for advice on "mind control." Reno
   replied that she was concerned about the negative affect of cults on
   children, that "if a child is in a cult situation for any length of
   time," he or she might experience "permanent damage."
   
   BATF is still investigating so-called cults. In November, 1993, acting
   director John W. Magaw stated that he was determined that other
   religious "cults" not develop into "armed compounds." He said,
   "They're out there. They don't yet have the kind of weaponry that we
   saw in Waco. . .but they will develop if society allows them to."
   Magaw said BATF is keeping tabs on "cult-like organizations" in "three
   or four places around the country. . .We're trying to monitor way
   early in the game." [33]
   
   In his November 22, 1993, American Academy of Religion presentation,
   Dr. Melton condemned the government's calling on groups like the Cult
   Awareness Network for information on "cults." He compared it to the
   government calling on Nazis for information on Jews or Ku Klux Klan
   members for information on African-Americans.
   
   At least one group is fighting FBI use of the "cult" term and its
   reliance on private spies. In May, 1993, the New Alliance Party, its
   presidential candidate Dr. Lenora Fulani, and other members of the
   party sued the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Janet Reno, and other
   officials. Referring to "cult," the party is "seeking a declaratory
   judgment that defendants' description as the predicate or
   justification for investigative activities, use of force, criminal
   prosecution, or governmental regulation is a violation of the First,
   Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States."
   The suit also claims the FBI excused its "virtual liquidation of the"
   Branch Davidians as "appropriate law enforcement action to take
   against a `cult'." And the suit attacks the FBI's having "consulted
   with one or more persons associated with a Chicago-based organization,
   the Cult Awareness Network."
   
THE HISTORY OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS 
   
   To provide a fuller perspective on government action against the
   Branch Davidians, we present a history of the group and analyze former
   members' most damning non-weapon related allegations. The Branch
   Davidians are an offshoot of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Like
   the church, they believe in the "advent" or "Second Coming" of Jesus
   Christ, complete with the end of the world in a fiery apocalypse, the
   death of all sinners and the salvation of true believers. [34] In 1935
   Seventh Day Adventist Victor Houtoff declared himself a prophet,
   formed the Shepherd's Rod Church and established the first Mount
   Carmel Center in Waco. In 1955 Houtoff died and his wife Florence took
   over and established the current Mount Carmel further outside Waco.
   When the Second Coming of Christ did not occur on April 22, 1959, as
   she predicted, the group split. The largest contingent followed
   another "prophet," Ben Roden, who changed the Church's name to the
   Branch Davidians.
   
   In 1978 Ben Roden died and his wife Lois Roden, a woman well-known in
   evangelical circles because of her pronouncement that the Holy Spirit
   was female, became the new Branch Davidian prophet. However, she soon
   found herself in power struggles with her son George Roden, whom most
   Branch Davidians considered too poorly versed in Scriptures and too
   erratic to lead the group. In 1981, after being "disfellowed" from the
   Seventh Day Adventist Church for proclaiming himself a prophet, rock
   musician and handyman Vernon Howell joined the Branch Davidians. His
   knowledge of Scripture and personable manner quickly gained him the
   confidence of Lois Roden and many Branch Davidians. It also earned him
   the enmity of George Roden, who saw Howell as his prime rival for
   Branch Davidian leader and prophet. In 1984 Howell married 14-year-old
   Rachel Jones. The battle between Roden and Howell escalated until
   finally, in 1985, a gun-toting George Roden drove Howell and his
   followers out of Mount Carmel. They established a community in shacks
   and buses on property they purchased in Palestine, Texas.
   
   Howell visited Israel in 1985 and studied the Bible with several
   rabbis. There he had, as he explained in a February 28, 1993, KRLD
   radio interview, "an encounter" or, as he told FBI negotiators, "a
   miraculous meeting with God," (TDR:43) which instructed him to study
   and fulfill the prophecies of the Seven Seals of the Book of
   Revelation.
   
   The rivalry with the paranoid and gun-obsessed Roden heated up after
   Lois Roden's death. In late 1987 Roden dug up the coffin of a
   long-dead Branch Davidian and challenged Howell to raise her from the
   dead. Howell complained to authorities about "corpse abuse," but they
   demanded proof of a crime. When Howell and seven armed followers snuck
   onto the property to photograph the coffin, Roden caught them and a
   gunfight ensued. All eight were tried for attempted murder of Roden;
   seven were acquitted and Howell's trial ended in a hung jury.
   
   By now George Roden had lost most of his followers, was in debt, and
   was renting out Mount Carmel's ramshackle houses, including to at
   least two drug traffickers. [35] After writing threatening letters to
   a Texas Supreme Court Justice, Roden was jailed for six months. Howell
   took this opportunity to encourage the county to put a lien on Mount
   Carmel for 16 years of unpaid taxes. Howell paid the taxes in 1989,
   thereby gaining control of Mount Carmel. By this time he also had full
   use of a follower's large house in LaVerne, California and travelled
   back and forth between the two locations. George Roden continued to
   threaten Howell and his followers. In 1989 Roden murdered a man with
   an ax and was incarcerated in a mental institution. Nevertheless,
   Branch Davidians feared he would return and attack them and therefore
   remained armed and alert. Roden did escape briefly in late 1993.
   
   In early 1990 Vernon Howell legally changed his name to David (for
   King David) Koresh (Hebrew for Cyrus, the Persian king who freed the
   Jews from Babylon). Koresh collected even more followers, almost half
   of whom were of African, Hispanic or Asian descent. They all believed
   that he was a prophet--the "Lamb of God"--destined to unlock the
   secrets of the Seven Seals, show the way of repentance to society and
   thereby hasten the return of Jesus Christ. And they concurred with his
   view that he must create a "House of David" where his many wives would
   bear him children who would become the rulers of a purer new world.
   
   During the siege Wayne Martin, a Harvard-educated African-American
   attorney, told negotiators his view of Koresh's importance. The
   Justice report describes it thusly: "America's political system was in
   decay and in conflict with God's law, and that Koresh had been chosen
   by God as `the Lamb' to rule over his kingdom on earth. Martin claimed
   that America and the world were witnessing the birth of a new nation
   founded on the Seven Seals." (JDR:41) Koresh asserted his prophetic
   greatness would inevitably attract evil authorities--the "Babylonians"
   or "Assyrians"-- who would try to crush him. If the Branch Davidians
   died defending Koresh's prophecies, they would be resurrected and
   return to conquer the Babylonians and rule the world.
   
   Some have said that Koresh's first prophesizing the government would
   come to attack him and then collecting a lot of weapons--including
   allegedly illegal ones--just "invited" a government attack. They call
   it a "self- fulfilling prophecy." However, intelligent law enforcement
   should be able to deal with such situations without violence and
   without massive loss of innocent lives.
   
   At the November 22, 1993, American Academy of Religion panel Jamaican
   Branch Davidian Janet McBean summarized David Koresh's appeal: "We are
   spiritual people. And we feel that God is watching what happens to
   this world. That's the reason why David protected his people and David
   felt the way he did. . .He felt compelled to give us the revelation as
   he did. And you can't blame him for that. And we studied it for
   ourselves. Now if you people study revelations and you see something
   different, then it is your responsibility to show it to the nation and
   show it to the world. . .David could speak to anyone on any level,
   from fourth grade to doctorate."
   
   In 1989 Koresh began having troubles with breakaway members,
   especially Marc Breault, a follower from 1984 to 1989, who left and
   joined his wife in Australia. Breault claims that he became
   disillusioned because power had corrupted Koresh. He charged Koresh
   manipulated members through fear of hellfire, physically abused adults
   and children for minor infractions of capricious rules, seduced and
   impregnated young girls, took other men's wives, and demanded a
   willingness to die for him and his prophecies. [36]
   
   Branch Davidians admit Koresh devised various "tests" of his
   followers' faith in God and his prophecies--from long study sessions,
   to communion twice a day, to food deprivation, to relinquishing wives
   to Koresh. However, they assert Breault's claims are exaggerations or
   lies and that he had challenged Koresh for control of the group.
   Breault replied to such charges in November, 1993. "If I was trying to
   take over the group I wouldn't have gone to the authorities. I
   wouldn't have tried to have justice done and had the group
   dismantled." [37] In his book Breault admits he "became a cult
   buster." For the next three years Breault devoted himself to the
   destruction of the Branch Davidians. Breault's often confused,
   contradictory or emotionally dishonest statements, in his book and
   elsewhere, reinforce the view that his motives were less than pure.
   
   During 1990 Breault managed to convince a dozen or so discontented
   Branch Davidians in Australia, New Zealand, England and the United
   States to join his efforts. The Australians hired a private detective,
   Geoffrey Hossack, and signed affidavits alleging that Koresh was
   guilty of the statutory rape of two teenage girls, tax fraud,
   immigration violations, harboring weapons, child abuse, and exposing
   children to explicit talk about sex and violence. However, Hossack's
   visits to California and Texas local police, the Texas Department of
   Public Safety, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the
   Internal Revenue Service resulted in no action. Breault and his wife's
   visits to California and Waco in 1991 were also fruitless. He laments
   that McLennan County Sheriff Gene Barber said that "Breault's
   complaints, along with the others, stemmed from `sour grapes.'" [38]
   
   Linedecker writes in Massacre at Waco, Texas that in October, 1990,
   Robyn Bunds told Koresh she was leaving the group with their son. They
   were in LaVerne, California at the time and he immediately sent the
   child back to Waco. She reported the child missing to LaVerne Police
   who gave Koresh 48 hours to bring the child back, which he did. Bunds
   also told police that Koresh was having sex with the underage Aisha
   Gyarfas, but when they returned to investigate, Gyarfas and Koresh had
   returned to Texas. [39] (Bunds also instigated an INS investigation of
   illegal immigrants, as Breault later did in Texas, but neither
   investigation led to government action.) In September, 1991, Jeannine
   Bunds, who like her daughter Robyn Bunds was Koresh's lover, left the
   Branch Davidians, claiming that she was upset that Koresh had asked
   her if she was "capable of killing her children." [40] Her husband
   Donald Bunds remained a member of the group.
   
   Breault brought his allegations about Koresh and the Branch Davidians
   to the Australian television producers of "Current Affair." Reporter
   Martin King, who co-wrote Breault's book, visited Mount Carmel and
   interviewed Koresh in January of 1992. The program that eventually
   aired portrayed Koresh as a sex-crazed, gun-loving religious fanatic.
   Breault alleges Koresh saw it and was furious. Breault also informed
   Kiri Jewell's father, David Jewell, that Kiri was slated to become one
   of Koresh's wives. Jewell sued for custody and in January, 1992,
   Breault and other former Branch Davidians testified at the custody
   hearing in Michigan. Kiri's mother Sherri relinquished primary custody
   and promised to keep Kiri away from Koresh during visitations. (As we
   shall see, Jewell used his daughter in continuing attacks on the
   Branch Davidians.) Breault claims that the custody trial "panicked"
   Koresh and that he began planning for mass suicide over Easter
   weekend. [41] Breault and Jewell wrote Michigan Representative
   Frederick Upton with this allegation and Breault contacted the U.S.
   consulate in Melbourne which sent warning wires to Washington, D.C.
   
   According to Linedecker, when Kiri Jewell told her father that two
   other young girls were also slated to become Koresh's brides, Jewell
   called the Texas Department of Human Services, which instigated the
   February-April, 1992, child abuse investigation. [42] Many of the
   Branch Davidian "defectors" eagerly cooperated with BATF and FBI
   investigators in 1992 and 1993.
   
   That a number of former members were willing to make these allegations
   certainly suggests that there were problems with Koresh's leadership
   of the Branch Davidians. However, most of these individuals were
   influenced by either amateur cult buster Marc Breault or by
   professional cult busters Rick Ross and Patricia Coates, individuals
   committed to turning former members' genuine concerns or personal
   disappointments into action by law enforcement to destroy the alleged
   "cult."
   
NON-WEAPONS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST DAVID KORESH 
   
   The allegations against Koresh have been so sensationalized that
   Koresh's alleged crimes seem to excuse the massacre of 86 or more
   Branch Davidians. The use of the most damning allegations to demonize
   the group necessitates that the allegations be explored. As we shall
   see, there is much truth in Dr. Gordon Melton's statement to the
   American Academy of Religion panel on the Branch Davidians: "As I
   examined the evidence of all the horrible things that Koresh had
   allegedly done, those horrible things began to melt away; they were
   unsubstantiated charges from witnesses who were biased and whose
   credibility was very low. The various accusations made had no
   foundation in fact. . .The question shifted to why did the government
   misuse its power in such a horrendous way?"
   
   Child Abuse: The Justice Department report quotes just two 1990
   affidavits by former members. Ian and Allison Manning alleged that
   Koresh insisted disobedient children be spanked with a wooden paddle
   and that such beatings sometimes severely bruised the children's
   bottoms. Michelle Tom alleged that Howell spanked her eight-month-old
   daughter for forty minutes because she would not sit on his lap and
   once threatened to kill a child if her mother gave her a pacifier.
   (JDR:224-226)
   
   On February 27, 1992, Texas Department of Human Services social worker
   Joyce Sparks visited Mount Carmel with two other Human Services
   employees and two McLennan County Sheriff's deputies. They made two
   more visits and Koresh visited their offices. The case was closed on
   April 30, 1992. The Department offered this summary of the nine- week
   investigation: "None of the allegations could be verified. The
   children denied being abused in any way by adults in the compound.
   They denied any knowledge of other children being abused. The adults
   consistently denied participation in or knowledge of any abuse to
   children. Examinations of the children produced no indication of
   current or previous injuries." [43]
   
   Dr. Bruce Perry, who interviewed children released from Mount Carmel
   during the siege, told the FBI on March 26, "these children had a
   number of strict behavioral and verbal prohibitions. Violations of
   these resulted in punishment, sometimes severe. The children, for
   example, expected to be hit when they spilled. The style of discipline
   often involved being beaten with what these children labeled `the
   Helper'. . .some variation on a wooden spoon. Other forms of
   discipline included restrictions of food, sometimes for a day. . ."
   (JDR:224) Steve Schneider's attorney Jack Zimmerman says that members
   never used the word "beatings" to describe the discipline. "The term
   they used was `Christian discipline'. . .Discipline is not abuse."
   [44] At a May, 1993, press conference Perry confessed: "We can't
   say, `Aha, physical abuse,' that's the crux of the issue. President
   Clinton and Janet Reno say `child abuse.' Child protective services
   say, `Well, we didn't see any.'. . .It's very complicated. It is an
   ongoing dilemma for what is the threshold for saying what is abuse."
   [45]
   
   Sex with Minors: According to Daniel Wattenberg, Texas statutory rape
   laws are rather confusing, since the age of consent is 14 if the girl
   is promiscuous, but 17 if she is not. Nationwide, because so many
   young girls are having sex today, statutory rape laws frequently are
   not enforced; when they are, the sentences are usually light, assuming
   the girl fully consented. Hillary Rodham Clinton herself has
   criticized "the so-called status offenses," including for "sexual
   precociousness". [46] There are, of course, serious moral questions
   about the authenticity of a 14-year-old girl's consent to sex with an
   adult in any small community which considers sex with the leader to be
   a privilege. Government agencies found that Koresh's alleged victims
   were unwilling to cooperate and therefore they did not have enough
   evidence to convict Koresh of sex with minors. More importantly,
   civilized societies do not deal with sexual abuse of minors by
   attacking the perpetrator and his victims with heavily armed officers
   and then burning them to death when they refuse to surrender!
   
   BATF agent Davy Aguilera's February 25, 1993 affidavit, which was used
   to secure search and arrest warrants against Koresh, states: "Mrs.
   (Jeannine) Bunds also told me that Howell had fathered at least
   fifteen (15) children from various women and young girls at the
   compound. Some of the girls who had babies fathered by Howell were as
   young as 12 years old. . . He also, according to Mrs. Bunds, has
   regular sexual relations with young girls there. The girls' ages are
   from eleven (11) years old to adulthood." There are no other
   allegations he had children with girls that young.
   
   Mrs. Bunds herself had made love to Koresh and told Newsweek that
   being chosen by Koresh was an eagerly sought honor. Koresh "wouldn't
   do it unless you wanted it. . .It wasn't about sex, but he was a very
   appealing, sexual person." Robyn Bunds, who first slept with Koresh
   when she was 17, said, "he's perfect, and he's going to father your
   children. What more can you ask for?" [47] According to 1990
   affidavits by former members Ian and Allison Manning, and Marc Breault
   in his book, Koresh had bragged in Bible study about having sex with
   Michelle Jones and Aisha Gyarfas when they were 14. (JDR:219-221)
   However, even Marc Breault admitted that Aisha Gyarfas was "completely
   captivated by Vernon. She was like his little puppy dog tied to his
   leash. Aisha would do anything for Vernon." [48] Both girls, then ages
   17 and 18, died with their children in the April 19th fire.
   
   According to the Justice report, on February 22, 1993, a young girl
   told Texas Child Protective Services social worker Joyce Sparks "that
   on one occasion, when she was ten years old, her mother left her in a
   motel room with David Koresh. He was in bed and he told (her) to come
   over to him. She got into the bed. David had no pants on. He took off
   her panties and touched her and got on top of her. . .We talked about
   how she was feeling when this happened and she responded. . .scared. .
   .scared but privileged." (JDR:219) The Justice report concedes, "This
   evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause to indict or
   prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict." (JDR:215) Evidently this
   is the same girl the Treasury Department report states was "unwilling
   to testify about what happened." (TDR:64) Similarly, the Washington
   Post reported that a LaVerne, California sergeant said that "one of
   the underage girls alleged as a victim was out of the cult, in her
   father's custody. . .she eventually confirmed she had sex with
   Koresh." The sergeant also admitted that while he'd garnered enough
   evidence to arrest Koresh, he doubted he had enough to convict him.
   [49]
   
   Both reports and the sergeant are probably talking about the same
   young girl--who may be Kiri Jewell. According to Linedecker, in
   mid-February David and Kiri Jewell flew to Texas at the BATF's expense
   to speak to agents. [50] Kiri had been given over to her father's
   custody. And David Jewell was in constant contact with Marc Breault
   who, according to his book, had been working closely with a LaVerne,
   California sergeant. If this is indeed Kiri Jewell, one wonders if Mr.
   Jewell had joined the "cult busters" committed to destruction of the
   group and even was using his daughter in that effort. He even exposed
   her to public scrutiny by allowing her to appear on a March, 1993
   "Donahue" show to talk about her experiences with the Branch
   Davidians.
   
   Polygamy: In 1879, Reynolds vs. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court
   ruled that polygamy could not be protected by freedom of religion
   because it was "subversive of the public order" due to mobs rioting
   against hated polygamous Mormons. It is questionable whether
   criminalizing bigamy and polygamy would stand such a questionable
   court ruling today. Nevertheless, individuals are still prosecuted for
   bigamy and polygamy, be they liberals promoting plural marriage as a
   more fulfilling lifestyle or Christian, Mormon and Muslim
   fundamentalists, citing Scriptures. Further, those who practice
   "plural marriage" are open to the charge they are abusing children
   exposed to the lifestyle.
   
   Koresh and Branch Davidian Paul Fatta have admitted publicly that
   Koresh was a polygamist. On February 28, 1993, Koresh told CNN, "There
   are a lot of children here. I've had a lot of babies these past two
   years. It's true that I do have a lot of children and I do have a lot
   of wives." [51] On the same day he told KRLD radio, "I'm a polygamist.
   Which is not according to your laws, I understand that, but according
   to the laws of God."
   
   Paul Fatta told reporters that Koresh did believe he had a right to
   take any consenting Branch Davidian woman as wife. "Mr. Fatta said
   that Mr. Koresh presented this behavior as a test of faith for the men
   who had lost their wives." [52] However, Branch Davidians deny that
   Koresh controlled the sex lives of the members. Ruth Riddle told an
   interviewer, "No. Not true. It was totally up to the couples what they
   wanted to do." She said she and her husband were planning to have
   children. [53] Stan Sylvia, who was forced to go through a parental
   training course to regain custody of his son, calls the allegations
   that his daughter Holly was really Koresh's child "government and
   tabloid lies." [54] Involuntary Servitude: Davy Aguilera's February
   25, 1993 affidavit contends that Poia Vaega alleged that in June,
   1991, Koresh and Stan Sylvia "falsely imprisoned" and physically and
   sexually abused Mrs. Vaega's sister, Doreen Saipaia, for three and a
   half months. Despite this allegation, Ms. Saipaia's relatives Neal and
   Margarida Vaega remained at Mount Carmel and died in the April 19th
   fire. Moreover, the FBI opened and closed a possibly-related
   investigation on "involuntary servitude" during 1992 but did not press
   charges. (TDR:Appendix D:4) Charges of "involuntary imprisonment" or
   "involuntary servitude" are frequently made by those influenced by
   cult busters. The fact that BATF and FBI failed to make this
   allegation to the media indicates even they questioned it.
   
   Mass Suicide: As mentioned above, Marc Breault claims that Koresh
   planned mass suicide during Easter, 1992. In his book, he asserts that
   members began calling families to say goodbye, selling assets, and
   returning to Mount Carmel. Linedecker writes that David Jewell wrote
   Representative Upton that Steve Schneider had told his family goodbye
   and that a young woman fled the group with her children because of her
   fear of a slaughter. [55] Surviving Branch Davidians who heard these
   allegations at the time say those at Mount Carmel laughed them off as
   absurd (private communication). And Koresh told Waco Tribune-Herald
   reporter Mark England, "I'm not ready to die. It's all lies. Every
   year we've gathered for Passover. Every year. Look, the place is being
   built up. We're spending lots of money. A lot of people are putting
   time and effort in. . .I've got the water-well man coming in. I mean,
   two weeks in a row we're supposed to be committing suicide. I wish
   they'd get their story straight." [56]
   
   The Treasury Department report states that a child had told a
   California police officer that she had been trained by Koresh and his
   advisers "to commit suicide in several different ways, including
   placing the barrel of a handgun in her mouth and pulling the trigger."
   (TDR:46) Edward Dennis identified this child as Kiri Jewell.
   (JDR:Dennis:37) (Reportedly, she said the same thing on the Donahue
   television show.) According to Edward Dennis, after the fire, former
   member Dana Okimoto alleged that "Koresh's biggest fear was someone
   would take his wives away and that he felt that rather than letting
   someone take his wife, the wife should kill herself and if she could
   not do so one of the `Mighty Men' should do it, since this was one of
   their duties." (JDR:Dennis:34)
   
   Despite the statements of some former members that the Branch
   Davidians might commit suicide, the FBI had collected statements from
   many more Branch Davidians that they would not. FBI spokesperson Bob
   Ricks said after the April 19th fire: "We went thought the world and
   interviewed former cult members, associates of cult members, the
   number that I last checked was 61 people. The vast bulk, the
   substantial majority of those believed that they would not commit
   suicide." [57]
   
   Propensity Towards Violence: During the siege, numerous neighbors and
   acquaintances of the Branch Davidians were interviewed. Most made
   statements like that of A.L. Dreyer, an 80-year-old farmer living near
   Mt. Carmel: "I've never had no trouble with them people. . .I have no
   fear of those people." [58] McLennan County Commissioner Lester Gibson
   was shocked that Branch Davidian Wayne Martin was involved in any
   violence. "He was very friendly and quiet. It was common knowledge
   that he was a Davidian, but he never talked religion." [60]
   
   Nevertheless, Koresh and the Branch Davidians, like many Christian
   fundamentalists, firmly believed that the "advent" or "Second Coming"
   of Jesus Christ would be accompanied by violence. Millions have
   studied the Book of Revelations and believe that 144,000 devout
   Christians will be called up into heaven just before the end of the
   world and that the sinful remainder of humanity will die horrible
   deaths. Millions believe that before Jesus appears there will be
   natural, economic and political disasters for which Christians should
   be prepared with food stocks and weapons to fight off the
   "Babylonians"--government agents, evil doers and hungry hordes from
   the cities.
   
   A reporter who interviewed Lonnie Kliever, professor of religion at
   Southern Methodist University wrote: "Koresh was typical of the
   leaders of the millennarian sects who use their ability to interpret
   Biblical prophecy to gain power and influences. But Koresh's style
   also should be familiar to millions of Americans, Kliever said after
   listening to the 58-minute message broadcast the first week of the
   siege. `I listened to the tape,' Kliever said. 'I grew up in a
   fundamentalist Baptist church. I heard that preaching all my
   childhood. You can hear that same sermon in thousands of churches any
   Sunday or Wednesday night in this country.'" [61]
   
   Koresh was convinced that he was the "Lamb of God" who would "break"
   the Seven Seals and bring on the Apocalypse and the Second Coming of
   Christ, as prophesized in the Book of Revelation. These prophecies are
   very bloody and violent. As the Lamb breaks each of the Seals, the
   Book of Revelation prophesizes, in summary: 1--a rider on a white
   horse rides forth to conquer; 2--a rider on a red horse takes away
   peace so men may slaughter; 3--a rider on a black horse is holding a
   pair of scales; 4--a rider of a pale horse named death has power over
   a quarter of the earth to kill by sword, famine, pestilence and wild
   beasts; 5--those slaughtered for God's word are told to rest a little
   longer until all brothers in Christ's service are put to death; 6--
   after a violent earthquake the great day of wrath comes; 7-- "now when
   the Lamb breaks the seventh seal, there was silence in heaven for
   about half an hour." [62] When BATF raided Mount Carmel and killed six
   Branch Davidians, Koresh and his followers were convinced that they
   had to wait a little longer, and then they too would be put to death,
   as a fulfillment of the Fifth Seal.
   
   Former Branch Davidians claimed that Koresh was obsessed with members
   proving their loyalty to him and his prophecies by promising to kill
   or die for them. David Block told BATF agents that he "left the cult
   group because (Koresh) would always remind them that if they were to
   have a confrontation with the local or federal authorities, that the
   group should be ready to fight and resist." (TDR:45)
   
   Branch Davidian Kathryn Schroeder, who has agreed to testify for the
   prosecution to obtained reduced charges, claims that Koresh "told his
   followers that soon they would have to go into the world, turn their
   weapons on individual members of public, and kill those who did not
   say they were believers. As he explained to his followers, `you can't
   die for God if you can't kill for God.' Koresh later canceled the
   planned action, telling his followers that it had been a test of their
   loyalty to him." [62] Some former members claim Koresh had a "hit list
   to eliminate former members who were complaining to law enforcement
   authorities and the media." (TDR:28) Breault, Jeannine and Robyn Bunds
   and Dana Okimoto also alleged that Koresh believed "law enforcement
   officers have to be the vehicle for his death in order for his
   prophesies to come true." (JDR:Dennis:38)
   
   It is true that after the raid and during the siege Koresh several
   times challenged negotiators to fight and even claimed that he and his
   followers had been preparing for battle with authorities since 1985.
   (JDR:51) If Koresh's statements had been merely "all talk" before the
   February 28, 1993 BATF raid, they certainly began to appear much more
   threatening once he and his followers vigorously defended themselves
   against the raid. Nevertheless, it was government action that prompted
   their violent reaction.
   
   These allegations of (non-defensive) violence certainly would be
   alarming to the public if made by a criminal or a radical political
   group--even though the First Amendment protects such "alarming"
   speech. However, these statements must be viewed differently when made
   within a Christian apocalyptic framework. In her recommendations to
   the Justice Department, Nancy Ammerman wrote that authorities
   responsible at Waco "should have understood that new or dissident
   religious groups are often `millennialist' or `apocalyptic.' That is,
   they foresee the imminent end of the world as we know it and the
   emergence of a new world, usually with themselves in leadership
   roles."
   
   "They should have understood that new groups almost always provoke
   their neighbors. . .They defy the conventional rules and question
   conventional authorities. . .Not surprisingly, then, new groups often
   provoke resistance. . .organized `anti-cult' response that make
   predictable charges (such as child abuse and sexual `perversion')
   against groups that are seen as threatening. . .The corollary to their
   provocation of neighbors is that they themselves are likely to
   perceive the outside world as hostile. This almost always takes the
   form of rhetoric condemning the evil ways of non-believers, and that
   rhetoric can sometimes sound quite violent. It may also be
   supplemented by rituals that reinforce the group's perception that
   they are surrounded by hostile forces. . .as the (Branch Davidians)
   talked about the evils of the federal government and went through the
   ritual motions of rehearsing a confrontation with their enemies, they
   may have been reinforcing their own solidarity more than they were
   practicing for an anticipated actual confrontation. The irony, of
   course, is that their internal group rhetoric did eventually come
   true." (TDR:Ammerman:5-6)
   
   Branch Davidian Stan Sylvia expresses the duty incumbent on all of us
   to study the massacre of the Branch Davidians. "Let's have mercy for
   the people who died there. Let's examine what really happened there.
   Regardless of what your opinion of us is. Whether we were bizarre.
   Whether we were inhumane. Whatever you think of us. It doesn't give
   anybody a right to come in and kill helpless women and children." [63]
   
   THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
   
   Outside Mount Carmel February 28*: Donald Bunds Paul Fatta, 35 Janet
   McBean Janet Kendrick Stan Sylvia
   
   Arrested on Feb 28, 1993: Delroy Nash, 29 Woodrow Kendrick, 63
   
   Left Mount Carmel During Siege: Brad Branch, 34 Livingston Fagan, 34
   Nahara Fagan, 4 Renae Fagan, 7 Oliver Gyarfas, 19 Victoria
   Hollingsworth, 59 Heather Jones, 10 Kevin Jones, 11 Mark Jones, 3
   Margaret Lawson, 75 James Lawten, 70 Christyn Mabb, 8 Jacob Mabb, 10
   Scott Mabb, 12 Daniel Martin, 7 Jaime Martin, 11 Kimberly Martin
   Sheila Judith Martin, 46 Catherine Matteson, 77 Natalie Nobrega, 11
   Gladys Ottman, 67 Anita Richards, 64 Rita Fay Riddle, 35 Ophelia
   Santoya, 62 Bryan Schroeder, 3 Kathryn Schroeder, 34 Angelica Sonobe,
   6 Crystal Sonobe, 3 Joshua Sylvia, 7 Jaunessa Wendel Landon Wendel, 4
   Patron Wendel, 1 Tamara Wendel, 5 Kevin Whitecliff, 31
   
   Survived April 19th Fire Renos Avraam, 29 Jamime Castillo, 24 Graeme
   Leonard Craddock, 31 Clive Joseph Doyle, 52 Misty Ferguson, 17 Derek
   Lloyd Lovelock, 37 Ruth Ottman Riddle, 29 David Thibodeau, 24 Marjorie
   Thomas, 30
   
   Died February 28, 1993: Winston Blake, 28 Peter Gent, 24 Peter
   Hipsman, 28 Perry Jones, 64 Michael Schroeder, 29 Jaydean Carnwell
   Wendel, 34
   
   Died April 19th, 1993**: Katherin Andrade, 24 Jennifer Andrade, 19
   Aldrick Bennett, 35 Susan Benta, 31 Mary Jean Borst, 49 Pablo Cohen,
   38 Yvette Fagan, 34 Doris Fagan, 60 Lisa Marie Farris, 26 Ray Friesen,
   76 Dayland Gent, 3 Diana Henry, 28 Paulina Henry, 24 Phillip Henry, 22
   Stephen Henry, 26 Vanessa Henry, 19 Zilla Henry, 55 Novellette
   Hipsman, 36 Floyd Houtman, 61 Cyrus Howell, 8 Rachel Howell, 23 Star
   Howell, 6 Sherri Lynn Jewell, 43 David Michael Jones, 38 Michelle
   Jones, 18 Serenity Sea Jones, 4 Bobbie Lane Koresh, 16 months David
   Koresh, 33 Jeffery Little, 31 Nicole Elizabeth Gent Little, 24
   Livingston Malcolm, 26 Douglas Wayne Martin, 42 Lisa Martin, 13 Sheila
   Martin, 15 Abigail Martinez, 11 Audrey Martinez, 13 Juliete Santoyo
   Martinez, 30 Crystal Martinez, 3 Joseph Martinez, 30 Jillane Matthews
   Alison Bernadette Monbelly, 31 Melissa Morrison, 6 Rosemary Morrison,
   29 Sonia Murray, 29 Theresa Noberega, 48 James Riddle, 32 Rebecca
   Saipaia, 24 Judy Schneider, 41 Mayanah Schneider, 2 Steve Schneider,
   48 Laraine B. Silva, 40 Floracita Sonobe, 34 Scott Kojiro Sonobe, 35
   Aisha Gyarfas Summers, 17 Gregory Allen Summers, 28 Startle Summers, 1
   Isiah Martinez, 4 Hollywood Sylvia Lorraine Sylvia, 40 Rachel Sylvia,
   13 Doris Vaega Joanne Vaega, 4 Margarida Joanna Vaega, 47 Neal Vaega,
   37 Martin Wayne, 20 Mark H. Wendell
   
   This is not a complete list.
   
   * Several dozen more Branch Davidians lived elsewhere or were
   temporarily outside Mount Carmel on February 28, 1993.
   
   ** Most of those not named were children, including two unborn
   children.
   
   Source: Associated Press, Justice Department Report and other sources.
   
BATF-TREASURY DEPARTMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND
COVERUP: THE FEBRUARY 28, 1993 RAID ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
   
   In May of 1992 the United Parcel Service informed the McLennan County
   Sheriff's Department that the Branch Davidians were receiving
   "suspicious" deliveries, including shipments of firearms worth more
   than $10,000, inert grenade casings, and a substantial quantity of
   black powder. (Like the Anti-Defamation League and Cult Awareness
   Network, UPS evidently turns over information about citizens' legal
   activity to authorities.) The Sheriff's Department contacted BATF and
   Special Agent Davy Aguilera was assigned to investigate. Around the
   same time, the Waco Tribune- Herald, which had been contacted by
   former members, began researching an expose about the Branch
   Davidians' alleged arms stockpiling.
   
   From June until August, Aguilera investigated companies which had
   sold weapons to David Koresh and discovered the Branch Davidians
   bought about $43,000 worth of weapons from March 26 to August 12,
   1992, after which such purchases virtually ceased. The case
   effectively was dropped for more than two months. It was picked up
   again in November, after the "60 Minutes" television show contacted
   BATF about a planned expose of the agency, and after the Waco
   Tribune-Herald contacted BATF about their planned expose of the
   Branch Davidians' arms buildup (TDR:67).
   
   In November Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Johnston held that "there
   already was sufficient evidence of illegal activity to meet the
   threshold of probable cause for a search warrant. . .and tactical
   planning for an enforcement operation began in earnest." (TDR:37)
   However, BATF Director Stephen Higgins admitted to the House Judiciary
   Committee on April 28, 1993, that despite the information collected
   about Koresh's 1992 weapons purchases, "We had a review here at
   headquarters office in December with respect to whether we had
   probable cause. We decided at that point that we did not, and we
   continued to gather information. We brought people in from Australia;
   we got the undercover agent in; we interviewed any number of people."
   [64] Higgins was referring to the December 24, 1993 meeting in
   Washington where BATF Associate Director of Enforcement Daniel
   Hartnett and his Deputy Director Edward Conroy demanded that more
   probable cause should be developed and tactical plans should be slowed
   down. (TDR:Appendix D-7)
   
   What BATF did in early December was to begin interviewing disgruntled
   former members and to set up an undercover house across the street
   from Mount Carmel Center. However, David Koresh and the Branch
   Davidians were aware throughout the investigation that some agency was
   monitoring them. At different points they invited the BATF and the
   Sheriff's Department to look at their guns, complained to the
   Sheriff's Department about blatant undercover activities and purposely
   befriended individuals they knew were undercover agents. Meanwhile
   BATF went forward with plans for a full scale paramilitary raid on
   Mount Carmel.
   
   On February 12, 1993, BATF Director Higgins was first fully briefed on
   the plan. (TDR:Appendix D-11) On February 25th, BATF agent Davy
   Aguilera, with the assistance of U.S. Attorneys Bill Johnston and John
   Phinizy, produced a "Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of Search
   Warrant." On the basis of that affidavit, Magistrate Judge Dennis S.
   Green signed a search warrant for illegal weapons and explosives for
   Mount Carmel and the "Mag Bag" garage and an arrest warrant for David
   Koresh for possession of an unregistered destructive device. [65]
   However, Treasury Department officials nixed the raid plan when they
   discovered its existence Friday, February 26th. BATF Director Higgins
   convinced officials that because of the Waco Herald-Tribune series on
   the Branch Davidians, February 28th might be the last opportunity to,
   as one put it, "catch the cult members unprepared and away from their
   stockpile of heavy weaponry." [66] And Higgins told officials that
   raid planners had assured him that the raid would be called of if the
   element of surprise was lost. They did not tell him they were
   expecting a shootout.
   
   Saturday, February 27th the Waco Herald-Tribune began their series,
   "The Sinful Messiah." And on Sunday, February 28th, despite their
   knowledge that the Branch Davidians had been forewarned, 76 armed BATF
   agents stormed Mount Carmel Center. The assault left four BATF agents
   and five Branch Davidians dead. Another Branch Davidian would be
   killed later that afternoon trying to return home.
   
   In this section the Committee for Waco Justice report describes BATF
   violations of constitutional rights and excessive use of force in
   their investigation of and February 28th raid upon the Branch Davidian
   religious group and the subsequent BATF and Treasury Department
   coverup. The report then presents the Committee for Waco Justice
   conclusions: that BATF agents drove the Branch Davidians to violent
   self-defense, resulting in the deaths of four agents and six Branch
   Davidians, and that the Attorney General should appoint an Independent
   Counsel to identify and prosecute responsible agents and officials for
   official misconduct, violations of rights, and negligent homicide. We
   will present further recommendations in the last section of this
   report.
   
   It should be noted that none of the testimony given to Treasury
   Department "review teams" or to Congress was given under oath. Also,
   the Treasury Department report does not include information which
   might effect the prosecutions of the Branch Davidians now on trial.
   
   TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND BATF CHAINS OF COMMAND FEBRUARY 28, 1993
   TREASURY DEPARTMENT
   
       Lloyd Bentsen - Secretary of the Treasury
       John P. Simpson - Acting Assistant Secretary
       Ronald K. Noble - unconfirmed Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
       for Enforcement (a consultant at this point)
       
   BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
   
       Stephen Higgins-Director
       Daniel Hartnett - Associate Director of Enforcement
       Edward Conroy - Deputy Associate Director of Enforcement
       David Troy - Chief of Intelligence Division@@"National
       Response Plan" Assignments for "Waco Operation"
       SAC Philip Chojnacki - Incident Commander
       ASAC Chuck Sarabyn - Tactical Coordinator
       SAC Pete Mastin - Deputy Incident Commander
       ASAC Jim Cavanaugh - Deputy Tactical Coordinator
       SA Sharon Wheeler - Public Information Officer
       RAC Bill Buford - Special Response Team 1 leader
       SAC Curtis Williams - Special Response Team 2 leader
       SAC Gerald Petrilli - Special Response Team 3 leader
       SAC Ted Royster - planner, untitled raid coordinator
       SA Earl Dunagan - investigator
       SA Davy Aguilera - investigator
       SA Robert Rodriquez - undercover agent@@Note:
       SAC-Special Agent-in-Charge
       ASAC-Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge
       RAC-Resident Agent-in-Charge
       SA-Special Agent
   
1. BATF IGNORED BRANCH DAVIDIANS' LEGAL GUN BUSINESS 

   These first five sections will review the process by which BATF agents
   gathered evidence of probable cause to serve a search warrant on the
   Branch Davidians and to arrest David Koresh. Some might consider this
   detailed review unnecessary, given government assertions that illegal
   weapons were found after the fire. However, it is important to
   understand that a raid was conducted despite the facts that Branch
   Davidians ran a legal business, BATF found no evidence of illegally
   purchased weapons, and the Branch Davidians attempted to cooperate
   with investigators. Moreover, the "probable cause" to obtain a search
   warrant was based largely on biased information, information used to
   excuse a full paramilitary raid by 76 armed agents. Such unnecessary
   paramilitary raids on any American undermines all our rights.
   
   Some Branch Davidians "confirmed that they stockpiled weapons in
   preparation for what Mr. Koresh long prophesized would be an
   apocalyptic firefight with law enforcement officials that could be a
   precursor to the end of the world. But they insisted that the weapons
   were obtained legally." [67] However, others will testify during the
   trial that only certain members of the group had known about the
   weapons or handled them. [68] In any case, it is not illegal to
   stockpile guns for defense against some future illegal attack by
   government agents.
   
   More importantly, BATF investigative agents either never
   discovered--or completely ignored--the fact that the Branch Davidians
   ran a profitable legal gun business. According to the Washington Post,
   its "biggest moneymaker was its thriving trade in guns and ammunition,
   bought from mail-order firms and local gun stores and resold at a
   profit at gun-fancier fairs throughout Texas. Among the products it
   marketed at these fairs were souvenir plaques made of hand grenade
   casings mounted on wood." [69] Even Marc Breault mentions that of the
   Branch Davidian businesses, the "most important of all" was trade in
   weapons. [70] Clifford L. Linedecker writes, " (Paul) Fatta was a
   regular at gun shows in Austin, Dallas, Forth Worth, San Antonio, and
   other cities in Texas and sold everything from camouflage clothing to
   military-type ready-to-eat meals, gun grips, and weapons." [71] The
   September, 1993, indictment against Fatta and other Branch Davidians
   admits that "Paul Fatta acquired a Texas Sales and Use Tax Permit in
   the name of "The Mag Bag." (JDR:Indictment:4)
   
   Koresh and the Branch Davidians were working with gun dealer Henry
   McMahon, who held a Class III dealer's license allowing him to legally
   own, sell, and buy, any type of weapon. In April of 1993, McMahon told
   the Pensacola television show "Lawline" that Koresh had purchased a
   large number of legal military-style semi-automatics as an investment,
   assuming that their value would increase if the government somehow
   restricted their manufacture or sales in the future. Considering that
   this had happened with other guns in the past, this was a reasonable
   business investment. McMahon said most of these guns were kept boxed
   and never fired, to enhance resale value. [72] During the first days
   of the Branch Davidian trial, Paul Fatta's attorney Mike DeGeurin told
   the jury: "Koresh and Fatta saw that a tremendous investment could be
   made by buying these guns (semiautomatic rifles). They thought the
   guns may be outlawed in Washington and that they would triple or
   quadruple in price." [73]
   
   BATF Agent Davy Aguilera wrote in his February 25, 1993, affidavit:
   "June 9, 1992, I requested a search of the records of the Firearms
   Licensing Section of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
   Atlanta, Georgia, to determine if Howell, Fatta or the `Mag-Bag'
   Corporation were licensed as Firearms dealers or manufacturers. The
   result of this search was negative." He did not search under the names
   David Koresh or Michael Schroeder, who also signed for guns, or any of
   a number of other adults who lived at Mount Carmel. Nor did he do a
   second search when the case was reactivated in late November.
   
   Aguilera's affidavit mentions that David Block said that "he attended
   two gun shows with Vernon Howell, Mike Schroeder, Paul Fatta, and
   Henry McMahon who is a Federally licensed firearms dealer." Yet
   Aguilera was unable to discover they all had legal business dealings.
   If he had, perhaps BATF might not have been so alarmed by the Branch
   Davidians buying $200,000 in weapons over a 16 month period. [74]
   
2. BATF FOUND NO EVIDENCE WEAPONS WERE PURCHASED ILLEGALLY 
   
   Davy Aguilera's investigation of shipments from various arms vendors
   to the "Mag-Bag" and of gun dealer Henry McMahon's records indicated
   that during 1992 the Branch Davidians acquired the following firearms
   and related explosive paraphernalia: one hundred four (104)
   AR-15/M-16, upper receiver groups with barrels; eight thousand, one
   hundred (8,100) rounds of 9mm and .223 caliber ammunition for
   AR-15/M-16; twenty (20), one hundred round capacity drum magazines for
   AK-47 rifles; two hundred sixty (260), M-16/Ar-15, magazines; thirty
   (30) M-14 magazines; two (2) M-16 EZ kits; two (2) M-16 Car Kits; one
   M-76 grenade launcher; two hundred (200) M-31 practice rifle grenades;
   four (4) M-16 parts set Kits "A"; two (2) flare launchers; two cases
   (approximately 50) inert practice hand grenades; 40-50 pounds of black
   gun powder; thirty (30) pounds of Potassium Nitrate; five (5) pounds
   of Magnesium metal powder; one pound of Igniter cord (A class C
   explosive); ninety-one (91) AR/15 lower receiver units; twenty-six
   (26) various calibers and brands of hand guns and long guns; 90 pounds
   of aluminum metal powder; 30-40 cardboard tubes. The amount of
   expenditures for the above listed firearm paraphernalia, excluding the
   (91) AR-15 lower receiver units and the (26) complete firearms, was in
   excess of $44,300."
   
   All these guns, gun parts, powders, inert grenades, and other
   equipment were lawfully purchased and may be legally owned. None per
   se established probable cause that Koresh had violated or was about to
   violate federal law. As has been noted, the seemingly large amounts
   are not illegal either according to the Firearms Owners' Protection
   Act of 1986 and the Supreme Court decision United States vs. Anders,
   nor are they unusual for someone dealing in weapons or holding them as
   an investment.
   
   Aguilera did not investigate the one dealer who might possibly have
   sold Koresh illegal arms. In the affidavit he states, "because of the
   sensitivity of the investigation" he did not contact "vendors with
   questionable trade practices" who had sold to Koresh, including one
   suspected of "unlawful possession of machineguns, silencers,
   destructive devices, and machinegun conversion kits." In effect,
   Aguilera refused to check to see if Koresh had bought illegal items
   from this source and instead inferred probable cause. This is
   blatantly unconstitutional. Aguilera suspected the Branch Davidians
   were breaking laws regarding machineguns and explosives. It is only
   legal to own a machinegun--or machinegun conversion kit-- manufactured
   before May 19, 1986. Both must be registered and one must also pay a
   $200 transfer tax upon buying the machinegun. Uncertainty arises
   because these conversion kits can be used to turn other guns into
   machineguns. According to former enforcement chief Robert Sanders,
   this area remains so unclear that, "There are no published rulings
   telling you what is and what isn't (a violation) ." [75]
   
   What would probably be illegal is: a) buying a registered machinegun
   without paying the $200 tax; b) owning unregistered conversion kits;
   c) using a registered conversion kit to convert a gun into a
   machinegun, but not paying the $200 tax; d) using an insufficient
   number of parts from a registered conversion kit to convert a gun into
   a machinegun, even if the tax is paid; e) owning an unregistered
   conversion kit; f) owning all parts necessary to assemble a brand new
   machinegun, even if the parts are not assembled; g) unregistered
   manufacturing of conversion parts; h) using illegally manufactured
   parts to convert guns into machineguns; i) buying an illegal
   machinegun produced in any of ways above.
   
   As of December, 1992, Aguilera's only evidence that the Branch
   Davidians were doing one or more of these things was that they had
   bought a number of legal weapons and legal gun parts which, with the
   help of a few parts they did not have, can be converted into
   machineguns. Aguilera states that Firearms Enforcement Officer Curtis
   Bartlett told him that the firearms parts which Howell had received,
   and the method by which he had received them, was consistent with
   findings in other BATF investigations which resulted in the seizure of
   illegal machineguns. However, BATF's suspicions remained pure
   conjecture.
   
   It is also legal to own all the destructive device- related items
   Aguilera listed--the grenade launcher, M-31 practice rifle grenades,
   inert practice hand grenades, black gun powder, potassium nitrate,
   magnesium metal powder, aluminum powder, and igniter cord. What would
   not be legal is to manufacture these materials into grenades or other
   destructive devices. Aguilera asserted in the affidavit that BATF
   explosives expert Jerry A. Taylor had concluded that these materials
   could be used to manufacture explosives. However, according to Paul H.
   Blackman, Ph.D. "the assertion that possession of the black powder and
   inert grenades constitutes an explosive grenade because it is possible
   to make one is misleading. Not only are more materials needed, along
   with the machinery to drill and plug a hole, but without intent, there
   is no violation of the law." Blackman asserts the Branch Davidians
   were using the explosive materials for construction projects and for
   refilling ammunition, both legal uses. [76] It was because of this
   lack of probable cause that in December BATF officials instructed
   Aguilera to gather information about Koresh's "intent."
   
3. "PROBABLE CAUSE" BASED ON BIASED INFORMATION ABOUT INTENT 
   
   The credibility and reliability of witnesses in an affidavit is very
   important. Yet all Aguilera's witnesses as to Koresh's "intent" had
   some credibility problems. Neighbor Robert L. Cervenka, who alleged to
   Aguilera he actually had heard machinegun fire on the property, had
   been involved in a property dispute with the Branch Davidians. [77]
   Joyce Sparks' evidence on intent was delivered to Aguilera through
   another BATF agent and, as we shall see, was probably a garbled
   transmission. All other evidence on intent came from disaffected
   former Branch Davidians, all of whom were influenced by "cult busters"
   Marc Breault and Rick Ross.
   
   a. Rick Ross
   
   Aguilera began contacting former members in November, 1992. He
   obtained their names from the 1990 affidavits Breault and other former
   members left with the local Sheriff's Department and from Rick Ross.
   Nancy Ammerman, who had access to all BATF and FBI files, wrote "The
   ATF interviewed the persons (Ross) directed to them and evidently used
   information from those interviews in planning their February 28th
   raid." (JDR:Ammerman:Addendum) Rick Ross "deprogrammed" David Block,
   who lived at Mount Carmel only three months, in the summer of 1992 in
   the home of CAN national spokesperson Priscilla Coates in Coates' home
   in California. [78] He or California CAN representatives were probably
   in close contact with Jeannine, Robyn and Debbie Sue Bunds, all of
   whom gave BATF information. (Linedecker writes that in 1991 California
   police said Robyn was being deprogrammed. [79] )
   
   Evidence that Rick Ross had a financial motivation for inciting BATF
   against the Branch Davidians is contained in Marc Breault's January
   16, 1993, diary entry, where he describes a conversation with Branch
   Davidian Steve Schneider's sister. "Rick (Ross) told Sue that
   something was about to happen real soon. He urged her to hire him to
   deprogram Steve. Rick has Sue all scared now. The Schneider family
   doesn't know what to do. Rick didn't tell them what was about to
   happen, but he said they should get Steve out as soon as possible. I
   know that Rick has talked to the ATF." [80] It is unknown how many
   other families Ross contacted offering his expensive services "before
   it's too late."
   
   b. Former Members' Allegations About Intent
   
   Marc Breault, David Block, Poia Vaega and Jeannine, Robyn and Debbie
   Sue Bunds provided Aguilera with the following evidence of "intent"
   about illegal machineguns: Robyn Bunds said she found what David Bunds
   called a "machinegun conversion kit" in their LaVerne home in 1991,
   but Aguilera did not interview David; Jeannine and Debbie Sue Bunds
   said they saw a Branch Davidian shooting a gun that must have been a
   machinegun because it shot so fast; Debbie Sue said she head Koresh
   say he wished he owned a machinegun; Poia Vaega said that Koresh had
   passed an "AK-47 machinegun" around at a meeting (AK-47s also come in
   legal, semi-automatic versions); Marc Breault said Koresh told him how
   easy it was to convert a gun to a machinegun; David Block told
   Aguilera that Donald Bunds, a mechanical engineer, who remained with
   the group after his family left it, operated a metal lathe and milling
   machine that had the capability to fabricate firearm parts and that he
   had observed Bunds designing a machinegun on a computer.
   
   Jeannine Bunds, Breault and Block provided Aguilera with the following
   evidence of intent to produce illegal explosives: Jeannine Bunds said
   she had seen one "grenade", but not that she knew it contained
   explosive materials; Marc Breault said that sometime before 1989
   Koresh said he wanted to "obtain and/or manufacture" grenades; David
   Block said he had heard Koresh ask if anyone "had any knowledge about
   making hand grenades" and another time he "heard discussion about a
   shipment of inert hand grenades and Howell's intent to reactivate
   them"; both Breault and Block asserted that Koresh had expressed
   interest in the (legally available) book Anarchist Cookbook which
   explains how to make explosives.
   
