                           Chapter 12:
                         Includes What?
                                
                                
     Now, we  juxtapose the sublime next to the ridiculous.  In a
previous chapter, the issues of statutory construction that arose
from the  terms  "includes"  and  "including"  were  so  complex,
another chapter  is required  to revisit  these terms  in greater
detail.   Much of  the debate revolves around an apparent need to
adopt either  an expansive  or a  restrictive meaning  for  these
terms, and  to stay  with this  choice.   The restrictive meaning
settles a  host of  problems.   It confines  the meaning  of  all
defined terms  to the  list  of  items  which  follow  the  words
"include", "includes"  and "including".    An  official  Treasury
Decision, T.D. 3980, and numerous court decisions have reportedly
sided with this restrictive school of ambiguous terminology.  The
Informer provides  a good  illustration of this school of thought
by defining "includes" and "include" very simply as follows:

     
     ... [T]o use "includes" as defined in IRC is restrictive.

                                    [Which One Are You?, page 20]


     ... [I]n tax law it is defined as a word of restriction ....

                                   [Which One Are You?, page 131]
                                                                 
                                                                 
     In every  definition that  uses the word "include", only the
     words that follow are defining the Term.

                                    [Which One Are You?, page 13]
                                                                 
                                                                 
     Author Ralph Whittington cites Treasury Decision (T.D.) 3980
as  his   justification  for   joining  the  restrictive  school.
According to  his reading  of this  T.D., the  Secretary  of  the
Treasury has  adopted  a  restrictive  meaning  by  stating  that
"includes" means  to "comprise  as a  member", to  "confine",  to
"comprise as the whole a part".  This was the definition as found
in the  New  Standard  Dictionary  at  the  time  this  T.D.  was
published:

     "(1) To comprise,  comprehend, or  embrace  as  a  component
     part, item,  or member;   as,  this volume  includes all his
     works, the bill includes his last purchase."

     "(2) To enclose  within;   contain;  confine;  as, an oyster
     shell sometimes includes a pearl."

     It is defined by Webster as follows:
                                                  [continued ...]



                        Page 12 - 1 of 16

                                                The Federal Zone:


     "To comprehend  or comprise,  as a genus of the species, the
     whole a  part, an argument or reason the inference;  to take
     or reckon  in;   to contain;    embrace;    as  this  volume
     includes the essays to and including the tenth."

     The Century  Dictionary  defines  "including,"  thus:    "to
     comprise as a part."

                 [Treasury Decision 3980, January-December, 1927]
                               [Vol. 29, page 64, emphasis added]

     Authors like  Whittington may  have seized  upon  a  partial
reading of  this T.D., in order to solve what we now know to be a
source of  great ambiguity in Title 26 and in other United States
Codes.  For example, contrary to the dictionary definitions cited
above, page 65 of T.D. 3980 goes on to say the following:

     Perhaps the  most lucid  statement the  books afford  on the
     subject is  in Blanck  et al.  vs Pioneer  Mining Co. et al.
     (Wash.;  159 Pac. 1077, 1079), namely, "the word 'including'
     is a  term of  enlargement and not a term of limitation, and
     necessarily  implies   that  something  is  intended  to  be
     embraced in  the permitted  deductions  beyond  the  general
     language  which  precedes.    But  granting  that  the  word
     'including' is  a term  of enlargement,  it is clear that it
     only  performs  that  office  by  introducing  the  specific
     elements constituting  the enlargement.   It  thus, and thus
     only, enlarges the otherwise more limited, preceding general
     language.   *   *   *   The word  'including' introduces  an
     enlarging definition of the preceding general words, 'actual
     cost of  the labor,' thus of necessity excluding the idea of
     a further  enlargement than  that furnished by the enlarging
     clause to  introduced.   When read in its immediate context,
     as on all authority it must be read, the word 'including' is
     obviously used  in the  sense of its synonymous 'comprising;
     comprehending; embracing.'"
                                                                 
                 [Treasury Decision 3980, January-December, 1927]
                               [Vol. 29, page 65, emphasis added]
                                                                 
Now, didn't  that settle  the matter  once and for all? Yes?  No?
Treasury Decision  3980 is really not all that decisive, since it
obviously joins  the restrictive  school on  one page,  and  then
jumps ship to the expansive school on the very next page.  If you
are getting  confused already,  that's good.   At  least when  it
comes to "include", be proud of the fact you are not alone:

     This word  has received  considerable discussion in opinions
     of the courts.  It has been productive of much controversy.