   While such allegations might be credible in most witnesses, they must
   be regarded skeptically when coming from individuals involved with
   professional or amateur cult busters. The Treasury report itself
   notes, "the planners failed to consider how Block's prior relations
   with Koresh, and his decision to break away from the Branch Davidians
   at the Compound, might have affected the reliability of his
   statements. Although the planners knew Block had met with a
   self-described `deprogrammer,' Rick Ross, they never had any
   substantive discussions with him concerning Block's objectivity about
   and perspective of Koresh and his followers." (TDR:143-144) All those
   who gave BATF the all important "evidence of intent" had similar
   credibility problems!
   
   c. BATF and Treasury Department Use of Former Members' Allegations
   
   It is interesting to note that none of the most inflammatory
   allegation's about Koresh's violent criminal intent made by former
   members--that he had made up a "hit list" against former members, that
   he had once "tested" them by saying they would have to turn their guns
   on the public, that Branch Davidians were considering "mass suicide,"
   or that they had renamed Mount Carmel Center "Ranch Apocalypse" [81]
   -- were included in the Aguilera's February 25th affidavit. Yet the
   Treasury report claims these allegations--some of which may not have
   been made until after the raid--were a prime excuse for the raid
   because Koresh "might soon have been inspired to turn his arsenal
   against the community of nonbelievers." (TDR:127)
   
   It is particularly disturbing to see that these cult buster stories
   even convinced top Treasury Department officials to support the plan.
   Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement Ronald K. Noble
   told the April 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing that
   from what BATF officials had told him, the Branch Davidians were
   "people who were feared to be gathering machineguns and automatic
   weapons and explosives for either a mass suicide or for some kind of
   assault near Waco, Texas; that they had bad intentions, evil
   intentions." [82]
   
4. "PROBABLE CAUSE" BASED ON RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL BELIEFS 
   
   In his February 25th affidavit Aguilera includes third hand
   information--from social worker Joyce Sparks to Special Agent Carlos
   Torres to himself--that "during her conversation with Koresh, he told
   her that he was the `Messenger' from God, that the world was coming to
   an end, and that when he `reveals' himself, the riots in Los Angeles
   would pale in comparison to what was going to happen in Waco, Texas.
   Koresh declared that it would be a `military type operation' and that
   all the `non- believers' would have to suffer." However, it is likely
   Sparks misinterpreted Koresh's Biblically prophetic statements,
   statements fully protected under the First Amendment freedom of
   religion provision.
   
   The affidavit also used other statements fully protected under the
   First Amendment freedom of speech provision as evidence of criminal
   intent. These include Koresh's talk about the desire to own
   machineguns and the fully legal Anarchist Cookbook and his telling
   undercover Agent Robert Rodriguez it is possible to purchase a "drop-
   in-sear" to convert an AR-15 rifle into an illegal machinegun. Former
   member Robyn Bunds said that "she and the other residents were
   subjected to watching extremely violent movies of the Vietnam War
   which Howell would refer to as training films." However, the movies
   alluded to were popular Hollywood films "Hamburger Hill," "Platoon"
   and "Full Metal Jacket." [83]
   
   Particularly disturbing is the affidavit's mentioning Koresh's
   assertion of his right to bear arms and his criticism of BATF as
   evidence of criminal intent. "David Koresh stated that the Bible gave
   him the right to bear arms. . .David Koresh then advised Special Agent
   Rodriguez that he had something he wanted Special Agent Rodriguez to
   see. At that point he showed Special Agent Rodriguez a video tape on
   ATF which was made by the Gun Owners Association (G.O.A.). This film
   portrayed ATF as an agency who violated the rights of Gun Owners by
   threats and lies." A later March 9, 1993 affidavit signed by BATF
   agent Earl Dunagan actually listed as objects for which BATF wanted to
   search audio and video tapes which criticized "firearms law
   enforcement and particularly the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
   Firearms (ATF)." BATF wanted to present these as "evidence of Howell's
   or other cult members' motive for wanting to shoot and kill ATF
   agents."
   
5. OTHER IRREGULARITIES IN THE FEBRUARY 25, 1993 AFFIDAVIT 
   
   Davy Aguilera's February 25, 1993 affidavit contains stale, inaccurate
   and misleading information and presents an "indefensible" probable
   cause theory. Considering the sloppiness of Aguilera's February 25,
   1993 affidavit, it is not surprising that the Treasury report does not
   bother to include a copy as one of its several appendixes!
   
   a. Stale Information
   
   All Aguilera's supporting information regarding the purchase of
   possibly suspicious weapons was more than eight months old. According
   to David Koresh's attorney Dick DeGuerin, the February 25th affidavit
   contained "stale information" under the 1932 Supreme Court case Sgro
   v. United States which holds: "the magistrate (has to) conclude that
   what they are searching for is there now, not that it was there at
   some time in the past." [84] Similarly, United States v. Ruff, 984,
   F.2d 635 5th Cir., 1993 holds that evidence must be fresh. [85] Most
   former members' allegations that they had heard Koresh discuss
   machineguns or seen Koresh use alleged machineguns came from 1989 and
   1991. David Block's allegations that he'd heard Koresh discuss making
   machineguns and grenades were also more than six months old.
   
   b. Inaccurate Information
   
   Aguilera's affidavit contained glaring errors of fact that attest to
   the shoddy nature of the "supporting information." Despite Aguilera's
   swearing to be familiar with federal firearms and explosives laws, he
   confused the legal definition of "destructive devices" and "firearms."
   He called E-2 Kits, "E-Z kits" and did not mention that they are legal
   gun parts kits, not machinegun conversion kits. He claims that the
   AK-47 has an upper and lower receiver, when in fact it has a one-piece
   receiver. [86] And he claims the legal .50 caliber rifle Block
   describes is probably an illegal .52 caliber Boys rifle, though Paul
   H. Blackman believes it is unlikely such a gun even exists. [87] (In
   its discussion of the probable cause investigation, the Treasury
   report corrects Aguilera's errors without mentioning it has done so.)
   
   It is important to note that none of the former Branch Davidians who
   claimed they had seen or heard machineguns were knowledgeable about
   firearms, nor did Aguilera swear that they were. All identified the
   guns from pictures and from the fact that they fired more rapidly than
   normal shotguns. And none seemed to be aware the Branch Davidians
   owned "hellfire" devices that make the guns sound like machineguns.
   David Bunds, who Aguilera claims had arms' expertise, was never even
   interviewed.
   
   Two non-weapons factual errors are of note. The affidavit states a
   former member "observed at the compound published magazines such as,
   the `Shotgun News' and other related clandestine magazines." However,
   Shotgun News is a legal, aboveboard publication with a distribution of
   150,000. [88] Also, the affidavit repeats Joyce Sparks' inaccurate
   statement that Koresh made comments about the Los Angeles riots on a
   date three weeks before the riots began. The Treasury report claims
   that, despite this error, Sparks' records show she did visit Koresh at
   Mount Carmel the day after the beginning of the riots. (TDR:125-126)
   
   c. Misleading Information
   
   In 1978 the Supreme Court held in Franks vs. Delaware that a search
   warrant is invalid if the agent has misled or lied to the magistrate
   in order to get it. Aguilera's affidavit describes child abuse
   allegations and the Texas Department of Protection and Regulatory
   Services investigation, but does not mention that the case was closed
   on April 30, 1992, with no evidence of child abuse. Similarly, the
   affidavit states that a relative of an ex- member alleges "a false
   imprisonment for a term of three and one half (3 1/2) months," but
   does not mention that the FBI opened a (probably-related) case for
   "involuntary servitude" in April, 1992, and closed it in June, 1992.
   
   The affidavit states that Branch Davidian neighbor Robert L. Cervenka
   reported what sounded like machinegun fire in February, but does not
   mention that the Branch Davidians discussed this allegation with a
   McLennan County Sheriff who assured them the "hell fire" devices they
   were using were legal. It states that a Deputy Sheriff heard a large
   explosion and saw smoke at Mount Carmel on November 6, 1992, but does
   not mention that the Sheriff didn't consider it important enough to
   investigate--or that the Branch Davidians were excavating for a large
   underground tornado shelter at the time.
   
   The affidavit states that INS records show most foreign nationals had
   overstayed their entry permits or visas and that "it is a violation of
   Title 18, United States Code, Section 922 for an illegal alien to
   receive a firearm"; it does not provide evidence that any illegal
   alien was using a firearm. The affidavit states, "Howell forced
   members to stand guard at the commune 24 hours a day with loaded
   weapons," but does not mention that in 4 weeks of observation from the
   undercover house, agents saw no such armed guards. (TDR:53)
   
   BATF experts told Aguilera that Koresh's gunpowder and igniter cord
   "were themselves explosives requiring proper registration and
   storage--neither of which Koresh provided." (TDR:124) However, Paul H.
   Blackman writes that since there was no attempt to contact Koresh to
   ask him what kind of storage he was providing, BATF did not know if it
   was being illegally stored. Moreover, the amount of gunpowder Koresh
   had was expressly exempt from the law, and no registration is required
   for igniter cord (U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 841 et.seq.; Title 26,
   Sec.5845(f) [89]
   
   d. Indefensible Probable Cause Theory
   
   Aguilera's February 25th affidavit includes several serious
   allegations related to matters which are not under BATF's authority to
   investigate: child abuse, involuntary servitude, illegal drugs, and
   tax avoidance. The Treasury report defends Aguilera's presenting this
   inflammatory material to the Magistrate. "While reports that Koresh
   was permitted to sexually and physically abuse children were not
   evidence that firearms or explosives violations were occurring, they
   showed Koresh to have set up a world of his own, where legal
   prohibitions were disregarded freely." (TDR:27) Paul H. Blackman
   writes, "Such a theory would allow law enforcement agencies to allow
   any allegations of any serious criminal activity to help to establish
   probable cause that all other criminal activities were also being
   engaged in. In law, the theory is currently indefensible." [90]
   
6. BATF IGNORED BRANCH DAVIDIAN ATTEMPTS TO COOPERATE 
   
   The Treasury report alleges: "Aguilera wisely sought to keep his
   investigation a secret from Koresh and his followers. . . (and) . .
   .sharply circumscribed his inquiries about Koresh to third parties,
   including arms dealers and former cult members." (TDR:123) However,
   the Branch Davidians clearly knew that they were under surveillance,
   were worried about it and even tried to cooperate to with authorities.
   Evidence of their worry comes from Marc Breault's February 18, 1993,
   diary entry where he writes that Steve Schneider told his sister Sue:
   "Vernon is worried about the arms he has and what the Government might
   do about them. I asked Sue whether Steve mentioned illegal weapons.
   She assured me that Steve did not mention illegal weapons, but only
   arms in general. Steve also said Vernon is searching Reuters and AP
   news services to find out anything about Government involvement in
   arms cases. . . Steve said Vernon is particularly interested in the
   Randy Weaver case." [91] The Branch Davidians were wise to worry that
   the fate that befell the Weaver family might befall them.
   
   a. Koresh Had Cooperated with More Serious Investigations
   
   The Treasury report claims, "There was, in fact, no evidence that
   Koresh was prepared to submit to law enforcement authorities or that
   he had done so in the past." (TDR:135) In fact, Koresh had been
   investigated on more serious charges than gun law violations and had
   cooperated fully with law enforcement. In 1987, when Koresh and seven
   Branch Davidians were indicted for attempted murder after the shoot
   out with George Roden, the Sheriff called Koresh and told him they
   should turn themselves in and surrender their weapons. When Deputies
   showed up to arrest them, they complied. Former McLennan County
   District Attorney Vic Feazell, who prosecuted Koresh in that case
   criticized federal agents, and said, "If they'd called and talked to
   them, the Davidians would've given them what they wanted." [92] In his
   February 25th affidavit Aguilera reports on the shootout but not
   Koresh's full cooperation with authorities. The Treasury report
   dismisses this evidence, given Koresh's "disdain for fire arms laws
   and hatred for those charged with their enforcement." (TDR:135) The
   report includes a photograph of Koresh and followers dressed in
   fatigues and armed with weapons, allegedly right before the shootout.
   (TDR:19-20)
   
   In 1991, when LaVerne, California police demanded Koresh return their
   child to Robyn Bunds, he did so immediately. Koresh and Sherri Jewell
   cooperated fully with the Michigan court which awarded custody of Kiri
   Jewell to her father. And between February and April, 1992, Koresh
   allowed Texas Department of Protection and Regulatory Services and
   McLellan County Sheriff's Department personnel to inspect Mount Carmel
   on three occasions and visited their offices once.
   
   b. Koresh Invited Sheriff to Inspect Weapons in 1992
   
   As mentioned above, in February, 1992, Robert L. Cervenka complained
   to the Sheriff's office that he had heard machinegun fire at Mount
   Carmel. According to Aguilera's affidavit, he even "offered to allow
   the Sheriff to use his property as a surveillance post." Several
   months later Branch Davidians contacted the local Sheriff about this.
   The New York Times reports, "According to Mr. Fatta, the weapons the
   Davidians were firing at that time were legal AK-47s and AR-15s
   outfitted with a `hellfire trigger' that allowed for rapid firing
   without converting the rifles into fully automatic weapons. `We had
   heard that one of the neighbors had been approached about using their
   property as a listening post,' Mr. Fatta said several weeks ago, `and
   we went to the local sheriff's department and asked them if the
   hellfire triggers were legal, just to make sure. We were told that
   they were legal.'" [93] According to another article, they told the
   Sheriff, "why don't you come and ask us what we've got." [94]
   
   c. Koresh Invited BATF to Inspect Weapons in 1992
   
   The Treasury report alleges: "During the compliance inspection of
   Henry McMahon. . .Special Agent Aguilera deliberately led McMahon to
   believe that the inspection was a routine administrative inquiry."
   (TDR:186-188) However, it fails to mention McMahon's version of the
   visit. Because Aguilera and another BATF agent were asking Henry
   McMahon a lot of questions about Koresh, he immediately called Koresh
   to inform him. According to McMahon, "He said, `If there's a problem,
   tell them to come out here. If they want to see my guns, they're more
   than welcome.' So I walked back in the room, holding the cordless
   phone and said, `I've got (Koresh) on the phone. If you'd like to go
   out there and see those guns, you're more than welcome to.' They
   looked at each other and Aguilera got real paranoid, shaking his head
   and whispering, `No, no!' And so I went back to the phone and told
   David they wouldn't be coming out." [95]
   
   After Koresh's attorney Dick DeGuerin mentioned the incident during a
   media panel in September, 1993, reporters from two Houston papers
   contacted Jack Killorin, Chief of BATF's Public Affairs. He told one
   reporter he was not surprised that a federal agent rejected an offer
   to inspect weapons. "The preferred method by the law is going with the
   standard of getting a warrant before entering a home. We execute such
   warrants." [96] He told the other reporter, "Koresh's learning of the
   investigation in July 1992 had no effect on the raid or the resulting
   standoff between agents and cult members." [97]
   
   d. Lieutenant Lynch Statement on Another Service of Warrant
   
   McLennan County Sheriff's Lieutenant Larry Lynch told the June 9,
   1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing about having visited
   Mount Carmel with only a few officers to serve a warrant on an
   individual who no longer resided there. [98] One lawmaker asked BATF
   Chief of Intelligence David Troy about Lynch's statement. "Did you
   have a conversation with the local law enforcement officials regarding
   their previous service of arrest warrants and search warrants?" Troy
   replied, "That is the first time I had ever, myself, had heard that
   there had been an attempt that was not related to that shootout that
   occurred in 1987, to serve any type of legal document at the compound
   by any other enforcement agency. . .I don't believe they ever
   considered seriously driving up in that front yard and telling him we
   had a Federal search warrant for the place." [99]
   
   This attests to the BATF's failure to consult adequately with local
   authorities. BATF Associate Director Daniel Hartnett informed the
   subcommittee that at least one McLellan County Sheriff's Lieutenant
   was assigned full time to BATF planners. [100] This may have been
   Lieutenant Barber, who had had numerous contacts with both former and
   current Branch Davidians. Lieutenant Larry Lynch stated during the
   hearing that Lieutenant Barber was his superior during the February
   28, 1993 raid. [101] Marc Breault claims it was Lieutenant Barber who
   called his complaints "sour grapes." [102] Clifford L. Linedecker
   writes that Branch Davidians discussed the Cervenka complaint and the
   hellfire devices with Lieutenant Barber. [103] It is unknown if the
   officer assigned to BATF--be it Lieutenant Barber or someone
   else--conveyed information about Branch Davidians past cooperation to
   BATF planners or if BATF ignored such information. One reason for any
   "communications breakdown" might be found Marc Breault's allegation,
   "ATF believes there might be a leak to Vernon from the McLennan County
   Sheriff's Department. They are bypassing the local authorities." [104]
   
   e. Koresh Befriended Undercover Agents
   
   On January 11, 1993, eight undercover agents were assigned to pose as
   students living in the two bedroom house across the street from Mount
   Carmel Center. Branch Davidians immediately visited that house, but
   undercover agents refused to let them come in, despite their repeated
   requests. A few days later Koresh visited the family next door to the
   undercover house and told them he thought the "students" were FBI
   agents and that he was expecting a visit from the FBI. (TDR:Appendix
   D:8-9) Koresh said he doubted the men were students because they were
   too old, their cars were too new, they carried brief cases, and the
   owner had previously refused to rent the house to anyone. However,
   Koresh remained unsure as to which government agency had him under
   surveillance. (TDR:187)
   
   Koresh then went out of his way to befriend agent Robert Rodriguez
   (who was working under the name "Gonzales"). He invited him to visit
   Mount Carmel Center, listen to music, and shoot guns in the back of
   Mount Carmel. (TDR:D-11) Koresh invited Rodriguez to take Bible
   studies and even invited him to join the Branch Davidians. After the
   fire Rodriguez admitted to reporters that Koresh's teachings did
   affect him. "`He was close,' he finally said, his voice cracking at
   the memory." [105] Koresh told KRLD radio reporters February 28th that
   he was disappointed that after his talks with Rodriguez, he and his
   superiors did not "understand" that Koresh was a serious religious
   person worthy of "respect." On Sunday, February 28th, Koresh was in a
   Bible study with Rodriguez when he was told that BATF and National
   Guard were approaching. Rather than take Rodriguez hostage, as he
   easily could have, he told Rodriguez that he knew BATF and the
   National Guard were coming and shook Rodriguez' hand as the agent
   left.
   
   f. Koresh Complained to Sheriff about UPS Surveillance
   
   On January 27, 1993, a special agent posed as a UPS trainee and
   accompanied a UPS delivery person to the MagBag and Mount Carmel
   Center. His attempts to get into the buildings made Koresh suspicious.
   He told the delivery person "I know we're being watched." According to
   the Treasury report, "This undercover effort was so transparent that
   Koresh complained to the local sheriff's department. He accused the
   department of trying to infiltrate the Compound." (TDR:187-188)
   
   g. After Raid, Koresh Stated He Would Have Cooperated
   
   The above evidence lends credence to Koresh's claims on the publicly
   released February 28, 1993, "911" tape that he would have cooperated
   with authorities if they had contacted him. On the 911 tape Koresh
   told 911 operator Lieutenant Larry Lynch, "You see, you brought your
   bunch of guys out here and you killed some of my children. [106] We
   told you we wanted to talk. No. How come you guys try to be ATF
   agents? How come you try to be so big all the time?" Later in the tape
   he says, "Now, we're willing, and we've been willing, all this time,
   to sit down with anybody. You've sent law enforcement out here before.
   . .And I've laid it straight across the table. I said, if you want to
   know about me, sit down with me and I'll open up a book and show you
   Seven Seals."
   
   After the February 28 raid, Koresh said to KRLD radio reporters, who
   asked how he felt about the 4 agents who died, "Unnecessary, my
   friend. These men, they don't know anything about me. They don't know
   what I teach. I respect law enforcement. I loved the Waco Sheriff
   Department. They treated me good. When we had the child accusations
   against us, some Sheriff department guys came out and they treated us
   with the highest respect. . .Larry Abner. I loved the guy. I took him
   and I showed him around and everything. They took the children off
   where they can talk to them personally. Those kind of people I can
   deal with." When a reporter asked if he would have gone to town and
   discussed the weapons with the Sheriff's Department, Koresh answered,
   "I would have come. I would have come. I would have come."
   
   The Houston Chronicle obtained tapes of telephone conversations
   between Koresh and BATF agent Jim Cavanaugh shortly after the assault.
   Koresh told the agent, "It would have been better if you just called
   me up or talked to me. Then you could have come in and done your
   work." [107]
   
7. QUESTIONABLE GROUNDS FOR A PARAMILITARY RAID 
   
   Former New York City Police commissioner Benjamin Ward said of the
   BATF's February 28th raid on Mount Carmel, "They did it backwards. The
   accepted way is to talk first and shoot second." [108] Dr. Robert
   Cancro, one of the outside experts the Justice Department asked to
   review BATF and FBI's actions, wrote, "David Koresh asked why they did
   not serve him the warrant directly rather than through an armed
   assault. . .The issue is why was this not considered and evaluated
   more thoroughly and with adequate behavioral input." (JDR:Cancro:2)
   
   One explanation is BATF's negative attitude towards what Time called
   "determined and fanatical groups." BATF spokesperson Jack Killorin
   declared, "We've gone about them in a number of different ways--ruse,
   ambush, siege and talk. In almost every one we lose law enforcement
   officers." [109] That BATF had no intention of allowing Koresh to
   cooperate is evidenced by Aguilera's rejection of Koresh's invitation,
   via gun dealer Henry McMahon, to look at his guns. Also, Marc Breault
   writes in his book that in December, 1992, Aguilera told him "that he
   felt Vernon was a lunatic and needed to be put away." [110]
   
   The Treasury report admits that BATF planners decided immediately that
   their only options were a siege (surrounding Mount Carmel until
   residents surrendered) or a "dynamic entry" or paramilitary raid.
   (TDR:38-43) Below are the highly questionable reasons BATF rejected
   both a simple search and a more complicated but less dangerous siege
   and went forth with a paramilitary raid by 76 heavily armed agents.
   
   a. Paramilitary Raids Are Preferred BATF Modus Operandi
   
   As BATF Director Stephen Higgins told the House Judiciary Committee,
   BATF "Special Response Teams" (SRTs) had made hundreds of similar
   "activations" during the last several years. Such "dynamic entry"
   raids--armed agents busting down doors and otherwise smashing into
   unsuspecting individuals' homes and businesses with barely a moment's
   notice of "search warrant"--are clearly BATF's preferred modus
   operandi. The Gun Owners of America video tape Koresh showed Agent
   Rodriguez criticized these Gestapo- like tactics.
   
   Two BATF top planners were noted for their raid and siege experience.
   Dallas Special Agent-in-Charge Ted Royster had led many high profile
   raids, including the destructive and controversial raid on John
   Lawmaster's home. [111] And William Buford, Resident Agent-in- Charge
   of the Little Rock BATF office, had planned and participated in the
   1985 siege of the white supremacist group "The Arm and Covenant of the
   Sword." (TDR:38) SAC Chuck Sarabyn, who would become co-commander of
   the February 28th raid, may have favored such a raid because it would
   be the first opportunity to test the "National Response Plan" which he
   had "played a significant role in drafting." This would also be only
   the fifth time more than one Special Response Team had been used in an
   operation. (TDR:62) BATF grandiosely named the operation "Operation
   Trojan Horse," because the agents were to be hidden in cattle
   trailers. (TDR:Appendix B:40)
   
   b. Cult Busters Advised Against Simple Search
   
   Considering BATF's bias in favor of paramilitary raids, it is easy to
   understand why BATF investigators Davy Aguilera and Bill Buford
   accepted so uncritically cult buster "scare stories," which reinforced
   their commitment to such a raid. Marc Breault writes in his diary
   entry of January 8, 1993, that "ATF" asked him, "If Vernon received a
   summons to answer questions regarding firearms, would he show up?"
   Breault answered, "No way." ATF asked, "If the good guys came with a
   search warrant, would Vernon allow it?" Breault answered, "If Vernon
   were not expecting it, no. If Vernon had prior warning, yes. He'd have
   time to shift all the firearms. . .There is a considerable amount of
   danger because Vernon feels that since he is Jesus Christ, he has
   already died. Therefore he can skip that phase of things. Since he
   does not have to die, there is no resurrection and therefore he may
   well feel he can start shooting beforehand." [112]
   
   Breault similarly had informed the U.S. Embassy in Australia in
   February, 1992, that "there would be a shootout with authorities if
   they attempt to enter the cult's Waco property to take away any of the
   children now living there, or investigate living conditions." [113]
   This had not happened when social workers and local sheriffs visited
   Mount Carmel, yet BATF heeded Breault's questionable advice.
   Doubtless, Rick Ross also was telling BATF investigators what he told
   the Waco Tribune-Herald--that Koresh was violent and dangerous.
   
   The "deprogrammed" David Block told agents that he "left the cult
   group because (Koresh) would always remind them that if they were to
   have a confrontation with the local or federal authorities, that the
   group should be ready to fight and resist." The Treasury report
   admits, however, "as far as former cult members knew, Koresh had not
   specifically trained his followers to repulse law enforcement officers
   or other visitors perceived to be hostile." (TDR:45)
   
   This cult buster-induced belief that Koresh would not cooperate was
   communicated all the way to the top. Chief of Public Relations Jack
   Killorin claimed after the raid that Koresh was "sworn to resistance"
   and it was only prudent to have firepower. [114] And David C. Troy,
   chief of BATF's intelligence division, told a House Ways and Means
   subcommittee: "Once we had probable cause (to arrest him), he was so
   kinked up over government. . .that he would not come off the compound.
   . .And the people behind Vernon Howell (Koresh's birth name) were just
   as violent." [115]
   
   c. Cult Buster Mass Suicide Scare Stories
   
   The Treasury report mentions a legitimate reason for not implementing
   a siege--the Branch Davidians might destroy evidence. However, it goes
   into greater detail about a more questionable reason--former Branch
   Davidians' concerns about the possibility of mass suicide should the
   government attempt a siege. Not surprisingly, Marc Breault promoted
   this idea "most forcefully." (TDR:46) In fact, the Treasury report
   admits, "The planners ultimately rejected the siege option mainly
   because the intelligence obtained in January from former cult members.
   . .Most significantly, they noted the distinct danger that Koresh
   would respond to a siege by leading his followers in mass suicide."
   (TDR:141) Doubtless, Rick Ross promoted his "Jim Jones" comparison.
   
   d. Shoddy Intelligence
   
   BATF planners decided they could only consider a siege if Koresh was
   arrested away from Mount Carmel when he was out jogging or in town.
   Agents believed that without Koresh's leadership, the other members
   would offer little resistance to a BATF search of Mount Carmel. The
   Treasury report admits agents received inaccurate information from
   social worker Joyce Sparks and undercover agent Robert Rodriguez that
   Koresh rarely left Mount Carmel. It also admits that the agents at the
   undercover house could not identify who left and entered by
   automobile. (TDR:136-140) Only after the raid did BATF receive
   information that Koresh had left Mount Carmel a number of times during
   December, January and February, 1993. BATF did attempt to convince
   Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services to summon
   Koresh to town for a meeting so that BATF could arrest him, but they
   refused to become involved. BATF also tried obtain a Texas arrest
   warrant for Koresh for sexual activities with a young girl, but that
   fell through when the girl refused to testify. (TDR:64)
   
   e. Publicity Stunt to Bolster BATF's Image
   
   In early 1993, BATF was a beleaguered agency. Ronald Reagan and others
   had been calling for its abolition since the early 1980s. A newly
   elected liberal Democrat just might try to do it. The Waco
   Tribune-Herald was calling to find out why BATF wasn't doing something
   about the Branch Davidians weapons build up. And in mid-November,
   1992, CBS's "60 Minutes" contacted BATF about an upcoming expose
   about female BATF agents who charged routine sexual harassment and
   even attempted rape. The expose, which aired January 10, 1993,
   included damning statements by BATF agents. Agent Bob Hoffman
   exclaimed, "the people I put in jail have more honor than the top
   administration in this organization." Agent Lou Tomasell said, "I took
   an oath. And the thing I find abhorrent and disgusting is that these
   higher-level people took that same oath and they violate the basic
   principles and tenets of the constitution and the laws and simple
   ethics and morality." A few weeks later, 15 black agents accused the
   agency of discrimination in hiring and promotion. [116]
   
   Facing Congressional appropriations hearings on March 10, 1993, BATF
   leadership may have felt it needed some good publicity to illustrate
   its effectiveness, something like the sight of BATF agents arresting
   dozens of religious fanatics and displaying a big weapons cache. Any
   later story that the guns were found to be legal and that charges had
   been dropped would never go beyond the local papers. Mike Wallace
   reran this January episode May 23, 1993, and declared, "Almost all the
   agents we talked to said that they believe the initial attack on that
   cult in Waco was a publicity stunt--the main goal of which was to
   improve the ATF's tarnished image."
   
   During the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearings
   lawmakers grilled BATF Public Information Officer Sharon Wheeler to
   determine if BATF Washington or local offices had been concerned with
   "the BATF image and whether or not this operation would impact on that
   image?" (Committee members did not ask the same question of Wheeler's
   superior David Troy, who was also at the hearing.) Wheeler denied two
   reporters' contentions that when she called them for weekend phone
   numbers she had told them, "we have something big going down" on
   Sunday. She also asserted that she was told not to send out a press
   release "until we knew if there was significant things found in the
   compound, you know, evidence of violations." [117] The Treasury report
   contends it was not BATF, but a private ambulance driver who tipped
   off the local television station KWTX. Their cameraman inadvertently
   tipped off a Branch Davidian to the impending raid. (TDR:159)
   
   f. Desire to Punish BATF Critic
   
   Aguilera's February 25th affidavit asserts: "David Koresh stated that
   the Bible gave him the right to bear arms" and then showed undercover
   agent Robert Rodriguez a video tape which "portrayed ATF as an agency
   who violated the rights of gun owners by threats and lies." During the
   January, 1992 interview with Martin King for the Australian television
   program "Current Affair," Koresh gave his opinion about guns: "This is
   not Europe, not where a country overthrows a bunch of people, takes
   away their weapons so the people cannot argue any issues. Guns are the
   right of Americans to have. Yeah, we've got a gun here and there. Most
   of the guns were sold. A lot of people say: `He's got guns, that makes
   him bad, that makes him a cult.'" When asked if he would use a gun if
   "someone" trespassed, Koresh answered, "They come in here with a gun
   and they start shooting at us, what would you do?. . .Our constitution
   states every citizen in American has the right to rebuttal the
   government. Guns? Yes, we have guns." [118]
   
   It may well be that the Branch Davidians perceived "secessionist"
   tendencies disturbed BATF--and later the FBI. Sheriff Harwell said,
   "They were like living in another little country out there. They had
   their property line and they were basically good people. All of `em
   were good people. . .I don't know about Vernon Howell. I think he
   really believed he was what he told everybody he was, and I think he
   was probably sincere in everything that he taught. But the other thing
   that he did was to teach the philosophy that once anyone crossed that
   property line out there it would be just like someone invading the
   United States." [119] Columnist Joseph Sobran wrote: "We are already
   being told how threatening David Koresh is to society at large, when
   apparently all he ever wanted to do was to secede from it. And this, I
   think, is the real nature of a cult: its desire to withdraw. Even
   before its physical isolation, it has rejected the moral and cognitive
   authority of the larger society. This disturbs everyone who feels
   wholly at home in that society and dependent on it." [120]
   
8. GOVERNMENT MULTI-TASK FORCE MAKES FOR "PARTNERS IN CRIME" 
   
   The Treasury report describes the "multi-task force" of federal, state
   and local authorities used to carry out the BATF's February 28th raid.
   While BATF agents from three Special Response Teams carried out the
   actual raid, support was provided by the National Guard, Texas
   Department of Public Service employees, including the Texas Rangers,
   and the McLennan County Sheriff's Department. (TDR:79) At the June 9,
   1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearings, BATF Associate
   Director Hartnett explained that a Drug Enforcement Agency team was on
   hand to disassemble any methamphetamine laboratory which might be
   found, something not mentioned in the Treasury report. He also said
   that the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S Marshals
   Service were involved. [121]
   
   The problem with such federal, state and local "multi-task forces" is
   that they make all participants defacto "partners in crime," should
   crimes be committed against citizens--especially if federal agents
   commit the crimes. National legislation and federal funding for state
   and local law enforcement ensure that many state and local authorities
   may not be very aggressive in preventing or investigating federal
   crimes against citizens.
   
   The Treasury report states, "The Texas Rangers (were) deputized as
   U.S. Marshals for the criminal investigation and prosecution." (TDR:7)
   and "opened a formal homicide investigation" of the murder of federal
   agents by Branch Davidians. (TDR:116). (According to a Texas Rangers
   public affairs representative, they were deputized by the U.S.
   Attorney's office in Waco, Texas.) As we shall see, BATF and FBI
   interfered with Texas Rangers' attempts to conduct a complete and
   impartial investigation. After the fire, several Texas residents tried
   to file formal complaints with the Texas Rangers regarding what they
   believed to be the FBI murder of the Branch Davidians. Texas Rangers
   and a representative of the Texas Attorney General told them that
   since all Texas Rangers investigators were deputized as U.S. Marshals,
   there was nothing that the state of Texas could do. [122]
   
9. DUBIOUS DRUG ALLEGATIONS TO OBTAIN HELICOPTERS FREE 
   
   The 1878 posse comitatus law, Section 1385 of the U.S. code, states
   U.S. military forces and state national guards cannot be used as
   police forces against civilians. However, courts have given law
   enforcement wide leeway in using military and national guard equipment
   and facilities. As BATF Associate Director Hartnett told Congress, "We
   use the military all the time for support with reimbursement." [123]
   More recent modifications of the posse comitatus law (32 U.S.C. =15112
   and 10 U.S.C. =15371) allow the military and national guard to provide
   "non-reimbursable" (i.e., free) support to civilian law enforcement if
   they are engaged in counter-drug operations.
   
   The Treasury report states BATF wanted to use military training
   facilities and equipment at Fort Hood, and Texas National Guard aerial
   reconnaissance before, and diversionary helicopters during, the raid.
   "However, in the absence of a drug nexus, ATF was told by both the
   U.S. military and the National Guard that the assistance would be
   reimbursable." (TDR:213) To get that free assistance, BATF constructed
   drug allegations from extremely shaky and dated evidence.
   
   Marc Breault had told BATF that Koresh claimed that after he took over
   Mount Carmel from George Roden, "he had found methamphetamine
   manufacturing facilities and recipes on the premises." Koresh told
   Breault he had asked the local Sheriff to take them away, but the
   Sheriff had no record of doing so. (TDR:30) Breault never alleged
   having seen such a lab in his years at Mount Carmel. Undercover agent
   Robert Rodriguez told BATF, "Koresh had told him that the Compound
   would be a great place for a methamphetamine laboratory because of its
   location." Also, one Branch Davidian had a "prior conviction for
   possession of amphetamines and a controlled substance" and 10 others
   had been either arrested or investigated for drug violations in the
   past. (TDR:212)
   
   However, as revealed to Congress, BATF admitted it knew the identity
   of the individuals most likely responsible for building this lab.
   "Roden allowed others to stay on the property and pay rent. Convicted
   narcotics trafficker Donny Joe Harvey and his associate, Roy Lee
   Wells, Jr., were verified by the McLennan County Sheriffs Department
   as residing at the compound. Both Harvey and Wells are incarcerated."
   BATF also admitted that it knew the last Branch Davidian to be
   convicted on drug charges was Brad Branch, back in 1983. [124]
   Finally, the statement Koresh allegedly made to the agent may well
   have been made within the context of George Roden tenants' former
   activities.
   
   On the basis of this shaky information, Army Lieutenant Colonel
   Walker, who advised BATF on obtaining "training or equipment or
   support in a counter-drug operation," recommended BATF solicit Texas
   National Guard services. [125] BATF convinced the Texas National Guard
   to do two overflights of the buildings to look for "hot spots" that
   might indicate drug laboratory activity. A hot spot was found but,
   since it could indicate construction, cooking or other activities
   requiring heat, "no official interpretation of the `hot spot'" was
   provided. (TDR:213)
   
   Given this dubious evidence, it is not surprising that in the month
   after the raid, BATF denied to reporters that it had used allegations
   of a drug laboratory to obtain the helicopters. After press reports
   that BATF had obtained the helicopters under "false pretenses" angered
   Texas Governor Ann Richards, Hartnett sent her a March 27, 1993 memo
   to assure her that there had been sufficient evidence to invoke the
   drug "nexus" exception to the posse comitatus law and obtain free use
   of Texas National Guard helicopters.
   
10. CHRONOLOGY OF FEBRUARY 28, 1993 BATF RAID 
   
   @ This chronology has been assembled largely from Appendix D of the
   Treasury Department report on Waco, other parts of the report and the
   February 28, 1993 "911" audio tapes.
   
   7:30 am--BATF convoy arrives at Bellmead civic center.
   
   7:45--KWTX television reporter and cameraman arrive nearby Mount
   Carmel.
   
   8:00--Undercover agent Robert Rodriguez enters Mount Carmel for Bible
   study. --Raid Commander Chuck Sarabyn briefs ATF convoy at Bellmead
   Civic Center.
   
   8:30--KWTX cameraman warns postman David Jones, a Branch Davidian,
   that a "shootout" is about to occur. Jones returns to Mount Carmel and
   warns Koresh.
   
   8:45--Three Waco Tribune-Herald cars arrive nearby Mount Carmel.
   
   9:05--Rodriguez leaves Mount Carmel, hurries to undercover house
   across the street, calls raid, Commander Sarabyn and tells him that
   Koresh knows BATF and National Guard are coming. Commanders Sarabyn
   and Philip Chojnacki and SAC Ted Royster decide to go ahead with raid.
   
   
   9:10--Chojnacki calls BATF National Command Center in Washington and
   informs them operation is a go.
   
   9:25--Sarabyn arrives at Bellmead, announces operation is to proceed,
   tells agents "Hurry. They know we're coming." ATF agents board cattle
   trailers.
   
   9:29--Helicopters carrying Chojnacki and Royster are on the way to
   Mount Carmel to create a "diversion."
   
   9:30--A long convoy of cars, vans and 3 cattle trailers heads towards
   Mount Carmel.
   
   9:45--Cattle trailers enter drive way of Mount Carmel, followed by
   KWTX television vehicle.
   
   9:47--Sarabyn and Chojnacki end cellular telephone contact. --Raid
   begins; helicopters and agents "taken under fire". --KWTX video crew
   takes cover behind bus.
   
   9:48--Wayne Martin calls 911 to report 75 armed men are attacking
   Mount Carmel. "Attempts continue (19 times) to reach ATF. Contact is
   finally established via TSTC Patrolman `197' at 10:20 am."
   
   9:55--Associate Director Hartnett and Director Higgins are informed
   agents are under fire.
   
   10:03--911 Lieutenant Lynch calls back Mount Carmel after
   disconnection and talks continue. Martin complains about shooting from
   helicopters.
   
   10:20--911 finally contacts ATF and Lieutenant Lynch helps Chojnacki
   and Royster negotiate cease fire.
   
   10:34--Koresh calls 911, soon disconnects.
   
   10:42--Koresh calls 911 again, soon disconnects.
   
   10:46--Schneider and Koresh call 911 and discuss cease fire.
   
   10:49--911 call disconnects. Lynch gives Koresh's cellular phone
   number to Royster who passes it to agent Cavanaugh at the undercover
   house.*
   
   10:59--Lynch negotiates with Martin and Schneider on one line and
   Chojnacki and Royster on the other.
   
   11:27--Cavanaugh finds telephone number on undercover house
   refrigerator door and calls into Mount Carmel and continues
   negotiations.*
   
   11:30--Hartnett unilaterally requests FBI Hostage Rescue Team support.
   
   
   11:39--Agents move in to pick up wounded and dead agents.
   
   11:54--Ambulance moves in to pick up agents.
   
   12:45pm Approx.--ATF agents physically assault KWTX cameraman taking
   pictures of dead agents.
   
   12:37--Lynch gives Schneider Cavanaugh's phone number and direct
   contact is established.* Mid-afternoon--Branch Davidian Donald Bunds
   arrested as tries to return to Mount Carmel by car.
   
   4:55--Agents fire on three Branch Davidians trying to re- enter Mount
   Carmel, Michael Schroeder killed, Delroy Nash arrested, Bob Kendrick
   escapes.
   
   4:00-12:00--David Koresh gives KRLD and CNN radio interviews and tape
   of his sermon is played several times over KRLD. Four children leave
   Mount Carmel.
   
   5:30--FBI Special Agent-in-Charge Jeffrey Jamar arrives at command
   post. --Royster holds first press conference.
   
   10:00pm--Hartnett and FBI Hostage Rescue Team arrive via FBI HRT
   plane. FBI takes charge at 10:00 am March 1, 1993.@@* Seeming
   conflicts occur between accounts in Treasury report text and
   Chronology in Appendix D.

     _________________________________________________________________
   
   Diagram and Drawing from Treasury Department Report - Not to Scale
   Drawing includes undercover house, the lake, Mount Carmel Center and
   hay barn. Altered to include concrete room, water tower, buried bus,
   missing room names.
     _________________________________________________________________
   
11. BATF USED EXCESSIVE FORCE TO SERVE WARRANT 
   
   BATF's executing search and arrest warrants upon the Branch Davidians
   with 76 heavily armed agents utilizing a plan which provided no
   opportunity for the Branch Davidians to cooperate peacefully by itself
   constituted an excessive use of force. As we shall discuss in the
   section on the Branch Davidians' defense, their attorneys can make a
   strong argument that BATF's excessive use of force alone gave the
   Branch Davidians the legal right to shoot back in self- defense.
   
   a. Excessive Numbers of Agents and Weapons
   
   During the June 9 House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, BATF
   Chief of Special Operations Richard L. Garner described the arms
   carried by 76 agents: every agent had a Sig Sauer 9mm semiautomatic
   pistol; 27 agents carried tactical carbine MP-5 9mm semiautomatics;
   snipers were equipped with .308 caliber high power sniper rifles;
   agents also carried 8 AR-15s and 12 shotguns. [126] Agents also
   carried "flash bang" percussion grenades. 9mm rounds in submachine
   guns are highly-penetrating rounds available only to law-enforcement
   special operations teams and the military, and are specifically
   designed to cut through body armor. James L. Pate alleges that it was
   not humanitarian concerns or negotiations that ended the hour- long
   assault, but the fact that agents ran out of ammunition. They had only
   40 rounds left when they finally backed off. [127]
   
   b. Evidence BATF Did Not Properly Serve Warrants
   
   Nothing in Aguilera's affidavit indicated that Koresh or his followers
   would use force to resist service of search and arrest warrants. Nor
   did the Magistrate give the necessary explicit permission for such a
   "no knock" warrant which would permit agents to bypass giving notice
   that they were serving a search warrant. Title 18, U.S.C. 3109 states
   that an officer must give notice of his legal authority and purpose
   before attempting to enter the premises. Only if an officer is refused
   entry is it legal for him or her to use force to gain entry.
   
   Before the trial there was much suspicion that BATF never properly
   served the warrants. BATF spokesperson Jack Killorin told USA Today,
   "We needed 60 seconds of them not being prepared and we would have
   neutralized the compound and gotten the children out." [128] However,
   60 seconds is barely time for an agent to walk to the front door of a
   large building, knock, wait for an adult to answer the door and
   formally announce that he was there to serve a search warrant. What
   BATF had planned was more like a military search and destroy mission
   than any constitutional effort. News reports describe an armed attack.
   "According to witnesses, federal agents hid in livestock trailers as
   they drove up to the compound. As three National Guard helicopters
   approached, the 100 law officers stormed the main home, throwing
   concussion grenades and screaming `Come out!' For a moment, there was
   no response. Then the shooting began. `It was a large barrage of
   gunfire from several places in the house at once,' said Dan Mulloney,
   a KWTX-TV news photographer who followed the agents onto the
   compound." [129] Koresh's attorney Dick DeGuerin asserted Branch
   Davidians alleged, "these two cattle trailers roar up, and people
   start screaming out of the back of them, screaming at the tops of
   their lungs, not anything like, `This is a search' or `We're agents'
   or `Put up your hands' or anything like that. It was just screaming,
   yelling, like Marines storming the beach." [130] An FBI spokesman
   explained to a reporter why BATF agents would not have identified
   themselves, "you don't want to give these guys a chance to get their
   guns. In Waco, there was no announcement of who was there and the fact
   they're there for the lawful purpose of executing a warrant." [131] It
   is obvious from Koresh's 911 conversation that even though he had
   heard it was BATF that was about to raid him, and even though he
   answered the front door himself, a half hour after the raid he was
   still confused about who was attacking him and why. He told Lieutenant
   Larry Lynch of the Sheriff's office, alluding to past talks with the
   office, "We told you we wanted to talk. No. How come you guys try to
   be ATF agents?"
   
   On the fourth day of the trial BATF Special Agent Roland Ballesteros,
   the first to arrive at the front door, took the stand for six hours.
   Ballesteros acknowledged that BATF planners had never had a plan for
   peacefully serving the search and arrest warrants. He said no agent
   had been designated to announce the purpose of the raid. "Basically,
   we all announced. We practiced knocking, announcing, and then going
   through the front door." Asked if he ever rehearsed a peacefully
   entry, he answered, "No, we did not." Ballesteros was armed with a 12
   gauge shotgun, 9mm pistol, and a 38 caliber handgun. He and two other
   agents were also armed with a battering ram.
   
   Ballesteros testified he saw Koresh in the doorway, and yelled,
   "Police, lay down!" He said Koresh answered, "What's going on?" He
   yelled back, "Search warrant, lay down." However, defense attorneys
   pointed out that this was the first time he had mentioned seeing
   Koresh in the door or announcing he was serving a search warrant.
   During his February 28, 1993 interview with the Waco police, his March
   10th interview with the Texas Rangers, and a September 30th pre-trial
   hearing, he did not mention these facts. Ballesteros testified he had
   changed his story because during earlier testimony pain killers from a
   wound he suffered during the raid had dulled his memory.
   
   What "jogged" Ballesteros' memory was a meeting with U.S. Customs
   agents who interviewed him as part of the Treasury Department's review
   of the raid. As a result of this interview, "He changed that version
   of the incidents. . .His Tuesday account of the early minutes of the
   bloody raid agreed with the account he gave customs agents." [132]
   Considering that the Treasury Department was interested in exonerating
   BATF, it seems likely that U.S. Customs agents "helped" Ballesteros
   remember a version more consistent with the Treasury Department's
   version of events. Two days later another BATF agent, Robert Champion,
   testified that agents had identified themselves as police with a
   search warrant--something he also did not tell Texas Rangers in March.
   When questioned by defense attorneys, Champion said the Texas Rangers
   had not specifically queried him about that issue. [133] Branch
   Davidians and their attorneys see Ballesteros and Champion's new
   testimony as one more example of a massive government coverup.
   
12. ALLEGATIONS BATF AGENTS SHOT FIRST 
   
   The Treasury report describes a slightly different version of events
   than Ballesteros' version: "Koresh appeared at the front door and
   yelled, `What's going on?' The agents identified themselves, stated
   they had a warrant and yelled `freeze' and `get down.' But Koresh
   slammed the door before agents could reach it. Gunfire from inside the
   Compound burst through the door. The force of the gunfire was so great
   that the door bowed outward." (TDR:96) Branch Davidians tell the
   opposite story: Koresh told BATF he wanted to talk and agents started
   shooting at him, hitting the front door. (Note that the front door was
   actually a set of two doors, not a single door.)
   
   a. Agents Expected A "Shootout"
   
   The Branch Davidians learned of the impending raid when KWTX camera
   man James Peeler asked directions of Branch Davidian David Jones, who
   was driving his mailman's truck. (Something which would BATF would not
   reveal to the public until six months after the raid.) Two slightly
   different versions of what Jones told Dick DeGuerin about the incident
   confirm the idea that agents were actually expecting a shootout.
   According to a news account, DeGuerin said Peeler told Jones, "Well,
   you better get out of here because there's a National Guard helicopter
   over at TSTC and they're going to have a big shootout with the
   religious nuts." [134] According to the Treasury report, Jones told
   DeGuerin that Peeler told him there were going to be "60 to 70 TABC
   (Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission) guys in helicopters and a
   shoot-out would occur." (TDR:85) Since KWTX's initial information came
   from a private ambulance driver working with BATF (TDR:189), BATF
   agents' expectations of a shoot-out were indirectly transmitted to the
   Branch Davidians.
   
   Moreover, the morning of the raid, many agents read the Waco
   Herald-Tribune's February 27th story about the Branch Davidians and
   raid co-commander Chuck Sarabyn discussed the article with them during
   a briefing. (TDR:82) The story was filled with cult buster accusations
   that the Branch Davidians were dangerous fanatics. Finally, at the
   trial, BATF agent Ballesteros admitted that BATF agents had been
   briefed that they would encounter 20 to 30 or more "Mighty Men." He
   said, "We anticipated we would be met with force." [135]
   
   b. Over Sixty Agents Knew Branch Davidians Were Warned of Raid
   
   After Jones discovered that a raid was imminent, he rushed back to
   Mount Carmel and told Koresh. Koresh then told Rodriguez that he knew
   "ATF and National Guard" were coming and Rodriguez hurried across the
   street and called raid co-commander Chuck Sarabyn. After consulting
   with co-commander Philip Chojnacki, Sarabyn decided to go forward with
   the raid anyway and dashed out to the staging area shouting, "Get
   ready to go, they know we're coming!" and "Koresh knows the ATF and
   National Guard are coming!" (TDR:91) "Over sixty agents who heard
   Sarabyn on the day have since recounted" they heard him given these
   warnings. (TDR:195) On top of the propaganda they had absorbed about
   the Branch Davidians' alleged ferocity, this information must have
   unnerved many agents.
   
   c. Agents Confused by Poor Planning
   
   Besides expectations of a "shootout" and knowledge that the Branch
   Davidians knew they were coming, obvious flaws in the planning may
   have heightened agents' anxiety. According to the Treasury report,
   there had never been a contingency plan for bad weather, the loss of
   surprise, armed resistance or retreat. The commanders of the raid were
   in a helicopter and a cattle truck where they could not communicate
   effectively with agents. Two-way radio communications quickly broke
   down between agents. (TDR:143-156) The Houston Post wrote, "Unless you
   have a very disciplined group, you can expect all hell to break loose
   once any shot is fired; and according to Charles Beckwith, a retired
   Army colonel and founder of the military's anti-terrorist Delta Force,
   the ATF's raid was `very amateur.'" [136]
   
   d. Branch Davidians Did Not Use "Tactical Advantage"
   
   Despite an excellent opportunity to shoot at oncoming
   vehicles--perched as they were in a large building on a hill with an
   excellent view of all oncoming vehicles-- the Branch Davidians did not
   do so. Justice Department outside expert Alan A. Stone commented, "The
   BATF investigation reports that the so-called `dynamic entry' turned
   into what is described as being `ambushed'. As I tried to get a sense
   of the state of mind and behavior of the people in the compound the
   idea that the Branch Davidians' actions were considered an `ambush'
   troubled me. If they were militants determined to ambush and kill as
   many ATF agents as possible, it seemed to me that given their
   firepower, the devastation would have been even worse. . .The ATF
   agents brought to the compound in cattle cars could have been cattle
   going to slaughter if the Branch Davidians had taken full advantage of
   their tactical superiority." (JDR:Stone:18-19)
   
   Agent Ballesteros testified that BATF was "ambushed" because the
   Branch Davidians didn't shoot at them until they were up close to the
   compound. Needless to say, this is a rather nefarious way of
   describing what was more likely their prudently waiting to see if
   BATF's intentions were violent. Defense attorney Dan Cogdell dismissed
   the theory BATF was "ambushed" by dozens of heavily armed Davidians.
   "If there were 46 individuals that used fully automatic weapons we
   wouldn't have four agents dead, we'd have 100 dead," said Dan Cogdell
   [137] In fact, "another Branch Davidian survivor who asked not to be
   named acknowledged that some people inside began to return fire:
   `People were running around everywhere, asking if anybody had any
   guns. Nobody had any handy. Most of what we had was new, still in the
   box.'" [138]
   
   e. David Koresh's Allegations
   
   On the evening of the February 28 raid Koresh described the first
   shots to a KRLD radio reporter: "I begged these men to go away. I had
   wives and I had children. But they didn't listen. . .They came out. I
   was at the front door. I had the front door open so they could clearly
   see me. And then what happened was, I told them, I said `Get back.
   There's women and children here. Get back. I want to talk.' and all of
   the sudden 9mm rounds started firing at the front wall." The reporter
   asked, "Was that when you got wounded?" Koresh answered, "No. They hit
   the metal doors which deflected them. I had my face out where they
   could see me. And then I moved back and all of a sudden the guy
   started firing." That evening Koresh told CNN, "They fired on us
   first. Like I said, they were scared."
   
   Deceased Branch Davidian Steve Schneider's attorney Jack Zimmerman
   says of Koresh's version, "That was confirmed by a number of people
   who heard him say that" and that ATF's version "is a lie." [139] One
   evidence of this is that just 15 minutes after the raid began, Wayne
   Martin told 911 Sheriff's Deputy Larry Lynch, "I have a right to
   defend myself. They started firing first." According to a news report,
   "On his way to a court hearing Wednesday, cult member Livingston
   Fagan, who left the compound Tuesday, told reporters ATF agents fired
   the first shots--a charge the ATF has denied." [140]
   
   f. Agent Ballesteros' Previous Allegations BATF Shot First
   
   In earlier testimony to Waco police and Texas Rangers Agent
   Ballesteros said he thought that agents shooting at the Branch
   Davidians' dogs fired the first shot. At the trial, he changed his
   story and testified that the Branch Davidians did so, shooting through
   the front door. Again, he blamed medication for impairing his memory.
   [141] (The only non-agent to testify that the Branch Davidians shot
   first was Waco Tribune-Herald reporter Marc Masferrer, who was about
   300 yards away at the time. He testified that he thought the first
   shots came from inside the building. A defense attorney commented, "At
   that distance, those people would look like ants." [142] )
   
   g. Photos of Agents Firing Before Bullet Holes Appear in Front Door
   
   Waco Tribune-Herald photos introduced at the trial show agents firing
   before any holes can be seen in the front door. [143] This certainly
   contradicts BATF agents' story that the Branch Davidians fired first,
   out through the front door and that "the force of the gunfire was so
   great that the door bowed outward," as the Treasury report puts it.
   
   h. Evidence Gun Shots Were Fired Inward through the Front Door
   
   Contrary to BATF and Treasury assertions the Branch Davidians fired
   out through the door, Branch Davidians claim the first shots were
   fired at David Koresh and entered inward through the front door.
   Attorney Jack Zimmermann, who had an opportunity to examine the hollow
   metal front doors before the fire, stated that Branch Davidians would
   have fired out through windows, not the door. "What would cause that
   front door to be peppered with holes like that?" [144] The door was
   first rammed by tanks and then burned in the fire. Nevertheless, at
   the trial a Texas Ranger testified they did find one of the two front
   doors. One news report said the door was "crumpled, bullet-
   pocked"--but did not mention in which direction the bullets had
   entered. The Texas Ranger said "that while other doors and many metal
   objects had survived the fire, he believed that the missing door was
   destroyed in the intense heat." When asked if FBI or BATF agents had
   access to the site immediately after the fire, he answered, "I'm sure
   they were both out there." [145] The possibility that BATF or the FBI
   destroyed this evidence after the fire must be investigated.
   
   i. Unreleased BATF Video Tape
   
   Waco television station KWTX had not yet set up their camera when the
   first shots were fired. According to an Associated Press wire press
   story, "ATF associate director Conroy said a video tape taken from an
   ATF helicopter during the raid may help clarify the question of who
   fired the first shots in the deadly shootout that left four ATF agents
   and at least two cult members dead." Supposedly BATF was operating
   more than one video camera, but it has refused to release any tapes.
   [146]
   
   U.S. District Court Judge Walter A. Smith, Jr. ordered that all BATF
   audio and videotapes be persevered and presumably these will be
   released during the trial of the eleven Branch Davidians. [147]
   However, "the judge stopped short of ordering what the lawyers for
   Koresh and his lieutenant, Steve Schneider, had requested, which was
   that they be held by the court and not federal officials." [148]
   (Judge Smith is the judge who will be presiding over the Branch
   Davidian trial.) If the government does not release these tapes during
   the trial, attorney's for Branch Davidians suing the government may
   subpoena them, or other individuals may seek to obtain them under the
   Freedom of Information Act.
   
   j. Audio Analysis from Video Tapes
   
   Even if video cameras were not focused on the scene of the first shots
   as they were fired, the audio portion of the videotapes can still
   provide valuable information, such as, who shot first, whether a
   "flash-bang" grenade was thrown through a window, and whether there
   was shooting from helicopters. Because the audio comes from video
   tapes, the exact location from which the recordings were made will be
   easy to gauge and therefore the exact "geometry" of many of the echoes
   will be ascertainable with great accuracy. The sounds of shooting from
   inside the building, as opposed to from outside it, will be
   significantly different and provide useful evidence. Today
   IBM-compatible sound-analysis software is available which will allow
   anyone to do such analysis with great precision. [149]
   
   k. Law Enforcement Allegations
   
   James L. Pate writes that two law enforcement sources confirmed to him
   that BATF shot first, Texas Ranger "sources," and "federal law
   enforcement sources." The latter said that a BATF agent had an
   accidental discharge as he got out of the cattle trailers in front of
   Mount Carmel. He wounded himself in the leg and cried out, "I'm hit!"
   Everyone then opened fire, thinking it was a signal to initiate fire.
   Pate also states that Steve Willis, one of the BATF agents killed in
   the raid, was assigned to "take out" Koresh if necessary and did fire
   an MP5 SD submachine gun at him from the passenger side of the lead
   pickup truck. [150] While this story may sound far fetched, it is
   certainly one of many allegations that must be explored by an
   independent investigator.
   
13. ALLEGATIONS AGENTS SHOT INDISCRIMINATELY AND FROM HELICOPTERS. 
   
   The Treasury report states that BATF agents "returned fire when
   possible, but conserved their ammunition. They also fired only when
   they saw an individual engage in a threatening action, such as
   pointing a weapon." (TDR:101) However, Branch Davidians claim BATF
   agents fired indiscriminately, including through walls, and that
   helicopters sprayed the building with bullets. News video tapes
   clearly show agents exercising little control over their firing as
   they fire over vehicles with little or no view of what they were
   shooting at. Both BATF Director Higgins at an April 2nd Congressional
   hearing and Treasury Secretary Bentsen during the September 1993
   Treasury Department press conference denied allegations that agent
   fired indiscriminately. [151] BATF may allege that any firing down
   through roofs was done by Branch Davidians firing from the building
   tower or from the water tower.
   
   a. Bullet Evidence in Doors, Walls and Roof
   
   Branch Davidians, and attorneys Dick DeGuerin and Jack Zimmerman who
   visited Mount Carmel during the siege, insist that there was extensive
   evidence that BATF agents shot indiscriminately through Mount Carmel
   Center's front door, walls and roof. They were very concerned with
   preserving this evidence of an out-of-control assault.
   
   The New York Times reported, "both lawyers clearly believed that
   helicopters flying over the compound during the raid had fired into
   upper floors of the main building from above." ATF Spokesperson Jerry
   Singer denied that the helicopters had flown over the compound or
   fired upon it. "The helicopters did not overfly the compound on Feb.
   28 and I have no information that anyone fired from the helicopters."
   However, Jack Zimmerman stated, and Dick DeGuerin concurred, "an
   expert will be able to tell from the angle of the trajectory plus the
   pattern whether there are entry or exit holes. If it's in the ceiling
   and it's clearly an exit hole, it had to come from above. How else
   could it have come in?" [152] Except for half the front door, all this
   evidence was destroyed by the April 19 tank rammings, the fire, and
   the bulldozing of still burning walls into the rubble.
   
   b. Wayne Martin Allegations on 911 tape
   
   Wayne Martin and an unidentified Branch Davidian complain frantically
   to Lieutenant Lynch 15 minutes after the start of the raid about the
   continuing gun fire from BATF agents, even as they themselves withhold
   fire. Nearly continuous gunfire can be heard in the background of the
   tape.
   
   Martin: Another chopper with more people; more guns going off. They're
   firing. That's them, not us.
   
   Unidentified Davidian: There's a chopper with more of them. Lynch:
   What!?
   
   Davidian: Another chopper with more people and more guns going off.
   Here they come!
   
   Lynch: All right, Wayne, tell . . .
   
   Davidian: We're not firing. That's not us, that's them!
   
   Lynch: Okay. Tha . . . All right. Are you, are you ready to come out
   and give up? Are you ready to terminate this Wayne? Martin: We want to
   cease fire! We'll stop!
   
   Lynch: Standby. (he then tries to get in touch with BATF radio van.
   There is more sound of gunshots)
   
   Lynch: Sta . . . Who's firing now?
   
   Davidian: They are!
   
   Wayne: They are!
   
   Lynch: All right. Standby. I'm tryin' to reach 'em. Stand. Don't
   return fire, okay?
   
   Davidian: We haven't been.
   
   Lynch: What?
   
   Davidian: We haven't been. (sounds disgusted)
   
   During the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, an
   FBI agent gave a staff member an excerpted tape of the "911" calls
   between Lieutenant Larry Lynch and Branch Davidians David Koresh and
   Wayne Martin. [153] The tapes, which the Waco Police Department sells
   to the public, were edited into a 30 minute tape. The FBI claimed the
   tape was a "sampler of voice changes." Lawmakers were led to believe
   the tape was verbatim. However, Waco police said the tape gave a
   "false impression of how the events occurred." [154] If one compares
   the transcript of the tape in the hearing record to the Treasury
   Department's chronology, one finds that the section where Wayne Martin
   complains about helicopters shooting at him has been moved towards the
   end of the tape, which would have been well after the helicopters
   withdrew from the scene. This might be evidence that someone wanted to
   discredit Martin's claims and cover up BATF's illegal actions.
   
   c. Agents Shot from Undercover House
   
   The first days of the Branch Davidian trial confirmed what has been
   long suspected--that agents in the undercover house 300 yards from
   Mount Carmel were firing at the building. A Texas Ranger testified
   they had collected 40 used shell casings found in and around the
   undercover house. [155] The Texas Ranger also said that "friendly
   fire" could have struck the driver's door of one of the BATF pickup
   trucks that pulled cattle trailers on February 28th. [156]
   
   d. Catherine Matteson Allegation
   
   "I seen (sic) those trailers drive up. I was downstairs. I thought it
   strange, but I figured they were delivering firewood or something. I
   picked up the Sunday paper and went upstairs to my room, and started
   reading. When next, bullets came through the roof. I could hear the
   helicopters overhead, I got under my bed." [157]
   
   e. Children's Pictures of Bullets Through Roof
   
   A story about psychologist Bruce D. Perry's interviews with Branch
   Davidian children who left Mount Carmel after the raid mentions,
   "Still another child created a picture of a house beneath a rainbow.
   When Perry asked, `Is there anything else?' the child calmly added
   bullet holes in the roof. That was an allusion to the Feb. 28 shootout
   with federal agents that marked the beginning of a 51-day standoff and
   left the compound near Waco scarred with bullet holes." [158] A May
   19, 1993 Newsweek story shows this picture with the caption, "A girl
   drew her home's dotted roof. `Bullets,' she said."
   
   f. Questions about Deaths of 6 Branch Davidians
   
   In opening statements on January 12, 1994, lead prosecutor U.S.
   Assistant Attorney Leroy Jahn said, "On February 28 the occupants of
   Mount Carmel (the cult compound) not only killed ATF, they killed
   their own. People who were too wounded to fight were put out of their
   misery." [159] Prosecutors are referring to the deaths of Peter
   Hipsman, Winston Blake and Koresh's father-in-law, Perry Jones. The
   Treasury report alleges Peter Hipsman received a number of allegedly
   non-fatal wounds and was "later killed by a cult member who shot him
   at close range in the back of his skull--an apparent mercy killing."
   (TDR:101) It alleges Winston Blake's death by a shot to the head from
   two to three feet was from a "cult member." (TDR:104) However, it
   describes no other wounds. Neither does it describe other wounds to
   Perry Jones, who it states committed suicide with one shot to the
   mouth. (TDR:101) However, Rita Riddle, who was at Mount Carmel during
   the BATF raid, stated Jones was shot in the stomach by bullets
   piercing the building walls. [160]
   
   If these individuals did commit suicide or were shot in mercy
   killings, it may have been because they believed that the BATF raid
   was in fact the beginning of a prophesized government massacre. They
   may have wanted to die quickly rather than suffer before being killed
   by the "Babylonians." BATF retains direct responsibility for their
   deaths.
   
   The Treasury report conflicts with statements by Branch Davidians that
   some dead members were not even armed at the time of the attack. Brad
   Bailey and Bob Darden write that the "official version"--which agents
   are not supposed to discuss--is that Peter Gent was carrying a gun on
   top of water tower, shot Steven Willis, and was then shot by a
   sniper--"possibly Rodriguez"--from the undercover house. They note
   that the government denies Gent was shot from a helicopter. [161]
   However, attorney Dick "DeGuerin recounted how witnesses reported Gent
   was working, unarmed, in the water tower. `He was scraping the sides
   of the tank. There was very little or no water in it. He heard all the
   noise, came up and stuck his head out to see what was going on and he
   was shot through the heard. He fell within the water tower onto a
   platform.'"
   
   Branch Davidians also claim Jaydean Wendell had just finished nursing
   her baby when a bullet shot from a helicopter came through the ceiling
   and penetrated her skull, killing her. [162] The New York Times
   repeated Rita Riddle's allegation a woman had been shot in her bed.
   [163] The Treasury report offers no explanation for Jaydean
   Wendell's death from a distant shot by agents. Michael Schroeder, who
   was trying to return to Mount Carmel the afternoon of February 28, was
   shot six times, several times in the back. (TDR:104) More details
   about all these deaths may emerge during the trial.
   
14. ALLEGATIONS FRIENDLY FIRE INJURED OR KILLED SOME AGENTS 
   
   BATF Chief of Intelligence David Troy told the press that "in the
   first two minutes, 16 agents were injured and four were killed." [164]
   It is certainly possible that in those first minutes terrified agents
   firing wildly from the ground and from helicopters injured and killed
   some of their own. During the trial a defense attorney asserted agents
   firing from the undercover house could also have killed or wounded
   some agents. [165]
   
   a. Two Different BATF Versions of Where Two (or Three) Agents Died
   
   The Treasury report states two teams of agents climbed the roof to
   Koresh's second floor living quarters--a bedroom on the west side and
   allegedly an arms room on the east side. Agents Conway LeBleu and Todd
   McKeehan "were to enter Koresh's bedroom from the west side of the
   roof." (TDR:98) They were killed, but the report does not explain
   whether it was on the roof or inside the bedroom, who killed them,
   from what angle the bullets came, what kinds of guns killed them [166]
   and how their bodies were removed from the roof or room. During the
   trial BATF Agent Petrilli said that agents climbed to the roof and
   removed LeBleu and McKeehan's bodies from it. [167]
   
   The Treasury version of two agents killed near or in the bedroom is
   substantially different from the version BATF originally released,
   which held that three agents were killed in the arms room. [168] The
   report admits, "Contrary to some publicly disseminated reports, none
   of the agents that entered the armory were killed." (TDR:100) The fact
   that BATF changed its story has given rise to speculations BATF is
   trying to cover up that McKeehan and LeBleu were killed by friendly
   fire, either from helicopters, ground fire, or agents shooting from
   the roof into the armory. The choppily edited KWTX video tape [169] of
   the entry into the arms room shows an agent throwing a device into and
   then firing into the room after three agents enter. Some claim this
   firing really killed the two agents; some claim it killed all three in
   the arms room, as BATF originally told news reporters.
   
   However, the Treasury report claims that the agents threw the device
   into the window before entering and does not mention the agent firing
   into the room. "At the arms room, Agent Jordan managed to `break and
   rake' (i.e. break the window and clear glass shards) the window and
   Agent Buford threw a distraction device into the room. Buford,
   Constantino and Jordan entered. Inside, Agent Buford saw a person
   armed with an assault rifle backing out of a doorway in the far left
   corner of the room. That individual began firing into the room from
   the other side of the thin walls." Buford was shot twice in the upper
   thigh and Constantino provided cover as Buford and Jordan escaped the
   room. "As Constantino was deciding whether to hold his position or
   make a run for the window, a cult member entered the room aiming an
   assault rifle at him. He fired two or three shots at Constantino.
   Constantino returned fire and the man fell." (TDR:98-100) There is no
   mention of whether Constantino was in or out of the room when he shot.
   
   Some of this confusion was clarified on February 25, 1994 when Agent
   Constantino testified at the Branch Davidian trial. He said that a
   portion of the bullet removed from Agent Jordan was 9mm "hydroshock"
   bullet like his own and acknowledged "it's possible" he may have shot
   Jordan. He did not know if a ballistics test had been done to
   determine if the bullet was from his gun. [170] More investigation of
   this incident and a careful study of the full KWTX videotape of this
   incident remain necessary.
   
   b. "Federal Sources" Admit Evidence Exists
   
   The April 5, 1993 Newsweek reports, "A federal source involved in the
   Waco situation says that `there is evidence that supports the theory
   of friendly fire,' and that during the assault "there was a huge
   amount of cross- fire." [171] Another highly placed federal source
   told James L. Pate "about half of ATF casualties in the raid
   apparently resulted from `friendly fire'." [172]
   
   c. Agents Allege Friendly fire
   
   According to the New York Times, "One agent said that some people
   involved in the raid believed that some agents had been hit by
   so-called friendly fire, although the agent and others said they knew
   of no evidence to support that belief. The agency has strongly denied
   the possibility that any agents were wounded by other agents." [173]
   During January 25, 1994 trial testimony both Agents Constantino and
   later Agent Buford admitted that they suspected or had heard of
   friendly fire incidents. [174]
   
15. BATF INTIMIDATION OF THE PRESS 
   
   BATF agents and officials were originally convinced that the press had
   purposely tipped off the Branch Davidians. They accused KWTX reporter
   John McLamore and cameraman Dan Mulloney of making a deal with the
   Branch Davidians that they would tip them off if they were allowed to
   hide in a tree and tape the raid. [175] Some BATF agents and families
   accused the publisher of Waco Herald-Tribune of being a "murderer" for
   running his series on the Branch Davidians, despite BATF requests to
   hold it off until after the raid. [176] Later they blamed Waco
   Tribune-Herald reporter Mark England because undercover agent
   Rodriguez heard a Branch Davidian tell Koresh "England" was on the
   phone just before he learned of the raid.
   
   On March 17, 1993, BATF agent John T. Risenhoover filed a lawsuit
   claiming that an unnamed Waco Tribune-Herald employee called David
   Koresh and warned him about the impending BATF raid. Risenhoover, who
   was wounded in the ankle and hip, sought damages for hospital costs
   and mental anguish. According to the Treasury report, BATF agents had
   tried to convince the newspaper not to publish their expose of the
   Branch Davidians until after the raid and mistakenly thought they had
   an agreement to that effect. (TDR:69) Risenhoover's lawsuit also
   claimed the newspaper reneged on an agreement to withhold its series
   on the Davidians until BATF completed its investigation. One assumes
   this is something higher-up BATF officials would have to have told
   Risenhoover. However, the editors denied ever making such an
   agreement, and SAC Chojnacki was very angry or "hot," because editors
   said they were unconcerned about how their series would affect raid
   plans. (TDR:71) BATF immediately distanced itself from Risenhoover's
   lawsuit. "This is strictly between the agent and the newspaper," said
   BATF spokeswoman Sharon Wheeler. [177] However, many suspect that this
   was just part of a broader government effort to intimidate the press
   and the media.
   
16. BATF COVERUP 
   
   The Treasury Department report admits only that BATF commanders tried
   to cover up their decision to go ahead with the raid despite the loss
   of surprise, and that several officials disregarded evidence that they
   were covering up. Below we list evidence that this admitted coverup is
   but one of many.
   
   a. Dubious Allegations about Koresh Statements
   
   Undercover agent Robert Rodriguez alleged in the second, March 5, 1993
   affidavit that when Koresh learned of the impending BATF assault he
   said to Rodriguez, "Neither ATF or the National Guard will ever get
   me. They got me once, and they will never get me again." However,
   neither the BATF or the National Guard had ever arrested or "gotten"
   Koresh before, so this statement would seem to be either a fabrication
   or a misunderstanding of a Koresh statement.
   
   b. Unverified Reports of Machine Gun Fire and Grenades
   
   The Treasury report alleges "unrelenting automatic and semiautomatic
   weapons fire" from the Branch Davidians. (TDR:101) However, according
   to Paul Blackman, "firearms experts who have heard videotapes of the
   incident have heard no such regular rapid fire." [178] Also, news
   reports state, "Officials said today that two of the wounded agents
   were hit by fragments of hand grenades lobbed from the compound."
   [179] Again, we will not have certain evidence until the government
   releases all audio and video tapes. We do not know if it is possible
   to distinguish between BATF "flash-bang" grenades and explosive ones.
   
   c. False Report Members Try to "Shoot their Way Out"
   
   At 4:55 p.m. on February 28 Branch Davidians Michael Schroeder, Delroy
   Nash and Woody Kendrick together approached Mount Carmel in an effort
   to re-enter it. They came upon BATF agents Dyer, Brigance and Appel
   who were moving away from the hay barn and towards the evacuation
   point. The agents claim that when they identified themselves, the
   three shot at them and the agents returned fire. (TDR:111, Appendix
   D:19) Schroeder was shot six times but escaped into the brush where he
   died. His body was not recovered for several days. Nash was arrested
   and Kendrick escaped; he was arrested a few days later. Initially,
   BATF told the press these individuals were shot trying to shoot their
   way out of Mount Carmel. BATF's original, inaccurate story has raised
   suspicions that BATF agents are trying to cover up an improper attack
   on the three Branch Davidians. Evidently, BATF never adequately
   corrected this story. As late as April 20, the Washington Post
   reported in a sidebar, "Sunday, Feb. 28. . .6 p.m. Three cult members
   storm out of the compound." [180] During the trial, Bob Kendrick and
   Delroy Nash, who were with him at the time, will present the Branch
   Davidian's side of the story about their meeting with federal agents
   near the "hay barn."
   
   d. BATF Denies Branch Davidians Captured and Released Four BATF Agents
   
   Dick DeGuerin and Jack Zimmerman assert that four BATF agents were
   captured inside the compound in the gun battle, disarmed, then
   released during a cease-fire. "They had their arms up, threw down
   their guns, and were taken into custody. That much is clear from the
   videotape. Their release and the entire cease-fire was a suggestion of
   the Branch Davidians." Waco television video tapes of the raid show
   people coming out of the compound with their hands up, but, according
   to news reports "it was not clear whether the people had been caught
   in the crossfire or had come from inside the compound." However, BATF
   spokesperson Jerry Singer "denied that agents of the bureau were
   captured and then released. `No,' he said, `It did not happen.'" [181]
   
   However, during the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee
   hearing, McLennan County Sheriff's Lieutenant Larry Lynch mentioned
   his negotiations with Wayne Martin regarding "ATF wounded." "I still
   had Wayne on the line and was working with Wayne to get ATF into
   the--back into the compound to get their wounded. . .I would talk to
   Wayne and get Wayne's assurance that there would not be firing, that
   ATF was coming in to retrieve their wounded." [182] Perhaps BATF
   prefers to consider its agents "wounded," rather than "captured."
   However, if government- issued weapons had been found after the fire,
   it would support the Branch Davidians' contention and show that BATF
   told yet another lie. We do not know if such guns were found.
   
   e. BATF Takes Gun Dealer McMahon Into "Protective Custody"
   
   On March 1, 1993, BATF agents took custody of gun dealer Henry McMahon
   and his woman friend Karen Kilpatrick who had recently moved to
   Florida. In September, 1993, Dick DeGuerin told the Freedom of
   Information Foundation media panel on Waco: "They told these two
   people they were in danger from Branch Davidians who were not inside
   Mount Carmel who might try to kill them and convinced them to ask for
   protective custody. Mr. McMahon and his friend soon realized they'd
   been tricked into asking for protective custody but ATF flew them to
   Oregon. . .flew them down to Waco. The purpose of that was to prevent
   you from talking to them." [183] In late April, 1993, McMahon and
   Kilpatrick were interviewed on a Pensacola television show "Lawline."
   They stated that during these weeks BATF agents tried to keep them
   away from both the FBI and the press. [184]
   
   James L. Pate alleges that BATF agent Davy Aguilera lied when he
   stated that McMahon had referred to Koresh as "my preacher" and when
   he alleged McMahon tried to hide from him the fact that Howell and
   Koresh were the same person, allegations repeated in the Treasury
   report. (TDR:26, Appendix D:5) Pate writes: "Interviewed by phone
   about the Treasury report's claims, McMahon told SOF that he and his
   girlfriend/business partner Karen Kilpatrick informed Aguilera
   truthfully that Koresh was `a' preacher, not their preacher. `We were
   never members of that church-- never went to a single church service
   out there,' Kilpatrick told SOF. . .As for properly identifying Koresh
   to the ATF, McMahon said gun dealers are required to check drivers'
   licenses for identification on paperwork documenting gun purchases.
   McMahon did so, using a Texas driver's license for identification on
   paperwork identifying the buyer as Vernon Wayne Howell." Knowing
   Koresh had changed his name, McMahon wrote "in parentheses after
   Howell's name on the ATF yellow forms: `AKA David Koresh.' Henry
   McMahon wasn't trying to hide anything from anyone and Aguilera knew
   this. But Aguilera lied. . .in an effort to discredit McMahon's
   knowledge of ATF wrongdoing." [185] McMahon has not been charged with
   conspiracy to manufacture machineguns, despite his selling many
   weapons to the Branch Davidians.
   
   f. Paul Fatta Charged After Leaving Waco
   
   Another individual who could attest to the Branch Davidians' legal gun
   business was Paul Fatta, who ran the business. He was in Austin with
   his son at a gun show on the morning of February 28. When he returned
   to Waco that afternoon, Fatta called radio station KRLD, which had
   been interviewing David Koresh. The station broadcast Fatta telling
   the radio interviewers that authorities had refused to give him
   information, and that he wanted to get back to Mount Carmel.
   
   According to Ron Engelman, who talked to Paul Fatta several times
   during the siege, Fatta then offered his assistance in bringing about
   a peaceful end to the standoff. However, authorities refused his help
   and were abusive towards him. After a week he left Waco for Oregon.
   BATF immediately issued a warrant for his arrest on the charge of
   conspiracy to manufacture and possess unregistered machine guns and
   stated that he was "armed and dangerous." Engelman said this action
   frightened Fatta into believing that BATF would murder him if he
   surrendered to them. [186] Fatta finally surrendered to Texas Rangers
   in Houston on April 26. "Mike DeGuerin, Mr. Fatta's attorney, said his
   client did not surrender earlier because of his mistrust of federal
   agents." [187]
   
   g. Raid Commanders and BATF Officials Covered Up Loss of Surprise
   
   Part Two, Section Seven of the Treasury report is entitled "ATF
   Post-Raid Dissemination of Misleading Information About the Raid and
   the Raid Plan." (TDR:193-209) The report states, "raid commanders
   Chojnacki and Sarabyn appear to have engaged in a concerted effort to
   conceal their errors in judgement. And ATF's management, perhaps out
   of a misplaced desire to protect the agency from criticism, offered
   accounts based on Chojnacki and Sarabyn's statements, disregarding
   clear evidence that those statements were false." (TDR:193)
   
   When BATF finally informed higher Treasury Department officials of the
   planned raid Friday, February 26, 1993, then Acting Assistant
   Secretary of the Treasury John P. Simpson decided the action was too
   dangerous and "directed that the operation not go forward." Also
   expressing reservations was Ronald K. Noble, the designated but
   unconfirmed Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Law Enforcement,
   who was acting as a consultant. In a Friday night conference call,
   Higgins told Simpson and Noble that he had obtained reassurance from
   raid co-commander Philip Chojnacki that the "raid could be executed
   safely" and that "the raid would be aborted. . .if things did not look
   right," i.e., if there was any evidence of a "change in routine."
   Simpson allowed the raid to go forward, "after these assurances were
   given." (TDR:75-76) During the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations
   subcommittee hearing Higgins stated he "instructed Dan (Hartnett) . .
   .if there is any indication that we have lost that element of
   surprise, simply do not do the raid. And I was assured that would be
   the case." [188] Noble told the same committee Higgins told him, "if
   for any reason they lose the element of surprise. . .express orders or
   directives to call off the operation." [189]
   
   However, even after Chojnacki learned from his co-commander Chuck
   Sarabyn that the Branch Davidians knew BATF was coming, and after
   consulting briefly with SAC Ted Royster--who did not have an official
   title for the raid, but was still a raid leader, he allowed the raid
   to go forward. Chojnacki even called the National Command Center in
   Washington and reported that the raid was commencing. He did not
   report that the Branch Davidians knew about the raid. When Rodriguez
   learned that the raid was underway he was "distraught." (TDR:89-91,
   165)
   
   It would be almost two months before this account of what really
   happened that morning would be related to the press and public. >From
   the start, BATF officials denied reports like the Los Angeles Times
   that an agent was heard shouting, "We've gotta move. He's been tipped
   off." [190] BATF's Law Enforcement Associate Director Daniel Hartnett,
   Deputy Associate Director Edward Conroy, and Intelligence Division
   Chief David Troy, who became the principal BATF spokesperson,
   immediately interviewed undercover agent Rodriguez and three other
   agents who were with Rodriguez when he made the important call to
   Sarabyn. All confirmed that Rodriguez had told Sarabyn that Koresh
   knew that BATF raid was imminent.
   
   However, Hartnett and Troy gave less credence to their stories than to
   commander Chuck Sarabyn's story that Rodriguez "was not real
   descriptive as to the ATF-National Guard statement" and commander
   Philip Chojnacki's claim that Sarabyn hadn't told him anything about
   Koresh's foreknowledge. So Troy continued to deny to the press that
   the commanders knew that Koresh had been alerted to the impending
   raid. (TDR:196-199)
   
   Meanwhile, the Texas Rangers were gathering even more evidence,
   including from 60 BATF agents, that raid commanders Sarabyn and
   Chojnacki knew that they had lost the element of surprise. They passed
   this along to Hartnett and Conroy. However, "Hartnett and Conroy
   failed to keep (BATF Director) Higgins informed about the mounting
   weight of evidence that Sarabyn and Chojnacki's account was false," so
   Higgins continued to mislead the press and public. In late March
   Director Higgins wrote a memo to BATF agents denying there was a
   coverup of "mistakes in planning, leadership or both" after he
   discovered some agents were planning to make coverup allegations to
   the media. [191]
   
   Finally in early April, after a number of agents contacted Higgins
   directly to complain about these misstatements, did Higgins ask for a
   copy of Rodriguez statement. Yet for another month he allowed Hartnett
   and Conroy to instruct Troy to keep misleading the press. Only under
   pressure from the Treasury review team did Sarabyn, Chojnacki,
   Hartnett and Conroy finally admit to their roles in the coverup.
   (TDR:199-206) SAC Ted Royster also participated in the coverup,
   claiming he did not know that surprise had been lost. When Noble
   threatened him with disciplinary action, "Royster then sent agents a
   three-page letter outlining personal pressures and career problems
   that caused his memory lapse." [192]
   
   Chojnacki and Sarabyn also tried to cover up their lack of
   professionalism and errors by altering the written plan of the raid,
   which they had not issued before it took place. They did not tell the
   Texas Rangers or the Treasury review team that it had been altered.
   They then tried to blame the alterations on a lower ranking agent who
   had assisted them and finally admitted the truth to the review team.
   (TDR:208-210)
   
   Immediately after the release of the Treasury Department report on
   Waco, Treasury Secretary Bentsen put Hartnett, Conroy, Troy, Chojnacki
   and Sarabyn on administrative leave. Hartnett and Conroy immediately
   resigned. Bentsen also removed BATF Director Higgins, who had another
   month to go before retirement.
   
   The Treasury Department is willing to admit to this coverup because so
   many disgusted and vocal agents had complained about it. However, both
   BATF agents and the Treasury Department continue to defend BATF's
   slipshod investigation and excessive use of force in serving the
   search and arrest warrants. Therefore we cannot rule out the
   possibility of other coverups which only an Independent Counsel
   investigation can discover.
   
   h. Raid Commanders May Have Lied about Firing from Helicopters
   
   According to the Treasury report raid commander SAC Philip Chojnacki
   was in one of the three National Guard helicopters "at the outset of
   the firefight." (TDR:154) According to Clifford L. Linedecker, Ted
   Royster was also in one of the helicopters. [193] Both Chojnacki and
   Royster would go on to lie to their superiors about whether they knew
   if the element of surprise had been lost. Therefore, we must wonder if
   they also lied about whether there was firing from helicopters.
   
   i. Government Keeps Warrants Sealed After Koresh Sees Them
   
   On February 28, 1993 BATF had the Magistrate seal the contents of the
   affidavit and search and arrest warrants "to ensure the integrity of
   an ongoing criminal investigation against Vernon Wayne Howell and
   others. It is believed that evidence may be altered should the
   direction of the investigation become evident." This prevented the
   public from discovering the grounds for the raid. "One problem with
   either criticism or support for the government is that the reasons for
   the raid remain largely secret. The original search and arrest
   warrants remain sealed, and the ATF won't say exactly what it was
   looking for, or what information it has. The agency has insisted that
   it has a legal right to keep the warrants sealed until they have been
   executed." [194]
   
   On March 19th the FBI delivered to Koresh "copies of legal documents
   concerning the ATF warrants." (JDR:74) Despite the fact that Koresh
   now knew the contents of both the February 25th and the later March 5
   affidavit and search warrant, the government refused to release these
   to the press and public until April 20, 1993, the day after Koresh's
   death.
   
   j. Possibility BATF will Tamper with Audio/Video Evidence
   
   Above we noted that U.S. district court Judge Walter A. Smith, Jr.
   ordered that all BATF audio and videotapes be preserved. However,
   defense attorneys had requested that the judge retain the tapes to
   prevent any tampering to delete evidence of government wrongdoing or
   create evidence of Branch Davidian wrongdoing. With modern audio and
   video techniques, such tampering can go virtually undetected;
   therefore, the government's keeping the tapes assures that many will
   continue to doubt whatever evidence they present.
   
   k. BATF Involved with Texas Rangers' Investigation
   
   As we have seen the U.S. Attorney's office in Waco deputized the Texas
   Rangers as U.S. Marshals for the criminal investigation and
   prosecution. Nevertheless, there is evidence of continued BATF
   interference with the investigations--including after the fire. The
   Justice report states, "a memorandum of understanding between the FBI
   and ATF gave the ATF jurisdiction in cases involving the injury or
   death of their own agents." (JDR:23) It was BATF agents Aguilera and
   Dunagan who continued to issue search and arrest warrants during the
   siege.
   
   The Texas Rangers took charge of the ruins of Mount Carmel the
   afternoon of the fire. During the first days of the trial, a Texas
   Ranger "recounted barricading the site after the standoff to assure
   there would be no coverup." [195] Nevertheless, during the next few
   days BATF and FBI agents had access to the crime scene--and ample
   opportunity to tamper with evidence. News video tapes and photos
   clearly show that BATF agents hoisted a BATF flag over Mount Carmel's
   still smoldering ruins. And the Treasury report admits "after the
   Compound was ravaged by fire, ATF firearms explosives experts
   collected evidence of the firearms and other destructive devices
   Koresh and his followers had possessed." (TDR:128) Again, many believe
   that deputizing state investigators as U.S. Marshals prevented them
   from fully investigating possible BATF and FBI crimes against the
   Branch Davidians.
   
   l. Questions About Weapons Found After the Fire
   
   The Treasury report states, "based on the materials recovered, the
   experts concluded that Koresh possessed: 57 pistols, 6 revolvers, 12
   shotguns, 101 rifles, 44+ machineguns, 16+ silencers, 6 flare
   launchers, 3 live grenades plus numerous components, and 200,000
   rounds of unused ammunition." (TDR:128) Two 50 caliber rifles were
   among the rifles found. [196] Among these items, only the machineguns,
   the live grenades, and the silencers would have been illegal. During
   the third day of the trial, Texas Rangers reported finding 48 machine
   guns, one silencer, six pieces of tubing being converted into
   silencers, but no live grenades among the many grenade parts. Also,
   the expert said there was no way of knowing if any of the machineguns
   actually had been fired. [197]
   
   As we have seen, BATF--and FBI--agents had access to the ruins of
   Mount Carmel for 24 hours after the fire. BATF had the time and
   opportunity to tamper with evidence. And they certainly had the
   motive--excusing the February 28 raid which killed four of their
   agents and set in motion the 51 day siege and caused the death of 86
   or more Branch Davidians. These facts, and BATF agents' history of
   coverup in this issue, have prompted wide speculation that BATF
   "planted" evidence in the form of burned illegal weapons. However,
   news reports have not mentioned defense attorneys questioning the
   authenticity of the weapons found.
   
   Further, there has been little discussion of whether the illegal
   machine guns, grenades and silencers were assembled from legal parts
   before the February 28th raid by 76 armed BATF agents, or after it, by
   Branch Davidians, in self-defense. Papers filed at the time Schroeder
   agreed to plea bargain state that she "admitted being an armed guard
   from the day of the initial raid until March 12th, when she left the
   compound. Though she was unarmed during the actual shootout, she
   admitted that after the standoff began, she carried a semiautomatic
   AR-15 rifle and later a fully automatic AR-15 machinegun when she took
   up her guard posts." [198] The fact that she admitted to carrying
   automatic weapons only "later" might be evidence that they were
   manufactured after the BATF attack.
   
17. TREASURY DEPARTMENT COVERUP 
   
   The Treasury Department report does expose inept planning and
   execution of the BATF raid on the Branch Davidians. However, it
   defends the probable cause basis for the search and arrest warrants
   and excuses the decision to go forward with a paramilitary raid. There
   is other disturbing evidence of coverup which support the argument
   that an Independent Counsel must be appointed to investigate the
   federal government's destruction of the Branch Davidian religious
   group.
   
   a. Ronald K. Noble Conflict of Interest
   
   In late April, 1993, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen selected
   Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Law Enforcement Ronald K.
   Noble to head the investigation of BATF's handling of the raid on the
   Branch Davidians. As we know, Noble approved the decision to go ahead
   with the raid. Since he had not been confirmed, Noble had no formal
   authority at that point. However, he still retains moral
   responsibility. So Noble would seem to have little interest in issuing
   a report that would either challenge significantly BATF's
   investigation or operations modus operandi or energetically seek
   evidence of criminal behavior on the part of BATF agents or officials.
   
   
   b. No Testimony Taken Under Oath
   
   There is no indication that any individuals gave testimony under oath
   to those who conducted the review. In fact, the Treasury's "review
   team" seems to have been hampered in getting at the whole truth by
   "employment contracts," the "Privacy Act" and the "Federal Advisory
   Committee Act." (TDR:6) There is also no evidence that any of the BATF
   officials who testified before Congressional committees were sworn in,
   though they still could be prosecuted were it proved they had lied to
   a Congressional committee. Therefore, much of the truth about what
   really happened at Waco will come out only during the trials of the
   Branch Davidians, civil law suits against the government or through an
   independent investigation.
   
   c. Treasury Department Attempts to Seal Investigation Records
   
   In mid-August 1993 the Treasury Department proposed a rule to exempt
   the Treasury Department's report from public scrutiny. "In accordance
   with the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended,
   Departmental Offices, Office of Enforcement is proposing to exempt a
   system of records, the Waco Administrative Review Group Investigation
   (DO/.207) from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. The exemptions
   are intended to increase the value of the system of records for law
   enforcement and investigative purposes, to comply with legal
   prohibitions against the disclosure of certain kinds of information,
   and to protect the privacy of individuals identified in the system of
   records. The exemptions are intended to increase the value of the
   system of records for the fact finding investigation and
   administrative review performed by the Waco Administrative Review
   Group so as not to reveal local, state or Federal law enforcement
   techniques, sources and methods or affect the ability of law
   enforcement agencies to prosecute people for criminal wrongdoing."
   
   The Treasury Department gave the public a month to comment. It
   received 5,150 telegrams and letters, most in the last few days before
   the deadline. Representative Pat Schroeder wrote: "I strongly oppose
   this rule. While I can appreciate the Treasury Department's desire to
   complete a successful investigation and prosecute people for
   wrongdoing, the public and media's right to know should not be
   compromised." [199]
   
   Austin's Freedom of Information Foundation sent out a press release
   supporting the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. It said
   "any reporters who were targeted in the investigation should have
   access to the findings and be allowed to amend any records about
   themselves. . .In addition, the committee said the notice of the
   exemption is too broad and would exempt all records of the review
   group, not just those that are withheld for the purposes outlined in
   the exemption." [200] David Kopel, director of Firearms Research
   Project in Denver said, "I think it is a scandalous attempt to cover
   up the facts surrounding one of the greatest governmental disasters in
   the 20th century." Larry Pratt of the Gun Owners of America--which has
   protested the fact that BATF considers Koresh's showing its videotapes
   as evidence of criminal intent--asserted, "I think this means that not
   only is the fox in charge of the chicken coop, he's not going to let
   anyone inside to see how many bones he's picked clean." [201]
   
   d. Treasury Department Report Demonizes Koresh and Branch Davidians
   
   The Treasury report excuses any errors in BATF's investigation or
   affidavit of probable cause and its overly aggressive paramilitary
   raid by demonizing Koresh and the Branch Davidians. "The extraordinary
   discipline that Koresh imposed on his followers, which enable him, for
   example, to obtain all their assets and to establish exclusive sexual
   relationships with the Compound's female residents, while not itself
   cause for ATF intervention, made him far more threatening than a lone
   individual who had a liking for illegal weapons. The Compound became a
   rural fortress, often patrolled by armed guards, in which Koresh's
   word--or the word that Koresh purported to extrapolate from the
   Scriptures--was the only law. And the accounts of the former cult
   members, including an abused child, that Koresh was sexually abusing
   minors made it clear that Koresh believed he was beyond society's
   laws. Were Koresh to decide to turn his weapons on society, he would
   have devotees to follow him, and they would be equipped with weapons
   that could inflict serious damage." (TDR:127) Branch Davidians deny
   Koresh took all their assets and controlled their sex lives. And
   government is not empowered to assault individuals or groups merely
   because they could conceivably "decide" to attack others.
   
   It is interesting to note that despite the government's assertion the
   Branch Davidian's were under Koresh's spell, BATF Associate Director
   Daniel Hartnett told the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations
   subcommittee hearing that it would have been difficult to lure Koresh
   away from Mount Carmel because he "feared that some of the people in
   side the compound, his followers, were going to turn against him," and
   "he was almost paranoid--at least the way it was being described to
   me--that something was going to happen to him by his followers." [202]
   
   e. Evidence of Coverup in the Treasury Department Report
   
   Throughout this report we have noted where the Treasury report has
   failed to provide information--even when it would not seem necessary
   to "redact" it per law--or has provided questionable information. The
   examples most indicative of coverup are: no mention of the Branch
   Davidians legal weapons business; ignoring or correcting Davy
   Aguilera's misleading or inaccurate statements without mentioning he
   made them; not including Aguilera's affidavit in the Treasury report;
   supporting Aguilera's contention that McMahon lied to him about Koresh
   and Howell being same person; no acknowledgement of Koresh's past
   cooperation with law enforcement; not discussing whether publicity was
   a BATF motivation for the raid; not admitting that BATF knew that
   George Roden's former tenants were known drug traffickers; not
   admitting that BATF initially denied they had made a claim of a drug
   nexus to obtain free military and National Guard support; not
   admitting that no agent was assigned to announce the search warrant,
   that a battering ram was to be used, or that Chuck Sarabyn warned
   agents to expect gunfire; no mention of allegations of friendly fire
   or agents firing from helicopters; no mention of the false initial
   report that three Branch Davidians tried to shoot their way out of
   Mount Carmel; no mention of Henry McMahon being taken into protective
   custody or of Paul Fatta being put on the "most wanted list" after
   offering his help to BATF.
   
   f. Treasury Department Has Taken No Further Action Against Agents or
   Officials
   
   In early October, 1993, Robert Cesca, Treasury Deputy Inspector
   General, was reviewing whether to launch a full scale investigation of
   agents and officials actions. As we have seen, two BATF agents and two
   BATF officials were immediately put on administrative leave and
   Director Higgins was dismissed one month before the end of his term.
   Any charges the inspector general's office might recommend would be
   referred to the Justice Department. In late September, Representative
   Charles E. Schumer, chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime
   said he thought "those involved should be fully prosecuted." However,
   a call to his office revealed he was only calling for prosecuting
   agents for official misconduct, such as lying to superiors. Similarly,
   these are probably the only prosecutions the Treasury Department might
   consider. As of January, 1994, there had been no action to prosecute
   anyone.
   
   g. No Recommendations to Prevent Future Tragedy
   
   What lessons has BATF learned from Waco? Only two, it would seem--they
   need better guns and better spies. An official at the Treasury
   Department's September 30, 1993, press conference can be heard to
   utter a comment about the need for better guns. And John W. Magaw,
   acting director of BATF, stated he was determined that other religious
   "cults" not develop into "armed compounds." "They're out there. They
   don't yet have the kind of weaponry that we saw in Waco. . .but they
   will develop if society allows them to." Magaw said ATF is keeping
   tabs on "cult-like organizations" in "three or four places around the
   country. . .We're trying to monitor way early in the game." [203]
   During an October, 1993 House Appropriations subcommittee hearing
   Philip K. Noble told lawmakers: "Although we cannot prejudge all
   future situations, we must be open to the possibility that a dynamic
   entry--exposing agents, innocent persons and children to gunfire--may
   simply not be an acceptable law enforcement option. [204] Time will
   tell if BATF ends its aggressive modus operandi.
   
18. COMMITTEE FOR WACO JUSTICE CONCLUSIONS 
   
   a. BATF Drove Branch Davidians to Armed Defense
   
   The Committee for Waco Justice believes that the Bureau of Alcohol,
   Tobacco and Firearms drove the Branch Davidian religious group to
   self-defense because of its conspicuous surveillance, its refusal to
   acknowledge Branch Davidian attempts to cooperate, its collusion with
   "cult busters" committed to destruction of the group, and its use of
   excessive force in executing search and arrest warrants. Given their
   religious views that the government was intent on massacring them, it
   is understandable why the Branch Davidians resorted to armed defense.
   While we believe this was not the wisest choice, we believe that it
   was legal self-defense.
   
   b. Independent Counsel Should Prosecute Responsible BATF Agents and
   Officials
   
   Under current law the Attorney General can appoint an Independent
   Counsel to identify and prosecute any BATF agents and officials
   suspected of committing any and all relevant crimes, including the
   following: * Official Misconduct for disobeying superior's orders and
   covering up their disobedience; this would apply to anyone found
   participating in any other to-be-discovered coverups.
   
   * Negligent Homicide for carrying out an unnecessary and ineptly
   planned paramilitary raid, against specific orders, which resulted the
   deaths of four BATF agents and five Branch Davidians;
   
   * Homicide or Manslaughter in the death of Branch Davidian Michael
   Schroeder should it be learned that the alleged "shootout," on the
   afternoon of February 28, 1993 was in fact an unlawful and/or
   excessive use of force against Schroeder;
   
   * Conspiracy against the Rights of Citizens U.S. Code Title 18,
   Section 241 reads: "If two or more persons conspire to injure,
   oppress, threaten, or intimidate any inhabitant of any State,
   Territory, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right
   or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
   States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or if two or
   more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
   another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or
   enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured- they shall be fined
   not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both:
   and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any
   term of years or for life."
   
   * Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law U.S. Code Title 18, Section
   242 reads: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
   regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State,
   Territory or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
   immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
   United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on
   account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color,
   or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be
   fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
   both; and if bodily injury results shall not be fined under this title
   or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results
   shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life."
   
   On the evening of February 28, 1993, the Treasury Department and BATF
   agreed to turn over control of the scene to the FBI. By that time
   Special Agent-in-Charge Jeffrey Jamar of the San Antonio office, who
   had been put in charge of the operation, had already driven up to
   Waco. The FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and several Special Weapons
   and Tactics Teams (SWAT) also began arriving that day. (JDR:9,27)
   [205]
   
   Meanwhile, Koresh and the Branch Davidians were convinced that BATF's
   attack was the opening of the Fifth Seal: that those six Branch
   Davidians slaughtered February 28th were killed for "preaching God's
   word" and the surviving Branch Davidians only would have to "rest a
   little longer" until the remainder were also put to death. Thus would
   begin the countdown to Apocalypse and the Second Coming of Christ.
   They also believed that the siege was an opportunity to spread
   Koresh's message to the world that God was giving humanity its last
   opportunity to repent. [206]
   
   The FBI regarded the Branch Davidians' resistance as "a direct
   challenge to lawful federal warrants and to duly authorized law
   enforcement officials" (JDR:12) and had little sympathy with either
   the Branch Davidians' religious beliefs--or their complaints about
   BATF's excessive use of force. Doubtless, Koresh was looking for a way
   to come out that would be consistent with his religious views and his
   sense of dignity. However, during 51 days of the siege, negotiators'
   efforts to convince them to surrender were continually undermined by
   HRT Commander Richard Rogers' persuading siege commander SAC Jeffrey
   Jamar to allow him to escalate pressure tactics and psychological
   warfare. As early as March 1, 1993, there were predictions that the
   government's intentions towards the Branch Davidians were violent.
   Former McLennan County District Attorney Vic Feazell, who had
   unsuccessfully prosecuted the Branch Davidians for the shootout with
   George Roden, criticized federal agents for "storm trooper" tactics in
   laying siege to Mount Carmel and predicted a grim end to the standoff.
   "The feds are preparing to kill them," he said, noting the
   mobilization of military equipment. "That way they can bury their
   mistakes. And they won't have attorneys looking over what they did
   later at a trial." [207]
   
FBI-JUSTICE DEPARTMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COVERUP: THE
51 DAY SIEGE AND APRIL 19, 1993 ASSAULT ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS 
   
   In this section the Committee for Waco Justice report describes the
   FBI's violations of constitutional rights and use of excessive force
   in its handling of both the siege and the April 19th destruction of
   Mount Carmel and the subsequent FBI and Justice Department coverup.
   The report then presents the Committee for Waco Justice conclusions:
   that the FBI effectively massacred the Branch Davidians and that the
   Attorney General should appoint an Independent Counsel to identify and
   prosecute responsible agents and officials for official misconduct,
   violations of rights, and negligent--or even intentional-- homicide.
   We will present further recommendations in the last section of this
   report.
   
   It should be noted that none of the testimony given to the Justice
   Department "review teams" or to Congress was given under oath. Also,
   the Justice Department report does not include information which might
   affect the prosecutions of the Branch Davidians now on trial. (The
   Justice report specifies where material is being withheld by using the
   notation {material redacted as required by statute}.)
   
   The "Justice Department report" issued October 8, 1993, consists of 5
   separate documents. Assistant to the Attorney General Richard Scruggs
   compiled the largest report, the Justice Department factual report.
   Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann issued the short report
   "Lessons of Waco: Proposed Changes in Law Enforcement." Edward S.G.
   Dennis, Jr. issued an "Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch
   Davidian Stand-off in Waco, Texas." Finally, nine outside experts
   submitted recommendations compiled in "Recommendations of Experts for
   Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco." The tenth outside
   expert, Alan A. Stone, M.D., submitted a separate report one month
   later.
   
   WHITE HOUSE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND FBI CHAINS OF COMMAND FEBRUARY 28
   - APRIL 19, 1993
   
   WHITE HOUSE
   
       Bill Clinton - President
       Thomas McLarty - Chief of Staff
       Bernard Nussbaum - White House Counsel
       Vince Foster - Deputy White House Counsel
       Bruce Lindsay - Presidential Advisor
       George Stephanopolous - Communications Director
       
   JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
   
       Stuart M. Gerson - Acting Attorney General (From Feb. 28-March 12)
       
       Webster Hubbell - Assistant to Acting Attorney General
       Gerson, liaison between Clinton and Justice Department
       Janet Reno- Attorney General (From March 12)
       Richard Scruggs - Assistant to the Attorney General
       Philip B. Heymann - Deputy Attorney General
       Webster Hubbell - Associate Attorney General
       Carl Stern, Director of the Office of Public Affairs
       Mark Richard - Deputy Assistant Attorney General
       Ronald Ederer - U.S. Attorney (James DeAtley, his assistant)
       Bill Johnston - Assistant United States Attorney in Waco
       John Phinizy - Assistant Untied States Attorney in Waco
       LeRoy Jahn - Assistant United States Attorney in Waco and lead
       Prosecutor of Branch Davidians
       
   FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
   
   Officials in Washington
   
       William S. Sessions - Director
       Floyd Clarke - Deputy Director
       Doug Gow - Associate Deputy Director for Investigations
       Larry Potts - Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigative
       Division
       Danny Coulson - Deputy Assistant Director of Criminal
       Investigative Division
       E. Michael Kahoe -- Section Chief of Criminal Investigative
       Division Violent Crimes
       
   Agents in Waco
   
       Jeff Jamar - Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the Waco Operation
       SAC Robert Ricks, SAC Richard Schwein, SAC Richard Swensen, aides
       to Jamar
       Richard M. Rogers - Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge and
       commander of Hostage Rescue Team
       Byron Sage - Supervisory Special Resident Agent, Chief negotiator,
       in charge of 24 negotiators.
   