                 [Treasury Decision 3980, January-December, 1927]
                               [Vol. 29, page 64, emphasis added]

Amen to that!



                        Page 12 - 2 of 16

                                                   Includes What?


     One of  my goals  in this  chapter is to demonstrate how the
continuing controversy is proof that terms with a long history of
semantic confusion  should  never  be  used  in  a  Congressional
statute.   Such terms are proof that the statute is null and void
for vagueness.   The  confusion we  experience is inherent in the
language, and  no doubt  deliberate, because  the controversy has
not exactly been a well kept national security secret.

     Let us  see if  the Restrictive  School leads  to any absurd
results.   Reductio ad absurdum to the rescue again!  Notice what
results obtain  for the  definition of  "State" as  found in  the
7701, the "Definitions" section of the Internal Revenue Code:


     Step 1:  Define "State" as follows:

     The term  "State" shall be construed to include the District
     of Columbia,  where such  construction is necessary to carry
     out the provisions of this title.
                                             [26 USC 7701(a)(10)]
                                                                 

     Step 2:  Define "United States" as follows:

     The term  "United States"  when used in a geographical sense
     includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

                                              [26 USC 7701(a)(9)]
                                                                 

     Step 3:  Substitute text from one into the other:

     The term  "United States"  when used in a geographical sense
     includes only  the Districts of Columbia and the District of
     Columbia.  (Or is it the District of Columbias?)


     This is  an absurd result, no?  yes?  none of the above?  Is
the definition of "United States" clarified by qualifying it with
the phrase "when used in a geographical sense"?  yes or no?  This
qualifier only  makes our situation worse, because the IRC rarely
if ever  distinguishes Code sections which do use "United States"
in a  geographical sense,  from Code sections which do not use it
in a  geographical sense.   Nor does the Code tell us which sense
to use  as the  default, that  is, the intended meaning we should
use when  the Code  does  not  say  "in  a  geographical  sense".
Identical problems arise if we must be specific as to "where such
construction is  necessary to  carry out  the provisions  of this
title", as stated in 7701(a)(10).  Where is it not so necessary?

     The Informer's  work is a good example of the confusion that
reigns in  this empire  of verbiage.   Having  emphatically sided
with the  Restrictive School,  he then goes on to define the term
"States" to mean Guam, Virgin Islands and "Etc.", as follows:



                        Page 12 - 3 of 16

                                                The Federal Zone:


     The term  "States" in  26 USC 7701(a)(9) is referring to the
     federal states of Guam, Virgin Islands, Etc., and NOT the 50
     States of the Union.
                                    [Which One Are You?, page 98]

     You can't  have it  both ways,  can you?   no?  yes?  maybe?
Let us  marshall some help directly from the IRC itself.  Against
the fierce winds of hot air emanating from the Restrictive School
of Language Arts, there is a section of the IRC which does appear
to evidence a contrary intent to utilize the expansive sense:

     Includes  and   Including.     The  terms   "includes"   and
     "including" when  used in  a definition  contained  in  this
     title shall  not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise
     within the meaning of the term defined.
                                                                 
                                 [26 USC 7701(c), emphasis added]
                                                                 
Perhaps we  should give  this school a completely different name.
How about  the Federal Area of Restrictive Terminology (F-A-R-T)?
All in favor, say AYE!  (Confusion is a gaseous state.)