1. FBI CONTROL OF THE PRESS AND MEDIA 
   
   According to Mad Man at Waco authors Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, the
   FBI used its daily press briefings as a way of "controlling" the media
   and the public's perceptions of David Koresh so that they would
   consider him an unpredictable psychopath. The FBI's other goal was
   "inflaming the already beleaguered cult leader."
   
   a. FBI Restricted the Press and Media
   
   The FBI imposed a number of harsh rules on the media. It prohibited
   reporters from getting closer than three miles to Mt. Carmel, claiming
   the Branch Davidians' .50 caliber rifles could hit anyone closer. The
   FBI strictly controlled its daily press briefings, prevented agents
   and officials from granting media interviews.
   
   Speaking at the September 10, 1993, Freedom of Information Foundation
   panel on "Mt. Carmel: What Should the Public Know," John O. Lumpkin of
   the Associated Press described other examples of government
   restrictions on the media. The FBI refused to allow Koresh to speak to
   the media. It refused to divulge information such as: on whose
   authority they made the original raid, who was alive or dead at Mount
   Carmel, the contents of the warrant against David Koresh, and why
   building walls were bulldozed into the fire. Months after the end of
   the siege, FBI representatives continued to refuse to talk to the
   press. Lumpkin said, "it is my personal opinion. . .the argument could
   be made (that) the situation could have turned out differently, and
   certainly not tragically, if there had been much more open access
   instead." [208]
   
   Lumpkin asserted that because of FBI control of information, the
   public still does not know the truth about what happened in Waco. He
   said a reporter told him it reminded him of U.S. government control of
   the American press in Vietnam. Panelist Shelly Katz, a Time Magazine
   photographer stationed in Waco during the siege, said this was the
   worst suppression of media he had seen in 27 years of journalism.
   
   b. FBI Intimidated the Press and Media
   
   Federal agents intimidated the media by arresting members on flimsy
   pretexts. Federal agents assaulted and arrested a reporter who had
   merely asked about a Branch Davidian arrested after the BATF raid and
   illegally confiscated his film. When journalist Louis Beam, who had
   valid press credentials for the right-wing publication Jubilee, asked
   whether the country was "witnessing a fascist takeover," he was
   whisked out of the press room. When he tried to return the next month
   he was arrested on charges of criminal trespass. [209] After state
   troopers arrested two news photographers and confiscated their film
   near the ruins of Mount Carmel on April 22, 1993, Tony Pederson,
   managing editor of the Houston Chronicle, protested: "In a situation
   already marred by tragic loss of life and questionable actions, this
   seems to be a rather sorry follow-up. One has to wonder seriously if
   the Bill of Rights has been suspended in McLennan County." [210]
   During the Freedom of Information Foundation media panel Dick DeGuerin
   asserted that the press should have done civil disobedience and
   continued getting arrested until they were allowed to get closer to
   the scene of the action.
   
   c. FBI Lied to the Press and Media
   
   Louis Alaniz, a Christian sympathizer who snuck into Mount Carmel for
   several days during the siege and left just before the fire, said the
   Branch Davidians listened to the FBI press conferences. "What really
   got them is they constantly heard the story changing-another lie,
   another lie, another lie. These people were saying, `Why are they
   saying all this about us?' I didn't see anything that (the FBI) was
   telling the press that was true." [211]
   
   We will discuss these various lies as we proceed. One glaring example
   was media spokesperson SAC Bob Ricks' telling the public that
   operations were costing $2 million a day. [212] During the April 22,
   1993, Senate Appropriations Committee hearings it was revealed that
   actual costs for the operation as of April 22, 1993, were $6,792,000,
   an average of $130,000 a day. [213]
   
   Another example was the FBI's describing the rickety wooden buildings
   of Mount Carmel Center as a "fortress" built for war. They alleged
   that the old concrete building around and on top of which the new
   building had been built was a "concrete bunker;" that the tornado
   shelter under construction was an "underground bunker;" and that the
   underground bus which was used as a tunnel to the tornado shelter, and
   a practice shooting range, was particularly sinister. The
   disinformation grew as the siege continued, to end in a crescendo of
   falsehoods immediately after the April 19th fire.
   
   d. Press and Media Repeated Government Propaganda
   
   During the media panel attorney Dick DeGuerin condemned journalists
   for engaging in "pack journalism" and for regurgitating BATF and FBI
   propaganda by repeating charged words like "cult," "compound,"
   "fortified bunkers," "Ranch Apocalypse," etc. He also criticized
   journalists for merely waiting for the Treasury and Justice Department
   reports as if they would be a final "Warren Commission Report" and not
   doing any investigative reporting to find out the truth.
   
   The FBI's tight control of the news left many media people with only
   government allegations and disinformation about child abuse, arms
   buildups, mass suicide, etc. to write about. Few bothered to dig
   deeper to discover the dubious sources of these allegations. Even
   fewer examined their own prejudices against deeply committed religious
   groups. Much of the media merely repeated Cult Awareness Network
   propaganda and gave CAN spokespersons ample "cult busting" forums.
   
   e. Press and Media Practiced Self-Censorship
   
   Worse than merely repeating government propaganda was the
   self-censorship in which some media engaged, including suppressing
   criticism of the government. In his media panel comments, Dick
   DeGuerin chastised the national media for ignoring two important
   stories: BATF's refusing Koresh's invitation to view his guns before
   the raid and BATF's taking Koresh's gun dealer and business partner
   Henry McMahon into "protective custody" after the raid and forbidding
   him to speak to the press or the FBI. The national media still has not
   reported either story. The producers of Pensacola's television show
   "Lawline" even sent copies of their April 21, 1993, interview with
   McMahon, titled "Fiasco in Waco," to television stations all over the
   country. However, stations ignored McMahon's allegations. [214]
   
   After the April 19th fire there were other incidents of
   self-censorship. Ron Engelman hosted a mid- morning talk show on KGBS
   radio in Dallas from February through June, 1993. The Branch Davidians
   listened to his show and even requested that he be made a negotiator.
   (JDR:Appendix C:3) Even after the fire, Engelman's callers wanted to
   talk about the destruction of the Branch Davidians. Management
   demanded Engelman move his show to 6 a.m., take a co-host and make the
   show "light and fluffy." Engelman refused and resigned. [215]
   
   NBC, which had aired the television movie "Ambush at Waco" about the
   BATF raid on Mount Carmel, originally planned to do a sequel about the
   ending of the siege. However, it canceled the sequel, claiming it
   would be "too violent." Perhaps NBC network executives did not want to
   offend government officials by vividly portraying government tanks
   gassing the Branch Davidians and ramming away at the building until it
   caught fire, killing more than 80 people.
   
   While some newspapers like the New York Times and the Washington Times
   called the Justice report a "whitewash," others applauded it. An
   October 12, 1993 Washington Post editorial declared: "In hindsight, it
   is tempting to say that anything that turned out so badly must have
   been the result of serious error. But it is difficult to cast blame
   after reviewing the evidence. . . (A)n earnest effort was being made
   to talk the group's members out of the buildings. . .The finding of
   mass suicide and/or murder is a reasonable one."
   
2. POSSIBLE ILLEGAL USE OF TANKS 
   
   The Justice report is not as forthcoming as the Treasury report
   regarding the FBI's obtaining military tanks without violating posse
   comitatus prohibitions on the use of the military as a police force.
   First, the report does not reveal whether the FBI used the allegation
   of a "drug nexus" at Waco to obtain the tanks from the military on a
   no charge, "nonreimbursable" basis. However, a Legal Times reporter
   wrote, "Much of the equipment used at Waco was provided by the Army,
   under an agreement that all costs would be reimbursed." [216]
   
   Next the report states: "the FBI requested Bradley fighting vehicles
   from the U.S. Army. Nine of these-- without barrels, pursuant to an
   agreement between the FBI and the Army to avoid posse comitatus
   prohibitions--were ultimately provided." However, when Koresh claimed
   he had weapons that could blow these vehicles into the air, the FBI
   "sought and obtained from the Army two Abrams (M1A1) tanks and five
   M728 Combat Engineering Vehicles (CEVs)." (JDR:123-124) The report
   does not state if these also were "without barrels," but many claim
   that the tanks do have barrels--which even the Justice Department
   itself admits would be illegal.
   
   Upon learning that tanks had been brought to Waco, "the President
   called (Acting Attorney General Stuart) Gerson, requesting an
   explanation for the deployment of military vehicles. Gerson assured
   the President that no assault was planned. . . (and) that it was legal
   for the FBI to use the military vehicles for safety purposes."
   (JDR:239) Evidently, this means that it was illegal to use the tanks
   for actions like the April 19th assault. However, no government agency
   seems willing to challenge what the Justice report itself infers is
   the illegal use of the tanks.
   
   Fire survivor Ruth Riddle expressed shock at the use of the tanks.
   "Who ever heard of Americans using tanks against Americans on American
   soil?" [217]
   
3. FBI IMPATIENT WITH CONCILIATORY MEASURES 
   
   The federal government has successfully negotiated past sieges. The
   1973 siege at Wounded Knee lasted 70 days and, despite the fact that
   two FBI agents had been killed, the siege ended peacefully. Similarly,
   a Native American takeover of Alcatraz (after it was no longer used as
   a prison) was allowed to play itself out peacefully. BATF and the FBI
   had negotiated a peaceful surrender after 3 days with the Covenant of
   the Sword and Arm of the Lord group in 1985. And despite the deaths of
   Samuel and Vicki Weaver, after Bo Gritz became a third party
   negotiator, Randy Weaver did surrender without further bloodshed.
   
   Nevertheless, FBI Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard
   Rogers--evidently an individual with little patience for
   negotiations--convinced siege commander SAC Jeffrey Jamar to allow him
   to use pressure tactics against the Branch Davidians. Justice
   Department outside expert Alan A. Stone, M.D. notes that "pushed by
   the tactical leader (i.e., Rogers) the commander on the ground (i.e.,
   Jamar) began to allow tactical pressures." (JDR:Stone:9) These
   tactical pressures--cutting off power, harassing the Branch Davidians
   with bright lights and loud music, destroying property--went against
   the recommendations of FBI behavioral scientist and many negotiators.
   
   Dr. Stone criticized these actions: "I have concluded that the FBI
   command failed to give adequate consideration to their own behavioral
   science and negotiation experts. They also failed to make use of the
   Agency's own prior successful experience in similar circumstances.
   They embarked on a misguided and punishing law enforcement strategy
   that contributed to the tragic ending at Waco." (JDR:Stone:1) He
   holds: "What went wrong at Waco was not that the FBI lacked expertise
   in behavior science or in the understanding of unconventional
   religious groups. Rather, the commander on the ground and others
   committed to tactical-aggressive, traditional law enforcement
   practices disregarded those experts and tried to assert control and
   demonstrate to Koresh that they were in charge. . . (T)he FBI's own
   experts recognized and predicted in memoranda that there was the risk
   that the active aggressive law enforcement mentality of the FBI--the
   so-called `action imperative'-- would prevail in the face of
   frustration and delay." (JDR:Stone:14-15) (It should be noted that the
   Justice report quotes statements from audio tapes of negotiations. The
   full transcripts of these tapes must be investigated by independent
   reviewers.)
   
   a. Smerick and Young Advised Against Tactical Pressures
   
   The FBI consulted its own behavioral scientists, whose specialty was
   applying psychology to law enforcement situations, but ignored their
   recommendations. Pete Smerick and Mark Young recommended in several
   March 5th to 9th memos that this was not a typical hostage situation
   since the Branch Davidians insisted on staying with their leader. They
   wrote that "tactical presence. . .if carried to excess, could
   eventually be counter productive and could result in loss of life."
   They advised, "If the followers could be made to see that the
   government had no intention of engaging them in an apocalyptic final
   battle, then perhaps they would begin to question the validity of
   Koresh's predictions about the inevitability of such a battle."
   
   Smerick and Young recommended that the FBI "establish some trust with
   Koresh" and even suggested "moving back from the compound, not to show
   law enforcement weakness, but to sap from Koresh the source of his
   powerful hold over his followers--his prediction that the government
   was about to start a war against them." [218] They concluded by saying
   that the FBI could "always resort to tactical pressure, but it should
   be the absolute last option we should consider."
   
   In their last memorandum Smerick and Young did recommend mild
   pressures, like sporadic cutting off of power, sudden movements of
   equipment and manpower, and downplaying Koresh's importance to the
   press, but only if exercised with "extreme caution." (JDR:179-183)
   After reviewing Smerick and Young's recommendations, Alan A. Stone,
   concludes "decision-making at Waco failed to give due regard to the
   FBI experts who had the proper understanding of how to deal with an
   unconventional group like the Branch Davidians." (JDR:Stone:28)
   
   b. FBI Rejected Family and Third Party Intervention
   
   FBI commanders rejected two important negotiation tactics: allowing
   direct communication between families and Branch Davidians and
   allowing third parties to negotiate a surrender. While the FBI would
   send in video and audio tapes from families, in order to "drive a
   wedge" between Koresh and his followers, they forbid them to speak
   directly to family members. Months after the massacre, Balenda Gamen,
   mother of fire survivor David Thibodeau, recalled: "I originally came
   to Waco because I was challenged by the FBI when they said to me
   `there is no room for family in this operation. Perhaps we'll do it in
   the future.' When I heard those words I knew that the writing was on
   the wall for this community. They had a very good chance of never
   coming out." [219] Despite Gamen and other family members' continual
   entreaties to the FBI and Janet Reno via fax and registered letter
   that they be allowed to negotiate directly with relatives inside Mount
   Carmel, the FBI would only allow them to send in and receive
   occasional audio and video tapes. During the April 28, 1993, House
   Judiciary Committee hearings Reno admitted that she had never heard
   about the families' attempts to reach her.
   
   A number of third party negotiators were considered and rejected. On
   March 6th FBI Director William Sessions had discussions with Koresh's
   former attorney Gary Coker--who happens to be a personal friend of
   Sessions from his days in Waco [220] --about negotiating with Koresh.
   However, FBI commanders refused to allow Coker to act as a negotiator
   because they thought he merely was looking for a client. (JDR:131).
   Sessions himself offered to negotiate, but Acting Attorney General
   Gerson forbid it. (JDR:239-241)
   
   On March 7th David Koresh declared he would surrender if some
   theologian could convince him his interpretation of the Seven Seals
   was incorrect, but the FBI made no attempt to pursue that avenue.
   (JDR:58) During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing
   SAC Jamar declared that having theologicians--especially renowned
   ones--negotiate with Koresh would just make him more egomaniacal.
   After the Branch Davidians expressed respect for McLennan County
   Sheriff Jack Harwell, the FBI allowed him to participate in some
   mid-March negotiations. They did not give him a free hand as a third
   party negotiator. (JDR:133-134) They also rejected the Branch
   Davidians' request for radio talk show host Ron Engelman as a
   negotiator and Bo Gritz' offer to be a third party negotiator.
   
   On March 16th frustrated Branch Davidians used flashlights to send a
   Morse code to reporters reading, "SOS, SOS, SOS, SOS. FBI broke
   negotiations. Want negotiations from the press." [221] The FBI soon
   started flashing bright lights at the compound at night, perhaps in
   part to end such communications. Only after the Branch Davidians were
   in Mount Carmel for a full month did the FBI allow David Koresh and
   Steve Schneider to meet with their attorneys. As we will see in a
   later section, peaceful efforts by third parties--attorneys and
   theologians--did result in a credible promise by Koresh to lead the
   Branch Davidians out of Mount Carmel despite FBI tactical pressure.
   
   c. Conflicts between Tactical Agents and Negotiators
   
   The Justice report admits that negotiators criticized the tactical
   commanders for undercutting negotiations: "the negotiators felt that
   the negotiating and tactical components of the FBI's strategy were
   more often contradictory than complementary. . .negotiators emphasized
   to Branch Davidians the `dignity' and fair treatment the group would
   receive upon its exit from the compound. By contrast, the negotiators
   felt that the efforts of the tactical personnel were directed toward
   intimidation and harassment. . .some of the negotiators lamented the
   absence of joint strategy sessions with the on-site commander and the
   tactical commander." (JDR:139-140)
   
   The Justice report alleges that negotiators did not believe
   negotiations alone could have avoided the April 19th fire. (JDR:142)
   Alan A. Stone, who made special efforts to conduct his own interviews,
   found many of these individuals had a different opinion. "FBI's
   behavioral scientists and negotiators. . .share my belief that
   mistakes were made. . . (and) . . .expressed their determination to
   have the truth come out, regardless of the consequences."
   (JDR:Stone:4)
   
   Nancy Ammerman, another outside expert, agreed that the FBI did have
   negotiators and experts giving them good advice. However, this advice
   was not heeded because these individuals were "outranked and
   outnumbered by the tactical types." [222] The tactical leaders had
   more pull than the negotiators because of the FBI's action-oriented
   ethos and because negotiators usually were stationed several miles
   from the site, while the Hostage Rescue Team and Richard M. Rogers
   were stationed at the site with SAC Jamar.
   
   Also, some of the FBI negotiators were as hardnosed as the tactical
   agents, insulting Branch Davidians over the phone, calling Koresh a
   "child molester," and abruptly hanging up when they quoted Scriptures.
   One "negotiator" betrayed his true feelings when, after urging Branch
   Davidians to come out over a loudspeaker, he inadvertently left the
   microphone on and was heard to say: "I've been in the FBI for 27 years
   and I've never seen anything like these people. They think they can
   get away with murder. Well, they'll have another thing coming as soon
   as they come out of there." [223]
   
4. FBI RELIED ON EXPERTS AND CULT BUSTERS URGING TACTICAL PRESSURE 
   
   The Justice report states, "The FBI has questioned whether its
   negotiations with Koresh could even be characterized as `negotiations'
   at all, but rather as Koresh's attempt to convert the agents before it
   was too late and God destroyed them." (JDR:17) Yet despite Koresh's
   obsession with the Seven Seals, they never allowed anyone who was an
   expert on the subject to have direct contact with him.
   
   Nancy Ammerman believes FBI agents had such a negative view of
   Koresh's religious views for three reasons: some individuals didn't
   understand religion, others were antagonistic towards religion in
   general, and others were antagonistic towards Koresh's specific views,
   which differed from their own. [224] She noted FBI officials' and
   agents' "tendency to discount the influence of religious beliefs and
   to evaluate situations largely in terms of a leader's individual
   criminal/psychological motives" and that their "consensus" was that
   "when they encountered people with religious beliefs, those beliefs
   were usually a convenient cover for criminal activity."
   (JDR:Ammerman:5) For example, siege Commander SAC Jamar expressed his
   contempt for Koresh when he declared at the April 28, 1993, House
   Judiciary Committee hearing that Koresh had merely "corrupted people"
   and "corrupted religion to his own ends" and that there was "no way to
   convince Koresh that he was not the Messiah."
   
   It is evident from the Justice report's description of its
   consultations with seven theologians (JDR:186-189) that the only one
   they took seriously was Dr. Glenn Hilburn of Baylor University. Not
   surprisingly, the report mentions that "Baylor University has one of
   the largest `cult' reference and research facilities in the country."
   However, even Dr. Hilburn had little substantive impact on FBI
   thinking or actions. (JDR:186-189)
   
   Several times the Justice report mentions theologian Philip Arnold--an
   expert on the Seven Seals and apocalyptic groups--but never
   acknowledges his crucial impact on Koresh's decision to come out. We
   will review that in detail in a later section. A study of the Justice
   report makes it clear that psychologists, psychiatrists (JDR:158-185)
   and "cult busters" (JDR:190-193) who reinforced the FBI's own
   prejudices had the greatest impact on the FBI's decisions.
   
   a. Psychologists and Psychiatrists
   
   The FBI was particularly attentive to the advice of psychologists and
   psychiatrists who asserted that Koresh was mentally unbalanced and
   would not surrender voluntarily. Dr. Park Dietz held that, "continuing
   to negotiate in good faith would not resolve the situation, because
   Koresh would not come out." (JDR:168) Dr. Anthony J. Pinizotto said,
   "Koresh displayed psychopathic behavior, that he was a `con artist'
   type, and he had narcissistic tendencies." Dr. Mike Webster opined,
   "Koresh appeared to be manifesting anti- social traits." (JDR:170) Dr.
   Perry and social worker Joyce Sparks, who interviewed children
   released from Mount Carmel, agreed that "Koresh was stalling for time,
   to prepare for his `final battle' with authorities." (JDR:171-174)
   
   Dr. Joseph L. Krofcheck (with FBI psychological profiler Clinton R.
   Van Zandt) held that Koresh appeared to be a "functional,
   paranoid-type psychotic," that he was unlikely to "give up the power
   and omnipotence he enjoyed inside the compound," that there was the
   possibility of a "mass-breakout. . .with women carrying a baby in one
   arm while firing a weapon from the other," and that "the only way the
   FBI could influence Koresh's exit from the compound would be some form
   of tactical intervention." (JDR:176-179)
   
   b. Cult Busters
   
   There is evidence that in response to Nancy Ammerman's sharp
   criticisms, to Rick Ross's being indicted for "unlawful imprisonment"
   in the summer of 1993, and to the New Alliance Party suit against the
   FBI for its abuse of the word "cult," the FBI and Justice Department
   have tried to cover up its association with professional or amateur
   "cult busters." The Justice report asserts the FBI "did not solicit
   advice from any `cult experts' or `cult deprogrammers.'" (JDR:190)
   
   In mid-April the FBI asked Dr. Murray S. Miron, a Professor of
   Psycholinquistics at Syracuse University, to analyze five letters that
   Koresh sent out of Mount Carmel. After reading the first and third
   letters, he concluded that they bore "all the hallmarks of rampant,
   morbidly virulent paranoia. . .In my judgement, we are facing a
   determined, hardened adversary who has no intention of delivering
   himself or his followers into the hands of his adversaries. It is my
   belief that he is waiting for an assault." (JDR:174-176)
   
   What the FBI either did not know--or did not admit--is that Dr. Miron
   is an outspoken cult critic. Reportedly, during the 1970s he had been
   involved with the Citizens Freedom Foundation, the anti-cult group
   which evolved into the Cult Awareness Network. During the week of
   April 14-21--even while he was consulting with the FBI-- Miron
   published an article called "The Mark of the Cult" in the Syracuse New
   Times. The article contains stereotypical anti-cult propaganda: "The
   totalitarianism of the cult banishes dissent and fosters dependence
   upon fallible, power-mad leaders. It is the system of every dictator,
   whether benign or benevolent." [225]
   
   In typically media-savvy cult buster fashion, Miron managed to make
   himself one of the few FBI consultants quoted in major media right
   after the fire--thus using his FBI connections to promote his
   anti-cult propaganda. He told the Los Angeles Times, "I advised the
   FBI that all of his promises as to giving up were only subterfuges,
   deceptions and delaying tactics." [226] He told the Washington Post,
   "There was every indication in my mind that he was not prepared to
   commit suicide." [227] His comments occupied eight paragraphs of a New
   York Times article: "Dr. Miron said that Mr. Koresh had become so
   delusional" that he and his followers may have believed that after
   they set the fire "either that they were invulnerable and that the
   fires would consume the authorities while leaving them untouched, or
   that they were about to ascend to glory no matter what happened to
   their bodies." [228]
   
   Rick Ross' contention that he was in close contact with BATF and the
   FBI is backed up by Nancy Ammerman's September 10, 1993 one page
   addendum to her report. (Which the Justice Department did not bother
   to include in its report.) In it she wrote, "The interview transcripts
   document that Mr. Rick Ross was, in fact, closely involved with both
   the ATF and the FBI. . .He clearly had the most extensive access to
   both agencies of any person on the `cult expert' list, and he was
   apparently listened to more attentively." However, after reviewing
   Ross's contacts with the FBI, the Justice report states: "The FBI did
   not `rely' on Ross for advice whatsoever during the standoff."
   (JDR:192)
   
   The Justice report claims that the FBI determined Breault was talking
   to the media and therefore only accepted his affidavits and electronic
   mail from him, but decided "not to contact him." (JDR:192) However,
   Breault asserts: "as soon as the siege began. . .the FBI tried for
   hours to contact us. . .they almost sent the police to drag us to
   police headquarters. Just before they took that drastic action, the
   negotiators broke through." Breault gave them detailed information
   about the Seven Seals, Koresh and his followers. Breault also writes:
   "The FBI contacted us throughout the siege. They showed us Koresh's
   letters." [229] Clearly, either Breault is lying or the FBI and
   Justice Department are trying to cover up their reliance on him.
   
   During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing FBI
   Director William Sessions admitted that the FBI had consulted "cult
   experts," though he got confused about the advice they had given the
   FBI. And SAC Jamar admitted, "we had a white paper on cults that was
   very, very useful to us." The white paper outlined the traits of cults
   with one "dynamic, manipulative, egomaniacal, psychopathic leader" and
   Jamar asserted that the traits fit Koresh "to a T." Jamar did not tell
   the committee what individual--or organization--gave him the white
   paper. However, considering that it contained typical anti-cult
   stereotypes, one might guess either Dr. Murray Miron or Rick Ross gave
   Jamar the white paper. Despite the Justice report denials, it is
   evident that there was a definite cult buster influence on--and
   justification for-- decisions to replace negotiations with pressure
   tactics against the Branch Davidians.
   
5. FBI PRESSURE TACTICS REPLACED NEGOTIATIONS 
   
   Alan A. Stone, M.D. writes: "By March 21st, the FBI was concentrating
   on tactical pressure alone. . .This changing strategy at the compound
   from (1) conciliatory negotiation to (2) negotiation and tactical
   pressure and then to (3) tactical pressure alone." (JDR:Stone:10)
   Below is a description of these escalating tactical pressures and the
   Branch Davidians' response to them, grouped into Dr. Stone's three
   phases.
   
   a. Conciliatory Negotiations--February 28-March 6
   
   During this period 23 of the 35 individuals to leave Mount Carmel did
   so. The FBI did not punish Koresh after he reneged on his promise to
   surrender on March 2nd because "God had spoken to him and told him to
   wait." And they dealt gingerly with his various threats of violence
   against federal agents. When the U.S. Attorney's office enraged the
   Branch Davidians by charging with murder the two elderly women who had
   left Mount Carmel, negotiators quickly convinced them to drop the
   charges. However, much to the Branch Davidians dismay, the FBI did cut
   off their phones to everyone but the FBI and sent armored vehicles
   onto Mount Carmel Center's property. [(JDR:21-57)]
   
   The FBI also "bugged" Mount Carmel. "A federal law enforcement
   official said that tiny recording devices had been sent in. . .with
   deliveries of milk, news magazines, a typewriter and various other
   items requested. [230] The Justice report admits there was "court-
   ordered electronic surveillance." (JDR:107-108) A Sunday Times of
   London article asserted that the FBI even used aircraft to pick up
   conversations, infrared devices to pinpoint individual's positions,
   and tiny fibre-optic microphones and cameras inserted in walls to
   relay audio and visual images back to the command center. [231] This
   information has not been confirmed.
   
   b. Negotiation and Tactical Pressure--March 7-21
   
   During this period 11 more people left Mount Carmel. While negotiators
   remained conciliatory, they did try to drive a wedge between Koresh
   and his followers by ridiculing Steve Schneider because his wife had
   born Koresh's child and by playing family and negotiation tapes over
   loudspeakers. The FBI began exposing the "negative part of (Koresh's)
   personality"--including his most inflammatory threats--during press
   conferences because "it is important for the American people to know
   what we are dealing with." [232] The FBI turned the electricity on and
   off as a pressure tactic, turning it off for good on March 13th.
   
   These pressures made the Branch Davidians more distrustful. Koresh and
   Schneider called this "bad faith" by the government and Steve
   Schneider claimed on March 13th that "the government wanted to kill
   all of them and burn down the building." (JDR:68) On March 15th
   negotiators made it clear they would refuse to listen to any more
   "Bible babble." However, they did allow a "cordial and positive"
   face-to-face meeting between chief negotiator Byron Sage and McLennan
   County Sheriff Jack Harwell and Branch Davidians Steve Schneider and
   Wayne Martin. (JDR:70)
   
   After the FBI sent in lawyers' letters and an audio tape from
   theologian Phil Arnold, Koresh told the FBI on March 19th that "he was
   ready to come out and face whatever might happen to him." He even
   joked, "When they give me the lethal injection, give me the cheap
   stuff." (JDR:70-75) Between just March 19th and 21st alone ten people
   left Mount Carmel.
   
   c. Tactical Pressure Only--March 22-April 19
   
   Despite these obvious successes, SAC Jamar, influenced by HRT
   commander Rogers, decided it was time to increase tactical pressures
   and "demonstrate the authority of law enforcement." (JDR:135) On the
   evening of March 21st the FBI started blaring music over its
   loudspeaker system and kept it up despite Branch Davidian complaints.
   At 11:45 p.m. Koresh sent out the message, "Because of the loud music,
   nobody is coming out." The next day Schneider claimed "that the music
   had been counterproductive." On March 22nd the FBI promised Koresh
   that if he surrendered immediately he could communicate with his
   followers in jail, hold religious services and make a worldwide
   religious broadcast. He angrily threw their letter away. (JDR:78-80)
   The last Branch Davidian left Mount Carmel on March 23rd.
   
   The Justice report states the negotiating team recommended escalating
   harassment and the eventual gassing of the compound. (JDR:138) (As we
   know, not all of them agreed that was the best approach.) Except for
   finally allowing Koresh and Schneider to meet with their attorneys,
   over these four weeks the FBI's strategy consisted mostly of
   harassing, insulting and punishing the Branch Davidians.
   
   During the March 24th press briefing, as the Branch Davidians
   listened, "the FBI increased its `verbal assault' against Koresh,
   calling Koresh a liar and coward, and accusing him of hiding behind
   his children." (JDR:83) It may have been during this time that an FBI
   spokesperson declared that Koresh was just a "cheap thug who
   interprets the Bible through the barrel of a gun." [233] The FBI
   harassed the Branch Davidians by blaring loud music night and day and
   playing back audio tapes of negotiation, family members and released
   members greetings tapes. It shined bright lights all night long.
   
   Some of the harassment was quite violent. The FBI declared deadlines
   by which Branch Davidians were to exit on March 23rd, 24th, 27th, and
   28th. When these were not met, the FBI removed and often crushed and
   destroyed automobiles, vans, go-carts and motorcycles. Also, "Bradleys
   (tanks) were run up and down in front of the compound in what
   negotiators believed was a show of force" (JDR:Dennis:44); individuals
   who left the building without permission were "flashbanged," i.e. had
   loud smoke grenades thrown near them; helicopters brazenly buzzed the
   building; and loudspeakers blared sounds of screeching rabbits being
   slaughtered and played the song "These Boots are Made for Walking"
   which contains the line, "and if you play with matches you know you're
   going to get burned." (JDR:79-109)
   
   Louis Alaniz, who snuck into Mount Carmel for several days, described
   "these Bradley's running around and the guys in them shooting the
   finger at these kids, and one incident where they actually mooned some
   of the girls. These people were scared. They only thing they saw was a
   bunch of people coming and shooting at them." [234] Outside expert Dr.
   Robert Cancro told reporters: "the threats implicit in the use of
   armored vehicles, razor wire, and a tightening perimeter tend to
   negate the positive and friendly tone attempted by negotiators. .
   .Even a person who isn't paranoid would interpret that as lack of
   consistency and good faith in negotiations. A paranoid individual
   needs more reassurance, not less." [235]
   
   Edward Dennis wrote, "Some negotiators believe that as a result of
   these actions the Davidians concluded that the negotiators had no
   influence over the decision makers and that the FBI was not
   trustworthy." (JDR:Dennis:45) Dick DeGuerin told reporters, "They're
   still intimidated by the FBI. We're not coming out until we know the
   media are going to be there." [236] And Balenda Gamen explained why
   many Branch Davidians did not exit or send their children out after
   this point: "Because we're a very arrogant, proud nation of people.
   You challenge Americans to defend their property, and they're probably
   going to do that. The bottom line is, if you truly believe in what you
   are doing that passionately, you don't send your children out to the
   enemy." [237] According to Louis Alaniz, "Koresh kept members in line
   by threatening to force them to leave the compound." [238]
   
   To show his lack of concern about the government's harassment, at one
   point Steve Schneider declared "you can burn us down, kill us,
   whatever." (JDR:87) According to news reports Koresh told the FBI, "If
   they want blood, then our blood is here for them to shed. . .We are
   not afraid of the government. If we have to die for what we stand for,
   we're going to. I don't mind if I die." [239] Dick DeGuerin said,
   "There was a collective feeling that the harassment was making them
   more stubborn." [240] During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary
   Committee hearings SAC Jamar dismissed Representative Don Edwards
   question about whether these pressures only brought the Branch
   Davidians closer, saying there was "no way to drive them closer than
   they were."
   
   When Representative William Hughes asked SAC Jamar which experts had
   recommended they use pressure tactics like blasting loud noises all
   night long, Jamar did not answer; he merely repeated his claim the
   purpose of the noise was sleep deprivation. Outside expert Nancy
   Ammerman also could not get a straight answer about who had
   recommended these pressure tactics. She notes that Drs. Miron,
   Krofcheck and Dietz were the most frequently consulted experts. She
   then complains: "It is unclear which of these consultants (if any)
   recommended the psychological warfare tactics (Tibetan chants, sounds
   of rabbits dying, rock music, flood lights, helicopters hovering,
   etc.). None of the persons associated with (National Center for the
   Analysis of Violent Crimes) with whom I have talked claims to have
   favored these tactics, but no one was willing to say who recommended
   them or how the decision was made to use them." (JDR:Ammerman:2) Who
   gave these orders should be investigated.
   
6. FBI DESTROYED CRIME SCENE DESPITE COMPLAINTS 
   
   One form of harassment which had important legal implications was the
   FBI's moving and destroying vehicles. This enraged the Branch
   Davidians because they believed the vans and automobiles would prove
   that they had done relatively little firing at the agents hiding
   behind them and that BATF was responsible for most of the shooting,
   including of its own agents. The vehicles might also provide evidence
   that helicopters had shot from the air. As early as March 6th Steve
   Schneider had expressed fear that the government wanted to destroy
   evidence that would prove BATF's guilt. He told negotiators: "It
   wouldn't surprise me if they wouldn't want to get rid of the evidence.
   Because if this building is still standing, you will see the evidences
   of what took place." (JDR:53) Schneider's attorney Jack Zimmerman
   said, "There is no question that the FBI is destroying evidence. If
   nothing else they've moved the location of physical objects from a
   crime scene before they had been photographed." DeGuerin agreed.
   "They're destroying evidence with the bulldozers." [241]
   
   The Texas Rangers were put in charge of investigating the February
   28th raid. For ten days, SAC Jamar refused to allow the Texas Rangers
   to finish investigating the area behind Mount Carmel Center where the
   shootout between BATF agents and three Branch Davidians occurred. By
   then footprints which might help clarify who shot first had been
   eliminated by rain. Both Texas Rangers and BATF opposed FBI removal of
   the vehicles from the compound. (JDR:229) On March 23rd Assistant U.S.
   Attorney William Johnston wrote Janet Reno to complain. (JDR:81) The
   FBI then agreed to "photograph, graph and grid the portion of the
   compound where the vehicles sought to be moved were located" in order
   to preserve evidence. (JDR:255) However, the Justice report does not
   mention if the FBI told the Branch Davidians about this new policy.
   
7. FBI PLAN TO GAS, DISASSEMBLE MOUNT CARMEL 
   
   The FBI Hostage Negotiation Training Manual asserts, "Time is always
   in our favor," and urges personnel not to grow impatient in hostage
   situations. [242] London Times bureau chief James Adams, author of a
   number of books on covert warfare, wrote about the government's
   handling of the standoff: "Every professional in the hostage rescue
   business knows that the best chance of survival for all the innocents
   held captive is to play out a waiting game. The theory, which has been
   proved again and again, is that the longer you wait, the better the
   chances of a peaceful resolution." In his article he quotes
   counter-terrorism expert Noel Koch who wrote, "If nothing is
   happening, that is good. The heart of negotiation is patience, and if
   it takes 41 or 151 days it should make no difference. To depart from
   that central idea is crazy." Adams questions whether the deaths were
   necessary and ends by saying, "those responsible must be held
   accountable." [243]
   
   In early April Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard Rogers, who was
   continuing to push for more aggressive action, gave visiting FBI
   officials "a briefing on the use of CS gas and suggested an operation
   plan for such use," a plan which was soon approved by FBI Director
   Sessions. (JDR:256-258) The plan was to "introduce the liquid CS into
   the compound in stages. . .eventually walls would be torn down to
   increase the exposure of those remaining inside." (JDR:262-263) The
   report notes, "While it was conceivable that tanks and other armored
   vehicles could be used to demolish the compound, the FBI considered
   that such a plan would risk harming the children inside." (JDR:260)
   
   Nevertheless, Rogers' plan clearly included defacto demolition of
   Mount Carmel. "If all subjects failed to exit the structure after 48
   hours of tear gas, then a modified CEV would proceed to open up and
   begin disassembling the structure at the location that was least
   exposed to the gas. The CEV would continue until all the Branch
   Davidians were located." (JDR:277-78) The FBI had their plan--and they
   probably did not intend to let anything stand in their way of
   convincing Attorney General Janet Reno to approve it.
   
8. FBI REFUSED TO BELIEVE FINAL KORESH PROMISE TO SURRENDER 
   
   As noted above, in mid-March, after the FBI sent in the letters from
   lawyers and an audio tape from theologian Phil Arnold, Koresh stated
   that he was ready to come out. However, FBI harassment made him change
   his mind. A few weeks later the FBI allowed Koresh and Schneider to
   meet with their attorneys and they brought Koresh a 30 minute tape by
   Drs. Phil Arnold and Jim Tabor. There is solid evidence that as a
   result of these contacts, in mid-April David Koresh did indeed receive
   his "message from God" and that he and all Branch Davidians would have
   left Mount Carmel had the FBI waited only a few more days.
   
   a. DeGuerin and Zimmerman Visited Mount Carmel
   
   The FBI initially refused to allow the Branch Davidians to consult
   with attorneys. In mid-March U.S. District Judge Walter S. Smith Jr.
   rejected requests from lawyers contacted by Branch Davidian family
   members to enter the compound and negotiate for them, writing, "One
   simply cannot point a gun, literally or figuratively, at
   constitutional authority and at the same time complain that
   constitutional rights are being denied." [244] (Judge Smith is now
   presiding over the Branch Davidians' trial.) However, a number of
   attorneys, including "radicals" like Kirk Lyons of North Carolina's
   Cause Foundation, had filed habeas corpus suits, and the FBI may have
   feared some appellate judge might let them have access to Koresh.
   [245]
   
   Koresh's mother retained Houston criminal defense attorney Dick
   Deguerin who was well known for clients he'd defended in highly
   publicized homicides, including Muneer Deeb who was acquitted on
   charge of killing three teenagers in Waco. [246] The Schneider family
   retained another respected criminal attorney, Jack Zimmerman. Both
   DeGuerin and Zimmerman have frequently told the press that the Branch
   Davidians had very "triable" cases, might have been acquitted by
   juries on the grounds of self-defense, and were committed to leaving
   Mount Carmel and facing juries. Koresh even allowed DeGuerin to meet
   with New York attorneys to discuss film and book rights to Koresh's
   story.
   
   b. Drs. Arnold and Tabor Convinced Koresh to Write "Seven Seals"
   
   Dr. Philip Arnold, executive director of Houston's Reunion Institute
   and an expert in apocalyptic studies and the Seven Seals, read a
   newspaper transcript of David Koresh's February 28th sermon on KRLD
   and immediately resolved to be of assistance. [247] He drove to Waco
   and explained his expertise to SAC Bob Ricks, chief aid to SAC Jeffrey
   Jamar. However, Ricks put Arnold off several times saying, "You could
   never talk Book of Revelation with him. You've never heard anything
   like this." An FBI agent did take Arnold's number and contacted him a
   few days later. Arnold returned to Waco and spoke with the agent over
   the phone but was never contacted by the FBI again. This is not
   surprising considering negotiators March 15th decision to refuse to
   listen to any more "Bible babble." Dr. Arnold has lamented that the
   FBI "took that to be a big joke, all that talk about the Seven Seals.
   The Seven Seals was (Koresh's) language, and if you didn't speak that
   language, there was no way of showing him what he had to do." [248]
   
   On March 17th Branch Davidians happened by chance to hear Dr. Arnold's
   five minute radio show during which he discussed the Book of
   Revelation. They immediately told the FBI they wanted to speak with
   him, but the FBI "denied the request." (JDR:Appendix C:3) Edward
   Dennis notes that Steve Schneider had specifically mentioned Phil
   Arnold as possibly being a "theologian (who) could convince the people
   that Koresh was wrong" about their being in the Fifth Seal of death.
   (JDR:Dennis:15) The FBI's only concession was to send in a March 19th
   tape of Arnold's radio show. [(JDR:186)]
   
   On April 1st Phil Arnold and Dr. Jim Tabor, a professor of religious
   studies at the University of North Carolina who also specializes in
   apocalyptic studies, did a telephone interview on the Ron Engelman
   show. During it they explained to Koresh that the "little season" that
   the Branch Davidians needed to wait was not merely a couple of months,
   but might be a much longer time. They also talked about how great
   prophets like Jeremiah, John, and Paul had gone to prison--and had
   produced great literature there.
   
   Dr. Arnold gave this tape to Dick DeGuerin who brought it to Koresh on
   April 4th. Koresh told his attorneys everyone would be coming out
   after Passover, which would last 10 days. On April 9th and 10th he
   delivered to the FBI two defiant letters filled with Biblical
   allusions-- ones which the FBI has used to excuse their assault on
   Mount Carmel.
   
   However, on April 14th Koresh wrote a very different letter. In it he
   revealed that God finally had spoken to him and that they all would
   come out as soon as he had completed a short book on the Seven Seals.
   The letter to Koresh's attorney Dick DeGuerin reads, in part:
   
   As far as our progress is concerned, here is where we stand:
   
   . . .I am presently being permitted to document, in structured form,
   the decoded messages of the Seven Seals. Upon the completion of this
   task, I will be freed of my "waiting period." I hope to finish this as
   soon as possible and to stand before man to answer any and all
   questions regarding my actions.
   
   I have been praying so long for this opportunity; to put the Seals in
   written form. Speaking the truth seems to have very little effect on
   man.
   
   I was shown that as soon as I am given over into the hands of man, I
   will be made a spectacle of, and people will not be concerned about
   the truth of God, but just the bizarrity of me - the flesh (person).
   
   I want the people of this generation to be saved. I am working night
   and day to complete my final work of the writing out of the "these
   Seals."
   
   I will demand the first manuscript of the Seals be given to you. Many
   scholars and religious leaders will wish to have copies for
   examination. I will keep a copy with me. As soon as I can see that
   people, like Jim Tabor and Phil Arnold have a copy I will come out and
   then you can do your thing with this Beast.
   
   I hope to keep in touch with you by letter, so please give your
   address.
   
   We are standing on the threshold of Great events! The Seven Seals, in
   written form are the most sacred information ever! David Koresh
   
   
   On April 16th Koresh told the FBI he had finished the First Seal
   (JDR:107) and "asked for a word processor and batteries to speed
   production of the other six chapters." [249] At an October 15, 1993,
   congressional briefing sponsored by the Ross & Green consulting group,
   Dr. Tabor said that Koresh and Ruth Riddle, who was typing it for him,
   worked until 9 p.m. Sunday night, April 18th, putting the final
   touches on the First Seal, which was also the longest. That meant they
   would be leaving Mount Carmel in a few days. Tabor said, "they were so
   happy that night, shades of the last supper."
   
   During the April 19th fire Ruth Riddle managed to jump from a hole in
   the second floor wall. She carried Koresh's First Seal on a computer
   disk. The FBI immediately confiscated the disk, but later released it.
   Having read it, Tabor declared, "It's intriguing. It's not my own
   faith system, but it's coherent, logical and quite moving to read.
   What he lived and died for."
   
   After the April 19th FBI assault and the death of Koresh and 80 or
   more other Branch Davidians, Drs. Arnold and Tabor severely criticized
   the FBI. "I think they were convinced from the start that he was evil,
   horrible and wicked. . .They didn't take his religion seriously
   enough. They needed to have input from people who are trained in
   biblical symbols."
   
   c. FBI and Cult Busters Ridiculed Koresh Promise
   
   According to Tabor, as soon as they got Koresh's April 14th letter,
   the FBI began ridiculing Koresh, saying things like, "How long will it
   take a high school dropout to write a book." The April 26, 1993, Time
   (which went to press before the fire) devoted a whole article to
   Koresh's promise to write the book, including a long paragraph
   explaining Dr. Arnold's views on Koresh's possible interpretation of
   the Seven Seals. However, it also described the FBI's frustrations
   because it had taken Koresh 4 days to write 30 pages. "So, FBI men
   sourly note, a surrender may be months off, even if Koresh keeps his
   word. . .`No one at our place is holding his breath.' said FBI special
   agent Dick Swensen." An FBI official, speaking on the condition of
   anonymity, told the Washington Post, "Were we going to sit there and
   wait for this guy to finish his treatises on the Seven Seals?. . .Were
   we going to sit there status quo for another month, another two
   months, another six months?" [250] Bob Ricks' statement on April 16th
   sums up the FBI attitude: "We are going to get them. . .to bring them
   before the bar of justice for the murder of our agents. They're going
   to answer for their crimes. That's the bottom line to this whole
   thing, they're going to come out." [251]
   
   d. FBI Excuses After the Fire
   
   After the April 19th fire the FBI claimed that it had evidence that
   Koresh's contacts with his attorneys were just stalling techniques.
   SACs Jamar claimed that listening devices heard cult members joking
   about DeGuerin's involvement being a ruse [252] , a claim the Justice
   report repeats (JDR:143-144) Koresh attorney Dick DeGuerin "disputed
   claims by FBI spokesman Bob Ricks that cult members had called
   meetings with the attorneys `a fiasco'. `The real fiasco was the
   attack on the compound with tear gas and ripping the walls apart. .
   .If you consider that we got an absolute agreement signed that they
   would come out peacefully. . .'" [253]
   
   Jamar also told the press, "This latest business with the Seven Seals,
   we have intelligence that it was just one more stalling technique."
   [254] Dr. Phil Arnold challenged the FBI's allegation that
   electronic monitoring of Koresh's conversations proved he wasn't
   serious. He said Koresh's "vocabulary was not formed by high school,
   college or television. It's formed by the King James Version of the
   Bible, which he had memorized. It would take those of us who are
   similarly familiar or trained in its constant usage to be able to
   understand him on a depth level where the subtleties of the language
   come through." [255] Many have commented that the FBI's monitoring
   devices must not have been very good if they could not hear Koresh's
   loud dictating of his book to Ruth Riddle.
   
   The only evidence the Justice report presents that Koresh's writing
   his book on the Seven Seals was a stalling technique was provided by
   (defacto cult buster) Dr. Murray S. Miron. Concerning the
   all-important April 14th letter, "Dr. Miron noted that Koresh's
   discussion in the letter appeared to be a ploy designed to buy more
   time for Koresh." He concluded that he did not believe "there is in
   these writings any better, or at least certain, hope for any early end
   to the standoff." (JDR:175-176) Marc Breault alleges the FBI "showed
   us Koresh's letters, which were nothing more than scriptural ramblings
   written down. After reading those we became more and more convinced
   that Koresh had no intentions of coming out. We told the FBI as much.
   . .We told the FBI that Koresh was starting to lose his grip and that
   he would probably end the siege violently." [256]
   
   After DeGuerin, Arnold and Tabor held an October press conference to
   announce the release of Koresh's book, "Bill Carter, an FBI spokesman,
   said the agency could not comment on the tract because of pending
   cases against 11 Branch Davidians." [257] More disturbing than the
   FBI's reliance on Miron, and possibly Breault, to interpret Koresh's
   April 14th letter is strong evidence that the FBI never showed
   Attorney General Reno the April 14th letter so she could judge for
   herself whether Koresh intended to surrender!
   
9. FBI MISLED JANET RENO ON NEED FOR AND DANGERS OF ASSAULT 
   
   On April 12, 1993, the FBI presented the tear gas plan to Attorney
   General Janet Reno for approval. "Why now? Why not wait?" she asked.
   On April 16th she still disapproved the plan--until an all important
   conversation with FBI Director William Sessions. Whatever he said to
   her swayed her to the point that she asked for a documented statement
   of why the plan should go forward. On April 17th she received the
   documents. "She read only a chronology, gave the rest of the materials
   a cursory review, and satisfied herself that `the documentation was
   there'." (JDR:272) She then approved the gassing plan. The next day
   she informed President Clinton of her decision. Below are the known
   and admitted arguments the FBI used to break down Reno's resistance to
   the plan. Despite Janet Reno's assertions to the contrary, we can see
   that the FBI clearly did mislead, and perhaps even bully, her into
   approving their plan.
   
   a. FBI Misinformed Reno about Progress of Negotiations
   
   On April 15th Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell had a two
   hour conversation with chief FBI negotiator Byron Sage. "Hubbell
   recalls that Sage said further negotiations with the subjects in the
   compound would be fruitless. . .Sage further advised Hubbell that
   Koresh had been disingenuous in his discussions with Sage about the
   `Seven Seals.'. . .Hubbell recalls Sage saying he believed there was
   nothing more he or the negotiators could do to persuade Koresh to
   release anyone else, or to come out himself. . .Hubbell advised the
   Attorney General about this conversation." (JDR:270-271) It is unknown
   if Sage told Hubbell about the April 14th letter or read him its
   contents.
   
   Outside expert Alan A. Stone, M.D. writes: "It is unclear from the
   reports whether the FBI even explained to the AG (Reno) that the
   agency had rejected the advice of their own experts in behavioral
   science and negotiation, or whether the AG was told that FBI
   negotiators believed that they could get more people out of the
   compound by negotiation. By the time the AG made her decision, the
   noose was closed and, as one agent told me, the FBI believed they had
   `three options - gas, gas, and gas.'" (JDR:Stone:10-11)
   
   This is not surprising, since Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard
   Rogers himself met with Reno. "Rogers and others offered the following
   additional reasons (for the assault): Koresh had broken every promise
   he had made; negotiations had broken down; no one had been released
   since March 23rd; and it appeared that no one else would surrender."
   (JDR:269) In effect, HRT Commander Rogers, who had pushed SAC Jamar to
   use the tactical harassment that had so disrupted negotiations, now
   informed Attorney Janet Reno that negotiations were not working! Janet
   Reno told the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing:
   "Throughout this 51-day process, Koresh continued to assert that he
   and the others inside would at some point surrender. However, the FBI
   advised that at no point did he keep his word on any of these
   promises." It is not known if Rogers' and higher FBI officials'
   impatience to end the standoff was related to their possible fear the
   upcoming Weaver trial would bring out facts about FBI misconduct in
   that case-- however, that should be investigated.
   
   b. FBI Withheld April 14th Promise to Surrender Letter from Reno
   
   Dr. James Tabor lamented at both the October 15 congressional briefing
   and the November 22, 1993, American Academy of Religion panel that, as
   far as he knew, the FBI never gave Janet Reno the details of Koresh's
   decision to write the his book about the Seven Seals or a copy of his
   April 14th letter. As we can see below, there is no evidence that the
   FBI showed this document--what Dick DeGuerin called "an absolute
   agreement signed that they would come out peacefully"--to Attorney
   General Janet Reno. Nor does it seem to have been shown to FBI
   Director Sessions or FBI Deputy Director Clarke before the April 19th
   assault- -or to reporters or even to outside experts after the fire.
   Evidence of this follows.
   
   * The Justice report states only, "The FBI provided the Attorney
   General with copies of the memoranda prepared by Dr. Miron and Dr.
   Krofcheck and SSA Van Zandt analyzing Koresh's April 9th letter."
   (JDR:274)
   
   * At the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing, FBI
   Director Sessions insisted that the last Koresh letter was related to
   Passover, which would have been much earlier in April.
   
   * At the same hearing, FBI Deputy Director Clarke mentions only
   Koresh's April 9th and 10th letters when he declares that Koresh had
   "his own game plan" and the "snare had been set."
   