     Section 7701(c)  utilizes the  key  phrase  "other  things",
which now  requires us  to examine  the legal  meaning of things.
(So, what  else is  new?)  Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition,
defines "things" as follows:

     Things.   The objects  of dominion  or property  as  contra-
     distinguished from "persons." Gayer v. Whelan, 138 P.2d 763,
     768.   ... Such permanent objects, not being persons, as are
     sensible, or perceptible through the senses.
                                                 [emphasis added]
                                                                 
This definition,  in turn,  requires  us  to  examine  the  legal
meaning of "persons" in Black's, as follows:

     Person.   In general  usage, a  human  being  (i.e.  natural
     person),  though   by  statute   term  may   include   labor
     organizations,  partnerships,   associations,  corporations,
     legal representatives,  trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or
     receivers.

Here, Black's  Law Dictionary states that "person" by statute may
include artificial persons, in addition to natural persons.  How,
then, does the IRC define "person"?

     Person. --  The term "person" shall be construed to mean and
     include  an   individual,  a   trust,  estate,  partnership,
     association, company or corporation.
                                              [26 USC 7701(a)(1)]
                                                                 
Unfortunately, the IRC does not define the term "individual", so,
without resorting  to the  regulations in the CFR,  we must again
utilize a law dictionary like Black's Sixth Edition:



                        Page 12 - 4 of 16

                                                   Includes What?


     Individual.  As a noun, this term denotes a single person as
     distinguished  from   a  group  or  class,  and  also,  very
     commonly, a  private or natural person as distinguished from
     a partnership, corporation, or association ....
                                                                 
                                                 [emphasis added]
                                                                 
Therefore, "things" and "persons" must be distinguished from each
other, but  the term  "person" is  not limited  to  human  beings
because it  shall be construed to mean and include an individual,
trust, estate,  partnership, association, company or corporation.
So, are  we justified  in making  the inference that individuals,
trusts,  estates,   partnerships,  associations,   companies  and
corporations are  excluded from  "things" as that term is used in
Section 7701(c)?  This author says YES.  Notice also the strained
grammar that  is found  in the phrase "shall be construed to mean
and include".   Why  not use  the simpler  grammar found  in  the
phrase "means  and includes"?   The  answer:   because  the  term
"includes" is defined by IRC 7701(c) to be expansive, that's why!
But the  term "include"  is not mentioned in 7701(c);  therefore,
it must  be restrictive  and is actually used as such in the IRC.
Accordingly,   no   individual,   trust,   estate,   partnership,
association, company  or corporation  could otherwise fall within
the statutory  meaning of  a term  explicitly defined  by the IRC
because, being "persons", none of these is a "thing"!  Logically,
then, "includes"  and "including"  are also restrictive when they
are used in IRC definitions of "persons".  Utterly amazing, yes?
                                                                 
     Author Otto  Skinner, as  we already  know from  a  previous
chapter, cites  Section 7701(c)  of the  IRC as proof that we all
belong in the Expansive School of Language Science.  Followers of
this school  argue that  "includes only"  should be  used, and is
actually used in the IRC, when a restrictive meaning is intended.
In other  words, "includes" and "including" are always expansive.
An intent  contrary to  the expansive sense is evidenced by using
"includes only" whenever necessary.  Fine.  All in favor say AYE.
All opposed, jump ship. The debate is finished yes?  Not so fast.
Cheerleaders, put  down your  pom-poms.   The operative  concepts
introduced by  7701(c) are  those "things  otherwise  within  the
meaning of  the term  defined".    Now,  the  64  million  dollar
question is this:


     How does something join the class of things that are "within
     the meaning  of the  term defined", if that something is not
     enumerated in the definition?


We can  obtain some  help in answering this question by referring
to an  older clarification of "includes" and "including" that was
published in  the Code  of Federal  Regulations in the year 1961.
This clarification introduces the notion of "same general class".
(So, you  might be  in the  right school,  but you  may be in the
wrong class.  Detention after school!)  This clarification reads:



                        Page 12 - 5 of 16

                                                The Federal Zone:


     170.59    Includes and including.

     "Includes" and  "including" shall  not be  deemed to exclude
     things other  than those  enumerated which  are in  the same
     general class.