   * On April 21, 1993, senior FBI officials held a background briefing
   for reporters to explain their decision to gas Mount Carmel. They
   included Koresh's April 9th and 10th letters as examples of "his
   irrational and `insane' behavior during negotiations." [258] However,
   there is no indication they showed reporters the April 14th letter.
   (The only publication we found which mentioned or quoted the letter
   after the fire was Time, in it's May 3, 1993 issue. However, Time had
   been in touch with Dr. Phil Arnold and quoted him extensively in an
   earlier article.)
   
   * The Justice report does include the April 14th letter after the
   April 9th and 10th letters in an appendix. However, only Koresh's
   April 14th phone call is mentioned in the chronology for that date
   (JDR:105), while the April 9th letter is quoted extensively
   (JDR:99-100) and the April 10th letter is analyzed. (JDR:102) The
   Justice report only mentions the letter in the section where Dr. Miron
   dismisses it as a "ploy." The report inaccurately describes it as
   "Koresh's request that the FBI give him time to finish his manuscript
   about the Seven Seals." (JDR:174)
   
   * Outside expert Lawrence E. Sullivan quotes at length from Koresh's
   April 9th and 10th letters to the FBI, trying to find evidence that
   Koresh would have come out--yet he never mentions the April 14th
   letter! He does quote extensively from the earlier, defiant letters,
   ending, "In the briefing the letter seems to play the role of a last
   straw, measuring Koresh's intransigence and provoking the FBI to
   escalate their interventions." (JDR:Sullivan:5-6) Sullivan's reference
   to the "briefing" indicates that the letter was not discussed during
   the Justice Department's briefing of the outside experts! Even Edward
   Dennis, who was appointed to be the most prominent reviewer of the
   Justice report, refers only to the April 9th and 10th letters and
   Koresh's April 14th phone call. (JDR:Dennis:26) Only one outside
   expert, Nancy Ammerman, even refers to the letter. However, it is
   unknown if she got it from the Justice Department or directly from Dr.
   Philip Arnold. Whoever withheld the April 14th letter from the FBI
   Director and the Attorney General Reno ultimately may be responsible
   for the massacre of the Branch Davidians.
   
   c. FBI Told Reno CS Gas is Safe
   
   CS gas is a white crystalline powder that causes involuntary closure
   of eyes, burning of the skin, respiratory problems and vomiting.
   Amnesty International in October of 1992 said that CS is "particularly
   dangerous when. . .launched directly into homes or other buildings."
   The United States was one of 100 countries that signed an agreement
   banning the use of CS gas in war during the Chemical Weapons
   Convention in Paris in January of 1993. FBI officials did not know
   this when they recommended it. [259]
   
   The goal of the gassing was to drive Branch Davidians out of the
   house. However, the U.S. Department of the Army manual on Civil
   Disturbances (October, 1975, FM19-15) notes: "Generally, persons
   reacting to CS are incapable of executing organized and concerted
   actions and excessive exposure to CS may make them incapable of
   vacating the area."
   
   Alan A. Stone was particularly critical of the FBI's decision to use
   CS gas against the Branch Davidians, especially the children: "When
   asked, the Justice Department was unaware whether the FBI had even
   questioned whether these intentional stresses would be particularly
   harmful to the many infants and children in the compound. Apparently,
   no one asked whether such deleterious measures were appropriate,
   either as a matter of law enforcement ethics or as a matter of
   morality, when innocent children were involved. . .I can testify from
   personal experience to the power of C.S. gas to quickly inflame eyes,
   nose, and throat, to produce choking, chest pain, gagging, and nausea
   in healthy adult males. It is difficult to believe that the U.S.
   government would deliberately plan to expose twenty- five children,
   most of them infants and toddlers, to C.S. gas for forty-eight hours.
   . .The official reports are silent about these issues and do not
   reveal what the FBI told the AG about this matter. . .Based on my own
   medical knowledge and review of scientific literature, the information
   supplied to the AG seems to minimize the potential harmful
   consequences for infants and children." (JDR:Stone:29-30)
   
   Dr. Stone quotes a case of an unprotected child's two to three hour
   exposure to CS gas which resulted in first degree facial burns, severe
   respiratory distress typical of chemical pneumonia and an enlarged
   liver. "The infant's reactions reported in this case history were of a
   vastly different dimension than the information given the AG
   suggested. . .Whatever the actual effects may have been, I find it
   hard to accept a deliberate plan to insert C.S. gas for forty-eight
   hours in a building with so many children. It certainly makes it more
   difficult to believe that the health and safety of the children was
   our primary concern." (JDR:Stone:35)
   
   As for whether CS gas is flammable, "one manufacturer of CS gas. .
   .said. . .he was not certain if the chemical--when spread as a fine
   powder throughout buildings and exposed to fire--would act as a
   catalyst for flames." [260] Chemical consultant Dr. Jay Young said
   that a mixture of CS gas and air could be ignited, but only if the
   ratio of the gas and air was within a very narrow range. [261]
   Attorney Jack Zimmerman, who spoke with military experts, asserted,
   "All three types of CS can spontaneously ignite if occurring in a
   high-enough concentration in a confined space that is exposed to open
   flame." [262] Nevertheless, "the FBI informed (Reno) that the tear gas
   would not cause a fire." (JDR:266)
   
   The two methods of delivery which the FBI used are also dangerous. The
   Mark-V system, "a liquid tear gas dispenser that shoots a stream of
   liquid tear gas (propelled by noncombustible carbon dioxide)
   approximately 50 feet for a duration of approximately 15 seconds,"
   (JDR:287) might suffocate a child in direct line of fire. Even more
   dangerous were the "ferret liquid tear gas rounds", more than 400 of
   which were used to deliver gas. (JDR:277,292,294)
   
   The Justice report admits the ferret tear gas rounds, which it claims
   are not "pyrotechnic," are "launched by a M79 grenade launcher," and
   that, "when fired from 20 yards or less the rounds are capable of
   penetrating a hollow core door." (JDR:277) According to Dick DeGuerin,
   survivors claim that during the gas attack the grenades did in fact
   penetrate multiple walls before exploding.
   
   d. FBI Pushed Reno's Child Abuse "Hot Button"
   
   The Justice report states: "during the week of April 12, someone had
   made a comment in one of the meetings that Koresh was beating babies.
   When Reno inquired further, she had the clear impression that, at some
   point, since the FBI had assumed command and control of the situation
   they had learned that the Branch Davidians were beating babies. She
   had no doubt that the children were living in intolerable conditions.
   Moreover, she had been told that Koresh had sexually abused minors
   previously, and that he continued to have sex while recovering from
   his wounds." (JDR:275) Dr. Park Dietz wrote in a memorandum: "Koresh
   may continue to make sexual use of any female children who remain
   inside." (JDR:223)
   
   FBI Director Sessions went on at length during the April 28, 1993,
   House Judiciary Committee hearings about Victoria Hollingsworth's
   allegation that her 13- or 14-year- old daughter, who she had left
   inside Mount Carmel when she left in March, was one of David Koresh's
   child brides. We must wonder if this is one of the things Sessions
   told Reno during the private phone conversation which evidently
   convinced her to accept the gassing plan. To our knowledge, no other
   government agent or official has made this specific allegation.
   Despite all this discussion of child abuse, the Justice report relates
   that in retrospect Reno "did not believe that anyone at the FBI
   deliberately played up the issue of child abuse." (JDR:275-276)
   
   e. FBI Threatened to Withdraw Hostage Rescue Team
   
   On April 14th Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard "Rogers advised
   that his team had received sufficient breaks during the standoff that
   they were not too fatigued to perform at top capacity in any tactical
   operation at the time. He added, however, that if the standoff
   continued for an extended length of time, he would propose that the
   HRT stand down for rest and retraining. When Reno asked about using
   SWAT teams to take the place of the HRT, she was told that the HRT's
   expertise in dealing with the powerful weapons inside the compound,
   driving the armored vehicles, and maintaining the security of the
   perimeter was essential." She was also discouraged from using the
   Army's "Delta Force" or other forces because of posse comitatus
   restrictions. (JDR:268) The FBI warned Reno that "Koresh might
   actually mount an offensive attack against the perimeter security,
   with Branch Davidians using children as shields. This would have
   required the best trained forces available to the FBI." (JDR:269)
   
   On April 15th FBI chief negotiator Byron Sage told Associate Attorney
   General Webster Hubbell that "law enforcement personnel at Waco were
   getting tired and their tempers were fraying." Hubbell passed this
   information on to Reno. Upon hearing on April 16th that Reno had
   turned down the gassing plan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark
   Richard told Hubbell "that the FBI would not be pleased, that they
   would nonetheless accept the decision, and that they may then talk in
   terms of withdrawal." (JDR:271) Despite these threats to withdraw the
   FBI Hostage Rescue Team, the Justice report asserts Reno believes,
   "The FBI did not try to `railroad' her." (JDR:275-276)
   
   f. FBI De-emphasized Suicide
   
   BATF had used rumors that the Branch Davidians might commit suicide to
   excuse a paramilitary raid against the Branch Davidians. And the FBI
   had alluded to the possibility of mass suicide, as when SAC Bob Ricks
   told the press in March, "We're very concerned that part of Koresh's
   grand scheme is he would like to see a large number of his people die,
   which would be justification for his pronouncements of the fulfillment
   of the Scriptures." [263] However, when it came to promoting their
   gassing plan, mass suicide suddenly became a minor issue. "(T)he FBI
   told the Attorney General they regarded the possibility of mass
   suicide as remote." (JDR:274) Attorney General Reno told the April 28,
   1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing "she would not have given the
   go-ahead if she thought cult members would commit suicide. She said
   the FBI had interviewed former Branch Davidian members throughout the
   world and had concluded Mr. Koresh would not kill himself or lead a
   mass suicide effort." [264] She also asserted during the October 8,
   1993, Justice Department press conference on Waco, "I don't think
   there were any misleading statements about suicide because we talked
   about it..." [265] FBI Director Sessions also has said "none of us
   expect them to commit suicide." [266]
   
   The Justice report does not mention if FBI agents ever told Sessions
   or Reno that: "one former resident who left during the standoff told
   investigators that on March 2nd Koresh intended to leave the compound
   with his followers and commit mass suicide, until Koresh changed his
   mind when God told him `to wait.'. . .On March 5th, 1993, released
   child Joan Vaega had a note pinned to her clothes stating that her
   mother (Marguerite Vaega) would be dead by the time other relatives
   had read the note." Nor is it known if FBI agents had told Sessions
   and Reno they were aware of Kiri Jewell's allegations about having
   been taught to commit suicide. (JDR:Dennis:37)
   
   Even if there was no mass suicide, the FBI's withholding such evidence
   of potential suicide from Sessions and Reno certainly misled them.
   Moreover, the FBI's mere plan to gas and demolish the building was as
   irresponsible as yelling "jump" to a person threatening to jump from a
   ledge or waving a red flag at a raging bull. Dr. Stone, who believes
   the Branch Davidians did commit suicide, wrote he is "convinced that
   the FBI's noose-tightening tactics may well have precipitated Koresh's
   decision to commit suicide and his followers to this course of mass
   suicide. The official reports have shied away from directly
   confronting the possible causal relationship." (JDR:Stone:15)
   
   g. FBI Assured Reno "This Is Not D-Day"
   
   The Justice report states: "The action was viewed as a gradual,
   step-by-step process. It was not law enforcement's intent that this
   was to be `D-Day.' Both the Attorney General and Director Sessions
   voiced concern for achieving the end result with maximum safety. (FBI
   Deputy Director Floyd) Clarke made it clear that the goal of the plan
   was to introduce the tear gas one step at a time to avoid confusing
   the Branch Davidians and thereby maintain the impression that they
   were not trapped." (JDR:267) Reno asserted at her April 19th press
   conference, "Today was not meant to be D-Day. We were prepared to
   carry it out tomorrow and the next day, and do everything we could to
   effect a peaceful resolution of this matter." [267] In her April
   telephone briefing of President Clinton, Reno "emphasized that the
   operation was intended to proceed incrementally, and that it might
   take two or three days before the Branch Davidians surrendered. The
   Attorney General told the President that Monday, April 19th was not
   `D-Day'." (JDR:280)
   
   The Justice report states that during planning of the assault, Reno
   said she "made it clear that if children were endangered, i.e. if they
   were held up to windows and threatened to be shot, the FBI was to
   `back off.'" She recalls her exact words were "Get the hell out of
   there. Don't take any risks with the children." (JDR:273) Reno told
   the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing: "I directed
   that if at any point Koresh or his followers threatened to harm the
   children, the FBI should cease the action immediately. Likewise, if it
   appeared that, as a result of the initial use of teargas, Koresh was
   prepared to negotiate in good faith for his ultimate surrender, the
   FBI was to cease the operation."
   
   h. Reno's "Rules of Engagement" Authorized "D-Day"
   
   Despite Janet Reno's concern for the safety of the Branch Davidians
   and their children and her desire to "effect a peaceful resolution of
   this matter," she authorized rules of engagement which ensured the
   resolution would be violent.
   
   It is unknown if the FBI told Reno about Koresh's early threats to
   "blow the tanks to pieces" if agents attacked Mount Carmel again. He
   had threatened, "if something messes up on this side or on your side,
   then World War III again." (JDR:45) As late as April 18th, when tanks
   were moving Koresh's favorite automobile, agents reported seeing a
   sign in the window reading, "Flames await." (JDR:109) However, Reno
   did tell the House Judiciary Committee hearing she thought the
   possibility of the Branch Davidians firing on the tanks was the most
   important "contingency." If they did so, she had authorized the FBI
   "to return fire." She also said that she thereafter would leave
   decisions up to the FBI because she was not "an expert in tactical law
   enforcement."
   
   The Justice report states, "If during any tear gas delivery
   operations, subjects open fire with a weapon, then the FBI rules of
   engagement will apply and appropriate deadly force will be used,"
   (JDR:288) and "It was also agreed that once she approved the overall
   plan, decisions would be made on the scene. Although she had the
   specific authority to stop the action and tell the FBI to leave,
   tactical decisions were to be made by law enforcement officers in
   Waco." (JDR:273) It is difficult to believe that Janet Reno meant that
   once the Branch Davidians fired, the FBI could do what it pleased,
   women and children be damned--yet, in effect, that is what she
   authorized.
   
   Evidently, Reno did not make the rules of engagement clear to
   President Clinton. He told reporters during his April 20th press
   conference: "The plan included a decision to withhold the use of
   ammunition, even in the face of fire, and instead to use tear gas that
   would not cause permanent harm to health, but would, it was hoped,
   force the people in the compound to come outside and to surrender. .
   .I was further told that under no circumstance would our people fire
   any shots at them even if fired upon."
   
   FBI agents have not admitted to firing any guns on April 19th--but
   they did fire over 400 dangerous ferret grenades. However, Reno's
   instructions gave the FBI enough leeway to begin the aggressive
   gassing and dismantling of Mount Carmel. Evidently, ground commanders
   Jeffrey Jamar and Richard Rogers did not fully explain to Reno or even
   their FBI superiors what kind of "tactical decisions" they might make
   if fired upon. Even FBI Assistant Director Larry Potts told reporters,
   "We thought we could induce the gas, get some people out and get the
   rest of the people to negotiate. We always had a fear that maybe
   there's going to be a few of the people who would fight with us to the
   very end." [268] On the other hand, Potts is also the official who
   doesn't remember approving Richard Rogers' changing the rules of
   engagement in the Weaver case. Whether this indicates incompetence on
   his part or duplicity on Rogers' part should be investigated.
   
   If Potts or his aide Danny Coulson communicated the Attorney General's
   final directives that the operation be a safe one and that
   negotiations remain an option to the siege commanders, the directives
   did not "take". According to one news report: "The F.B.I. has
   acknowledged that it foresaw a high probability of casualties. Bob
   Ricks, one of the agents in charge at Waco, said the day after the
   fire that the assault had two basic goals: rescuing the children, and
   doing so without injuries to any Federal agents. `We knew that the
   chances were great that the adults would not come out unharmed,' Mr.
   Ricks told the Dallas Morning News. `So we felt that if we got any of
   them out safely, that would be a great bonus.'" [269] And despite the
   Branch Davidians signalling they wanted to negotiate that morning,
   during the 10:30 a.m. FBI press conference on April 9th, SAC Ricks
   said, "We're not negotiating. We're saying come out. . .this matter is
   over." [270]
   
10. QUESTIONS ABOUT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S HOSTILITY TOWARD THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS 
   
   The Justice report devotes a section to describing President Clinton
   and the White House's involvement in the siege and the FBI decision to
   assault Mount Carmel. Clinton initially supported negotiations. When
   his chief counsel Bernard Nussbaum first told Clinton about the plan
   to gas Mount Carmel he reminded the President that the decision was "a
   Department of Justice call, not a White House call," and Clinton
   responded that he had great confidence in the Attorney General and the
   FBI. When Janet Reno called him on April 18th regarding the plan he
   told her he supported her decision. (JDR:241-248)
   
   What we wonder about is Clinton's hostility towards the Branch
   Davidians. In his April 20th news conference he growled that Janet
   Reno should not have to resign "because some religious fanatics
   murdered themselves." Two days later he asserted, "I do not think the
   United States government is responsible for the fact that a bunch of
   fanatics decided to kill themselves." Also, Janet Reno told the House
   Judiciary Committee hearing that early April 20th, "The second call I
   got was from the president of the United States, saying,
   `That-a-girl'." [271] If this was an exact quote, it would also seem
   to be a highly insensitive remark.
   
   One explanation might be Clinton's having been influenced by anti-cult
   propaganda, evidenced by this anti- cult comments quoted in an earlier
   section. Another explanation might be Clinton's past association with
   agents wounded and killed on February 28th. In a March 18th, 1993
   speech before employees of the Treasury Department Clinton said, "My
   prayers and I'm sure yours are still with the families of all four of
   the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents who were killed in Waco--Todd
   McKeehan and Conway Lebleu of New Orleans, Steve Willis of Houston,
   and Robert Williams from my hometown of Little Rock. Three of those
   four were assigned to my security during the course of the primary or
   general election." The Wall Street Journal reported that Clinton
   wanted "to know the condition of one particular ATF agent who was
   wounded at Waco: Jay William Buford, an acquaintance of his from
   Arkansas." [272] As we know, Resident Agent-in-Charge Buford was a
   primary investigator and planner in the botched February 28th raid on
   Mt. Carmel. Also, Clinton may have been angered by potential criticism
   of Clinton family friend Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell.
   He was deeply involved in Waco decision-making and the highest ranking
   official in the FBI Operations Center during the last fatal April 19th
   attack.
   
   The New York Times wrote in its October 12, 1993, editorial, "The Waco
   Whitewash," "the report is silent on the most glaring deficiency of
   the tragic episode: the lack of judgement at the top and the reasons
   for it."
   
11. CHRONOLOGY OF APRIL 19TH GASSING, DEMOLITION AND FIRE 
   
   During the morning of April 19, 1993 five tanks [273] flying American
   flags began the attack on Mount Carmel Center. Ironically, the Branch
   Davidians were flying the Star of David on this day, the 50th
   anniversary of the Nazi attack on the Warsaw ghetto. This was also
   "Patriots' Day"- -the 217th anniversary of the first battle of the
   American Revolution, when a British expedition to raid Revolutionary
   Minutemen weapons stockpiles in Concord, Massachusetts resulted in the
   Battles of Lexington and Concord. [274]
   
   This chronology only outlines the FBI's prolonged and brutal attack on
   the Branch Davidians. Because the Committee for Waco Justice did not
   have the resources to obtain from news networks the full seven-hour
   footage of the tank attack and fire, and because the Justice report's
   account is very sketchy, this chronology may contain gaps and
   inaccuracies. Our chronology was assembled from what the Justice
   report text did reveal, from its infrared photos, and from newspaper
   accounts, survivors' reports, and news video tapes. Unless otherwise
   noted, all times and events are from the Justice report.
   
   The FBI took aerial infrared video tapes of the gassing, demolition
   and fire at Mount Carmel. On infrared photos, heat shows up as light,
   but the light may not show up for a minute or more after a fire first
   erupts. We include here two of the eight still shots of the infrared
   video tape from the Justice report. When the government finally
   releases all this footage, the public will finally see the true
   savagery of the assault that led to the deaths of 80 or more people.
   
   5:55 a.m.--CEV1 goes to front left and CEV2 to right side of building.
   
   
   5:59--FBI tells Steve Schneider gas attack is about to begin. He
   throws phone out the window.
   
   6:00--FBI announces over loudspeakers "If you come out now, you will
   not be harmed." and "You are under arrest."
   
   6:00--CEV1 ordered to inject gas using Mark-5 system.
   
   6:00 Approx.--Bradley vehicle delivers ferret tear gas rounds into
   "unoccupied construction area near the main structure" (tornado
   shelter) (Justice report and video footage)
   
   6:04--Agents allege the Branch Davidians are firing on the tanks. FBI
   opts to speed up delivery of gas and demolition of building. Tank
   punches first hole, 8 feet high and 10 feet wide in middle front
   building, left of the front door. [275]
   
   6:07-6:31--CEVs poke holes in building and insert gas at front left
   and right side of building; 4 Bradleys deploy ferret tear gas rounds
   through the windows. Tanks run back and forth over buried bus tunnel
   leading to tornado shelter and collapse debris over the tunnel,
   denying access to it. (Videotape and Fire Report)
   
   6:24--FBI told Davidians to hang out a white flag if phone is not
   working; they hold a white banner, pull it back and replace with dark
   blanket. FBI gives them two minutes to surrender.
   
   6:45-7:04--Tanks deliver more ferret tear gas rounds to every part of
   the building.
   
   7:30--CEV1 rips hole in front right first floor of building and
   inserts gas.
   
   7:58--CEV2 breaches a hole in the second floor back right corner of
   building. CEV rips into second floor womens' quarters. [276]
   
   9:10--Branch Davidians hang out banner, "We want our phones fixed."
   
   9:17--CEV1 breaks through the front door and agents can see both the
   upstairs and the downstairs.
   
   9:28-10:00--CEV1 enlarges the opening in middle front of building.
   CEV2 breaks down and a new CEV2, which is not equipped with tear gas,
   replaces it and breaches the rear side of the building near the
   gymnasium.
   
   9:49--FBI says phone will be connected only if there is a clear signal
   it is for surrender purposes. The Davidians give no signal.
   
   9:54--Graham Craddock gets the phone, indicates it has been severed.
   FBI does not reconnect it.
   
   10:00--Attorney General Janet Reno leaves the Justice Department for a
   speech in Baltimore.
   
   10:00-11:00--Bradleys continue delivering ferret tear gas rounds
   through various openings.
   
   11:00--Janet Reno calls President Clinton.
   
   11:30--Agents try to call into compound. New CEV-2 breaches back side
   of compound near the gymnasium. (Justice report) Tank rams middle
   front of building and something that looks like flame is seen comes
   from boom of tank. (Assistant to Attorney General R. Scruggs 10/8/93
   press conference.)
   
   11:40--Last ferret tear gas rounds delivered. Unknown time--Tank boom
   rams through window and wall of David Koresh's second story bed room.
   
   11:45--12:05 p.m. Approx.--Tank rams whole north back of gymnasium,
   collapsing half of its roof at approximately
   
   11:59. (Justice report account, infrared photos and news footage) Tank
   rams back wall of concrete room and dining room and blocks back exits.
   (Survivors' reports) Tank may have started a fire here. 11:59-12:02
   Approx.--Largest tank smashes through front door. (See Infrared Photo
   #1) Survivors say tank knocked over lanterns and crushed a propane
   tank. Survivors say tank started a fire here.
   
   12:00 Approx.--Removal of part of the southeast corner of exterior
   wall, ground floor level. (Fire Report, news report [277] and photos)
   
   12:01--A loudspeaker message mocks Koresh: "David, we are facilitating
   you leaving the compound by enlarging the door. David, you have had
   your 15 minutes of fame. . .Vernon is no longer the Messiah. Leave the
   building now."
   
   12:06 (12:08 in Justice Report)--Tank rams second story, right front.
   "A few minutes later, from the section of the building, a flicker of
   orange could be seen." [278] Video footage shows smoke coming from the
   building and what appears to be an agent riding on top of this tank.
   Survivor says tank started a fire here.
   
   12:07:41--Infrared photo indicates fire on second floor, right front.
   
   12:08:11--Infrared photo shows large fire on back wall near dining
   room. Tank can be seen sitting behind collapsed gymnasium wall.
   
   12:09:25--Infrared photo shows fire in front door/piano area.
   
   12:09--CNN announcer says "This is a roaring fire. This fire is really
   burning out of control." [279]
   
   12:09:50--Infrared photo shows fire near window of chapel; fire in
   front door/piano area is well-developed. (See Infrared Photo #2)
   
   12:10--An agent 300 yards from building reports seeing man start fire
   near piano, near front door.
   
   12:10:22--Gymnasium engulfed in fire. (Fire Report)
   
   12:10:40--Infrared photo shows room between chapel and collapsed
   gymnasium on fire and wall near dining hall fully inflamed. 12:13--FBI
   calls fire department.
   
   12:20--A Houston Chronicle April 20, 1993, photo shows more than half
   of building fully engulfed in fire.
   
   12:25--Agents report sounds of gunfire inside Mount Carmel Center.
   12:34--Fire vehicles arrive.
   
   12:40-1:20 Approx.--Tanks with plows push remaining walls and debris
   into rubble of Mount Carmel.
   
   12:41--Fire vehicles approach remains of building. A Houston Chronicle
   April 20, 1993, photo shows most of Mount Carmel is completely
   destroyed.
   
12. FATAL DECISION TO ESCALATE TO DEMOLITION 
   
   As we have seen, Attorney General Janet Reno directed that the
   operation was to proceed incrementally. She had specified that
   negotiations should remain an option and that the FBI should pull back
   if there was a chance the children would be harmed. However, she also
   had agreed that if the Branch Davidians fired on the tanks, the FBI
   would be allowed to return fire and the ground commanders could make
   tactical decisions. The Attorney General or, it is assumed, anyone
   delegated that power, could still call off the assault at any time.
   Again, it is unknown if she knew of FBI expectations that "the chances
   were great that the adults would not come out unharmed."
   
   The Justice report mentions, "On Monday morning, the Attorney General
   and several senior Justice Department representatives gathered with
   senior FBI officials in the FBI SIOC (Strategic Information Operations
   Center) , where they monitored events throughout the morning via CNN
   footage and a live audio feed directly from the FBI forward command
   post in Waco." (JDR:285) The report does not mention who these
   officials in the Washington FBI Operations Center were--nor did a
   number of news reports we read. It was revealed during the April 28,
   1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing that two of them were
   Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell and Assistant Deputy
   Attorney General Mark Richard. After Reno left for a speech at 10:00
   a.m., they were the highest ranking officials in the FBI Operations
   Center. They remained in phone contact with ground commanders
   throughout the siege. Despite Justice Department claims that the
   ground commanders would make tactical decisions (JDR:273), it is
   difficult to believe that these high officials were not consulted at
   crucial junctures. a. FBI Believed April 19th Was "D-Day"
   
   It seems clear that FBI siege commander Jamar, HRT commander Rogers
   and chief negotiator Sage did have every intention of making April
   19th "D-Day." The text of the script that chief negotiator Sage read
   to the Branch Davidians over the loud speaker throughout the gassing
   illustrates this. (Emphasis below is ours.) "We are in the process of
   placing tear gas into the building. This is not an assault. We are not
   entering the building. This is not an assault. Do not fire your
   weapons. If you fire your weapons, fire will be returned. Do not
   shoot. This is not an assault. The gas you smell is a non-lethal tear
   gas. This gas will temporarily render the building uninhabitable. Exit
   the compound now and follow instructions. You are not to have anyone
   in the tower. The tower is off limits. No one is to be in the tower.
   Anyone observed to be in the tower will be considered to be an act of
   aggression and will be dealt with accordingly. If you come out now,
   you will not be harmed. Follow all instructions. Come out with your
   hands up. Carry nothing. Come out of the building and walk up the
   driveway toward the Double-E Ranch Road. Walk toward the large Red
   Cross flag. Follow all instructions of the FBI agents in the Bradleys.
   Follow all instructions. You are under arrest. This standoff is over.
   We do not want anyone hurt. Follow all instructions This is not an
   assault. Do not fire any weapons. We do not want anyone hurt."
   
   b. FBI Alleged Branch Davidians Shoot Back
   
   It is questionable whether the Branch Davidians could have understood
   the FBI saying that "this is not an assault." Fire survivor Ruth
   Riddle explains, "I remember hearing crackling-type voices coming over
   the speaker. It was hard to make out what they were saying. Some kind
   of warning. And the next thing we knew they were ramming into the
   building." [280] Whether or not they could hear what the FBI was
   saying, the Branch Davidians must have considered the gas, the
   rampaging ferret rounds, and the tanks smashing into the building to
   be an assault--and the fulfillment of the 5th Seal, where they all
   would be killed. Some Branch Davidians may have decided to fight what
   the saw as a murderous assault by "Babylonians." Surviving Branch
   Davidians deny that they fired at the tanks. The New York Times
   reported that FBI "eavesdropping devices picked up someone saying
   `don't shoot until the very last minute' and `Stay low, stay ready and
   loaded' and `have you been gassed yet?'" [281] These alleged
   statements were not mentioned in the Justice report. No FBI agent who
   alleges hearing shots has been questioned under oath about their
   statements.
   
   As soon as FBI agents reported automatic and semi-automatic gun fire,
   the "FBI"--who actually made the decision is not revealed--immediately
   moved to apply the Reno-approved "rules of engagement," i.e.,
   "appropriate deadly force will be used" and "opted to escalate the
   gassing operation." The Justice report emphasizes that: "In fact, the
   FBI did not fire a shot during the entire operation." (JDR:288-289)
   (Their emphasis.) The FBI obviously does not consider the more than
   400 ferret tear gas rounds that grenade launchers shot into the
   building to be artillery, even though they are "capable of penetrating
   a hollow core door." The Justice report admits: "Some observers,
   including FBI employees who were not privy to the operations plan,
   have questioned whether it was proper for the FBI to escalate the
   operation once the Davidians opened fire, given that the HRT agents
   were not threatened by the gunfire while they were inside the CEVs and
   Bradleys" and then notes the Attorney General's prior approval, danger
   to tanks' drivers from rounds penetrating tank openings and the fact
   that the FBI had "exercised remarkable restraint" during 51 days.
   (JDR:289)
   
   Fire survivor David Thibodeau recalled he was listening to the Ron
   Engelman radio show in the chapel as the tanks gassed and rammed the
   building. When Engelman reported that the FBI alleged the Branch
   Davidians had fired on the tanks, Thibodeau's reaction was: "I knew it
   was over. I didn't hear any shots from my side of the building. . .I
   could see they were setting up the American people for a disaster. I
   was prepared to die at that point." [282]
   
   c. FBI Refused to Negotiate
   
   As we have seen, Reno told Congress she instructed the FBI that "if it
   appeared that, as a result of the initial use of teargas, Koresh was
   prepared to negotiate in good faith for his ultimate surrender, the
   FBI was to cease the operation." However, SAC Bob Ricks stated the
   FBI's opinion on negotiations during the 10:30 a.m. press conference
   on April 19th: "We're not negotiating. We're saying come out. . .this
   matter is over." [283]
   
   At 6:24 a.m., a half hour after Steve Schneider threw the phone out
   the window, FBI loudspeakers instructed the Davidians to fly a white
   flag to signal "their phone was not working and they wanted to
   reestablish phone contact." They did so, but quickly replaced it with
   a non-surrender dark blanket. Chief negotiator Sage then gave them two
   minutes to surrender. They did not. At 9:10 the Davidians hung out a
   white banner reading, "We want our phones fixed." It is not known if
   Janet Reno, who was at the Washington FBI Operations Center, saw the
   banner or inquired about the Branch Davidians' willingness to
   negotiate. At 9:49 the FBI negotiators announced over loudspeakers
   that "the phone would be reconnected only if the Davidians clearly
   indicated they intended to use the phone to make surrender
   arrangements." However, this would require an agent walking on foot
   near the building. "The FBI was unwilling to expose its agents such a
   risk (sic) absent a clear signal from the Davidians that they would
   use the reconnected phone to make surrender agents (sic) with the FBI.
   The Davidians never provided such a signal." Graeme Craddock retrieved
   the phone but never gave the "signal." (JDR:289-293)
   
   SAC Jeffrey Jamar told reporters that although the signs coming from
   the compound seemed to indicate that the cult members were willing to
   talk, "We tried to figure out a way to get a line, but we couldn't
   figure out a way to do it safely." [284] Obviously, it never occurred
   to the FBI to stop its gas attack and pull back its tanks. What does
   seem clear is that the FBI interpreted Reno's "ultimate" surrender to
   mean "immediate" surrender.
   
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   Diagram from Treasury Department Report - Not to Scale Altered to
   include concrete room, water tower, buried bus, missing room names,
   tank damage
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   Infrared photo page
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   Infrared photo page
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   d.FBI Did Begin Demolition of Mount Carmel
   
   The FBI did not expect gassing alone to work. One reporter wrote that
   SAC Bob Ricks "did not expect cult members to begin leaving the
   complex, despite the power of the tear gas." [285] In fact, the FBI
   described the next step--the plan to demolish Mount Carmel--to the
   press during an April 19th morning press briefing. Besides the
   gassing, "A secondary plan, according to authorities, was to knock the
   compound down building by building. Some of the armored vehicles that
   surrounded the Branch Davidian complex had been fitted with battering
   rams." [286]
   
   Just before noon, the FBI began demolition of the building. Edward
   Dennis calls this "an apparent deviation from the approved plan"
   because the FBI did not wait 48 hours before it "dismantled" the
   building. (JDR:Dennis:59) However, speeding up demolition was implicit
   in Reno's approving the new rules of engagement. Despite Dennis'
   acknowledgement that the tanks began demolition, Justice Department
   and FBI officials have been reluctant to admit that the tanks smashing
   through walls and into the building--what the FBI calls "breaching
   activities"--was in fact the beginning of demolition. They have given
   differing explanations for the accelerated tank rammings.
   
   During an April 21st press briefing, unnamed senior Justice Department
   officials told reporters, "agents began battering the walls of the
   compound to make bigger holes so long booms or `arms' attached to the
   vehicles could inject the gas deeper into the building to counteract
   high winds outside that appeared to be dispersing it." [287] And FBI
   Deputy Director Floyd Clarke told the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary
   Committee hearing that in the final assault the FBI drove the tank in
   through the front door, the side of the building and the back of the
   building, "to give these people ways to exit the building, which some
   later used." Whether FBI ground commanders Jamar and Rogers
   unilaterally began demolition of Mount Carmel, or first consulted with
   officials in the Washington FBI Operations Center, has not be
   revealed.
   
   Justice Department officials did admit to the press that "the net
   result was that the actual operation may have appeared more
   threatening to Koresh and his followers than the more cautious plan
   approved by Reno. Asked yesterday if agents in Waco had exceeded the
   plan she approved, Reno said `I don't think so,' according to
   department spokesman Carl Stern." [288] We have not found a specific
   comment from Attorney General Reno herself on this issue.
   
13. SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY BY FBI AGENTS 
   
   Indianapolis attorney Linda Thompson created a controversial and
   widely distributed video tape called "Waco, the Big Lie." It details
   important BATF and FBI violations of rights, use of excessive force
   and coverup in the massacre of the Branch Davidians. [289] The video
   tape footage clearly shows suspicious activity by agents (or suspected
   agents) which the Justice report does not explain and which must be
   explained by FBI agents and personnel under oath.
   
   a. Agents Jumping in and Out of Tanks
   
   The Justice report frequently mentions that FBI agents were in
   constant danger of being shot at by Branch Davidians. According to
   Newsweek, "HRT was under orders not to leave its tanks or enter the
   compound on foot. . .HRT agents did have authority to leave their
   tanks but only in the rarest circumstances, such as children being
   killed or held hostage." [290] During the April 19th, 10:30 a.m. press
   conference SAC Bob Ricks stated, "We are not exposing any of our
   agents individually to firearms." [291] The Justice report never
   mentions such directives, only that during the fire agents left their
   tanks to arrest Branch Davidians who were exiting the burning building
   and to look for survivors in the buried bus.
   
   However, in one portion of the "Waco, the Big Lie" agents clearly can
   be seen jumping in and out of the swung-open back of a tank, near the
   buried bus and a large hole in the building, during the gassing and
   before the fire. The Fire Report states that the M79 grenade launchers
   were "hand held." (JDR:Fire Report:8) Therefore, to use them agents
   would have to open the hatches of, or even leave, their tanks to fire
   the grenades. Neither the FBI nor the Justice report admits that
   agents left their tanks until after the fire was well underway.
   
   Later video footage shows what looks like a dark-clothed individual
   riding on top of a tank which is pulling away from right side of the
   building as wisps of smoke are seen coming from second floor.
   (However, some think it may not be a person but either debris or the
   tank's boom.) If it is a person, his activities, and those of all the
   agents outside their tanks, must be investigated.
   
   The agents being outside their tanks, plus news reports that survivors
   last saw David Koresh at 10:00 a.m. and Steve Schneider at 10:30 a.m.
   [292] and autopsy reports that both died of gunshot wounds, have
   fueled speculation that agents may have killed Branch Davidians inside
   the building. The Reno-approved rules of engagement--fire only if
   fired upon--still would have given FBI agents wide leeway to fire at
   Branch Davidians, since allegedly they were firing out of Mount
   Carmel. This would be especially true if any agents decided to apply
   the rules of engagement Richard Rogers approved in the Weaver
   case--fire if you see anyone with a gun. The hostility expressed by
   Jamar, Ricks, Rogers and Sage may have communicated the message that
   FBI agents were permitted to use "any means necessary" to end the
   siege.
   
   Pathologist Cyril H. Wecht, who conducted an independent autopsy on
   the body of David Koresh, said because the bullet wound was in the
   middle of the forehead, he did not "`rule out' the possibility that
   Koresh and Schneider were shot by outside snipers." [293] Dick
   DeGuerin admitted, "I have heard a rumor that six or eight specially
   trained (men) were sent in to shoot people. . .when you look at some
   of the wounds, they were not suicide wounds. Not typical suicide
   wounds." [294] Darren Borst, son of Mary Jean Borst who died from
   gunshot wounds in the back, insisted that an "FBI hit team" killed his
   mother and other Branch Davidians found with gunshot wounds. [295]
   Some even speculate one or more Branch Davidian fire survivors will
   testify they saw government agents shooting Branch
   Davidians--accusations they will have withheld for their own safety's
   sake until the trial.
   
   b. Questions About Individual Who Jumps Off Roof
   
   There are also questions about the individual seen jumping off the
   front roof, and, untouched by fire, walking away almost nonchalantly.
   He takes off a hood and then the walks at least 150 feet away from the
   burning building with his hands at his side, seemingly carrying a long
   stick or a rifle. These actions are contrary to the FBI's repeated
   instructions to individuals to put up their hands and not carry
   anything.
   
   Only one Branch Davidian male, Renos Avraam, jumped off the roof. The
   Justice report states, "Avraam then jumped off the roof, and walked
   toward one of the Bradleys with his hands up." (JDR:298) Newsweek
   reports, "One cult member, Renos Avraam, appeared on top of the
   burning roof. He fell to the ground, and FBI agents rescued him."
   [296] Time reports, "A man appeared on the roof, clothes aflame,
   rolling in pain; he fell off the roof, and the agents ran over, tore
   off his burning clothes and got him safely inside the armored
   vehicle." [297] And during the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary
   Committee hearing, FBI Deputy Director Floyd Clarke said HRT members
   had seen a man "consumed by fire" fall off the roof and ran over to
   help him into a vehicle. Considering that these accounts do not
   describe the individual seen on "Waco, the Big Lie," further
   investigation of who this individual was must be done.
   
14. LACK OF FIRE PRECAUTIONS 
   
   According to the Justice report, "In one of the meetings held in Waco
   in early April. . . (Assistant U.S. Attorney) LeRoy Jahn raised the
   possibility of fire at the compound and suggested to the FBI that fire
   fighting equipment be placed on standby at the scene. . . (Deputy
   Assistant Director Danny) Coulson explained . . .due to the range of
   the Branch Davidians' weapons, fire fighting equipment could not be
   brought into the proximity of the compound. Coulson further explained
   that structural fires cannot be fought from the outside. The only way
   a fire could have been fought at the compound would have required fire
   fighting personnel to enter the compound. That option would have posed
   an unacceptable risk to the fire fighters." (JDR:302-303) (Again, one
   wonders why the FBI was concerned about fire fighters and not about
   the agents seen jumping in and out of tanks on "Waco, the Big Lie.")
   
   Janet Reno admits she gave little thought to the possibility of fire.
   Her worse case scenario "would be an explosion, not a fire. . .She
   recalls lying awake at night asking herself. `Oh my God, what if he
   blows the place up?'" (JDR:274) Reno did assert at the April 28, 1993,
   House Judiciary Committee hearing: "I was concerned about intentional
   or accidental explosions and ordered that additional resources be
   provided to ensure that there was an adequate emergency response."
   During her April 19th press conference, "Ms. Reno said she thought
   that the fire department had been" given advance notice. However, the
   Waco fire department said it had not been given advance notice of the
   assault by Federal agents. [298] Reports that the FBI had called
   Parkland Memorial Hospital in Dallas about its burn unit were
   confirmed in November, 1993, when Parkland announced it was planning
   to sue the federal government for refusal to pay $370,000 in medical
   bills of three Branch Davidians in the hospital's burn unit. According
   to the Dallas Morning News, Tom Cox, Parkland's legal director "said
   he thinks the government should be held responsible because federal
   authorities called the hospital the day of the assault on the cult
   compound, asking about the burn unit and available bed space. He said
   a call was made to the hospital about 6 a.m. that day, but it was
   unclear if it was during that call or a later call that day that the
   burn unit was mentioned. The FBI began its tear- gas attack about 6
   a.m.; the fire did not begin until shortly after noon. . . (and) . .
   .the Davidians `certainly' were in federal authorities' custody when
   they were taken to Parkland." [299]
   
   Fire trucks were not summoned until 10 minutes after the fire broke
   out. The FBI then held them up for 16 minutes after they arrived.
   "Although the fire crews did not approach the burning building until
   31 minutes after the fire had first been reported, it would not have
   been safe for them to do so earlier given the reports of gunfire from
   inside the compound." (JDR:303) Of course, Houston Chronicle photos
   and video tapes show that 31 minutes after fire was first reported,
   the building is entirely gone! SAC Ricks "conceded, officials in
   charge of the operation had not expected a fire." [300] After the
   fire, Representative James Traficant commented on the FBI plan. "When
   you have 100 TV crews but not one fire truck, that's not a well-
   thought out plan, that's box office." [301]
   
15. BRANCH DAVIDIAN STATEMENTS THAT DEMOLITION TRAPPED PEOPLE 
   
   The streams of gas from the Mark-V delivery system, the rampaging
   ferret tear gas rounds and the ramming tanks drove Branch Davidians
   into the interior of the building where they were trapped when the
   fire started.
   
   a. Effects of the Gas
   
   The gassing had relatively little effect on the Branch Davidians
   because they wore gas masks and because stiff winds rushing through
   the large holes created by tanks quickly dispersed the gas. Some
   children's masks were made to fit with the help of wet towels; other
   children were placed in the concrete room with wet blankets over their
   heads to protect them from the gas. "During the hours before the fire,
   when the building was under assault, (attorney Jack) Zimmerman said,
   cult members donned gas masks and went about their normal routines
   while Koresh checked to see if everyone was all right. . .It bothered
   them, but it didn't cause pandemonium," he said of the tear gas.
   "People remained calm." [302] Zimmerman also said: "They thought they
   were going to spray some tear gas and retreat," and added that the
   survivors thought Koresh would be allowed to finish his book about the
   Seven Seals, after which they'd go to court. [303] What was terrifying
   was the dangerous ferret tear gas rounds smashing through the building
   which drove most Branch Davidians into the concrete room or to the
   second floor hallways. And those who were most severely affected by
   the gas may have been too debilitated to leave the building once the
   fire began.
   
   b. Effects of the Tanks
   
   At the April 19th 10:30 a.m. press conference SAC Ricks told
   reporters, "The pounding of the compound that you see is really a
   necessary function of the insertion of the gas. . .So, it's not
   necessarily, at this point, one of destruction to the compound." When
   reporters asked if they warned those inside each time a tank was about
   to smash into the building, Ricks answered, "We are not advising them
   ahead of time. We are continuing to advise them to please exit the
   compound." (Remember it was Ricks who also told the Dallas Morning
   News, "we felt that if we got any of them out safely, that would be a
   great bonus.")
   
   According to the Justice report, "Members of the HRT were assigned to
   be tank drivers, tank commanders, Bradley vehicle crew, snipers, and
   sniper's support. . .An orbiting helicopter with SWAT personnel aboard
   would apprehend and arrest subjects attempting to flee from the crisis
   site." (JDR:279) Well before April 19th FBI agents had been criticized
   for their sloppy tank driving techniques, especially after a Bradley
   Personnel Carrier driver trying to move a Waco Tribune-Herald vehicle
   stranded on the property, ran over and crushed it. [304] Doubtless,
   the tanks were driven with similar carelessness as they rammed their
   way into the building.
   
   Tanks rammed the front staircase, pushed in the bullet-riddled front
   door, collapsed the walls and then the roof of the gymnasium as they
   pushed their way back towards the back of the building where they
   bashed in the dining room walls and the back doors. And then, around
   noon, the tanks began the final, fatal round of tank attacks. FBI
   Deputy Director Floyd Clarke told the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary
   Committee hearing admitted to simultaneous tank attacks when he said:
   "at this time we made some openings in the building where we actually
   drove the tank in here through this door, through this side of the
   building and through the back side here to give these people ways to
   exit the building--which some later used." That the FBI believed it
   needed to punch out new "ways to exit" indicates they knew they
   already had blocked the existing exits.
   
   News reports provide more details of the damage caused by the tanks.
   "By noon, whole sections of the exterior walls had been demolished.
   Portions of the roof were collapsing. Cult members inside had been
   forced into an ever-narrowing circle of interior rooms." [305]
   According to Associated Press, "Then the FBI sent in its biggest
   weapon--a massive armored vehicle larger than the others [306] and
   headed for a chamber lined with cinder blocks where authorities hoped
   to find Mr. Koresh and Mr. Schneider and fire the chemical irritant
   directly at them. When the tank rumbled in, it produced such trembling
   it felt like an earthquake. The tank took out everything in its path.
   The front door went. So did an upright piano standing as a barricade
   behind it." [307] "(E)very assault by a tank rattled the poorly
   constructed buildings, and cult members dodged falling sheet rock and
   doors." [308]
   
   Attorney Jack Zimmerman said, "People were trapped: the building was
   falling down, the damn tanks had just destroyed the structure and
   nobody knew where they were because the ceiling had fallen in." [309]
   He also said the big tank's "concussion tipped everything over on the
   second floor, collapsed the walls and stairwells, trapping women and
   children upstairs." [310] Dick DeGuerin told the television show
   "Prime Time" that those who sought shelter in the second floor
   hallways were trapped because doors were twisted and jammed by the
   tanks ramming the building and they could not get into rooms that had
   windows from which they could escape.
   
   Fire survivor Jaime Castillo "tried to move around the building, but
   the repeated pounding on the exterior had left piles of rubble
   everywhere. The central stairway between the first and second floors
   was littered with plasterboard and wood and had partially collapsed."
   [311] Ruth Riddle explained why people didn't get out when the fire
   started: "I believe that they couldn't get out. Where the buildings
   were rammed is where the staircases were." [312] David Thibodeau told
   "Good Morning America," "I could see people being trapped, 'cause when
   the tanks did go in there, there were hallways, there were places that
   were cut off." [313] Survivors recall that after the fire started,
   even those who had been in the outside rooms "fled them for interior
   areas, but within a few minutes these were ablaze, too." [314] David
   Koresh's mother Bonnie Haldeman told a television interviewer that a
   survivor told her that "all the back exits had been blocked. The whole
   back building had been pushed in. The back doors had been pushed in.
   There was no way for anyone to get out the back." [315]
   
   After the fire SAC Jeffrey Jamar said: "Mr. Koresh obviously intended
   for the children to die or he would have put them in a safe
   place--such as the buried bus beneath the compound. . .`When our
   (hostage rescue team) was able to get down into the bus, hoping we
   could find the children. . .in that bus, the air was cool--and no gas.
   Had Koresh wished those children to survive, that was one place they
   could have been put safely when he had the fire started." [316]
   President Clinton also mentioned this "fact" during his April 20 press
   conference. However, as we know-- and Jamar should have--during the
   morning tanks had been running back and forth over the tunnel and part
   of the house had been pulled down on top of it. The Fire Report also
   admits that "a significant amount of structural debris was found in
   this area indicating that the breaching operations could have caused
   this route to be blocked." (JDR:Fire Report:10)
   
   c. Position of Bodies and Autopsy Reports
   
   The Justice report confirms that most of the 80 or more people who
   died were found in the furthest interior areas: inside the concrete
   room (32), in front of it (3), in the nearby kitchen (16), in hallways
   (6), in the communications room (3). During the April 28, 1993, House
   Judiciary Committee hearings, Representative James Sensenbrenner, who
   himself had barely escaped a disastrous house fire, questioned why so
   many bodies were found near the middle front of the building, which
   caught fire later than the back and the side. Assistant Director for
   the Criminal Investigative Division Larry Potts answered that the FBI
   had "statements from people in there who chose to come out" that
   others had "chosen not to come out." However, no such statements were
   included in the Justice report.
   
   The Justice autopsy report notes that one unidentified 30-50 year old
   female "died of multiple fractures of the cervical spine, caused by
   blunt force trauma probably associated with a fall. Her body was found
   in front of the bunker." (JDR:322) It is possible the woman was either
   crushed by a tank or that the tank brought down part of the second
   floor, killing her. There may be no survivors from this area of the
   building to testify as to what happened to the woman.
   
   Despite all this evidence, the Justice report refuses to admit the
   possibility that the gassing attack-- including more than 400 ferret
   rounds--and tanks ramming the building trapped the Branch Davidians.
   "While the fire was burning the negotiators repeatedly broadcast
   repeated messages to the compound, pleading with the residents to
   leave. Only a few of the Davidians heeded those pleas." (JDR:300)
   
16. BRANCH DAVIDIAN STATEMENTS DEMOLITION STARTED THE FIRE 
   
   Below we detail the statements of fire survivors that FBI tank
   activity caused the fire that consumed Mount Carmel and killed 80 or
   more people. Later sections will present FBI and fire investigators'
   conclusions that the fires were started by Branch Davidians.
   
   a. Building Filled with Flammable Fuel
   
   After the FBI cut off the building's electricity, the Branch Davidians
   became totally dependent on flammable fuel for light and heating.
   Attorney Jack Zimmerman noted that "almost every room had a coleman
   lantern." [317] These lamps use kerosene as fuel. Renos Avraam's
   attorney Dick Kettler said of that morning, "As they awoke, kerosene
   lamps hanging on the outside walls were lit." According to the same
   news account, "Some of the upper rooms also contained butane gas
   heaters, and propane gas tanks were located throughout the compound."
   [318]
   
   b. Ferret Rounds and Tanks Dispersed Fuel
   
   A Branch Davidian survivor told Dr. James Tabor that rocketing ferret
   rounds knocked over the kerosene lamps, spilling so much kerosene and
   making the floor so slippery, they sometimes had to go down on "all
   fours" to get around (private communication). The Fire Report does
   admit that due to "structural damage. . .it is possible that some
   flammables were spilled inside the building as a result. These
   flammables could have contributed to the destruction of the building
   as the fire spread to them. There is no positive proof of this but it
   cannot be eliminated." (JDR:Fire Report:9)
   
   c. Allegations Final Tank Assaults and Demolition Started Fire
   
   As our chronology illustrates, there were major tank assaults in the
   areas where the fires started just minutes before fires were first
   seen by outsiders. The assaults on the back of the compound--at the
   dining room and concrete room--and the collapse of half of the huge
   gymnasium were never shown in television news reports and no
   newspapers included them in their diagrams. Television footage and
   newspaper photographs did show clearly the fire which began on the
   second floor, the fire in the back of the building, once it reached
   the second story of the tower, and the fact that the middle and left
   front of the building caught fire later than either of those sections.
   The Justice report does not include a very clear description--or any
   graphics--of these last tank assaults before the fire, leaving anyone
   who has not studied the full aerial infrared video tape of the tank
   attack somewhat confused.
   
   The two "official" descriptions of the tank attacks below seem to
   describe tank attacks at the rear of the building that collapsed the
   gymnasium. Evidently the tanks were blocked by fuel tanks from
   reaching the back of the building from the left side of the building,
   so they tried to squeeze through the narrow space between the swimming
   pool and the gymnasium walls. In so doing, they brought down those
   walls, and half the gymnasium roof. Justice Department report reviewer
   Edward Dennis writes that the "CEV2 was ordered to clear a path
   through the compound in order to clear a path to the main tower so
   that CEV-1 could insert tear gas in that area. In that endeavor the
   CEV started to knock down a corner of the building and a portion of
   the roof collapsed. Very shortly after this happened, fire was
   observed in several locations in the compound." (JDR:Dennis:59) (The
   "tower" was the three stories built on top of the concrete room.)
   During the Justice Department press conference October 8, 1993,
   Assistant to the Attorney General Richard Scruggs, who compiled the
   factual report, explained: "Four to five minutes before the fire broke
   out the vehicle went through the tower area and breached a hole in
   there and saw what he believed to be a group of people inside, he
   believed women and children." [319] (Because we do not have a video
   tape of the press conference, we assume that Scruggs was pointing to
   photographs of the back of the building; however, he may have been
   pointing to entry of the tank through the front door.)
   
   The Associated Press account in a section above describes the entry
   through the front door. "Then the FBI sent in its biggest weapon--a
   massive armored vehicle larger than the others and headed for a
   chamber lined with cinder blocks." i.e., the concrete room. "
   (Survivors) said the tank took out a barrel of propane, flattening the
   container and spilling its contents. And as the tank thundered through
   the house it tipped over lit camping lanterns, spitting flames that
   ignited the propane and other flammables. . .The building erupted. It
   happened too fast to pull fire extinguishers from the walls." [320]
   Although Branch Davidian survivors claim it was this tank entry which
   started the fire, the Justice report does not mention its entry in its
   section on the final tank attacks. (JDR:294) The report does include
   the 11:59:16 infrared photo of the tank at the front door.
   
   "Jack Zimmermann, who said he spoke Wednesday with four survivors and
   attorneys for two others, said all six survivors say an armored
   vehicle that smashed through a wall hit the propane tank and started
   the fire. `One person heard someone screaming from the area where the
   tank was, `A tank has come in! There's a fire started!' They said the
   smoke was so black, that one of them said within seconds he couldn't
   see where he was.'" [321] According to the New York Times, "The
   survivors said that the fire began after an especially violent tank
   collision plowed far into the building. The (tank) crushed a container
   of propane, according to the account that lawyers gave the news
   agency. It also tipped over lighted camping lanterns, which spit
   flames that ignited the propane and other flammables. . .escape
   attempts were hampered because gas masks clouded up in the smoke and
   heat." [322]
   
   It is possible that the tank which rammed the second story at about
   12:06 p.m. also started a fire--the "flicker of orange" one reporter
   described shortly after the ramming. Attorney Dick Kettler reported
   his client Renos Avraam "was with a number of people squeezed into a
   hallway on the second floor when the fire started. He heard a tank
   crashing against the wall in a room near them. Then that room caught
   fire. He said it was terrifying. The tanks were crashing into the
   walls, and the whole building was shaking. He thought he would get
   crushed between the walls. Others in the hallway didn't have time to
   escape. The fire went too fast. It was total blackness and confusion.
   In seconds, everybody was disoriented." The story notes that Avraam
   was apparently the only survivor from that hallway, having found a
   window to crash through that led to the front roof. [323]
   
   Even with this sketchy evidence, we can see that the tank that rammed
   through the back wall near the dining room clearly could have started
   the fire seen minutes later which quickly consumed and collapsed the
   tower above the concrete room. And the big tank that rammed through
   the front door towards the tower could have started both the second
   story fire and fires deeper inside the chapel, including near the
   dining room. Alternately, the tank ramming the second floor may have
   started that fire. Either the second story fire or any other internal
   fire could have spread rapidly through the puddles of spilled lantern
   fuel into the chapel area to the back of the stage where infrared
   photos show flames raging a few minutes later.
   
   The collapse of half the huge gymnasium's roof also could have started
   a fire in that back area. A California gun rights organization
   obtained CBS footage of the April 19th attack and found that news
   footage clearly shows the gymnasium collapsing sometime between 11:55
   and 11:59 a.m. The group claims that a heat plume indicating fire in
   the gymnasium area can be seen in the 11:59:16 infrared photo included
   in the Justice report. [324]
   
   d. Questions about "Flaming" Tank
   
   The most controversial part of the video tape "Waco, the Big Lie" is a
   scene of a tank pulling out of the middle front of the building (not
   the front door) which appears to be shooting flames from the end of a
   boom. Thompson claims this is "proof" that the government
   intentionally started the fire. A number of FBI critics, including
   some Branch Davidians, doubt the tank is shooting flame, based on
   other footage of the same scene which makes the alleged "flames" look
   like a reflection from building debris or from escaping gasses. Others
   claim that no such light can be seen on high resolution tape of the
   same footage.
   
   Because Thompson had distributed her video to television stations and
   politicians all over the country, the Justice report answers
   Thompson's allegations in a section entitled "False Accusations that
   the FBI Started the Fire." (JDR:304-307) Note that the Justice
   Department did not bother to address survivors' more credible accounts
   of how FBI tanks "started the fire." Right after the fire, Justice
   Department spokesperson Carl Stern's dismissed the six survivors'
   statements saying, "That stuff is preposterous." [325]
   
   The report asserts that the time when that shot was filmed is
   "unclear." (JDR:305) However, earlier the report mentioned the
   existence of "split-screen video prepared by the FBI laboratory,
   containing the infrared footage from the air on one side, with the
   televised footage from the ground on the other." (JDR:296) Analysts
   should have been able to ascertain the time through the videos' "time
   meters." The report also asserts that infrared photos show no
   indication of heat coming from the front of the tank (they do show
   heat from the exhaust at the back of the tank). Evidently, Justice
   report experts did not watch the whole tape for signs of heat coming
   from the front of all the tanks.
   
   The Justice report asserts that the army "has examined all the CEVs
   used on April 19th to see if they had been outfitted with a
   flame-emitting device or if there was any evidence of charring or
   fire. "No such evidence was found." Of course, this investigation
   probably was not launched until mid or late summer, when "Waco, the
   Big Lie" began to have political impact. By that time, the tanks, some
   of which had pushed burning debris into the fire, would probably have
   been cleaned, refitted and repaired. The report does not mention if
   maintenance or repair records were checked.
   
   A reporter asked about the "flaming tank" at the Justice Department's
   October 8, 1993 press conference. Richard Scruggs provided more
   information from "preliminary assessments" by University of Maryland
   "experts." Scruggs speculated that a flame could have come from a
   "busted hydraulic line or something like that" but said that the
   Justice Department had inspected the CEV's and found no evidence of
   broken parts. During his statement Scruggs asserted that "carbon
   monoxide"--a poisonous and sometimes flammable gas--was used to propel
   the CS gas into the compound. [326] Because the Justice report states
   the dispersant was carbon dioxide (JDR:287), this prompted speculation
   that the Scruggs had accidently "let the cat out of the bag." However,
   Scruggs later told Washington Times reporter Jerry Seper that he had
   in fact made an error (private communication). (The fact that the Fire
   Report labels "CS" gas "CN" gas (JDR:Fire Report: 8) has also prompted
   speculation.) Further, investigation is in order as to whether any
   tanks were somehow spewing flames or casting off sparks that caused
   one or more of the fires that consumed Mount Carmel Center.
   
   e. Evidence Fire Drove Some to Suicide
   
   Because gun shots were heard during the fire and twenty-one Branch
   Davidians died from gun shot wounds, various FBI and Justice
   Department officials, and the mass media, have alleged the fire and
   shootings were either "mass suicide" or "mass murder" as a few Branch
   Davidians set the fires and shot those who tried to escape. SAC
   Jeffrey Jamar said, "maybe some were forced to stay" because gunshots
   were heard as fire started and one body bore a bullet hole in the
   head. [327]
   
   However, given the fact that most exit routes were blocked by debris
   from the tanks when the fire roared through the building, survivors
   and others believe that some of those trapped in the fire chose
   suicide over asphyxiation or burning to death. Fire experts who viewed
   video tape of the fire opined, "it was a text-book example of a deadly
   fire involving a unsafe building and a 30-mile-an-hour wind. Cult
   members may have had less than five minutes to escape after the fire
   began. . .Once one room had become engulfed by fire, a point referred
   to as flashover. . .the fire produces an enormous amount of toxic
   gases that cause confusion." [328]
   
   When asked about the fact that bodies had been found with gunshot
   wounds to the head, Branch Davidians denied there was a suicide pact.
   David Thibodeau said, "No, there was not a suicide pact. . .I know
   that if I were trapped in a fire and there was a fire next to me, and
   I was. . .it was very probable that I was going to burn, that I may, I
   may just taken the easy way out." When the interviewer asked why
   people didn't try to get out, Thibodeau answered, "I believe some
   people did try to get out or else I wouldn't be sitting here. .
   .obviously." [329]
   
   Fire survivor Ruth Riddle said, "Given the fact that they may have
   been trapped, they may have opted for that rather than burning to
   death, that's a terrible way to die." [330] Jaimie Castillo told a
   reporter, "If I was in that situation, where I couldn't get out and
   the fire was coming my way, I'd probably take myself out." [331] Derek
   Lovelock said Koresh "didn't want to commit suicide and he didn't want
   to be killed. . .We knew the end was coming, but we honestly thought
   it would all pass peacefully, David included." [332] Louis Alaniz, the
   "visitor" who left Mount Carmel a few days before the fire, also
   agreed that there was no suicide pact. [333]
   
   Pathologist Dr. Rodney Crowe told the Maury Povich audience, "I think
   they did what you would have done, what I would have done and I've put
   myself in that position. If I was on fire, if my child was on fire, if
   the heat was so unbearable, I'd shoot my child. I would hope I'd have
   the strength to shoot myself. As we were examining these people we
   hoped that we would find gunshot wounds because we knew that they went
   out quickly that way rather than suffer the horrible death that we
   knew some of them did."
   
   Dr. Crowe was also incensed by some newspaper interpretations of the
   autopsy findings. "In our local Fort Worth paper on the front page it
   said `Cultist Children Executed'. . .and mentioned that children were
   shot, stabbed, beaten to death. . . (The paper wrote) `It is apparent
   that the parents turned on their children in favor of David Koresh's
   teachings.' This is why I'm here because our product has been twisted.
   . .Nowhere did we say execution. Nowhere did we say beaten to death.
   It was blunt force trauma. Three children had blunt force trauma. But
   it was from the falling concrete in the bunker that fell on them.
   There's an opening in the top of the bunker eight feet approximately
   in diameter and large chunks of concrete fell on these people. And to
   say these children were beaten to death is unconscionable."
   
   The Justice report alleges (JDR:7), and some papers repeated, that one
   child had been stabbed to death. Dr. Crowe later told an audience
   member that the child who reportedly had been stabbed may also have
   been hit by falling concrete or other materials; the mark on a rib
   which suggested stabbing might also have been an old wound from a
   childhood accident (private communication.)
   
17. FBI ALLEGATIONS BRANCH DAVIDIANS STARTED THE FIRE 
   
   As soon as the fire started, SAC Ricks, who earlier in the day had
   assured reporters the FBI was confidant there would be no mass
   suicide, proclaimed, "Oh, my god, they're killing themselves!" as if
   that was the only possible cause of the fire. Below is evidence the
   government presents that the Branch Davidians started the fire, plus
   comments on that evidence. Discussion of the Fire Report follows in a
   later section.
   
   a. Testimony by Agents
   
   The Justice report states, "At 12:10 p.m. another HRT agent, who was
   300 yards away from the compound at Sierra One post, actually saw a
   Branch Davidian start the fire. The agent later reported to
   investigators what he had seen: `. . .he noticed the man was moving
   back and forth behind the piano and the individual then assumed a
   kneeling position. (The HRT agent) noticed the man's hands moving and
   immediately after that (he) noticed that a fire started in that
   position. The man immediately departed the area of the piano. At the
   same time (the HRT agent) noticed a fire start on the red or right
   side of the building." (JDR:296) However, as the Justice report's own
   12:09:50 p.m. infrared photos show, by the time the agent made that
   report the whole front and right of the building were fully aflame.
   
   The report goes on to say, "The HRT agent reported what he had seen
   over the radio. Two HRT snipers simultaneously noticed fire breaking
   out in two different parts of the building -- at the front-right
   corner, and at the third or fourth floor of the tower on the back-left
   side." (TDR:297) However, at that time they would have seen
   well-developed fires. The report adds, "Another HRT sniper thought it
   odd that, from his vantage point, the fire appeared to spread in the
   opposite direction of the wind, which was blowing from the right side
   to the left side of the complex." (TDR:297) The implication seems to
   be that the fires were deliberately started, since they go against the
   direction of the wind. However, fires started by tanks also could go
   against the direction of the wind.
   
   The Justice report does not mention SAC Jeffrey Jamar's April 20th
   allegation to reporters that, "At least 3 people observed a (cult
   member) spreading something. . .with a cupped hand and then there was
   a flash of fire." [334] (Two other reporters also mentioned Jamar's
   claim: one described it as "three FBI sharpshooters had seen a
   fireball shortly after they had watched cult members sprinkling liquid
   inside." [335] The other described it as "three snipers, peering
   through binoculars from a station 100 yards away from the compound,
   could see a cult member start the blaze." [336] ) Nor does the Justice
   report mention Bob Rick's account of an agent's version reported in
   the Washington Post: "someone appeared on the second floor of the
   compound wearing a gas mask and made a throwing motion. Flames
   erupted, and the person signaled to agents he did not want to be
   rescued." [337] There is no evidence either version was "redacted" in
   the Justice report. SAC Jamar and these agents must be interviewed
   under oath so that we may discover if any agents fabricated stories
   about seeing Branch Davidians start the fire.
   
   b. Surveillance Recordings
   
   During his opening statement in the Branch Davidian trial, lead
   prosecutor LeRoy Jahn alleged that surveillance devices had picked up
   voices saying, "spread the fuel," and "light the fire." [338] Jahn
   told jurors that they would hear an audio tape in which one individual
   asks, "What's the plan?" A second individual laughs and answers:
   "Haven't you always wanted to be a charcoal briquette?" [339]
   
   However, the prosecutor will have to prove that the individuals
   speaking are Branch Davidians (since we know FBI agents were outside
   their tanks); that they are referring to spreading fuel to start a
   fire--not moving fuel out of the way of tanks to prevent one; that the
   individual says "light the fire" and not something indistinguishable--
   or something closer to "a tank's light a fire". In relation to the
   "charcoal briquette" joke, the prosecution will have to prove that
   this is a statement of intention to light a fire--not a joking
   response about what will inevitably happen if they don't leave the
   building--a firetrap surrounded by rampaging tanks! One reporter
   writes that the FBI has admitted that the listening devices "had
   yielded only fragmentary and inconclusive information about Mr. Koresh
   and the conditions inside the complex." [340] This may well be true of
   these surveillance tapes as well.
   
   c. Alleged Testimony By Fire Survivors
   
   FBI agents interviewed surviving Branch Davidians as they escaped the
   burning buildings. "During those interviews three of the survivors
   made statements about the cause of the fire. Renos Avraam told the
   agents that he had heard someone inside the compound say, `The fire
   has been lit, the fire has been lit.' Clive Doyle told the Texas
   Rangers that the fire was started inside the compound with coleman
   fuel. Doyle said the fuel had been distributed throughout the compound
   in specific, designated locations." (JDR:300) However, on April 20th
   Renos Avraam called to the press as he was led into court, "The fire
   was not started by us. There were no plans for mass suicide." [341]
   
   The report describes at length only Graeme Craddock's alleged comments
   to the FBI: "Craddock advised that when the Bradley came in through
   the front entrance, they started moving fuel. Craddock believes that
   the compound had a total of approximately one dozen, one gallon
   containers of lantern fuel and that they had been located in the lobby
   area. He said he saw a lot of people grabbing fuel containers and
   moving them to other areas. Craddock believes that possibly three or
   four of these containers had been put next to the window that had
   already been knocked out by the Bradley on the southern side of the
   chapel area. Craddock said he had heard someone talking about shifting
   the fuel from the hallway near the chapel . . .He said he had heard
   someone complain about fuel being spilled inside. . .Craddock
   indicated that he had heard shouts about starting the fire. .
   .Craddock also said that he had heard someone say, `Light the fire,'
   and that he had also heard someone else say, `Don't light the fire.'"
   
   Craddock allegedly told the Texas Rangers: "He said he went into the
   chapel area with several other people. He heard the word passed to
   `start the fires.' He said that someone said `make sure.' He said that
   word was then passed to not start the fires . . .Craddock said that if
   there was a suicide pact, he knew nothing about it. He said that he
   knew nothing about a plan to burn the building until he heard someone
   pass the word to start the fire." (JDR:300-301) However, Craddock has
   told the press, "No one inside set any fires. The tanks knocked over
   the gas lanterns. . .There was no suicide pact." [342]
   
18. FBI AND BATF CRIME SCENE COVERUP 
   
   The FBI's disinformation campaign--and their disregard for preserving
   the "crime scene"--only increased after the April 19th fire.
   
   a. FBI Disinformation After the April 19th Fire
   
   SAC Jeffrey Jamar's claim that some Branch Davidians may have shot
   others trying to escape is just one example of the kind of
   disinformation the FBI, and especially SAC Bob Ricks, disseminated
   after the fire. Other examples are:
   
   * On April 19th, Ricks told the press: Koresh "wanted to have as many
   people killed as possible. That's why it was called Ranch Apocalypse."
   [343] ; and "David Koresh, we believe, gave the order to commit
   suicide and they all followed his order." [344] and Koresh "was
   demanding provocation to get in a fight with us. . .We believe they
   were preparing for another armed standoff." [345]
   
   * On April 19th, "Mr. Ricks said it was only speculation at this
   point, but that authorities had received reports, apparently from some
   of the survivors, that the children had been injected with some kind
   of poison to ease their pain." [346] However, the Justice report made
   no such claim.
   
   * During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearings, Ricks
   told lawmakers that when a released child heard his father and Koresh
   were dead he said, "I don't care. No more beatings." and the children
   had asked if their new home had a "beating room." The social workers
   have not revealed publiclly that any child making such a statement.
   During the hearing Texas Representative John Bryant said that he was
   bothered that the FBI seemed to make a lot of statements whose purpose
   was to create public opinion supportive of the FBI.
   
   * In August of 1993, in a speech before a Tulsa, Oklahoma civic group,
   Bob Ricks speculated that David Koresh ordered the cult compound
   burned down to kill followers and federal agents, but screamed, "Don't
   light it up!" when he realized agents were retreating. However, the
   order to hold back came too late. "What we think was in his mind was
   that he expected us to come in and mount a frontal tactical assault
   against the compound. Once we were inside, he would light it up and
   burn us up with his own people." Ricks added, "I never wish ill will
   on anybody, but he's one guy I'm glad who was in there." [347] A later
   news report quoted Ricks' speculation that Steve Schneider had shot
   Koresh out of anger. "In the end, he probably realized he was dealing
   with a fraud. After (Koresh) had caused so much harm and destruction,
   (Koresh) probably now wanted to come out, and Mr. Schneider could not
   tolerate that situation." Officials familiar with the evidence
   questioned Ricks' comments and FBI officials refused to comment."
   [348]
   
   b. April 19th Destruction of Evidence and the Crime Scene
   
   News videotapes like those in "Waco, the Big Lie" clearly show tanks
   equipped with plows pushing burning walls into the flaming rubble.
   These walls might have contained evidence that BATF agents had shot
   indiscriminately and illegally through them. The FBI may assert this
   was done to prevent injuries from detonating ammunition and
   explosives. However, news video tape shows agents walking close to the
   building as it burns and walking through the rubble the evening of the
   fire with little concern for their safety. At the end of "Waco, the
   Big Lie," Branch Davidian Brad Branch cries out over a phone from
   jail, "They're destroying the crime scene, this is the biggest lie
   ever put before the American people."
   
   c. FBI and BATF Assisted Texas Rangers In Search for Evidence
   
   As we have seen, the Texas Rangers took "official" control of the
   scene after Mount Carmel burned to the ground. "Immediately following
   the April 19th fire the Texas Rangers, working with the FBI, arranged
   to take command of the remains of the compound. . .The Texas Rangers
   assumed primary responsibility for combing through the crime scene and
   recovering evidence. The FBI provided substantial assistance to the
   Rangers in performing this task." (JDR:308) The Justice report notes
   that during the search, "The Rangers divided the physical area of the
   compound into sectors, rows and grids, then formed teams comprised of
   Rangers, FBI and other technicians, and other law enforcement agents."
   (JDR:309) The Justice report does not mention the presence of BATF
   agents, as does the Treasury report which states, "after the Compound
   was ravaged by fire, ATF firearms and explosives experts collected
   evidence of the firearms and other destructive devices."(TDR:128)
   
   Defense attorney Dan Cogdell commented that it was mere "window
   dressing" to have the Texas Rangers put in charge of the criminal
   investigation. "The Texas Rangers are very respected around here, but
   it's stretching it to say they are bringing any kind of true
   independent judgement. They are in charge, but Federal agents are
   dissecting the crime scene and cross-checking all the evidence." Also
   some legal experts called for greater separation between the Texas
   Rangers, FBI and BATF, including "a completely independent panel. .
   .to do the criminal investigation. `When the Challenger exploded, we
   didn't have NASA investigate the accident.' said Bruce Fein, a
   Washington lawyer who was an associate deputy Attorney General in the
   Reagan Administration and wrote guidelines of the Federal Bureau of
   Investigation on procedures for conducting investigations." [349]
   
   Whatever little separation there was between state and federal
   officials quickly ended. The New York Times reported: "State officials
   overseeing the investigation announced, in an apparent shift in
   policy, that once the voluminous amount of evidence from the compound
   is all collected, it would be shipped to Federal laboratories. `Our
   crime laboratory in Austin has to be available to handle criminal
   matters that come up in Texas,' said Mike Cox, a spokesman with the
   Texas Department of Public Safety. Earlier, officials conducting the
   investigation into how the fire started said that they were using
   private laboratories in an effort to avoid any appearance of conflict
   of interest that might arise from a Federal laboratory making
   conclusions about evidence in a case in which Federal agents' actions
   were being questioned." Cox told reporters, "The Texas Rangers are
   investigating the crime scene and if you are concerned about a
   conflict of interest, you should talk to the U.S. Attorney's office."
   However, the reporter writes that when he tried to do so: "The U.S.
   Attorney referred inquiries to the Department of Justice, and Carl
   Stern, a department spokesman, said, `All the shifts in police (sic) I
   know of, are the ones you invented,' referring to the news media."
   [350]
   
   d. May 12th Destruction of the Crime Scene
   
   Two weeks after the release of the "independent" fire investigators'
   report, but before Branch Davidian attorneys could send in their own
   fire investigators, bulldozers rolled across the burned rubble of
   Mount Carmel Center, filling in all the holes with dirt and burned
   rubble. SAC Jeffrey Jamar defended this action. "They're just filling
   holes so people won't fall in the pits. That's just part of taking
   care of the scene." And Mike Cox, spokesman for the Texas Department
   of Public Safety, said bulldozing was necessary so the Texas Health
   and Water departments could begin work at the site. However, attorney
   Jack Zimmerman said, "I guess what it does, it forever prevents any
   checking on the ATF's rendition that the fire was intentionally set."
   [351] Defense Attorney Jeffrey Kearney told local reporters:
   "Government agents can say what they want now and there's little
   physical evidence to dispute it." [352]
   
   e. Possibility FBI will Tamper with Audio/Video Evidence
   
   There exists a full record of what happened during the siege and on
   April 19th--news footage, aerial infrared and other video tapes, and
   surveillance audio tapes. However, as we have said, because modern
   audio and video techniques allow tampering which can go virtually
   undetected, any such taped evidence the prosecution uses against
   Branch Davidians will remain suspect.
   
19. "INDEPENDENT" FIRE INVESTIGATOR COVERUP 
   
   The head of the so-called "independent" fire investigation team was
   Paul C. Gray, Assistant Chief of the Houston Fire Department. However,
   Gray had very close ties to BATF. BATF officials recommended him. He
   had served as a member of the BATF's National Arson Response Team and
   taught classes for BATF agents. And his wife was a secretary in BATF's
   Houston office." [353] Attorney Jack Zimmerman revealed, ">From 1982
   to 1990, (Gray's) office was on Imperial Valley Drive, in the ATF
   office. . .He carried a card that identified himself as a special
   agent of ATF. He handed that card out to people when he interviewed
   witnesses." [354] Finally, Gray had socialized with BATF agent Steve
   Willis, who was killed February 28th, and attended his funeral. [355]
   
   Zimmerman criticized Gray's selection and his conclusions that Branch
   Davidians set the fires. "Until I see the evidence from an
   independent, impartial expert, I choose to believe the firsthand
   account of eyewitnesses who were in the center who said there was no
   fire started by the Branch Davidians." [356]
   
   The Fire Report does not mention if investigators interviewed any of
   the fire survivors, something which would be done routinely in other
   fires. In fact, the Fire Report rejects "media" accounts of the
   survivors very similar statements about how the fire started--despite
   the fact survivors left the building at different exit points, were
   immediately arrested, and had little opportunity to get together to
   "concoct" similar stories.
   
   a. Fire Report Asserts People Not Trapped In Building
   
   Despite the extensive testimony about people being trapped by falling
   debris, blocked stairways, jammed doors, caved-in walls, and rapidly
   spreading smoke and fire, the Fire Report concludes, "Considering the
   observable means of exit available, we must assume that many of the
   occupants were either denied escape from within or refused to leave
   until escape was not an option." (JDR:Fire Report:9) The report does
   not mention what other fire experts would emphasize: "Cult members may
   have had less than five minutes to escape after the fire began. . .
   the fire produces an enormous amount of toxic gases that cause
   confusion." [357]
   
   b. Fire Report Implies Flammables Present for Purpose of Arson
   
   The Fire Report notes, "the physical evidence collected at the scene
   included the remains of several metal containers commonly used for the
   storage of flammable liquids." (JDR:Fire Report:3) It does not bother
   to mention that the 90 or more inhabitants of Mount Carmel were
   totally reliant on coleman lanterns fueled by kerosene, on butane gas
   heaters, and on propane gas for heat and light. Again, the Fire Report
   does admit that, "it is possible that some flammables were spilled
   inside the building as a result" of the tanks activities. (JDR:Fire
   Report:9)
   
   The report also exhaustively lists all the flammable materials found
   on survivors' shoes and clothes, as if this is evidence of arson.
   However, since fire investigators evidently did not interview
   survivors, they had no way of knowing that Davidians sometimes had to
   crawl on their hands and knees because of fuel knocked over by ferret
   rounds.
   
   According to Newsweek, just after the fire arson investigators found
   "metal lantern-fuel containers with what appeared to be deliberate
   punctures." [358] However, neither the Justice factual report or the
   Fire Report mentions such punctures in the containers and this may
   have been more FBI disinformation. The Fire Report also denies that
   the "CN" gas, as it mistakenly calls CS gas, could have started or
   contributed to the fire.
   
   c. Fire Report Asserts Accidental Fire Impossible
   
   The report attempts to debunk what it calls "another theoretical
   explanation reported by the media," i.e., that tanks rupturing "a
   propane cylinder or flammable liquid container" started the fire.
   Again, it does not admit that this is survivors' testimony. The Fire
   Report claims, "if this had happened, an immediate vapor air explosion
   or flash fire would have occurred involving the vehicle itself. It did
   not happen. All law enforcement vehicles were well away from the
   building prior to the start of the fire." (JDR:Fire Report:9) However,
   one assumes that the tanks are sufficiently well armored to withstand
   proximity to such a relatively small fire. And, as we have seen, tanks
   smashed into the building minutes before the fires began.
   
   d. Fire Report States Separated Points of Origin Means Arson
   
   The report states, "Fires were set in three separate areas of the
   structure identified as points of origin 1, 2, and 3. This
   investigation establishes that these fires occurred in areas
   significantly distant from each other and in a time frame that
   precludes any assumption of a single ignition source or accidental
   cause." (JDR:Fire Report:3) In an April 26, 1993, news conference,
   Gray told reporters, "We believe it was intentionally set by persons
   inside the compound. . .It is the opinion of the investigative team
   that this fire started in the interior of the building in at least two
   separate locations, at approximately the same time." These locations
   "were significantly distant enough from each other that they couldn't
   have been set by the same source at the same time." [359] He asserted
   "evidence showed a time gap between the last battering of the compound
   by an FBI armored vehicle and the appearance of the blaze." [360]
   
   Again, the fire investigator is denying what we can plainly see, that
   a last barrage of tank attacks occurred in separate locations within
   the six to eight minute period during which the fires began. He also
   rejects simple common sense: if even one massive tank smashes deep
   inside a rickety wooden building filled with dozens of lighted
   lanterns, propane tanks and other flammable containers, that one tank
   alone could start two or three fires in widely separated parts of the
   buildings. If two or three tanks do so within a short time period, all
   three could start fires. Also, the further inside the building the
   fire starts, the longer it will take after tanks have withdrawn for
   outsiders to see the fire. And even if outsiders see fires appearing
   at about the same time, it does not mean they started at the same
   time. Depending on how great the "fire load" of flammable materials in
   each room, fires could have started several minutes apart, but appear
   to outsiders to start virtually simultaneously.
   
   e. Fire Report Downplays Breaching's Role in Spreading Fire
   
   The report lists as "contributory factors" to the fire's spread: poor
   construction; highly combustible stored products such as baled hay,
   large quantities of paper, and other flammables; strong wind; and
   "breaching operations." The report admits "the FBI removed several
   large sections of the building's exterior walls. . .these openings are
   contributory to the fire's spread." However, it asserts that the
   "fresh air" the openings let in ". . .while fanning the flames. .
   .would have also lowered the concentration of carbon monoxide. .
   .increasing the amount of time a person might have survived if trapped
   inside." This weak apology for the breaching operation's contribution
   to spreading the fire at least admits that people might have been
   trapped inside. (JDR:Fire Report:6)
   
   f. Gray Inaccurately Claimed Escape Tunnel Was Usable
   
   During his press conference Paul Gray claimed, "I do believe that a
   person could have survived the fire. I could speculate that there was
   ample room in the open pit area for everybody to have gotten into."
   [361] However, this statement directly contradicts what Gray put in
   his own report regarding the buried bus that served as a tunnel system
   connected to the open pit: "It is also possible that the escape route
   planned included the aforementioned tunnel system accessible through
   an opening in the floor at the west end of the building. A significant
   amount of structural debris was found in this area indicating that the
   breaching operations could have caused this route to be blocked."
   (JDR:Fire Report:10)
   
20. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT COVERUP 
   
   Because Justice Department officials were involved more deeply in the
   disastrous decisions at Waco than were their Treasury Department
   counterparts who approved the original BATF raid, the Justice
   Department coverup is much more systematic than the Treasury
   Department coverup. The Treasury Department had to explain only ten
   deaths and the Department could easily blame several agents and
   officials for going against orders and covering up their misdeeds.
   However, the Justice Department had to explain away the horrible
   deaths by fire of more than 80 people--25 of them children--who had
   made a very credible promise to surrender within a few days. The
   Justice Department did dismiss FBI Director Sessions shortly after the
   April 19th fire, but on other grounds related to incompetence and
   misconduct, not on his handling of the Waco standoff.
   
   a. Conflicting Statements About Reasons for the Assault
   
   In the days after the fire, Attorney Janet Reno and her
   representatives, and President Clinton and his representatives,
   emphasized "humanitarian" reasons for the assault, ones that
   presumably would play well with the public. Janet Reno began a media
   blitz where she repeatedly said in a press conference and on several
   television programs: "I approved the plan. I am responsible. The buck
   stops here." She explained the prime reasons for the assault were the
   "fatigue" of the hostage rescue team and ongoing evidence that "babies
   were being beaten." [362] Reno's efforts were extremely successful.
   Justice Department spokesperson Carl Stern asserted that while on
   April 19th the reaction from those who contacted the Justice
   Department was 10 to 1 against the assault, on April 20th, 8 out of 10
   said they agreed with Janet Reno! [363]
   
   In his April 20th news conference Bill Clinton emphasized that Reno
   had told him that the primary reason for the assault was: "It's
   because of the children. They have evidence that those children are
   still being abused, and that they're in increasingly unsafe
   conditions." [364] White House communications director George
   Stephanopoulos said, "I think there is absolutely no question that
   there was overwhelming evidence of child abuse in the Waco compound."
   He alleged David Koresh was "marrying children" and "sexually abusing
   children" and that children were "being taught how to commit suicide,
   how to put guns in their mouths, how to clamp down on cyanide. That is
   child abuse by any definition of the word. It was continuing, it was
   going on." [365] However, in the months after the assault, Attorney
   General Reno has come to admit that "she may have misunderstood (FBI)
   comments to her and that there was no evidence of recent child abuse
   by the Davidians." [366]
   
   Clinton also attacked Koresh. "The bureau's efforts were ultimately
   unavailing because the individual with whom they were dealing, David
   Koresh, was dangerous, irrational and probably insane. . .Mr. Koresh's
   response to the demands for his surrender by Federal agents was to
   destroy himself and murder the children who were his captives as well
   as all the other people there who did not survive." [367] Reno agreed.
   "I have absolutely no doubt at all that the cult members set (the
   fire) , based on all the information that has been furnished to me."
   [368]
   
   However, while Janet Reno and Bill Clinton may have stressed
   "humanitarian" concerns and Koresh's "wickedness," it is obvious that
   the FBI had other concerns. In a briefing for reporters FBI Director
   William Sessions said his agency had "no contemporaneous evidence" of
   child abuse during the siege. A reporter writes that Larry Potts,
   Assistant Director of the FBI's Criminal Division, asserted that the
   FBI's prime reason for going forward with the assault was that Koresh
   had "treated their efforts to negotiate with contempt," he was never
   going to surrender voluntarily, and "it was not in the nature of law
   enforcement officials who had seen the Federal agents killed during
   the initial raid on Feb. 28, to let the cult go on with its way of
   life." Potts told the reporter, "These people had thumbed their noses
   at law enforcement." [369] Columnist Paul Craig Roberts wrote of the
   true concerns underlying the government's action: "If the Branch
   Davidians could hold out, others might get the same idea. Heavens,
   people might stop paying their taxes. There was too much rebellion in
   the defiance of authority." [370]
   
   b. Justice Department Attempted to Forgo Full Investigation
   
   During his April 20th news conference President Clinton said: "We want
   an inquiry to analyze the steps along the way. Is there something else
   we should have known? Is there some other question they should have
   asked?" He appointed Philip B. Heymann, a Harvard Law School professor
   who had been nominated to be Deputy Attorney General, to lead the
   Justice Department investigation of the incidents at Waco. The New
   York Times reported that not-yet-confirmed Heymann told an interviewer
   that "investigators would not look at the decision to assault the
   compound with tanks and tear gas, which was made by Attorney General
   Janet Reno and William S. Sessions, Director of the Federal Bureau of
   Investigation. Department officials have not yet decided whether even
   to pose questions to Ms. Reno, he added. `I never wanted us to claim
   that we're doing a Warren Commission report that will try to stand for
   the agents, or that this will be the ultimate truth about what
   happened,' said Mr. Heymann." Because Congress and Americans
   overwhelmingly supported Reno and blamed the Branch Davidians for the
   fire, other unnamed officials "concluded that nothing could be gained
   by looking more closely at her order to carry out the assault." The
   article also reports, "Ms. Reno urged that there be `no
   recriminations,' and Justice Department officials involved in the
   investigation have interpreted that to mean that the decisions of the
   department and the FBI would be immune from review." [371]
   
   The day after the story appeared, and after several Congressional
   representatives criticized this revelation, the Justice Department
   contended that Heymann "had erred" and that there would be a full
   investigation. Officials gave different reasons for Heymann's
   inaccurate statement, including his not being fully briefed, his
   attempt to reduce expectations about the review, and, most
   revealingly, that his "remarks reflected a division within the Justice
   Department about how closely it should look at the events, with some
   high officials arguing forcefully that the inquiry should be more
   limited, to focus only on what should be done in future cases." [372]
   
   c. No Testimony Taken Under Oath
   
   Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann told reporters the review
   group did "not have the authority to issue subpoenas or grant immunity
   but could refer findings of wrongdoing for criminal prosecution."
   [373] Presumably, this means that agents and officials were not
   interviewed under oath. The Justice Department report makes no
   reference at all to these issues. There is also no evidence that any
   of the FBI agents or officials who testified before Congressional
   committees were sworn in, though they still could be prosecuted were
   it proved they had lied to a Congressional committee. As we noted in
   the BATF section, much of the truth about what really happened at Waco
   will come out only during the trials of the Branch Davidians, civil
   law suits against the government or through an independent
   investigation.
   
   d. Review Team and Outside Expert Conflicts of Interest
   
   First, it is questionable whether Deputy Attorney General Heymann or
   Assistant to the Attorney General Richard Scruggs, working as they do
   under Attorney Janet Reno, could do any "independent" investigation of
   errors in the Justice Department decision-making or in the actions of
   the FBI. Heymann was also the head of the Criminal Division under
   President Jimmy Carter, so he has a long history of loyalty to the
   institution, as well as to his superiors.
   
   The most noted conflict of interest is Heymann's appointing another
   former Chief of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, Edward
   S.G. Dennis, Jr., to review the procedures, decisions and actions of
   the Justice Department in the Waco matter. This choice came under
   scathing attack by William Safire who noted that Dennis was in charge
   of the botched investigation of Banca Lavoro and its relation to
   Iraq-gate: "Ms. Reno's Criminal Division directed Atlanta prosecutors
   to shoot down the explosive case with a plea bargain, avoiding a
   public trial that would have exposed the machinations of the Bush-
   Thornburgh-Dennis crowd. How could Ed Dennis not be grateful? His
   judgment about the Waco fiasco: `there is no place in the evaluation
   for blame, and I find no fault.' One hand whitewashes the other."
   [374] Mary McGrory also criticized the decision to end the Iraq-
   gate inquiry: "During the campaign, Bill Clinton indignantly promised
   to get to the bottom of it. But a deep incuriosity has set in, and so
   far his Justice Department has accepted the finding of an in-house
   whitewash headed by retired Judge Frederick Lacey." [375]
   
   According to James L. Pate, as U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia, Dennis
   also oversaw the investigation of the Philadelphia police department's
   bombing of MOVE in 1985. Another MOVE veteran assigned to review the
   Waco disaster was Los Angeles Police Department Chief, who was
   formerly Philadelphia's police commissioner. Pate writes: "If one was
   looking for two guys who might empathize with heavy- handed cops who
   screwed up, the phone numbers of Willie Williams and Eddie Dennis
   would be a must." [376]
   
   Another questionable Heymann appointment was Israeli professor Ariel
   Merari of Tel Aviv University as an outside expert. Professor Merari
   currently has a contract with Mr. Heymann to write a book, something
   which technically does not violate federal guidelines. Professor
   Merari's report does not offer any criticisms, only suggestions for
   improving future law enforcement efforts. Another former Heymann
   associate was more critical. Harvard's Alan A. Stone, M.D. first
   requested a "complete record of the events at Waco." [377] When he
   finally issued his report it was extremely critical.
   
   Former FBI director William Webster also was asked to be an outside
   expert and review the Justice Department's action. Since Webster
   authorized the creation of the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team, it is not
   surprising he writes, "the unfortunate tragedy at Waco does not in any
   way diminish my admiration for the men and women who serve in HRT."
   However, he does urge that such "special response teams," including
   BATF's, should not be used without the approval of the Attorney
   General. (JDR:Webster:4)
   
   e. Possible Clinton-Hubbell-Lindsay-Foster Coverup
   
   Associate Attorney General Webster L. Hubbell, the third ranking
   official in the Justice Department, was the liaison for Waco between
   the Attorney General's office and the White House and attended
   meetings there. He passed on FBI chief negotiator Byron Sage's
   negative assessment of negotiations to Attorney General Reno and was
   involved in decision-making regarding gassing Mount Carmel. He was
   with Janet Reno in the FBI Operations Center on April 19th and was the
   highest ranking official there after she left. On April 19th Janet
   Reno told television viewers that Hubbell had called President Clinton
   the afternoon of the fire. During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary
   Committee hearing, Representatives Hughes and Sensenbrenner expressed
   great interest in Hubbell's role in decision-making and about Reno's
   assertion Hubbell had spoken with Clinton April 19th. One even asked
   "whether Sessions and Reno were `out of the loop' with Hubbell." Reno
   told the Committee she had been in error and the Justice report claims
   Hubbell called White House Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty. (JDR:245)
   
   Webster Hubbell was one of Hillary Rodham Clinton's law partners in
   the Rose Law Firm in Little Rock as was Clinton's Deputy White House
   Counsel Vince Foster, who was also involved in Waco decision-making.
   Foster's July suicide may be linked to mismanaged or even illegal
   Clinton business dealings associated with the Madison Guaranty Savings
   and Loan Association and the Whitewater Development Corporation.
   Hubbell's father-in-law also received a questionable loan from the
   savings and loan.
   
   Another Clinton-Hubbell-Foster crony, Presidential Advisor Bruce
   Lindsay, also was involved in Waco decision-making with Hubbell.
   Lindsay was a senior partner at a law firm which, like the Rose Law
   firm, received hundreds of thousands of dollars in bond counsel fees
   from the Arkansas Development Finance Authority. Allegedly doing
   business with the Authority was a form of "payoff" for Clinton
   supporters. [378] Many suspect that Clinton-Hubbell-Lindsay-Foster
   cronyism would certainly extend to covering up any errors or crimes
   related to the massacre of the Branch Davidians. Therefore, the
   matters of whether Hubbell had some outside-the-chain-of-command
   contact with Clinton, whether Hubbell helped withhold Koresh's April
   14th letter from Reno, whether he was involved in a decision to
   proceed with the demolition that led to the April 19th fire, all might
   be subject to investigation as part of Independent Counsel Robert
   Fiske's probe of obstruction of justice in the "Whitewater" affair.
   
   f. No Fault Finding for FBI and Justice Department Errors or Crimes
   
   At the October 8, 1993, press conference where the Justice Department
   presented its report on FBI actions at Waco, outside "reviewer" Edward
   Dennis stated, "I find no fault in the performance of law enforcement
   during the standoff and the tear gas assault," and asserted
   "speculation regarding them coming out is irresponsible." Likewise,
   Deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann said, "We can't come out with a
   scapegoat when there's no severe blame to be placed." [379] However,
   outside expert Alan M. Stone disagreed, writing: "There is a view
   within the FBI and in the official reports that suggests the tragedy
   was unavoidable. This report is a dissenting opinion from that view."
   (Justice:Stone:46)
   
   Reporters at the press conference asked Heymann if the Justice report
   was a "whitewash," especially compared to the Treasury Department
   report. Heymann answered that the Treasury report found "recklessness
   (in the initial raid) followed by a coverup," and that in the FBI and
   Justice Department's handling of the Branch Davidians, the "underlying
   facts are different." [380] Attorney General Janet Reno said: "I'm
   always concerned about the perception of a white-wash. But I don't go
   out to seek mea culpas and I don't go out to seek (a report that says)
   we didn't do anything wrong. I go out to seek the truth..." [381] When
   Alan M. Stone issued his highly critical report of the FBI/Justice
   Department handling of the siege, Janet Reno refused to comment. The
   FBI released a statement defending its actions. [382]
   
   Despite Reno and Heymann's denials that the Justice report was a
   whitewash, a number of publications and respected columnists called it
   just that: the New York Times ("The Waco Whitewash," 10/12/93); the
   Washington Times ("The truth about Waco, still untold," 10/13/93);
   Paul Greenberg, editorial page editor of the Arkansas Democrat
   Gazette; Leonard E. Larsen, a columnist for Scripps Howard News
   Service; columnist Paul Craig Roberts, former assistant secretary of
   the U.S. Treasury; and many others.
   
   g. Evidence of Coverup in Justice Department Report
   
   Throughout this report we have noted where the Justice report has
   failed to provide information--even when it would not seem necessary
   to "redact" it per law--or has provided questionable information. The
   examples most indicative of coverup are: no mention of disinformation
   spread by SACs Jeffrey Jamar and Bob Ricks; failure to specify whether
   the use of the tanks was illegal; refusal to admit FBI reliance on
   Rick Ross and Marc Breault or knowledge of Dr. Miron Murray's
   anti-cult sympathies; failure to name those who recommended and
   ordered the use of harassment techniques; failure to admit that
   Koresh's letter was a promise to surrender; failure to state whether
   the letter was shown to FBI Director Sessions or Attorney General Reno
   and if not, who withheld the letter from them; failure to mention
   whether the ground commanders kept control of the whole operation or
   were given any orders from the FBI Operations Center regarding the
   speed up of gassing and the order to proceed with demolition; refusal
   of factual report and Justice Department officials to admit there was
   an order to proceed to demolition, as Dennis does; no mention of
   whether agents used "handheld" grenade launchers and why agents were
   outside their tanks; no mention of discrepancy between Jamar's April
   19th comment that three agents saw Branch Davidians starting fires and
   Justice reports' account of only one; no mention that both Renos
   Avraam and Graeme Craddock deny the statements the Justice report says
   they made about Branch Davidians starting fires; no mention of tanks
   pushing burning debris into the fire; no mention that BATF agents
   aided in the post-fire investigation; no mention of the chief fire
   investigator's ties to BATF.
   
   h. No Justice Department Report on Tampering with 911 Tapes
   
   As indicated earlier, during the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations
   subcommittee hearing, an FBI agent gave a staff member an excerpted
   tape of the "911" calls between Lieutenant Larry Lynch and Branch
   Davidians. Waco police said it gave a "false impression of how the
   event occurred" and Janet Reno promised the department would
   investigate the editing and dissemination of the tape. [383] In the
   tape, the section where Wayne Martin complains about helicopters
   shooting at him has been moved to a time period after the helicopters
   withdrew from the scene. The Subcommittee Clerk told us that as of
   January 19, 1994 the Justice Department had not reported back on this
   possible tape tampering.
   
   i. Weak Recommendations to Prevent Another Tragedy
   
   Representative Don Edwards, chair of the Judiciary subcommittee that
   oversees the FBI, expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the
   Justice Department report. "This is essentially an in-house review. It
   seems to me there is nothing in the report to indicate that if the
   same crisis arose tomorrow we wouldn't have the same tragic results."
   [384] Outside expert Alan Stone wrote: "One might think that the
   highest priority after a tragedy like Waco would be for everyone
   involved to consider what went wrong and what would they now do
   differently. I must confess that it has been a frustrating and
   disappointed experience to discover that the Justice Department's
   investigation has produced so little in this regard. (JDR:Stone:37)
   
   Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann's report, "Lessons of Waco:
   Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement," recommended increasing
   the size of the Hostage Rescue Team, closer consultations between
   Hostage Rescue Team tactical people and negotiators, better behavioral
   science understanding of non-traditional groups, better crisis
   management training for special agents-in-charge, and replacing them
   with more highly trained managers in some crisis situations.
   (JDR:Heymann:5-14) The new FBI Director Louis Freeh has instituted
   many of these measures and even insisted that Janet Reno undergo
   "dramatic tactical training" to help improve the Justice Department's
   response to crises like the 51-day standoff" with the Branch
   Davidians. However, according to news reports, Freeh continues to
   defend the FBI's handling of the tragic episode at Waco. [385]
   
   j. Refusal to Consider Discipline or Prosecution of Agents or
   Officials
   
   During the October 8, 1993 Justice Department press conference, Deputy
   Attorney General Heymann said that the report had been given to the
   FBI's new Director Louis J. Freeh who would decide if any disciplinary
   action was needed. [386] A few days later Freeh said a final review of
   the bureau's handling of the incident was continuing. However, he
   added, "I do not know at this time or contemplate at this time that
   any disciplinary action would be taken." [387]
   
   The FBI has been conducting investigations into the overly aggressive
   and irresponsible actions of the FBI Hostage Rescue Team, and its
   commander Richard Rogers, in the Randy Weaver case, and of the
   officials who supported them. Freeh has even spoken to agents about
   possible prosecutions in the matter. And Freeh suspended Assistant FBI
   Director James Fox for violating repeated judicial admonitions to
   refrain from commenting on the World Trade Center bombing to the news
   media. Therefore, Freeh's refusal to look at the overly aggressive and
   irresponsible actions of the very same FBI agents and officials at
   Waco must be questioned in terms of a larger, ongoing Justice
   Department coverup.
   
21. COMMITTEE FOR WACO JUSTICE CONCLUSIONS 
   
   a. FBI and Justice Department Actions Responsible for Branch Davidians
   Deaths
   
   The Committee for Waco Justice believes that FBI gassing and
   demolition actions trapped Branch Davidians in fires caused by massive
   military tanks, causing the deaths of more than 80 people. Therefore,
   FBI agents and FBI and Justice Department officials responsible for
   the decision to gas and disassemble Mount Carmel are legally
   responsible for the deaths of the Branch Davidians. Even if it should
   be proved beyond a doubt that any fires were started by one or more
   Branch Davidians, we still believe these decision- makers remain
   legally responsible for driving the perpetrator(s) to this desperate
   act and for causing the destruction that trapped so many people in the
   building when the fires started.
   
   b. Independent Counsel Should Prosecute Responsible FBI Agents and FBI
   and Justice Officials
   
   Under current law, the Attorney General can appoint an Independent
   Counsel to identify and prosecute any FBI agents and FBI and Justice
   Department officials suspected of committing any and all relevant
   crimes, including the following:
   
   * Official Misconduct for giving the Attorney General misleading
   information that led to the decision to gassing and demolishing Mount
   Carmel Center and for any role in covering up any irresponsible or
   illegal acts.
   
   * Multiple Counts of Intentional or Negligent Homicide or Manslaughter
   for carrying out an unnecessary and violently executed gassing and
   demolition of Mount Carmel. Decisions of whether to charge FBI agents
   with intentional or negligent homicide would depend on further
   investigations.
   
   * Conspiracy against the Rights of Citizens U.S. Code Title 18,
   Section 241 reads: "If two or more persons conspire to injure,
   oppress, threaten, or intimidate any inhabitant of any State,
   Territory, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right
   or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
   States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or if two or
   more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
   another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or
   enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured- they shall be fined
   not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both:
   and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any
   term of years or for life." [388]
   
   * Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law U.S. Code Title 18, Section
   242 reads: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
   regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State,
   Territory or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
   immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
   United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on
   account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color,
   or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be
   fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
   both; and if bodily injury results shall not be fined under this title
   or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results
   shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life."
   
   Footnote [388] John McCaslin's August 4, 1993 Washington Times column
   quotes Stacy Koon, one of the two Los Angeles policemen convicted in
   federal court of felony violations of Rodney King's civil rights: "The
   government used the same arguments in Waco--the suspect(s) set the
   tone and the officers responded to it. . .The difference is that we
   had 82 seconds; the federal government had 50-plus days in Waco. .
   .They had time to think and analyze and come up with game plans and
   they had the ability to wait out--we didn't have that. They used the
   same argument, and, in that case, people died, multiple people died."
   Speaking of Janet Reno, he said, "She, like I, took responsibility. .
   .Then there was a negative outcome--50 people died. The state of Texas
   should try her for multiple cases of murder. If the state of Texas
   then does not find her guilty, the federal government should come in
   and try her for civil rights violations." Similarly, Paul Craig
   Roberts wrote in his April 22, 1993, syndicated column, "If Rodney
   King's civil rights were violated, what happened in Waco?. . .If a
   billy club is excessive force, what is a tank?"
   
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS 
   
   The federal prosecution of eleven Branch Davidians began January 10,
   1994 in San Antonio, Texas. The trial was moved to San Antonio from
   Waco because of the "notoriety" of the case in that town. In his
   opening statement, lead prosecutor Assistant U.S. Attorney LeRoy Jahn
   claimed David Koresh expected his disciples to "kill for God." The
   defense blamed the raid on a faltering government agency that had
   "declared war on its citizens." [389]
   
   Many people believe that the government has "rigged" the trial to
   prevent a repeat of the Randy Weaver case, where a disgusted jury
   found the defendants innocent of most charges. The trial judge, U.S.
   District Judge Walter Smith of Waco, has already announced that he
   will not allow the defense to "put the government on trial." [390]
   >From the evidence of the first days of the trail, suspicions that
   BATF and FBI will withhold, delay and even fabricate evidence, as they
   did in the Randy Weaver trial, appear to be well founded. A crucial
   piece of evidence--one of Mount Carmel's two front doors--is missing.
   At least two BATF agents have made different statements during the
   trial-- after they spoke to the Treasury Department review team and
   prosecutors--than they made earlier to Waco police and Texas Rangers.
   The prosecution did not warn the defense it had a witness who could
   identify a defendant--and only later told the defense it had withheld
   evidence that the witness was previously uncertain he could in fact
   identify the defendant!
   
   Below we review the charges, pretrial motions and jury selection, and
   the cases the prosecution and defense can be expected to make.
   Finally, we will briefly describe Branch Davidian law suits against
   the government.
   
THE CHARGES 
   
   Between March 30 and July 20, 1993, a series of indictments were
   returned against several Branch Davidians. On August 6, 1993, the
   United States Attorney's office in Waco, Texas obtained a
   "superseding" indictment from a grand jury that combined all previous
   indictments into one. Charged with conspiracy to murder federal
   officers were: Paul Fatta, who was in Austin on February 28th; Norman
   Washington Allison (aka Delroy Nash) and Woodrow "Bob" Kendrick who
   tried to return to Mount Carmel on February 28th; Brad Branch,
   Livingston Fagan, Kathryn Schroeder and Kevin Whitecliff who left
   Mount Carmel during the 51-day siege; and Renos Avraam, Jaime
   Castillo, Graeme Craddock, Clive Doyle, and Ruth Riddle who survived
   the April 19th fire. Conviction on conspiracy charges could mean up to
   life in prison and a $250,000 fine for each defendant. [391]
   
   On September 9, 1993, Kathryn Schroeder pled guilty to one count of
   armed resistance to a federal officer, which still could result in 10
   years in jail. She also agreed to testify against the remaining eleven
   defendants in return for the government dropping the original charges
   against her. A Washington Post reporter commented on this fact:
   "Originally, 12 Branch Davidians were expected to face trial, a fact
   not lost on those who draw parallels between Koresh and Jesus
   Christ--son of a carpenter, dead at 33, survived by 12 disciples, one
   of whom turned against him." [392] Below is an outline of the ten
   counts of the August 6, 1993, indictment against the eleven Branch
   Davidians.
   
   Count One--Conspiracy to Murder Federal Officers: This is the most
   detailed count against all twelve defendants. The charge reads, in
   part, "It was part of this conspiracy that Vernon K. Howell, also
   known as David Koresh, would and did advocate and encourage an armed
   confrontation, which he described as a `war' between his followers and
   the United States government." Other parts of the conspiracy included:
   creating the "Mighty Men" unit, establishing the "Mag Bag" business
   location; acquiring or assisting in the acquisition of weapons to be
   used in this "war," assisting in converting legally purchased
   semi-automatic rifles to fully automatic rifles and inert hand grenade
   shells into live grenades, preparing for the arrival of Federal agents
   on February 28th, endeavoring to enter Mount Carmel after the
   shootout, forcibly resisting the execution of a search warrant from
   February 28th until each individual left Mount Carmel, firing upon
   tanks on April 19th, co-conspiring with David Koresh and Steve
   Schneider to spread flammable liquids throughout Mount Carmel and to
   start the fires within Mount Carmel. The remaining counts below are
   quoted directly from the Justice Department report.
   
   Count Two--Aiding and Abetting the Murder of Federal Officers: All
   twelve defendants were charged with aiding and abetting the murders of
   the four ATF agents on February 28, 1993.
   
   Count Three--Using a Firearm During a Crime of Violence: Schroeder,
   Branch, Whitecliff, Castillo, Fagan, Fatta, Craddock, Avraam and
   Riddle were charged with using a firearm during a crime of violence in
   connection with the first ATF shootout on February 28, 1993.
   
   Count Four--Aiding and Abetting the Attempted Murder of a Federal
   Officer: Allison (Nash) and Kendrick were charged with aiding and
   abetting the attempted murder of an ATF agent during the second
   shootout on February 28.
   
   Count Five--Using a Firearm During a Crime of Violence: Kendrick was
   charged with using two firearms in connection with the second ATF
   shootout on February 28.
   
   Count Six--Using a Firearm During a Crime of Violence: Allison (Nash)
   was charged with using a firearm during the second ATF shootout on
   February 28.
   
   Count Seven--Possession of an Unregistered Destructive Device:
   Craddock was charged with possessing an explosive grenade on April 19,
   1993.
   
   Count Eight--Conspiracy to Possess an Unregistered Destructive Device:
   Craddock was charged with conspiring with Koresh to possess an
   explosive grenade during the 51- day standoff.
   
   Count Nine--Conspiracy to Possess and Unlawfully Manufacture
   Machineguns: Fatta was charged with conspiring to manufacture and
   possess machineguns during 1992 and early 1993.
   
   Count Ten--Aiding and Abetting the Unlawful Possession of Machineguns:
   Fatta was charged with aiding and abetting Koresh in the unlawful
   possession of machineguns during 1992 and early 1993.
   
   The government's "conspiracy theory" is based on the "Pinkerton
   doctrine" that holds that a person involved in only a minor part of
   crime, like driving a getaway car, is as responsible for a crime like
   robbery or murder as the person doing the crime. Robert Dawson, a
   professor of criminal law at the University of Texas Law School, said
   that if the government is using the Pinkerton standard, then the
   standard will be the "`should have anticipated' standard--should the
   Branch Davidians have been able to anticipate that stockpiling weapons
   and other firearms violations could result in the death of those
   Federal agents?"
   
   Defense attorney Tim Evans insisted, "Conspiracy has become the
   darling of the government's nursery. It allows the Government to throw
   a huge net over everyone connected to a case and makes the jury sort
   it all out. The danger of that is that sometimes people get convicted
   based upon guilt by association." Graham Craddock's attorney Stanley
   Rentz said, "If their theory is `in for a penny, in for a pound,' then
   they should have indicted everyone who was in the compound. They've
   left some people out of the indictment altogether. The sad thing is
   that most of the people who were really active leaders perished in the
   fire. So now the Government is going after whoever is left just to
   placate themselves. I guess it's just hard for them to walk away from
   it." [393]
   
   >From currently available evidence, it would seem the government has
   pursued a strategy of selective prosecution. Three individuals
   especially seem to have been spared prosecution, even though evidence
   against them may be as strong as that against some of those being
   prosecuted.
   
   * Donald Bunds: One of BATF Agent Davy Aguilera's most convincing
   evidences of "intent" to manufacture illegal weapons mentioned in his
   February 25, 1993 affidavit was David Block's allegation that Donald
   Bunds, a mechanical engineer, operated a metal lathe and milling
   machine that had the capability to fabricate firearm parts. Block said
   he had observed Bunds designing a machinegun on a computer.
   Prosecutors have already entered into evidence equipment that one
   Texas Ranger said could have been used to fabricate firearm parts.
   [394] Bunds drove towards Mount Carmel on February 28th, but was
   prevented by police from returning. It is quite possible he was not
   prosecuted because his wife Jeannine and daughter Robyn may be two
   important prosecution witnesses. Even if they are not, this may be a
   "reward" for their cooperating with BATF Agent Aguilera in the
   original investigation.
   
   * David Thibodeau: Earl Dunagan's April 18, 1993 affidavit does not
   list him as being seen carrying a gun during the February 28th
   shootout or standing guard after it. It is quite possible he was not
   prosecuted because his mother, Balenda Gamen, was the most vocal and
   articulate of the Branch Davidian family members. She appeared on
   numerous television shows and surely would have conducted a damaging
   media campaign against the government had her son been indicted.
   
   * Rita Riddle: Earl Dunagan's April 18, 1993 affidavit does list Rita
   Riddle as having carried a gun on February 28th. She has been an
   active organizer for the defense since the fires. It is possible she
   was not prosecuted because her daughter Misty Ferguson was seriously
   disfigured during the April 19th fire and the government feared the
   girl would appear at the trial, displaying her wounds. Riddle's
   sister-in-law Ruth Ottman Riddle has been charged, even though
   Dunagan's April 18, 1993 affidavit mentions only that she was seen
   sewing tactical vests. It is possible she is being prosecuted because,
   as David Koresh's typist during his writing of the First Seal, she
   could testify convincingly about his efforts to finish his book so
   that he and his followers could leave Mount Carmel. She was a very
   effective spokesperson on television following the April 19th fire.
   
PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS AND JURY SELECTION 
   
   Certainly the early stages of the trial have only reinforced beliefs
   that the trial is rigged. A prejudiced judge seems to have
   "handpicked" the jury--and done all he can to ensure the jury does not
   see any literature that might persuade them to "vote their
   conscience."
   
   In December of 1993, Judge Smith "ordered that jurors' identities be
   kept a secret and attorneys not talk to the media. (He) indicated that
   he is taking unusual steps to ensure the safety of the defendants,
   jury members and witnesses in the trial." [395] Defense attorneys Joe
   Turner and Terry Kirk immediately filed an objection to Smith's order
   for an anonymous jury, believing it would hurt the jury's presumption
   of innocence. Their motion stated, "The prospective jury members are
   likely to assume that because their names are being kept secret, they
   must have reason to fear the defendant or her fellow Branch
   Davidians." [396] In January Smith explained to the press he was
   concerned Branch Davidian jurors might be mistaken for "jurors in an
   organized crime trial going on at the courthouse." [397]
   
   However, it turns out that the real reason Judge Smith demanded an
   anonymous jury was his fear that the jury would receive information
   from an organization called the Fully Informed Jury Association
   (FIJA). FIJA intended to send jurors leaflets containing general and
   well-documented information about jury rights--including the right of
   the jury to find defendants innocent if they disagree with the law or
   feel that the government acted improperly. They had done the same
   thing in the Randy Weaver case and some believe this helped win
   acquittal for Weaver. Smith had first taken the unusual step of
   restricting public access to the names of all potential jurors in the
   federal jury "wheel" for the Western District of Texas. On December
   30, the judge admitted "The Court is not as concerned about the
   possibility of the Defendants or their associates threatening the jury
   members," instead, it was concerned with protecting the jury panel
   because, "It (has) been reported that an organization plans to attempt
   to hand out leaflets to potential jurors about how they should ignore
   the law and follow their conscience." [398]
   
   Some believed Judge Smith silenced the eleven defendants' numerous
   attorneys so that their statements to the media could not affect
   potential jurors. Once the trial started, television news broadcasts
   showed some attorneys speaking freely to the press. However, in late
   January Judge Smith again barred defense attorneys from speaking to
   the press, saying "statements or information intended to influence
   public opinion regarding the merits of this case" would not be
   tolerated. Smith said he would monitor media sources and threatened
   daily contempt proceedings for any comments he found attorneys had
   made. [399] This is just one more evidence of a prejudiced judge
   participating in a government coverup of crimes against the Branch
   Davidians.
   
   During the jury selection process, Judge Smith demanded defense
   attorneys submit questions to him and disallowed their directly
   questioning potential jurors. Instead, he asked the questions. The
   only choice left for the attorneys was a limited number of "strikes."
   This selection process makes it more difficult for the attorneys to
   weed out prejudiced individuals. [400] Meanwhile the Dallas Morning
   News filed a motion seeking to overturn Smith's decision to bar most
   of the media and public during juror questioning, stating the public
   and the media have a "constitutional right of access to the
   examination of potential jurors in a criminal trial." [401] The fact
   that Judge Smith interviewed potential jury members in his
   shirtsleeves, without his judicial robes, so that he would not
   "intimidate" them was widely reported by the press. Jury selection was
   complete in two days--an unusually short period for such a complicated
   trial with so many defendants- -and the trial began on January 12,
   1994. Should any Branch Davidians be convicted, the restrictive jury
   selection process might provide grounds for appeal.
   
   Paul Fatta's attorney Mike DeGeurin requested Judge Smith prohibit
   prosecutors and witnesses from using the word "cult" because it has a
   "negative and dangerous" connotation that might influence a jury
   against the defendants. The motion noted that Assistant U.S. Attorney
   J. Ray Jahn has already stopped using the word. [402] The judge
   rejected the request. [403] Defense lawyers then asked Judge Smith to
   prohibit prosecutors from using prejudicial words like "compound,"
   "Ranch Apocalypse," and "Mighty Men." [404] We assume he also rejected
   this request because some of the terms have been used in the trial.
   
   As in all trials, the prosecution will first present its evidence of
   the defendant's guilt. Defense attorneys will have the opportunity to
   cross-examine all witnesses. Assuming the case is not dismissed for
   lack of evidence, the defense will then present its case. The
   prosecutors will also have the opportunity to cross-examine defense
   witnesses, including the defendants, should they decide to testify.
   Below is an outline of the expected cases to be presented by the
   prosecution and the defense--and some questions likely to be asked and
   points raised in cross- examinations.
   
THE PROSECUTION CASE 
   
   The eleven Branch Davidians were charged with conspiracy, in part,
   because there was little or no solid evidence that any of them shot at
   or killed any of the four BATF agents who died February 28, 1993. Nor
   was there evidence that any of them shot at tanks on April 19th or
   started the fires that destroyed Mount Carmel. Listed below is the
   evidence the U.S. Attorneys are expected to present to support the ten
   counts of the indictment:
   
   Physical Evidence: Weapons distributors invoices and United Parcel
   Service records of legal weapons purchases; hundreds of legal guns,
   grenade casings and explosives plus any illegal machineguns, silencers
   and live grenades found after the April 19th fire; any remaining
   evidence of the February 28th raid, including photographs and charts
   of bullet ridden vehicles and their positions before being moved by
   FBI tanks; explosives-related materials allegedly found at the
   LaVerne, California home; clothing, shoes, other materials soaked with
   fuel taken from fire survivors; other "evidence" of arson such as fuel
   containers, wood planks, etc.
   
   Undercover Eavesdropping Devices: While the government admits these
   recordings are of poor quality, prosecutors will try to use them to
   prove that the Branch Davidians started the April 19th fire, and
   probably to prove other aspects of the "conspiracy."
   
   Video tapes: KWTX and BATF footage of the BATF raid, including--if it
   exists--BATF aerial videotape evidence that Branch Davidians fired
   first; television news footage and any government video tape of the
   siege; video tapes of Koresh and other members made inside Mount
   Carmel during the siege and sent out to be shown to the FBI and family
   members; television news footage; and aerial infrared video tape and
   any other government video tape of the April 19th assault and fire.
   Should the government introduce Gun Owners of America video tapes
   which are "derogatory to ATF" as evidence Branch Davidians were
   "indoctrinated" to kill federal agents, the defense can argue both the
   First Amendment right to free speech and the Second Amendment right to
   bear arms.
   
   Audio tapes: These might include tapes of the 911 calls, of Koresh's
   negotiations with BATF agent Cavanaugh, of negotiations during the 51
   day siege, of KRLD and CNN radio interviews, and tapes of Koresh's
   sermons which allegedly show his propensity towards violence.
   
   Documents: These would include any relevant Koresh or Branch Davidian
   correspondence and Koresh's April 9, 10 and 14th letters to the FBI.
   (Will the prosecution, like the FBI and Justice Department, only
   present the first two letters and ignore the last?)
   
   Witnesses--BATF and FBI Agents: Prosecutors will ask them to testify
   about the planning and execution of the February 28th raid, during the
   siege, during the April 19th destruction of Mount Carmel, and during
   the investigation of the pre-and post-fire "crime scene." Defense
   attorneys are challenging these agents' credibility by exposing
   inconsistencies in their testimonies and asking them about the lies
   told by BATF raid commanders.
   
   Gerard E. Lynch, a Columbia University law professor and former
   Federal prosecutor said, "The defense will clobber them with every
   mistake everyone ever made in pursuing the case. They will make it a
   trial on the Government's tactics." [405] Former Koresh attorney Gary
   Coker, who is now representing some Branch Davidian material
   witnesses, told reporters, "I think people see that almost everybody
   from (former BATF Director Stephen) Higgins on down has at one time or
   another lied about this case. And if they would lie about those
   matters, why wouldn't they lie about other matters that are specific
   as to criminal charges?" [406] David Thibodeau's attorney Gary
   Richardson asserted, "Our clients said the Feds were lying all along,
   and they were. . .What our clients were telling us was true. Heads
   would roll when the truth eventually came out. That's just what
   happened." [407] Some defense lawyers told a reporter privately that
   they relished the idea of cross- examining the government's witnesses,
   particularly the BATF's February 28, 1993 raid commanders. Said one
   attorney, "It'll be the old `Were you lying then and are you lying now
   routine.'" [408] Judge Smith has so far refused to let the defense
   introduce as evidence the Treasury Department report that criticizes
   BATF's handling of the raid. However, the judge has allowed defense
   attorneys to ask questions which have resulted in Texas Ranger and
   BATF agent testimony that BATF raid commanders lied to them about
   certain issues.
   
   Witnesses--Paul Gray and other Fire Investigators: Chief fire
   investigator Paul Gray's close ties with BATF will lower the
   credibility of his testimony.
   
   Witness--Former "Co-conspirator" Kathryn Schroeder: Prosecutors may
   call Kathryn Schroeder, whose husband Michael Schroeder was killed on
   February 28th and whose four children left Mount Carmel early in the
   siege. She also left during the siege. Papers filed at the time
   Schroeder agreed to plea bargain state that she "admitted being an
   armed guard from the day of the initial raid until March 12th, when
   she left the compound." [409] She probably will testify about Koresh's
   alleged plan to have his followers turn their weapons on the public in
   Waco, Texas. [410] Defense attorneys may question Schroeder's motives:
   her desire to ensure that she will be able to see her children again;
   the fact that she was incarcerated in a mental institution for two
   months and possibly "deprogrammed"; her possible fear that her
   September, 1990 arrest in El Paso, Texas, for possession of marijuana
   and cocaine might have influenced the jury, sentencing judge or future
   parole boards against her. [411]
   
   Witnesses--Branch Davidians Who Left Mount Carmel after February 28th,
   i.e. "Material Witnesses": Any of those who were at Mount Carmel on
   February 28th or during the siege may be called. Most probably may not
   be very cooperative witnesses. However, some may be. Davy Aguilera
   states in his April 18, 1993 affidavit that on March 6th he talked to
   a "cooperating individual" who had lived at Mount Carmel for long
   period of time. This individual claimed to have seen machineguns,
   grenades and silencers manufactured and had "observed that Howell was
   attempting to construct a radio-controlled aircraft which can be used
   to carry explosives." Dunagan's affidavit states that released Branch
   Davidians claimed that on February 28th they had seen two boxes of
   hand grenades and Wayne Martin wearing a string of grenades around his
   neck. It also lists Branch Davidians seen wearing fatigues and
   carrying rifles, before and during the shooting. Defense attorneys
   will give these witnesses an opportunity to speak about their
   religious convictions and the savagery of the BATF attack and the FBI
   siege against them.
   
   Witnesses--Branch Davidian Children: Defense lawyers believe that if
   few or none of Mr. Koresh's adult followers prove to be valuable
   witnesses, prosecutors may call some of the 21 children who left Mount
   Carmel during the standoff. The law does not shield children from
   being forced to testify against their parents. [412]
   
   Witnesses--Breakaway Branch Davidians: To prove "conspiracy"
   prosecutors may call some former Branch Davidians. Since most of those
   who made the most damning statements about Koresh and the Branch
   Davidians--especially Marc Breault, the Bunds and David Block--have
   been associated with cult busters, defense attorneys may attempt to
   undermine their credibility by probing their motivations and their
   association with "cult busters" committed to destroying "cults" like
   the Branch Davidians.
   
   Witness--Joyce Sparks: Prosecutors may ask her to repeat her
   allegations about Koresh's statement about "military action" against
   Waco. Defense attorneys would question her to discover if she
   misunderstood a Biblical reference.
   
   Witness--Henry McMahon: Prosecutors may demand Koresh's arms dealer
   and sometimes partner Henry McMahon testify about the weapons he sold
   to Koresh and about Koresh's motivations. Davy Aguilera's April 18,
   1993 affidavit repeats McMahon's story that Koresh had "observed the
   `ATF S.W.A.T. Team' training at a vacant house approximately 500 yards
   toward the compound next to the `Mag Bag'" and that Koresh believed it
   was "conducted by ATF to assault the compound/Mount Carmel property."
   The government claims this police training was Koresh's motivation for
   his arms buildup.
   
   In cross-examination, the defense will ask McMahon to repeat his
   stories that Koresh keeping guns as an investment, that Koresh invited
   BATF to see his guns, that Aguilera lied when he said McMahon tried to
   confuse him about how many guns he had sold to Koresh, and that BATF
   lured McMahon into "protective custody" and kept him away from the
   press and the FBI. If the prosecution does not call McMahon, the
   defense surely will.
   
   Witnesses--Government Experts: The prosecution may call government
   "experts" to defend the BATF raid, to testify about David Koresh and
   the Branch Davidian's alleged mental problems, or to defend the
   pressure tactics used during the siege and the final assault on Mount
   Carmel. The defense will try to expose their prejudices and/or lack of
   competence in dealing with committed religous groups like the Branch
   Davidians.
   
THE DEFENSE CASE 
   
   Below we list the various counts and the defendants' expected defenses
   against the charges. Since the main defense is "self-defense" against
   excessive government force, it will be important to show that the
   government violated Branch Davidians rights, used excessive force and
   then tried to coverup their mistakes throughout the whole tragic
   operation. Attorneys and defendants pray that, as in the Weaver case,
   a disgusted jury will find the defendants innocent of murder and most
   or all other charges. Weaver's attorney Gary Spence said at that time,
   "A jury today has said that you can't kill somebody just because you
   wear badges and then cover up those homicides by prosecuting the
   innocent." [413]
   
   Count One--Conspiracy to Murder Federal Officers, Count Two--Aiding
   and Abetting the Murder of Federal Officers, Count Three--Using a
   Firearm During a Crime of Violence, all related to initial February
   28, 1993 shootout, forcible resistance of arrest, firing on tanks, and
   starting the April 19th fire. Attorneys' arguments will probably
   include the following defenses:
   
   * Legal Right to Shoot Back In Self-Defense Against Out- of-Control
   Law Enforcement--Defense attorneys may argue that BATF's lack of a "no
   knock warrant" and obvious use of excessive force in sending 76
   heavily armed agents to serve simple search and arrest warrants gave
   the Branch Davidians the legal right to shoot back in self-defense.
   They may point to evidence: that BATF raid commanders had done a
   sloppy job of investigating and were overly influenced by "cult
   busters"; that they had ignored Koresh's past cooperation with law
   enforcement, that they planned an unnecessary and dangerous
   paramilitary raid; that they disobeyed orders and proceeded with a
   raid despite the loss of surprise; that agents were expecting and
   prepared for a shootout; that agents shot first and indiscriminately--
   including from helicopters; and that agent friendly fire even injured
   or killed their own. This evidence of an out- of-control government
   agency will support the case that the Branch Davidians had a right to
   shoot back in self-defense. The fact that the FBI ground commanders
   also may have exceeded orders in proceeding with the demolition of
   Mount Carmel despite Branch Davidians' willingness to negotiate will
   point to an FBI that is similarly "out-of-control." If Justice
   Department officials are implicated in that fatal command, the defense
   can argue that "Gestapo"-like action against citizens starts right at
   the top.
   
   The self-defense argument may also be used regarding the Branch
   Davidians' resisting arrest during the siege and allegedly shooting at
   the tanks. It should be noted that the Randy Weaver jury acquitted
   Weaver and Kevin Harris of charges of resisting arrest, despite the
   eleven day standoff, because they evidently considered it part of
   their self-defense against government violence.
   
   Regarding the right to self-defense, one former senior BATF official
   said, "Irrespective of the situation inside, the notice of authority
   and purpose must be given. . .Unless the occupants of a dwelling are
   made aware that the persons attempting to enter have legal authority
   and a legal warrant to enter, the occupants have every right to defend
   themselves." [414] The Firearm Owners Protection Act of 1986
   recognizes the Common Law rule of self-defense, which is that the
   defender must have reasonable belief that the circumstances of
   immediate danger warrant self-defense. Section 9.31 of the Texas Penal
   Codes states: "The use of force to resist an arrest or search is
   justified: (1) If, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace
   officer (or persons acting at his direction) uses or attempts to use
   greater force than necessary to make the arrest or search; and (2)
   When and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is
   immediately necessary to protect himself against the peace officer's
   (or other person's) use or attempted use of greater force than
   necessary." [415] Whether or not the Branch Davidians knew the law at
   that moment, they may well have been acting within it.
   
   Even one of the Justice Department's handpicked outside experts, Dr.
   Robert Cancro, suggested the Branch Davidians were within their rights
   to defend themselves. "Certainly an armed assault by 100 agents had to
   be seen as an attack independent of who fired the first shot. If an
   armed individual enters your home by force and you have reason to
   believe that person represents a mortal threat, you are allowed to
   fire a weapon in self-defense in most states. The law does not usually
   allow the potential attacker to fire first before a response can be
   called self- defense [(JDR:Cancro:3)]
   
   Dick DeGuerin, who believed he would have obtained an acquittal of
   David Koresh had he lived, explained, "if a warrant is being
   unlawfully executed by the use of excessive force, you or I or anybody
   else has a right to resist that unlawful force. If someone's trying to
   kill you, even under the excuse that they have a warrant, you have a
   right to defend yourself with deadly force, and to kill that person."
   [416] A reporter wrote, "several lawyers said they expected to see a
   defense of self-defense, and possibly a claim that residents of the
   compound were unaware that the attackers were law-enforcement
   officers." [417] Defense attorneys can provide witnesses and tapes to
   prove Koresh had a sincere fear of attack by George Roden, by others
   who had threatened the Branch Davidians, and even by
   government--especially as it continued its surveillance of him even as
   he tried to cooperate. On February 28th Koresh told KRLD interviewers,
   "Let me explain the weapons from the beginning. The weapons were
   bought originally because in the prophecies. . .2000 years ago Christ
   tried for three and a half years to present the Gospel, right? And the
   night of his Crucifixion he told his servants, he said, before I sent
   you out without cloak nor purse nor sword so now I say unto you, if
   you do not have a sword go sell your cloak and buy one. The Christian
   Church was not to stand idly by and be slaughtered."
   
   Koresh told Dick DeGuerin in an audio taped March 28th telephone
   conversation: "I don't care who they are, nobody is going to come to
   my home, with my babies around, shaking guns around, without a gun
   back in their face. That's just the American way." Branch Davidian
   Stan Sylvia, who was in California the day of the raid, expressed his
   feelings on national television. "These people were on their own
   property. That didn't give the government right to come in shooting. .
   .For once in people's lives they stood up for God and what they
   believed." [418]
   
   * First Amendment Rights to Freedom of Speech, Religion and
   Association--The defense certainly could raise the issue of the rights
   of religious minorities to arm themselves for the Second Coming. Kelly
   Shackleford, an attorney for the Rutherford Institute, said of groups
   arming themselves for the Apocalypse, "There are a ton of these groups
   out there, and part of their faith is to ready themselves for the end.
   They have to be ready to fight on the side of the Messiah. There is
   nothing illegal about that." [419]
   
   The defense may argue that defendants are being prosecuted merely for
   associating with Koresh; it does not mean defendants necessarily
   agreed with all his ideas, were in on all his plans or followed all
   his orders. According to the New York Times, pretrial motions showed a
   split in the defense team about whether to depict Koresh as a
   "sincerely motivated teacher of Scripture, whose talks and writings
   were greatly misunderstood; others have suggested that he cruelly led
   his innocent followers astray. Still, no defendant has pleaded
   temporary insanity or suggested. . .being brainwashed." [420]
   
   * Government Tanks Started Fire: The government argues setting Mount
   Carmel on fire was part of the conspiracy. If the prosecution shows
   the complete infrared video tapes of the tank assaults and resulting
   fire, the jurors--and the public--finally will have a chance to study
   the full details of this brutal attack. Defense attorneys and the
   prosecution probably will differ in their interpretations of the video
   tapes. Defense attorneys will try to discredit the prosecutions'
   evidence--surveillance audio tapes, FBI Hostage Rescue Team agents,
   the "independent" fire investigator--that the Davidians started the
   fire. If any Branch Davidian survivors take the stand, they will
   describe how tanks knocked over lighted kerosene lamps and crushed a
   propane tank, starting the fires in one or more different areas within
   a few minutes. The defense may provide experts who will explain just
   how the tank rammings easily could have trapped people in the building
   and started one or more fires.
   
   Count Four--Aiding and Abetting the Attempted Murder of a Federal
   Officer and Counts Five and Six--Using a Firearm During a Crime of
   Violence, all related to Bob Kendrick, Delroy Nash and Michael
   Schroeder's attempts to reenter Mount Carmel on February 28, 1993. The
   prosecution will have to convince the jury that Kendrick and Nash
   resisted arrest by BATF agents. The defense may argue the Kendrick and
   Nash did not fire at agents or that if they did so they fired in
   self-defense.
   
   Count Seven--Possession of an Unregistered Destructive Device on April
   19, 1993 and Count Eight--Conspiracy to Possess and Unregistered
   Destructive Device related to Graeme Craddock's carrying a live
   grenade. The prosecution will have to prove Craddock was indeed
   carrying a live grenade; Craddock's defense may argue he was not, that
   someone planted a live grenade on him, or that he carried the grenade
   in self-defense.
   
   Count Nine--Conspiracy to Possess and Unlawfully Manufacture
   Machineguns and Count Ten--Aiding and Abetting the Unlawful Possession
   of Machineguns Paul Fatta's defense attorney may assert he had no
   knowledge of machineguns produced or planned for production before
   February 28, 1993.
   
   The defense will try to call witnesses who can prove their defense
   points. Considering that Judge Smith is obviously prejudiced against
   the Branch Davidians and has announced he will not let the defense put
   the government on trial, he may reject many of their requests to call
   specific witnesses. Those they may try to call include:
   
   Witnesses--Sympathetic: In addition to cross-examining sympathetic
   witnesses called by the prosecution, the defense will try to call
   Branch Davidians and other witnesses who can provide information to
   discredit prosecution witnesses or provide evidence that the Branch
   Davidians were not crazed fanatics totally under David Koresh's
   control. They will call individuals who can testify that the Branch
   Davidians knew they were under surveillance and tried to cooperate and
   to talk about their experiences during the February 28th raid or
   during the siege. Doubtless, they will also try to call David Koresh's
   attorney Dick DeGuerin and Steve Schneider's attorney Jack Zimmerman,
   both of whom saw evidence of BATF damage to the building during the
   raid, and experts like Dr. Phil Arnold and Dr. James Tabor who
   convinced David Koresh to exit despite the FBI's ignoring his efforts.
   They may even try to call the Justice Department's most critical
   outside experts--Dr. Nancy Ammerman, Dr. Lawrence E. Sullivan, Dr.
   Robert Cancro and Dr. Alan M. Stone.
   
   Witnesses-former BATF Director Steven Higgins, former FBI Director
   William Sessions, Attorney General Janet Reno, Other High Government
   Officials: Defense attorneys have asked that these individuals be
   called as witnesses. They may be used to discredit lower ranking
   officials and agents who lied to them or to show that governmental
   incompetence, violations of rights and excessive force were approved
   by top officials.
   
   Witnesses--The Defendants: Under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
   Constitution, the prosecution cannot compel defendants to take the
   stand or testify. If any defendant agrees to testify, he or she can
   not take the Fifth Amendment in response to any questions about
   alleged crimes relevant to the case but must answer honestly. It is
   unknown whether any defense attorneys will call their clients to
   protest their innocence or to describe their self-defense against an
   out-of-control goverment assault on February 28, 1993.
   
CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGFUL DEATH LAWSUITS 
   
   On May 3, 1993, attorney John P. Coale filed three notices of claim
   against the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. He is
   seeking $18.06 million for the deaths of his wife, Lorraine, and two
   daughters, Rachel, 14, and Hollywood, 2. Questions about who started
   the fire, or deaths by gunshot, are irrelevant to the case, Mr. Coale
   asserted. "We're alleging no matter what happened to these children
   and this woman, it was foreseeable." [421] Sylvia said the survivors
   should regroup and build a school at the site. Referring to possible
   forfeiture of the property, he declared, "Why should the FBI of all
   people be awarded that land, with what they did to my people, to my
   wife and children? Their lives were lost on that land, and I don't
   want to see that done in vain." [422]
   
   In October the first of numerous lawsuits under the Federal Civil
   Rights Act was filed in Waco by North Carolina's Cause Foundation on
   behalf of Oliver Gyarfas, Sr. and Elizabeth Gyarfas. Their daughter
   Aisha Gyarfas Summers, 18, and her child Startle Summers, 1 year, died
   in the April 19th fire. According to Kirk D. Lyons, attorney and
   executive director of the Cause Foundation, the suits are intended
   less to compensate the victims of the government's excessive use of
   force, as they are to defend the Constitution from government
   encroachment and to see that another situation like Waco never happens
   again. The Foundation intends to file more suits after the conclusion
   of the Branch Davidian trials. Both suits should shed additional light
   on the governments' violations of rights, excessive force and coverup.
   
   It is possible that some BATF and FBI agents and officials could be
   held individually liable in such law suits. In January, 1993, a U.S.
   District judge ruled that the city of Philadelphia and senior
   officials would have to face trial in a civil law suit brought by
   survivor Ramona Africa. Philadelphia police fire bombed MOVE
   headquarters to drive members out of their home, killing 11 members of
   the group. While former Philadelphia Mayor Wilson Goode was immune
   from the lawsuit because he was not involved in the decision to fire
   bomb the MOVE house, his three top lieutenants can be sued. [423]
   
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UPHEAVALS AND THE YEAR 2000 
   
   Justice Department outside expert Lawrence E. Sullivan wrote in his
   report: "If history be any judge, the change of millennium only seven
   years from now will be viewed as a momentous, highly charged turning
   point in history for many religious communities. The shift of
   millennia will likely be viewed as a seismic rupture in time, a break
   through which one may glimpse powers that transcend time, and provoke
   many to act in unconventional ways as they respond to messages read in
   the signs of an unconventional time." (JDR:Sullivan:11) We cannot
   ignore indications that religious zealots, survivalists, gun-toting
   drug gangs, gun- loving "right to bear arms" activists, tax
   protesters, and even secessionists will all begin or increase
   challenges to local, state and federal authorities as we approach the
   year 2000.
   
MILLENIALISTS AND SURVIVALISTS 
   
   Religious believers put the "Laws of God"--or some spiritual
   entity--above laws made by governments. Most consider government, and
   especially the federal government, to be enemies of religious freedom.
   In America millions of Christians are apocalyptics or millenialists
   convinced that Jesus will return in the midst of violent apocalypse,
   very possibly in the year 2000. There are also "new age"
   millenialists. Elizabeth Clare Prophet's Church Universal and
   Triumphant has predicted nuclear war as a precursor to a new age of
   enlightenment. And tens of thousands who celebrated the "Harmonic
   Convergence" in the late 1980s believe that as the millennium
   approaches we will experience economic collapse and the dissolution of
   nation states, followed by a rebirth of civilization. Many
   millenialists are survivalists, preparing for the inevitable collapse
   of law, order and food distribution networks during the time of
   tribulation. Many millenialists and survivalists arm themselves out of
   fear that governments, roving gangs, or hungry hordes from the cities
   will attack them during these coming times.
   
   One millennialist movement which particularly alarms law enforcement
   is the Christian Identity movement, also called Christian patriots,
   who believe that Northern European whites are the racial descendants
   of the Biblical people of Israel and want to break up the United
   States into racially and culturally separate nations. The movement has
   about 25,000 hardcore adherents and another 150,000 hangers- on. One
   of its leaders, Pete Peters, has a cable television show, "Truth for
   Our Times," which promotes their views. [424]
   
   Many millennialist groups regard the government's destruction of the
   Branch Davidians to be a symbol of the government's eagerness to
   destroy their religious groups as well. Some may even believe it was
   indeed one in a series of prophesized events that will lead to the
   Second Coming of Christ--especially because, much in line with the
   Book of Revelation, floods ravaged the midwest and fires and
   earthquakes ravaged California after Koresh's death.
   
   Millennialist groups surely will arise in other parts of the world. In
   November of 1993, thousands of followers of self-styled messiah Maria
   Devi Khrystos, leader of the "White Brotherhood," poured into Kiev,
   Ukraine. They were expecting the end of the world, to be marked by her
   crucifixtion, resurrection and ascension in to heaven in a ball of
   flame. Authorities arrested hundreds of followers, who promptly went
   on hunger strikes, and then arrested Khrystos and her husband for
   hooliganism and seizing state property. [425]
   
   Sociologist James Aho of Idaho State University predicts, "As we get
   closer to the millennium, there will be more and more people arming
   themselves for the end of the world." [426] The Washington Post
   writes, "Experts on millennial groups said that if there is a lesson
   to be learned from Waco, it may well be that law enforcement officials
   ought to be aware of the potency of millennial beliefs. Throughout the
   1990s, interest in end-of-time prophecy will grow, as the current
   millennium draws to a close." [427]
   
DRUG-PROHIBITION-RELATED VIOLENCE 
   
   The Treasury Department appendix which reviews the history of BATF
   mentioned the "prohibition-related rise in crime and use of firearms"
   during the 1920s and 1930s. Much of today's violent crime is also
   prohibition-related, but now it is related to the prohibition of
   psychoactive drugs, not alcohol. The twenty-five-year-old "War on
   Drugs" has suppressed supplies of the popular and relatively safe drug
   marijuana and ensured that dealers promote dangerous and
   addictive--but more easily smuggled and transported--drugs like
   cocaine and heroin. The attraction of hefty illegal profits has led to
   just the sort of struggles over territory and violence between armed
   gangs that occurred during alcohol prohibition. (Rising taxes on
   cigarettes also increases cigarette-bootlegging-related crime!)
   
   Because such a high percentage of criminal arrests and imprisonments
   are related to non-violent drug crimes, the justice system must give
   early paroles to violent rapists, thieves and murderers to make room
   for those given long mandatory sentences for using or distributing
   small amounts of marijuana or cocaine. There is little doubt that 25
   years of drug prohibition has created far more prohibition- related
   violence than 15 years of alcohol prohibition. Moreover, there is far
   greater random violence and violence by children than ever experienced
   under alcohol prohibition. Gang violence is decimating the young black
   male population since poor, inner-city black males see few
   opportunities as lucrative as dealing illegal drugs.
   
   Some consider drug prohibition itself to be a form of religious
   persecution against new religious movements which arose during the
   1960s and advocated using psychoactive drugs as a path to spiritual
   enlightenment. It was a case related to Native Americans' use of
   peyote which led to the U.S. Supreme Court's Oregon vs. Smith ruling
   that so undercut religious rights. In response, hundreds of religious
   groups of every description joined together to pressure Congress to
   pass the 1993 Religious Restoration Act. However, even this act
   provides scant protections for those who want to use psychoactive
   drugs for religious purposes.
   
   The War on Drugs has led to serious abuses of American's
   constitutional rights and freedoms by law enforcement: use of
   unreliable informants, inadequate investigations of alleged crimes,
   increasing use of entrapment, judicial rubber-stamping of search
   warrants, improper use of deadly force, growing use of unjustified "no
   knock" warrants, increasing violations of due process of law, improper
   use of forfeiture proceedings to augment law enforcement budgets, and
   growing use of the military in domestic law enforcement.
   
   One tragic forfeiture-motivated case is that of Donald Scott, a
   California millionaire who owned property bordered on three sides by a
   national park. On October 2, 1992, Los Angeles Sheriffs, National Park
   and Forest Service representatives, national and California Drug
   Enforcement agents and the National Guard raided Donald Scott's home,
   on a tip that marijuana was located on the property. Hearing a
   commotion, Scott ran to the living room, gun in hand, and was killed
   as he obeyed demands he drop his weapon. The local District Attorney's
   office admitted that one reason for the raid was the "desire to seize
   and forfeit the ranch for the government." [428] Drug prohibition has
   fostered accelerating gang and police violence.
   
GUN-PROHIBITION-RELATED VIOLENCE 
   
   Alcohol-prohibition-related gun violence led to the first national gun
   laws. Likewise, drug-prohibition-related gun violence is prompting
   calls for more and stricter enforcement of these laws. After many
   years of effort, the Brady Bill handgun registration law was recently
   passed. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen has proposed putting 80 per
   cent of gun dealers out of business by raising the annual licensing
   fee by 2000%. Many politicians call for banning "assault weapons" and
   President Clinton has discussed registering all guns.
   
   The "right to bear arms" community is furious. Nationwide its
   organizing efforts are mushrooming. Unlike outlawing drugs, regulating
   and restricting gun ownership goes against a powerful American
   mythology--that only an armed citizenry can protect itself against an
   oppressive government. (Members of the Committee for Waco Justice
   believe that during this century non-violent action has proved to be
   more successful; nevertheless, individuals should not be deprived of
   their right to defend themselves in extreme situations where they have
   no other choice.) Many groups nationwide currently are planning
   demonstrations for April 19th, "Patriots' Day." That it is also the
   anniversary of the government's destruction of the Branch Davidians in
   its attempt to enforce gun laws is not lost on gun owners' rights
   activists.
   
   The tragedy in Waco may be just a foretaste of what will happen as the
   government tries to restrict the ownership of guns in the United
   States. While some columnists and politicians said Waco was an example
   of why we need gun control, the Committee for Waco Justice is one of
   many groups that insist that it was the enforcement of gun laws that
   triggered the disaster. We fear that we may someday see a "War on
   Guns" more terrifying than the current War on Drugs. Gun prohibition
   will only expand the already huge black market in illegal guns and
   bring about a rise in gun-prohibition-related crimes and gangs. The
   same attitudes and practices that have undermined the rights of drug
   users and dealers are undermining the rights of gun owners and gun
   dealers. More and more innocent legal gun owners--as well as
   individuals merely accused of owning illegal guns--may find themselves
   raided and assaulted by out-of-control law enforcement.
   
   The massacre of the Branch Davidians is an important factor in
   bringing together those who oppose drug prohibition with those who
   oppose gun prohibition. On January 10, 1993, the date of the opening
   of the trial of the eleven Branch Davidians, a coalition consisting of
   two leading drug legalization groups, four gun owners' rights groups,
   and four civil liberties groups wrote President Clinton requesting he
   create a commission to review unlawful policies of all federal law
   enforcement agencies. [429] We include more details about the
   coalition in a later section.
   
ECONOMIC UNREST AND TAX REBELLION 
   
   Disorganized economic protest, like the Los Angeles riots, remains a
   continuing threat. However, government often is less concerned about
   these crisis than about organized economic protest, especially tax
   resistance. Today the average individual pays almost 50 per cent of
   his or her income in local, state, and federal taxes, a percentage
   which will only continued to rise. Already 18 percent of Americans
   fail to file tax returns and many more grossly underreport their
   incomes. Most are people without political ideology. However, many are
   religious or political ideologues convinced that the government is
   ripping them off, that the income tax is illegal, or that God has
   better purposes for their wealth than sending it to "Godless"
   politicians. Some are libertarians who believe taxation is theft and
   others are war tax resisters who will not pay for war or for
   government violence against citizens. A small percentage are "20
   somethings" convinced that the social security system will fold before
   they receive a cent.
   
   Meanwhile, millions of people who do pay taxes have joined local,
   state and national anti-tax groups which recommend and engage in
   lobbying to bring taxes down. America's growing federal deficit, ever
   rising taxes, and economic stagnation are already giving rise to
   radical anti- tax movements. However, it is unlikely they will be able
   to effect the kind of change they want through the electoral system
   because the majority of those who bother to vote are recipients of tax
   benefits: government employees, social security, medicare and medicaid
   recipients, pensioners, and employees of government contractors. If
   national health care is passed even more people will be drawn into the
   welfare net.
   
SECESSIONISTS AND SEPARATISTS 
   
   In fact, the passage of any compulsory national health care program
   might be the last straw not only for tax protesters, but for millions
   of Americans who still abhor what they consider to be socialist
   solutions. One indication of this is an October, 1993 column by
   libertarian conservative columnist Walter Williams: "Bill Clinton's
   efforts to forcibly impose socialized medicine on our nation has
   answered a question gnawing at me for quite some time. The question is
   whether we have reached a point where those of us who love liberty,
   private property rights, rule of law and the Constitution given us by
   our Founding Fathers should organize to make preparations to secede
   from the Union. . .The fundamental question totally ignored is whether
   federalized medicine is authorized by the U.S. Constitution. My
   thorough reading of our Constitution found no authorization for Mr.
   Clinton's plan. . .The only peaceful resolution is that of secession.
   . .After all, the right to part company is the most effective human
   safety valve, no matter whether it's divorce, quitting a job or
   secession. If there's a ban on parting company, somebody's likely to
   be treated like a dog. . .I hope that secession wouldn't be bloody.
   And it wouldn't be if the nation's socialists adopted the attitude of
   live and let live. But if they don't, liberty-loving people shouldn't
   roll over, play dead and take socialists' abuses without imposing high
   costs in return." [430]
   
   Williams read this column to millions of people when he filled in for
   vacationing talk show host Rush Limbaugh during the last week of 1993.
   During the show he explained that the moral justification for
   secession is found in the Declaration of Independence which contains
   in its first paragraph the sentence: "Whenever a government becomes
   destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or
   abolish it."
   
   On the December 28, 1993 show, Williams described the Utah-based
   Committee of 50 states, which is chaired by former governor Jay
   Bracken Lee. The Committee has proposed "The Ultimate Resolution," a
   resolution which--if endorsed by 38 state legislatures--would dissolve
   the entire federal apparatus when the federal debt reaches $6
   trillion. The president, Congress and the federal judiciary would be
   fired. Each of the 50 states would become a separate and sovereign
   nation, free to come together to form a new confederation. The
   Ultimate Resolution contains a provision whereby any attempt to
   suspend or eliminate the U.S. Constitution would automatically cause
   the states to take back all the powers they have delegated to the
   federal government. [431] Williams endorsed this resolution.
   
   A number of ideological groups--anarchists, libertarians, greens,
   bioregionalists, states' rights-ists and African- American,
   Hispanic-American and white separatists--endorse secession or
   recommend the break up of the United States into a number of nations
   or into confederations of communities. Many citizens of Hawaii, Texas,
   Alaska, and Vermont already have strong secessionist sentiments.
   Should economic and political turmoil increase in the future, American
   secessionist movements might grow as well. Should Quebec break away
   from the rest of Canada, it doubtless will further inspire
   secessionists in this country.
   
   Demographics also has secessionist implications. Demographers predict
   that by the year 2050 the population of the United States could be
   more than 50% African-American, Hispanic, and Asian. In 1992 Columnist
   Carlos Alberto Montaner wrote: "It would be interesting to predict the
   United States' reaction if faced with a possible ethnic secession.
   Would it be necessary, like in Yugoslavia, to send in U.N. troops to
   keep the peace, or would the country react in a civilized manner like
   Czechoslovakia? Fortunately, this question won't have to be answered
   for 50 years. We shall see then." [432]
   
COMMITTEE FOR WACO JUSTICE RECOMMENDATIONS RESPECT THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
   
   How will politicians and law enforcement react to growing social,
   political and economic unrest? Will they return to surveillance and
   disruption of legal, non-violent political and religious groups?
   Oregon's Backwoods Home Magazine reports that U.S. Senate Bill 8, the
   Crime Control Act of 1993 would allow the seizure of homes, computers,
   vehicles and other property used to plan or stage any activity that
   results in violence, even if that violence is done by hooligan
   passerbys or political opponents. Will the federal government continue
   to entrap innocent citizens into breaking laws, as it did Randy
   Weaver? Should the federal government detect any hint of illegal
   action, will it continue making forceful executions of search and
   arrest warrants on shaky and biased evidence, as it did against the
   Branch Davidians? Will the federal government continue to persecute
   any political or religious group that merely discusses armed
   self-defense against potential illegal violent state attacks upon
   them? Or will it reform law enforcement practices so that citizens no
   longer have to fear such illegal attacks?
   
   Finally, will the FBI expand its program of hiring informants and
   "agents provocateurs" to infiltrate potentially violent groups, even
   to the point of helping them carry out their violent acts? Will it be
   proven that the FBI's hired informant did in fact build and plant the
   World Trade Center bomb? Law enforcement has a legitimate role in
   stopping violent attacks against citizens or government facilities
   once it has credible evidence that such an attack is imminent.
   However, law enforcement should not be paying informants to use
   violence against Americans!
   
   Federal agents' murder of Vicki and Samuel Weaver, Donald Scott, 86 or
   more Branch Davidians--and possibly the six World Trade Center bombing
   victims--demonstrates that federal law enforcement agencies are out of
   control. The Committee for Waco Justice believes that these violations
   of Americans' rights are inevitable with the growth of "big
   government." For big government needs ever growing power to enforce
   more and more laws, to intervene in more and more foreign nations'
   affairs, to levy more and more taxes--and to handle public discontent
   with these laws, interventions and taxes. Barring the unlikely event
   of a rapid and thorough downsizing in the scope, size and taxing
   powers of local, state and federal governments, how can we protect
   ourselves from governmental violations of rights, excessive use of
   force and collusive coverups of those crimes? Below, the Committee for
   Waco Justice presents a list of recommendations for protecting
   citizens against abuses of government power. Perhaps the most
   important way to stop government crimes against citizens is to revive
   respect for the Bill of Rights. The BATF and FBI assaults on the
   Branch Davidians violated eight of the ten sections of the Bill of
   Rights. Therefore we present our recommendations categorized under
   each of these first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These
   recommendations are based on lessons learned from government excesses
   in the above- mentioned incidents and other, less prominent, ones.
   While this is not an exhaustive list, enacting these suggestions would
   certainly prevent another government massacre like the massacre of the
   Branch Davidians.
   
1. Protect Right to Freedom of Religion, Speech, Press, Assembly and to
Petition the Government 
   
   * Issue a Presidential Executive Order to ensure that only the
   President or the Attorney General may approve any law enforcement
   actions against "non-traditional" religious or political groups in
   order to ensure that there is credible probable cause, that
   non-coercive avenues of resolving possible violations are explored and
   that excessive force is not used. (As proposed by Justice report
   outside experts Lawrence E. Sullivan and Richard J. Davis.)
   
   * Ensure that only the President or the Attorney General may designate
   a group or category of groups suspected of breaking federal laws as
   being "violent" and therefore subject to governmental surveillance.
   Such groups should also have the right to appeal to these highest
   authorities if they discover such surveillance and want to challenge
   it.
   
   * End all governmental spying on peaceful political and religious
   groups, including new religious movements some call "cults." Ensure
   that acting BATF director John W. Magaw ends his monitoring of
   "cults."
   
   * End the use of the term "cult" as a category justifying
   investigative activities, use of force, criminal prosecution, or
   governmental regulation or liquidation of any group labeled a "cult."
   
   * Release all currently classified files relating to Reverend Jim
   Jones and the Jonestown incident in Guyana.
   
   * Prevent law enforcement agencies from receiving information from
   organizations--such as the Anti-Defamation League and the Cult
   Awareness Network--bent on harming or destroying other groups with
   which they have political or religious differences.
   
   * Consider Justice Department investigation of the Cult Awareness
   Network, its representatives and any allied groups for "conspiracy
   against the rights of citizens" for possible false allegations to law
   enforcement regarding various religious groups, including the Branch
   Davidians and The Family.
   
   * Make no laws or regulations restricting the press and media from
   covering law enforcement actions. Allow them access to allegedly
   dangerous situations on an "at-your-own- risk" basis. (During the June
   9, 1993, House Appropriations Subcommittee meeting, WNBC reporter John
   Miller said "having an ongoing cooperative mechanized procedure for
   bring the media on such operations where appropriate. . .lessens the
   potential of having stragglers." [433])
   
2. Protect Right to Keep and Bear Arms 
   
   * Repeal all laws regulating or banning the ownership, manufacture,
   transfer, or sale of firearms and munitions, except those prohibiting
   individuals certified to be mentally unbalanced or felons convicted of
   violent crimes from owning weapons. However, private homeowners,
   businesses, and communities should retain the right to ban such
   weapons from their private property.
   
   * Abolish the Bureau of Tobacco, Firearms and Firearms and turn any of
   its legitimate functions over to state and local authorities.
   
   * Ensure all agencies enforcing regulations and laws regarding
   firearms and munitions act in accordance with and be held accountable
   to provisions of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act.
   
3. Protect Right to Refuse Quartering of Soldiers 
   
   * Repeal all laws which permit government to quarter soldiers in
   wartime; while the U.S. Constitution allows this--"in a manner to be
   prescribed by law"--such laws are unnecessary.
   
   * Repeal any existing laws or regulations permitting federal agents to
   occupy private property for surveillance or other law enforcement
   activity without the express permission of the innocent property
   owner.
   
4. Protect Right to be Secure Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,
including Necessity for Probable Cause before Issuance of Warrants 
   
   * Include in all statutory and administrative regulations "first
   warning" provisions insuring investigators first warn individuals and
   corporate entities of possible violations; this insures individuals
   are not investigated, searched, arrested, tried and punished for
   violations of arcane, confusing and conflicting regulations.
   
   * Establish a method by which individuals discovering themselves to be
   under investigation regarding violations of administrative regulations
   or non-violent crimes may cooperate with such investigations to
   prevent warranted searches and arrests with the potential for
   employing excessive force.
   
   * Require federal agents assure the judge or magistrate not only that
   they have probable cause but: (a) that local and/or state authorities
   have been consulted about any suspect's past cooperation with law
   enforcement; (b) that agents justify the use of extraordinary force or
   unconventional entry methods, and explain why these do not constitute
   a "no knock" raid; (c) that agents certify that abandonment of any
   ongoing negotiations in a siege situation are merited; (d) that agents
   report if any jurisdictions involved in, or informed of, any action
   against a property subject to forfeiture have attempted to purchase
   the property in the past.
   
   * Establish disciplinary procedures to prevent judges and magistrates
   from simply "rubber stamping" search and arrest warrants.
   
   * Educate law enforcement agents regarding individuals' common law and
   statutory right to self-defense against excessive police force or
   against searches where the police do not announce who they are or
   provide the citizen with sufficient identification. Because of the
   national spate of break-ins by criminals claiming to be police, this
   right to self-defense might need to be strengthened by appropriate
   statutes.
   
   * Do not ease restrictions on the use of illegally obtained
   evidence--the exclusionary rule--as the 1993 Crime Control Act would
   do.
   
5. Protect Right to Indictment by Grand Jury, Trial by Jury, Avoid Double
Jeopardy, Refuse to Bear Witness against Oneself, Due Process of Law, and Just
Compensation for Public Taking of Property 
   
   * Require judges to inform jurors of the common law right to judge the
   law, as well as the facts of the case, and to acquit a criminal
   defendant, or to find against the government in a civil trial,
   whenever they consider the law unjust or oppressive.
   
   * Require judges to inform jurors of the common law practice that if
   the jurors find the government's conduct unacceptable, even if the law
   is valid, they may acquit the defendant.
   
   * Offer just government financial restitution for all losses suffered
   by persons who suffer searches and property damage where no crime has
   been committed or where damages are disproportionately high in
   relation to the alleged violation.
   
   * Offer just government financial restitution to those arrested,
   indicted, tried, imprisoned, or otherwise injured in the course of
   criminal proceedings that do not result in their conviction.
   
   * End the practice of pre-conviction seizures of property in civil and
   criminal cases.
   
6. Protect Right to A Speedy Public Trial, Impartial Jury, Knowledge of
Accusations, Confront Witnesses, Compel Favorable Witnesses, and Assistance of
Counsel 
   
   * Permit criminal defendants and civil parties in a court of law a
   reasonable number of peremptory challenges to proposed judges, similar
   to the right to challenge proposed jurors.
   
   * Educate all law enforcement agents, including members of "elite"
   special response teams, to the fact that loyalty to the unit does not
   excuse the violation of individual or constitutional rights or
   participation in coverups of same. They frequently must be reminded
   that they have taken an oath of loyalty to the constitution, not to
   their unit.
   
   * End the increasingly common practice of charging attorneys as
   co-conspirators to justify violations of the attorney-client
   privilege.
   
7. Protect Right to Trial By Jury In Civil Suits 
   
   * Eliminate the doctrine of "Sovereign Immunity" which holds that the
   State--or its agents--may not be sued without its permission or held
   accountable for its actions under civil law; replace it with the
   principle of full liability for damages. Government employees and
   agents should be held personally legally and financially liable for
   any violations of citizens rights, including excessive use of force.
   
8. Protect Freedom From Excessive Bail, Excessive Fines, or Cruel and Unusual
Punishment 
   
   * Repeal the Racket Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) laws
   which have been applied too indiscriminately, used to compel excessive
   fines and jeopardize First Amendment rights of all Americans to
   organize political demonstrations, and, especially, civil
   disobedience. Crimes like repeated trespass and destruction of
   property should be dealt with through existing local and state laws.
   
   * It should not be considered an "excessive fine" for any government
   employee or agent involved in rights violations, excessive use of
   force, and other illegal activity to lose not only their jobs, but all
   law enforcement-related government pensions and benefits.
   
9. Protect Rights Retained by the People 
   
   * Facilitate the people's access to government information by ending
   secret classifications which prevent the public from obtaining
   information regarding government policies and actions (exceptions
   being such matters as private information coerced by government agents
   and defensive military plans). Government should expedite the
   processes by which individuals may obtain such information.
   
   * End restrictions on the people's right to use some or all currently
   restricted psychoactive drugs. (This should also be considered under
   First Amendment religious rights.)
   
   * Repeal the drug exemption to the posse comitatus law.
   
   * Work for non-violent resolution of conflicts over sovereignty should
   communities, regions or states assert their right to secede from the
   United States of America.
   
10. Protect Powers Reserved to the States or the People 
   
   * End the practice of creating local-state-federal "multi-task forces"
   which override local powers so that local and state authorities cannot
   protect their citizens from excessive federal power.
   
   * Ensure that the people retain the power to prevent local and state
   involvement in federal law enforcement actions and to press criminal
   and civil suits against local and state law enforcement which
   participates in any federal violations of rights.
   
   * Restrict the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigating only
   narrowly defined federal crimes like espionage, kidnapping across
   state lines, etc.; it should not become a national police force
   overriding the authority of local and state governments.
   
   * Pass an Independent Counsel law to prosecute crimes in the executive
   branch of government--including any massive governmental violations of
   citizens rights, as occurred in Waco, Texas--if the Attorney General
   refuses to appoint one.
   
CONCLUSION 
   
   The Committee for Waco Justice encourages civil liberties, political
   and religious organizations and the media to re-educate the public and
   politicians about the necessity for protecting individual liberty and
   restraining governmental power. We therefore support the January 10,
   1994, letter to President Clinton from the American Civil Liberties
   Union, Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, the
   Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, the Drug Policy Foundation, the
   Independence Institute, the International Association for Civilian
   Oversight of Law Enforcement, the National Association for Criminal
   Defense Lawyers, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the
   National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Affairs, and the
   Second Amendment Foundation. The letter calls for "a national
   commission to review the policies and practices of all federal law
   enforcement agencies and to make recommendations regarding steps that
   must be taken to ensure that such agencies comply with the law"--and,
   we would add, the Bill of Rights.
   
   The letter's signers note that "federal police officers now comprise
   close to 10 percent of the nation's total law enforcement" and that
   "some fifty-three separate federal agencies have the authority to
   carry firearms and make arrests." The signers recommend that the
   national commission be composed of law enforcement experts,
   constitutional scholars, criminal defense lawyers and prosecutors,
   judges, representatives of federal law enforcement professional and
   labor organizations, and representatives of organizations that monitor
   police practices. They end their letter by asserting that "the
   creation of a high level national commission will contribute greatly
   to the continued improvement of federal police agencies by helping to
   ensure that federal police not only enforce the law in an effective,
   humane and constitutional manner, but that they also serve as models
   for local and state law enforcement agencies."
   
   The Committee for Waco Justice believes all local, state and federal
   law enforcement agencies must overhaul their investigative and
   enforcement procedures to prevent another massacre like that of the
   Branch Davidians. We believe strict adherence to the Bill of Rights
   will help accomplish this. However, we also believe that our citizenry
   and our political culture must become more tolerant of unconventional
   religions and lifestyles. And we believe our government must be more
   willing to apply non- violent conflict resolution to the inevitable
   challenges to the social, economic and political status quo as we
   approach the year 2000.
   
     _________________________________________________________________
   
  FOOTNOTES
   
   1. (c) 1993 Carol Moore. Copying for non-commercial distribution
   encouraged.
   
   2. Six Branch Davidians died during the February 28, 1993 raid and, at
   least 80 during the April 19, 1993 fire. According to several Branch
   Davidians, in the last few years the group had come to call themselves
   "Students of the Seven Seals." However, survivors do accept the use of
   the term "Branch Davidian" since it is so well known at this point
   (private communication).
   
   3. April 22 and 28, 1993 House Ways and Means subcommittee hearing, p.
   5.
   
   4. Associated Press wire story, April 26, 1993, 01:26 EDT. 5/ Michael
   Isikoff, "Reno Strongly Defends Raid on Cult," Washington Post, April
   29, 1993.
   
   5. (Reference missing in original ASCII file.)
   
   6. >From the Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of
   Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell
   also known as David Koresh, September, 1993. All references from the
   report will be included within the text, with the page number after
   the colon, e.g., (TDR:#).
   
   7. Louis Sahagun and Doug Conner, "Pair Acquitted of Murder in Idaho
   Mountain Shootout," Washington Post, July 9, 1993.
   
   8. "Informant said he built Trade Center Bomb," Washington Times,
   December 15, 1993, A5.
   
   9. Stephen Millies, "Did Government Agent Set World Trade Center
   Bomb?" Workers World Service, New York, NY 10011, January, 1994.
   
   10. All quotations from Clinton press conferences are from electronic
   mail transcripts.
   
   11. >From BATF Director Stephen Higgins written statement to the April
   28, 1993 House Judiciary Committee hearings. Because the hearing
   transcripts are still in draft form, no page numbers are given.
   
   12. >From National Rifle Association April 19, 1993 Press Release,
   "NRA Calls for Congressional Inquiry into Waco Raid," and James L.
   Pate, "No Longer Untouchable," American Spectator, August, 1993, page
   35. Pate also notes in the article that on April 19, 1993, the day of
   the fatal fire in Waco, 1500 BATF agents celebrated their hero Eliot
   Ness's birthday in Baltimore.
   
   13. McAlvany Intelligence Advisor, July, 1993.
   
   14. Account drawn from following articles: Associated Press wire
   story, "U.S. plods on in case against 2 white separatists in Idaho,"
   May 10, 1993; Jerry Seper, "White separatist acquitted in marshal's
   murder," Washington Times, July 9, 1993; David Johnston and Stephen
   Labaton, "F.B.I. Shaken by Inquiry into Idaho Siege," New York Times,
   November 25, 1993; Jerry Seper, "FBI's Idaho firefight linked to
   misinformation from marshals," Washington Times, December 1, 1993.
   
   15. FBI Legal Handbook for Special Agents, Section 3-6.4. 16/ Jerry
   Seper, "FBI Agents waged war on minds," Washington Times, September
   22, 1993.
   
   17. Michael Hedges, "FBI fined for delays in trial of Weaver,"
   Washington Times, October 29, 1993.
   
   18. David Johnston and Steven Labaton, November 25, 1993. 19/ Jerry
   Seper, "FBI agents likely to face charges in deadly siege," Washington
   Times, December 14, 1993, A14.
   
   20. "Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
   Enterprise and Domestic Security Terrorism Investigations," 1976.
   
   21. "Anti-Defamation League Still Faces Legal Action," Washington
   Post, November 28, 1993, A12.
   
   22. Herb Brin, "ADL's travails bring glee to enemies of the Jews,"
   Heritage, April 16, 1993, p. D.
   
   23. Associated Press wire story, April 23, 1993, 10:25 EDT.
   
   24. Dr. Gordon Melton presentation at American Academy of Religion
   panel on the Branch Davidians, Washington, D.C., November 22, 1993.
   
   25. Gustav Nieguhr and Pierre Thomas, "Abuse Allegations Unproven:
   Koresh Was Investigated in Texas, California," Washington Post, April
   25, 1993, A20.
   
   26. "30 Members of Children of God Arrested," Washington Post,
   September 2, 1993.
   
   27. December, 1993 Letter to Senators from Charles Russell of The
   Family, Los Angeles, CA.
   
   28. Information on CAN and unfootnoted quotes are from the Ross &
   Green Report "What is the Cult Awareness Network and What Role Did It
   Plan in Waco?", 1993. Available from Ross & Green, 1010 Vermont
   Avenue, NW, Suite 118, Washington, D.C., 20005. ("Ross" is no relation
   to Rick Ross.)
   
   29. All references from the Justice Department report will be included
   within the text, with the page number after the colon. The report
   consisted of 4 books and an unbound paper. (JDR:#) refers to the
   largest book, the factual report. All other references will include
   the name of each specific contributor, e.g., (JDR:Dennis:#) or
   (JDR:Stone:#).
   
   30. A description of Representative Leo Ryan's actions against Jim
   Jones and their similarity to the Cult Awareness Network's actions
   against the Branch Davidians is contained in Peter McWilliams Ain't
   Nobody's Business If You Do in the chapter on "Unconventional
   Religious Practices," pgs. 621- 639. (Santa Monica: Prelude Press,
   1993).
   
   31. Steven R. Reed, "Would-be Messiah gave death, not life," Houston
   Chronicle, April 20, 1993, 18A.
   
   32. Alexander Cockburn, ">From Salem to Waco, by Way of the Nazis,"
   Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1993.
   
   33. Scott Shepard, "ATF chief vows to keep an eye on religious cults",
   Washington Times, November 2, 1993, A3.
   
   34. Information from Clifford L. Linedecker, Massacre at Waco, Texas,
   (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) and Brad Bailey and Bob Darden,
   Mad Man in Waco, (Waco, Texas: WRS Publishing, 1993).
   
   35. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Treasury,
   Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, p. 189.
   
   36. Unless otherwise noted, material on or attributed to Marc Breault
   is from his book, Inside the Cult, co-authored by Martin King, (New
   York: Signet Books, 1993).
   
   37. Maury Povich television show, November 9, 1993. Povich presented
   two interview shows about the Branch Davidians on November 8 and 9,
   1993.
   
   38. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 245.
   
   39. Clifford L. Linedecker, pgs. 144-147.
   
   40. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 27.
   
   41. Gustav Nieguhr and Pierre Thomas, April 25, 1993, A20. 42/
   Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 144.
   
   43. Gustav Nieguhr and Pierre Thomas, April 25, 1993, A20. 44/ "Cult
   kids' discipline tough, but wasn't abuse, says doctor," Washington
   Times, May 6, 1993.
   
   45. Sue Anne Pressley, "Waco Cult's Children Describe Beatings,
   Lectures, War Games: Experts Fail to Confirm Abuse of Cult's
   Children," Washington Post, May 5, 1993, A17.
   
   46. Daniel Wattenberg, "Gunning for Koresh," American Spectator,
   August, 1993, p. 38.
   
   47. Newsweek, May 17, 1993, p. 50.
   
   48. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 92.
   
   49. Gustav Nieguhr and Pierre Thomas, April 25, 1993.
   
   50. Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 153.
   
   51. Associated Press wire story, March 1, 1993.
   
   52. Louis Sahagun and J. Michael Kennedy, "FBI places full blame on
   Koresh for Tragedy," New York Times, April 20, 1993, A20.
   
   53. Ruth Riddle interview on "Dateline NBC", June 15, 1993.
   
   54. Maury Povich television show, November 8, 1993.
   
   55. Clifford L. Linedecker, pgs. 151-152.
   
   56. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 152.
   
   57. Michael deCourcy Hinds, April 20, 1993, A20.
   
   58. Houston Post, March 8, 1993, p. A10.
   
   59. Houston Post, March 9, 1993, A13.
   
   60. Steven R. Reed, "Would-be Messiah gave death, not life," Houston
   Post, April 20, 1993.
   
   61. "Seven Seals rich in imagery," Houston Post, April 20, 1993, 16A.
   This version is from the Oxford Study Bible.
   
   62. The fact that Kathryn Schroeder made the allegation is from
   Associated Press wire story, October 2, 1993, 12:18 EST. The actual
   quotation is from the Treasury report, p. 127.
   
   63. Maury Povich television show, November 8, 1993.
   
   64. Paul H. Blackman report, "Affidavit to Kill," Institute for
   Legislative Action, National Rifle Association, p. 9.
   
   65. Federal Search Warrant Case Number W93-15M: issued on the probable
   cause to believe that unregistered machineguns and destructive devices
   concealed in violation of 18 and 26 USC.; Federal arrest warrant for
   Vernon Wayne Howell Case Number W93-17m issued in the belief he was in
   unlawful possession of an unregistered destructive device in violation
   of 26 USC. >From June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee
   hearing, p. 93..
   
   66. Michael Isikoff, "Treasury Balked at First At ATF's Raid on Cult,"
   Washington Post, May 1, 1993. Then consultant, now Assistant Secretary
   for Law Enforcement, Philip K. Noble made the comment.
   
   67. Sam Howe Verhovek, "Scores die as cult compound is set afire," New
   York Times, April 20, 1993.
   
   68. "Cult Had Illegal Arms, Expert Says," New York Times, January 15,
   1994.
   
   69. Jim McGee and William Clairborne, "The Transformation of the Waco
   'Messiah'," Washington Post, May 9, 1993, A19.
   
   70. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 223.
   
   71. Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 10.
   
   72. Paul H. Blackman report, p. 4.
   
   73. Associated Press wire story, January 13, 1994, 12:36 EST.
   
   74. Hugh Aynesworth, "President calls for investigation," Washington
   Post, April 21, 1993.
   
   75. Daniel Wattenberg, p. 33.
   
   76. Paul H. Blackman, report, p. 51.
   
   77. Ibid. 23.
   
   78. Ross and Green report, p. 12.
   
   79. Clifford L. Linedecker, pgs. 144-147.
   
   80. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 317.
   
   81. Clifford L. Linedecker, on pgs. 17-18, presents the only available
   evidence of the alleged name change. Member Perry Jones allegedly paid
   a bill at "Central Rental" in Waco and said Mount Carmel's new name
   was "Ranch Apocalypse." However, this seems to have been an in-house
   joke, not an official name change.
   
   82. June 9, 1993 House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 15.
   
   83. Daniel Wattenberg, p. 36.
   
   84. Daniel Wattenberg, p. 33.
   
   85. Paul H. Blackman report, p. 10.
   
   86. Ibid. pgs. 12-13.
   
   87. Ibid. p. 17.
   
   88. Larry Pratt, Gun Owners of America Special Report, "Could a Search
   Warrant Be Your Death Warrant?," 1993, p. 2. 89 Paul H. Blackman
   report, p. 6.
   
   90. Ibid. p. 21.
   
   91. Marc Breault and Martin King, pgs. 317-318.
   
   92. Roy Bragg, "Ex-prosecutor laments agents' `storm trooper'
   tactics," Houston Chronicle, March 2, 1993.
   
   93. Dirk Johnson, "40 Bodies of Cult Members are Found in Charred
   Ruins," New York Times, April 22, 1993, B12.
   
   94. Lexington (KY) Herald-Leader, March 7, 1993, A2.
   
   95. James L. Pate, "Waco: Behind the Cover-Up," Soldier of Fortune,
   November, 1993, pgs. 36-41, 71-72.
   
   96. Marc Smith, "Agent allegedly refused Koresh's offer," Houston
   Chronicle, September 11, 1993.
   
   97. Associated Press, "Gun Dealer Alerted Koresh to ATF Probe, Lawyer
   Says," Houston Post, September 11, 1993.
   
   98. April 9, 1993 House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 137.
   
   99. Ibid. pgs. 163-164.
   
   100. Ibid. p. 77.
   
   101. Ibid. pgs. 130, 137-138.
   
   102. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 245.
   
   103. Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 16.
   
   104. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 318.
   
   105. Dallas Morning News, May 13, 1993, 8A.
   
   106. While here he may have meant "children" in the larger sense of
   his followers, Koresh's claim elsewhere on the tape that his
   2-year-old daughter had been killed was not true, according to his
   attorney Dick DeGuerin and surviving Branch Davidians.
   
   107. "Koresh to agents: Should have called me," Washington Times, May
   26, 1993.
   
   108. Newsweek, March 15, 1993, p. 55.
   
   109. Time, March 15, 1993, p. 39.
   
   110. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 299.
   
   111. Larry Pratt report, p. 15.
   
   112. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 306-307.
   
   113. Gustav Nieguhr and Pierre Thomas, April 25, 1993, A20.
   
   114. "A Botched Mission in Waco, Texas," U.S. News and World Report,
   March 5, 1993.
   
   115. Associated Press wire story, April 22, 1993, 13:04 EDT.
   
   116. Stephen Labaton, "Firearms Agency Struggles to Rise >>From Ashes
   of Waco Raid," New York Times, November 5, 1993, A21.
   
   117. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, pgs.
   144-145.
   
   118. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 106.
   
   119. Daniel Wattenberg, August, 1993, p. 32.
   
   120. Joseph Sobran, "Applying the Cult Label," Washington Times, March
   22, 1993.
   
   121. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p.
   77-78.
   
   122. Private communication with Terry Liberty Parker of Austin, Texas.
   
   123. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 342.
   
   124. Ibid. p. 189.
   
   125. Ibid. pgs. 177-178.
   
   126. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 175.
   
   127. James L. Pate, "Gun Gestapo's Day of Infamy," Soldier of Fortune,
   June, 1993, p. 62.
   
   128. USA Today, April 21, 1993, A4.
   
   129. Associated Press wire story, February 28, 1993.
   
   130. Daniel Wattenberg, p. 40.
   
   131. Scott Pendleton, "Waco Siege Prompts Scrutiny of Agency,"
   Christian Science Monitor, April 8, 1993, p. 8.
   
   132. Account from four January 19, 1994 news stories: Kathy Fair, "ATF
   agent testifies about cult ambush," Houston Chronicle, 8A; "1st
   Eyewitness Testifies at Branch Davidian Trial," Washington Post; Chip
   Brown, "Davidians fired first, agent says," Washington Times; "Witness
   Says Cult Ambushed Agents but Acknowledges Blunders," New York Times.
   
   133. Kathy Fair, "Witnesses testify Koresh cultists fired first,"
   Houston Chronicle, January 21, 1994, 23A.
   
   134. Lee Hancock, "Television Photographer Says He Tipped Waco Cult,"
   Washington Post, August 28, 1993.
   
   135. Washington Post, January 19, 1994.
   
   136. Houston Post, March 4, 1993, A20.
   
   137. Kathy Fair, "Cult assembled weapons in compound, FBI says,"
   Houston Chronicle, January 15, 1994, 36A.
   
   138. James L. Pate, "What the Feds Don't Want you to Know about Waco,"
   Soldier of Fortune, October, 1993, p. 102.
   
   139. James L. Pate, October, 1993, p. 10.
   
   140. Associated Press wire story, March 24, 1993, 20:09 EST.
   
   141. "Witness Says Cult Ambushed Agents but Acknowledges Blunders,"
   New York Times, January, 19, 1994.
   
   142. Scott W. Wright, "Agents at Branch Davidian Trial Describe Blitz
   of Bullets at Raid," Austin American- Statesman, January 21, 1994, B3.
   
   143. Ibid.
   
   144. James L. Pate, October 1993, pgs. 93 and 101.
   
   145. "Much Evidence and Conflict in Branch Davidians' Trial," New York
   Times, January 17, 1994.
   
   146. Stephen Labaton and Sam Howe Verhovek, "U.S. Agents Say Fatal
   Flaws Doomed Raid on Waco Cult," New York Times, April 28, 1993, A20.
   
   147. Order, April 20, U.S. v. Vernon Wayne Howell, U.S. District Court
   of the Western District of Texas, Waco Division.
   
   148. "FBI Places Full Blame on Koresh for Tragedy," Los Angeles Times,
   April 21, 1993, A6.
   
   149. Information from letter to editor of Portland Oregonian submitted
   by Jim Bell, November, 1993.
   
   150. James L. Pate, June, 1993, pgs. 51-52.
   
   151. "Sect's Lawyers Dispute Gunfight Details," New York Times, April
   5, 1993, A10 and transcript of September 30, 1993 Treasury Department
   press conference.
   
   152. New York Times, April 5, 1993, A10.
   
   153. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, pgs.
   99-129.
   
   154. Associate Press story, "FBI tape of Waco talks probed,"
   Washington Times, June 17, 1993.
   
   155. "Much Evidence and Conflict in Branch Davidians' Trial," New York
   Times, January 17, 1994.
   
   156. Kathy Fair, "Cult assembled weapons in compound, FBI says,"
   Houston Chronicle, January 15, 1994, 36A.
   
   157. Interview with Catherine Matteson, August 30, 1993, on file at
   Gun Owners of America.
   
   158. Sue Anne Pressley, May 5, 1993, A17.
   
   159. Kathy Fair, "Cult members `executed' injured, prosecutors say,"
   Houston Chronicle, January 13, 1994, A6.
   
   160. "3 Waco Cultists Shot Point-Blank, Autopsies Show," Washington
   Post, July 15, 1993, A4.
   
   161. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, pgs. 172-173.
   
   162. James L. Pate, October, 1993, pgs. 101-102.
   
   163. New York Times, April 5, 1993, A10.
   
   164. Roy Bragg, "Ill-fated ATF raid: the beginning of the end,"
   Houston Chronicle, April 20, 1993, 17A.
   
   165. New York Times, January 17, 1994.
   
   166. On page 104 the Treasury Report does describe in detail the type
   of guns which killed Branch Davidians.
   
   167. "ATF agent tells of retrieving dead," Washington Times, January
   25, 1994.
   
   168. Dallas Morning News, March 3, 1993; Newsweek, March 15, 1993, p.
   54.
   
   169. On December 7, 1993 KWTX's Ray Deaver told us station employees
   had edited the tape and that it had not been impounded by the
   government. Nor had the tape been subpoenaed for the Branch Davidian
   trials.
   
   170. "ATF agent says he may have shot comrade," Washington Times,
   January 26, 1994.
   
   171. "Was It Friendly Fire?", Newsweek, April 5, 1993, p. 50.
   
   172. James L. Pate, July, 1993, 53.
   
   173. Stephen Labaton and Sam Howe Verhovek, March 28, 1993.
   
   174. Washington Times, January 26, 1994.
   
   175. John McLamore and Dan Mulloney statement on Maury Povich
   television show, November 9, 1993.
   
   176. >From audio tape of John O. Lumpkin, Texas Bureau Chief of the
   Associated Press, speaking at September 10, 1993 Freedom of
   Information Foundation panel on "Mt. Carmel: What Should the Public
   Know."
   
   177. Associated Press wire story, March 13, 1993, 02:57 EST.
   
   178. Paul H. Blackman report, p. 51.
   
   179. Mary Jordan and Sue Anne Pressley, "Cult Leader Wants to Die a
   Martyr in `All-Out Firefight'," Washington Post, March 9, 1993.
   
   180. "The Seven Week Siege," Washington Post, April 20, 1993, A8.
   
   181. New York Times, April 5, 1993, A10.
   
   182. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 137.
   
   183. >From audiotape of September 10, 1993 Freedom of Information
   Foundation media panel.
   
   184. Paul H. Blackman report, p. 50.
   
   185. James L. Pate, "Government's Waco Whitewash," Soldier of Fortune,
   January, 1994. p. 69.
   
   186. Ron Engelman, "Ron's Waco Update," The Freedom Report, September,
   1993.
   
   187. Hugh Aynesworth, "Koresh followers set fires," Washington Times,
   April 27, 1993.
   
   188. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 60.
   
   189. Ibid. p. 18.
   
   190. Newsweek, March 15, 1993, p. 55.
   
   191. Jerry Seper, "ATF chief denies Waco cover-up,' Washington Times,
   April 19, 1993, A3.
   
   192. Kathy Fair, "Report on Waco cult raid likely to be scathing,"
   Houston Chronicle, September 26, 1993, 9A.
   
   193. Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 27.
   
   194. Associated Press wire story, March 11, 1993, 16:23 EST.
   
   195. "Jury Told of Gunfire and Horror in Texas Siege," New York Times,
   January 13, 1994.
   
   196. "How David Koresh Got All Those Guns," U.S. News and World
   Report, June 7, 1993, p. 42.
   
   197. "Cult had illegal Arms, Expert Says," New York Times, January 15,
   1994 and Kathy Fair, "Jurors see a parade of cult weapons," Washington
   Times, January 14, 1994, 26A.
   
   198. "Koresh Follower Pleads Guilty to Resisting Officer," New York
   Times, September 12, 1993.
   
   199. Lee Hancock, "Thousands protest proposal to limit access to cult
   data," Dallas Morning News, September 23, 1993.
   
   200. Freedom of Information Foundation Press Release, September 25,
   1993.
   
   201. Jerry Seper, "Treasury wants to hid reports on Waco raid,"
   Washington Times, September 2, 1993.
   
   202. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations Subcommittee Hearings, pgs. 69
   and 84.. 
   
   203. Scott Shepard, "ATF chief vows to keep an eye on religious
   cults", Washington Times, November 2, 1993, A3.
   
   204. Jerry Seper, "New ATF chief tells panel his bureau will be ready
   for Waco-like situations," Washington Times, October 23, 1993.
   
   205. In the coming weeks law enforcement agencies would deploy the
   following number of personnel: FBI-668, ATF-136, U.S. Customs-6, Waco
   Police-18, McLennan County Sheriff's Office-17, Texas Rangers-31,
   Texas Dept of Public Safety Patrol-131, U.S. Army-15, Texas National
   Guard-13. (JDR:10). 
   
   206. Dr. Philip Arnold and Dr. James Tabor, "Comments and
   Clarifications" section of "The Decoded Message of the Seven Seals of
   the Book of Revelation" by David Koresh.
   
   207. "Ex-prosecutor laments agents' `storm trooper' tactics," Houston
   Chronicle, March 2, 1993.
   
   208. Audio tape of the September 10, 1993 Freedom of Information
   Foundation media panel on Waco.
   
   209. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 232.
   
   210. Paul McKay, "Photographers for Chronicle, AP arrested," Houston
   Chronicle, April 22, 1993.
   
   211. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 206.
   
   212. Mary Jordan and Sue Anne Pressley, May 9, 1993, A1.
   
   213. April 22, 1993, Senate Committee on Appropriations hearing, p.
   122.
   
   214. Paul H. Blackman report, p. 56.
   
   215. Libertarian Party of Dallas 1993 promotional materials on Ron
   Engelman talk video tape.
   
   216. Naftali Bendavid, "The Costs of Cult Standoff: Were Estimates Too
   High?" Legal Times, May 3, 1993, p. 18.
   
   217. Interview on "Dateline NBC," June 15, 1993.
   
   218. During the April 28, 1993 House Judiciary Committee hearings
   probably-confused FBI Director William Sessions asserted that "cult
   experts" had advised the government to leave the area and give up on
   arresting the Branch Davidians.
   
   219. Maury Povich television show, November 8, 1993.
   
   220. James L. Pate, October, 1993, p. 73.
   
   221. Associated Press wire story, March 16, 1993, 4:42 EST.
   
   222. Nancy Ammerman presentation at November 22, 1993 American Academy
   of Religion panel on Branch Davidians.
   
   223. "Bad Attitude Turns Fatal," The Balance, August, 1993.
   
   224. Nancy Ammerman presentation, November 22, 1993.
   
   225. Information from Dr. Gordon Melton talk at the November 22, 1993
   American Academy of Religion panel on the Branch Davidians and private
   communication.
   
   226. Louis Sahagun and J. Michael Kennedy, "FBI Places Full Blame on
   Koresh for Tragedy," Los Angeles Times, April 21, 1993.
   
   227. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, "Reno, FBI Took Fatal Gamble,"
   Washington Post, April 21, 1993, A15.
   
   228. Sam Howe Verhovek, "F.B.I. Saw the Ego in Koresh But Missed
   Willingness to Die," New York Times, April 22, 1993, B13.
   
   229. Marc Breault and Martin King, pgs. 335-336.
   
   230. Sam Howe Verhovek, April 21, 1993, A20.
   
   231. "FBI brings out secret electronic weapons as Waco siege drags
   on," Sunday Times of London, March 21, 1993.
   
   232. Mary Jordan and Sue Anne Pressley, March 8, 1993.
   
   233. "Primetime Live" television special on Waco, January 13, 1994.
   
   234. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 246.
   
   235. Dan Friedman, "Wealth of advice seen as costly to FBI at Waco,"
   Washington Times, October 8, 1993.
   
   236. New York Times, April 5, 1993, A10.
   
   237. Maury Povich television show, November 8, 1993.
   
   238. JoAnn Zuniga, "Outcome shocks compound visitor," Houston
   Chronicle, April 20, 1993, 16A.
   
   239. Associated Press wire story, March 25, 1993, 03:53 EST.
   
   240. Dirk Johnson, "Inside the Cult: Fire and Terror on the Final
   Day," New York Times, April 26, 1993, B10.
   
   241. New York Times, April 5, 1993, A10.
   
   242. Paul Craig Roberts, "Unsettling questions in probe of Waco,"
   Washington Times, June 1, 1993, E3.
   
   243. James Adams, "They Could Have Waited: A Lesson in How Not to Play
   the Hostage Game," Washington Post, April 25, 1993, C3.
   
   244. Associated Press wire story, March 16, 1993, 04:25 EST.
   
   245. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 233.
   
   246. Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 215.
   
   247. Much of information about Dr. Arnold's experience from November
   22, 1993 interview at Reunion Institute dinner in Washington, D.C.
   
   248. Time, May 3, 1993, p. 42.
   
   249. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, "Reno Says, `I Made the
   Decision,'" Washington Post, April 20, 1993, A9.
   
   250. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, April 20, 1993, A9.
   
   251. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 205.
   
   252. U.S. News and World Report, May 3, 1993, p. 30.
   
   253. Mark Smith, "Cult leaders lawyers urge probe of FBI," Houston
   Chronicle, April 20, 1993, 13A.
   
   254. Sue Ann Pressley and Mary Jordan, "Cultist may have been forced
   to stay," Washington Post, April 21, 1993.
   
   255. Associate Press wire story, April 21, 1993, 18:24 EDT.
   
   256. Marc Breault and Martin King, pgs. 336-337.
   
   257. Associated Press wire story, October 10, 1993, 15:23 EDT.
   
   258. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, "FBI Negotiators Detail
   Koresh's Threats to Avoid Being Captured," Washington Post, April 22,
   1993, A14.
   
   259. Jerry Seper, "FBI used chemical banned for war," Washington
   Times, April 22, 1993.
   
   260. Ibid.
   
   261. Malcolm W. Browne, "Chemical Isn't Meant to Cause Fire," New York
   Times, April 20, 1993.
   
   262. James L. Pate, October, 1993.
   
   263. Associated Press wire story, March 18, 1993, 21:40 EST.
   
   264. Jerry Seper, "House Panel Looks at FBI's assault on Waco
   cultists," Washington Times, April 29, 1993.
   
   265. Michael Isikoff, "FBI Clashed Over Waco, Report Says," Washington
   Post, October 9, 1993, A10.
   
   266. James L. Pate, July, 1993.
   
   267. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, "Reno Says, `I Made the
   Decision,'" Washington Post, April 20, 1993, A9.
   
   268. David Johnston, "U.S. Saw Waco Assault as Best Option," New York
   Times, April 25, 1993, A32.
   
   269. Dirk Johnson, April 26, 1993, B10.
   
   270. James L. Pate, July, 1993.
   
   271. Hugh Aynesworth, "President calls for investigation," Washington
   Post, April 21, 1993.
   
   272. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, "A Week in the Life," Wall Street Journal,
   March 9, 1993.
   
   273. Sue Anne Pressley, April 20, 1993, A20.
   
   274. Carol Moore, primary author of this report, is the
   great-great-great-great grand daughter of Colonel James Barrett,
   commander of the militia at Concord. Most of the weapons were stored
   at Barrett's farm, which was the primary target of the British
   expedition. Barrett later gave the order to fire upon the British,
   should they fire first.
   
   275. Dirk Johnson, April 26, 1993, B10.
   
   276. Ibid. B10.
   
   277. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 24.
   
   278. Ross E. Milloy, "An Angry Telephone Calls Signals the End of the
   World for Cult Members," New York Times, April 20, 1993, A21.
   
   279. Graphics box, New York Times, April 20, 1993, A20.
   
   280. Interview on Dateline NBC, June 15, 1993.
   
   281. Dirk Johnson, April 26, 1993, B10.
   
   282. Comments at Reunion Institute Dinner, November 22, 1993.
   
   283. James L. Pate, July, 1993.
   
   284. Dirk Johnson, April 26, 1993, B10.
   
   285. Sue Anne Pressley, April 20, 1993, A20.
   
   286. "Reno cleared FBI's assault on cult complex," Washington Times,
   April 20, 1993.
   
   287. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, April 22, 1993, A14.
   
   288. Ibid. A14.
   
   289. The 1993 video tape is a dramatic and effective introduction to
   the subject. However, it does include several inaccurate or dubious
   assertions. To obtain the tape contact WACO, P.O. Box 14, Beech Grove,
   IN 46107, 1-800-758-0308.
   
   290. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 28.
   
   291. Transcript of the April 19, 1993, 10:30 a.m. FBI press
   conference.
   
   292. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 26 and Sue Anne Pressley and Mary
   Jordan, "Cult survivors offer glimpse inside waco inferno," Washington
   Post, April 24, 1993.
   
   293. Sue Anne Pressley, "Koresh Wound Not Typical of a Suicide, Doctor
   Says," Washington Post, May 18, 1993, A3. 294 James L. Pate, October,
   1993.
   
   295. "Mark Potok, "Davidian trial's hoopla mirrors strange case," USA
   Today, January 11, 1994, A3.
   
   296. Newsweek, April 5, 1993, p. 26.
   
   297. Time, May 3, 1993, p. 31.
   
   298. Stephen Labaton, "Reno Says Suicides Seemed Unlikely," New York
   Times, April 20, 1993, A21.
   
   299. Laura Bell, "Parkland to Sue Over Davidians' Medical Bills,"
   Dallas Morning News, November 4, 1993.
   
   300. Sam Howe Verhovek, "Scores Die as Cult Compound is Set on Fire,"
   New York Times, April 20, 1993.
   
   301. Louis Sahagun and J. Michael Kennedy, "FBI Places Full Blame on
   Koresh for Tragedy," Los Angeles Times, April 21, 1993.
   
   302. Associated Press wire story, April 22, 1993, 08:26 EDT.
   
   303. Sue Anne Pressley and Mary Jordan, April 24, 1993, A7.
   
   304. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 211.
   
   305. Ross Milloy, April 20, 1993, A21.
   
   306. The Abrams is the largest tank used against the Branch Davidians.
   HRT Commander Richard Rogers was in the one Abrams tank used on April
   19. Whether he was in fact inside the tank which survivors claim
   started the fire should be investigated. (JDR:281,285) (Also, one
   former Army enlistee told us that because of its huge weight, the tank
   has brake problems which are exacerbated if the tank is exposed to
   particulate matter, like CS gas.)
   
   307. Associated Press story, "Tanks, chemicals couldn't break resolve
   of cultists," Washington Times, April 23, 1993.
   
   308. "Workers Pick Through Cult's Compound," New York Times, April 23,
   1993, A20.
   
   309. Associated Press wire story, April 22, 1993, 08:26 EDT.
   
   310. James L. Pate, October, 1993, p. 75.
   
   311. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 26.
   
   312. Interview on "Dateline NBC," June 15, 1993.
   
   313. Interview on "Good Morning America," May 15, 1993.
   
   314. Time, May 3, 1993, p. 42.
   
   315. Interview on "Good Morning America," June, 1993.
   
   316. Hugh Aynesworth, "President calls for investigation," Washington
   Post, April 21, 1993.
   
   317. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 25.
   
   318. Mary Jordan and Sue Anne Pressley, "Examiners Work to Identify
   Bodies," Washington Post, April 23, 1993.
   
   319. >From audio tape of October 8, 1993, Justice Department press
   conference.
   
   320. Associated Press story, "Tanks, chemicals couldn't break resolve
   of cultists," Washington Times, April 23, 1993.
   
   321. Associated Press wire story April 22, 1993, 08:26 EDT.
   
   322. New York Times, April 23, 1993, A20.
   
   323. Mary Jordan and Sue Anne Pressley, April 23, 1993.
   
   324. James L. Pate, "Waco Whitewash Continues," Soldier of Fortune,
   February, 1994, p. 59-60.
   
   325. Sue Ann Pressley and Mary Jordan, April 23, 1993, A16.
   
   326. Jerry Seper, "FBI still probing video of tank at Waco,"
   Washington Times, October 9, 1993, A9.
   
   327. Sue Anne Pressley and Mary Jordan, April 21, 1993, A1.
   
   328. Michael deCourcy Hinds, "Fire Experts, Fire Tapes Provide Rare
   Evidence," New York Times, April 28, 1993, A16.
   
   329. Interview on "Good Morning America," May 17, 1993.
   
   330. Interview on "Dateline NBC," June 15, 1993.
   
   331. Sam Howe Verhovek, "Investigators Puzzle Over Last Minutes of
   Koresh," New York Times, May 5, 1993, A18.
   
   332. Michael Hedges, "Search for corpses starts," Washington Times,
   April 22,1993, A1.
   
   333. JoAnn Zuniga, April 20, 1993.
   
   334. Louis Sahagun and J. Michael Kennedy, April 21, 1993, A6.
   
   335. Sam Howe Verhovek, April 21, 1993, A1 and A20.
   
   336. Dirk Johnson, April 26, 1993, A1.
   
   337. "Waco Siege Ends in Dozens of Deaths as Cult Site Burns After FBI
   Assault," Washington Post, April 20, 1993, A8.
   
   338. Sue Anne Pressley, "Waco Cult Adept in `Theology of Death,' Trial
   Told," Washington Post, January 13, 1994.
   
   339. Kathy Fair, "Cult members `executed' injured, prosecutors say,"
   Houston Chronicle, January 13, 1994, 6A.
   
   340. Stephen Labaton, "Officials Contradict One Another on Rationale
   for Assault on Cult," New York Times, April 21, 1993, A21.
   
   341. Sam Howe Verhovek, April 21, 1993, A1.
   
   342. Louis Sahagun and J. Michael Kennedy, April 22, 1993. 343/ Sue
   Anne Pressley, April 20, 1993, A8.
   
   344. Michael deCourcy Hinds, April 20, 1993, A20.
   
   345. Sue Anne Pressley, April 20, 1993, A20.
   
   346. Sam Howe Verhovek, April 20, 1993, A1.
   
   347. Associated Press wire story, August 26, 1993, 05:29 EDT.
   
   348. "FBI Agent Suggests Koresh Was Killed by Vengeful Aide," Dallas
   Morning News, September 5, 1993.
   
   349. Michael deCourcy Hinds, "Arson Investigators Say Cult Members
   Started Fire," New York Times, April 27, 1993.
   
   350. Michael deCourcy Hinds, "For Experts, Fire Tapes Provide Rare
   Evidence," New York Times, April 28, 1993, A16.
   
   351. "Cultist's lawyer calls bulldozing of site a cover-up,"
   Washington Times, May 13, 1993.
   
   352. Sue Anne Pressley and Mary Jordan, April 21, 1993.
   
   353. J. Michael Kennedy, "Waco Cult Set Fire, Texas Officials Say,"
   Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1993, A7 and Michael deCourcy Hinds,
   April 27, 1993.
   
   354. James L. Pate, October, 1993.
   
   355. James L. Pate, "Waco:Behind the Cover-Up," Soldier of Fortune,
   November, 1993, pgs. 74-75.
   
   356. Associate Press wire story, April 27, 1993, 04:10 EDT.
   
   357. Michael deCourcy Hinds, April 28, 1993, A16.
   
   358. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 26.
   
   359. Hugh Aynesworth, "Koresh followers set fires," Washington Times,
   April 27, 1993.
   
   360. Sue Ann Pressley, "Cultists Started Fire in Waco, Probers Say,"
   Washington Post, April 27, 1993.
   
   361. "Cultists had tunnel to escape fire, arson prober says,"
   Washington Times, May 1, 1993, A5.
   
   362. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, "Reno Says, `I Made the
   Decision,'" Washington Post, April 20, 1993, A9.
   
   363. Stephen Labaton, "U.S. Opens Up to Avoid Backlash on Cult
   Attack," New York Times, April 22, 1993, B13.
   
   364. Stephen Labaton, "Officials Contradict One Another on Rationale
   for Assault on Cult," New York Times, April 21, 1993, A1.
   
   365. Associated Press wire story April 21, 1993, 18:15 EDT.
   
   366. Michael Isikoff, "Waco Siege Prompts Crisis Training for Top
   Justice Department Officials," Washington Post, December 9, 1993.
   
   367. Federal News Service transcription of April 20, 1993 press
   conference.
   
   368. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, April 20, 1993, A9.
   
   369. Stephen Labaton, April 21, 1993, A21.
   
   370. Paul Craig Roberts, "Rallying Round Reno," Washington Times, May
   7, 1993.
   
   371. Stephen Labaton, "Inquiry Won't Look at Final Waco Raid," New
   York Times, May 16, 1993, A20.
   
   372. Stephen Labaton, "Justice Inquiry Will Now Examine Assault on
   Cult," New York Times, May 18, 1993.
   
   373. Michael deCourcy Hinds, "Toll is Lowered for Sect Dead to Around
   72," New York Times, April 30, 1993, A12.
   
   374. William Safire column, "Waco, Reno, Iraq-gate", October 14, 1993.
   
   
   375. Mary McGrory, "Clinton Closes the Iraqgate," Washington Post,
   November 14, 1993.
   
   376. James L. Pate, "One Hand Whitewashes the Other," Soldier of
   Fortune, February, 1994, pg. 60.
   
   377. Stephen Labaton, "Report on Siege to Blame Agents, Law Officials
   Say," New York Times, October 2, 1993, A8.
   
   378. Jerry Seper, "Whitewater probe grows to include state agency,"
   and "State agency Major Source of funds for Clinton backers,"
   Washington Times, January 24, 1994, A1, A9.
   
   379. Jerry Seper, "Tragedy Blamed on Cult: Reno Says Report is Not A
   Whitewash," Washington Times, October 9, 1993.
   
   380. Michael Kirkland, "Justice Department rejects charges of Waco
   `whitewash,'" United Press International, October 14, 1993.
   
   381. Michael Isikoff, "FBI Clashed Over Waco, Report Says," Washington
   Post, October 9, 1993, A10.
   
   382. Stephen Labaton, "Harsh Criticism of F.B.I. in Review of Cult
   Assault," New York Times, November 16, 1993.
   
   383. Associated Press story, "FBI tape of Waco talks probed,"
   Washington Times, June 17, 1993.
   
   384. Michael Isikoff, October 9, 1993.
   
   385. Associated Press wire story, 12/08 18:31 EST.
   
   386. Jerry Seper, "Tragedy Blamed on Cult," October 9, 1993.
   
   387. "No sanctions expected in Waco raid," Washington Times, October
   14, 1993.
   
   388. John McCaslin's August 4, 1993 Washington Times column quotes
   Stacy Koon, one of the two Los Angeles policemen convicted in federal
   court of felony violations of Rodney King's civil rights: "The
   government used the same arguments in Waco--the suspect(s) set the
   tone and the officers responded to it. . .The difference is that we
   had 82 seconds; the federal government had 50-plus days in Waco. .
   .They had time to think and analyze and come up with game plans and
   they had the ability to wait out--we didn't have that. They used the
   same argument, and, in that case, people died, multiple people died."
   Speaking of Janet Reno, he said, "She, like I, took responsibility. .
   .Then there was a negative outcome--50 people died. The state of Texas
   should try her for multiple cases of murder. If the state of Texas
   then does not find her guilty, the federal government should come in
   and try her for civil rights violations." Similarly, Paul Craig
   Roberts wrote in his April 22, 1993, syndicated column, "If Rodney
   King's civil rights were violated, what happened in Waco?. . .If a
   billy club is excessive force, what is a tank?"
   
   389. "Jury Told of Gunfire and Horror in Texas Siege," New York Times,
   January 13, 1994.
   
   390. Hugh Aynesworth, January 7, 1994, A7.
   
   391. Hugh Aynesworth, "Prosecution to begin for Davidian cultists,"
   Washington Times, January 7, 1994, A7.
   
   392. Sue Anne Pressley, "An Opportunity for the Branch Davidians,"
   Washington Post, January 9, 1994, A4.
   
   393. "Prosecutors Expand Case Against Texas Cult," New York Times,
   August 22, 1993.
   
   394. New York Times, January 15, 1994.
   
   395. "Branch Davidian judge wants anonymous jury," Washington Times,
   December 14, 1993.
   
   396. Associated Press wire story, December 29, 1993, 21:22 EST.
   
   397. Associate Press wire story, January 11, 1994, 18:00 EST.
   
   398. Lone Star FIJA Press Releases, January 3, 1994 and January 11,
   1994. To contact Lone Star FIJA on this matter call Larry Dodge
   (214)357-0902 or Ruth Claus or San Antonio FIJA at (210)349-1897.
   
   399. Mark Smith, "ATF agent admits he may have shot colleague,"
   Houston Chronicle, January 26, 1994, 19A.
   
   400. December, 1993, report from Larry Dodge of Lone Star FIJA.
   
   401. Associated Press wire story January 11, 1994, 14:08 EST.
   
   402. "Lawyer doesn't want to hear the term `cult' at trial," Houston
   Chronicle, December 30, 1993.
   
   403. Sam Howe Verhovek, "Texas Sect Trial Spurs Scrutiny of
   Government," New York Times, January 10, 1994, A10.
   
   404. "An Anonymous Jury is Seated in Trial of Branch Davidians,"
   Washington Post, January 12, 1994.
   
   405. Richard Perez-Pena, "U.S. Braces for a New Test by Branch
   Davidians, in Court," New York Times, April 30, 1993.
   
   406. Jennifer Lenhart, "Report on flawed raid may aid Davidians'
   defense, lawyer says," Houston Chronicle, October 1, 1993.
   
   407. Sam Hone Verhovek, "Criticism of Raid Heartens Cult Members," New
   York Times, October 1, 1993.
   
   408. Hugh Aynesworth, January 7, 1994, A7.
   
   409. New York Times, September 12, 1993.
   
   410. Associated Press wire story, October 2, 1993, 12:18 EDT.
   
   411. BATF information submitted to June 9, 1993 House Appropriations
   subcommittee hearing, p. 188.
   
   412. Richard Perez-Pena, "U.S. Braces for a New Test by Branch
   Davidians, in Court," New York Times, April 30, 1993.
   
   413. Michael Hedges, "FBI fined for delays in trial of Weaver,"
   October 29, 1993.
   
   414. James L. Pate, "Waco's Defective Warrants," Soldier of Fortune,
   August, 1993, page 74.
   
   415. Larry Pratt report, page 6.
   
   416. Houston Press, July 22, 1993.
   
   417. Richard Perez-Pena, April 30, 1993.
   
   418. Maury Povich television show, November 8, 1993.
   
   419. Howard Schneider, "Waco Cult Lawyers Prepare Themselves for Long
   Legal Siege," Washington Post, March 26, 1993.
   
   420. Sam Hone Verhovek, "Texas Sect Trial Spurs Scrutiny of
   Government," New York Times, January 10, 1994, A10.
   
   421. Andrew Blum, "Waco Tragedy Spawns Litigation," National Law
   Journal, May 17, 1993.
   
   422. Associated Press wire story, May 11, 1993, 10:25 EDT.
   
   423. "Philadelphia faces trial in MOVE fire suit," Washington Times,
   January 5, 1994, A9.
   
   424. Leonard Zeskind, "And Now, The Hate Show," New York Times,
   November 16, 1993.
   
   425. Associated Press story, "Ukraine cult waits in vain for end of
   world," Washington Times, November 15, 1993 and "Ukraine Seizes Chiefs
   of End-of-World Cult," New York Times, November 12, 1993.
   
   426. "A botched mission in Waco, Texas," U.S. News and World Report,
   March 15, 1993, page 26.
   
   427. Gustav Nieguhr, "Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: To Cults, Badges Can
   Signal the End of Time," Washington Post, April, 21, 1993.
   
   428. Larry Pratt report, pgs. 25-26.
   
   429. A copy of the letter can be obtained by contacting the American
   Civil Liberties Union in Washington, D.C. (202 544-1881)
   
   430. Walter Williams, "When Love of Liberty Lapses," Washington Times,
   October 22, 1993.
   
   431. Committee of 50 States, 4808 Quailbrook Circle, Salt Lake City,
   UT 84118. Or contact Tom Wood, an attorney who helped draft it, at
   801-561-2200.
   
   432. Carlos Alberto Montaner, "Tribal conflicts and the U.N. role",
   Washington Times, August 25, 1992.
   
   433. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, pgs.
   221-226.
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   World-Wide-Web html format by
    
    Scott Ostrander: scotto@cica.indiana.edu