                   [26 CFR 170.59, revised as of January 1, 1961]
                                                                 
     In an earlier chapter, a double negative was detected in the
"clarification" found  at IRC 7701(c), namely, the terms "not ...
exclude" are  equivalent to  saying "include"  ("not-ex" = "in").
Two negatives  make a  positive.   Apply  this  same  finding  to
regulation 170.59 above, and you get the following:


     "Includes" and "including" shall be deemed to include things
     other than  those enumerated  which are  in the same general
     class.


     What are those things which are "in the same general class",
if they  have not been enumerated in the definition?  This is one
of the many possible variations of the 64 million dollar question
asked above.   Are we any closer to an answer?  yes?  no?  maybe?
(Is this astronomy class, or basket weaving?)  If a person, place
or thing is not enumerated in the statutory definition of a term,
is it  not a  violation of the rules of statutory construction to
join such  a person,  place or  thing to that definition?  One of
these rules is a canon called the "ejusdem generis" rule, defined
in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, as follows:


     Under "ejusdem  generis" canon  of  statutory  construction,
     where general  words follow  the enumeration  of  particular
     classes of  things, the  general words  will be construed as
     applying only  to things  of the same general class as those
     enumerated.
                                                 [emphasis added]

Here the  term "same  general class"  is used once again.  One of
the major  points of  this book  is to  distinguish the 50 States
from the  federal zone,  by using  the principle  of  territorial
heterogeneity.   The 50  States are  in one class, because of the
constitutional  restraints  under  which  Congress  must  operate
inside those 50 States.  The areas within the federal zone are in
a different  class, because  these same constitutional restraints
simply do  not limit  Congress inside  that zone.  This may sound
totally correct,  in theory,  but the  IRC is totally mum on this
issue of "general class" (because it has none).  Yes, this is all
the more reason why the IRC is null and void for vagueness.

     This conclusion is supported by two other rules of statutory
construction.  The first of these is noscitur a sociis, in Latin.
Black's defines this rule as follows:



                        Page 12 - 6 of 16

                                                   Includes What?


     Noscitur a  sociis.   It is  known from its associates.  The
     meaning of  a word  is or may be known from the accompanying
     words.   Under the  doctrine of  "noscitur  a  sociis",  the
     meaning of  questionable or  doubtful words  or phrases in a
     statute may  be ascertained  by reference  to the meaning of
     other words or phrases associated with it.

                                                 [emphasis added]

In this  context, the 50 States are associated with each other by
sharing their  membership in  the Union  under the  Constitution.
The land  areas within  the federal zone are associated with each
other by  sharing their  inclusion within  the  zone  over  which
Congress has  exclusive  legislative  jurisdiction.    The  areas
inside and  outside the  zone are therefore dissociated from each
other because of this key difference, i.e., the Union, in or out.

     The second  rule is inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, in
Latin.  Black's defines this rule as follows:

     Inclusio unius  est exclusio alterius.  The inclusion of one
     is the exclusion of another.  The certain designation of one
     person is  an absolute  exclusion of  all others.  ...  This
     doctrine decrees  that where  law  expressly  describes  [a]
     particular situation to which it shall apply, an irrefutable
     inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was
     intended to be omitted or excluded.
                                                 [emphasis added]

Are we,  or are  we not,  therefore,  justified  in  drawing  the
following irrefutable inferences?

     Places omitted  from the  statutory definitions  of "State",
     "States" and  "United States"  were intended  to be  omitted
     (like California, Maine, Florida and Oregon).

     "Include" is  omitted from  the definition of "includes" and
     "including" because  the latter  terms were  intended to  be
     expansive, while the former was intended to be restrictive.


Let's dive  back into  the Code  in order to find any help we can
get on  this issue.   In  Subtitle F,  the Code contains a formal
definition of "other terms" as follows:


     Other terms.  -- Any term used in this subtitle with respect
     to the application of, or in connection with, the provisions
     of any  other subtitle  of this  title shall  have the  same
     meaning as in such provisions.
                                             [26 USC 7701(a)(28)]
                                                                 
Let's use  the rules  of grammar  to decompose this definition of
"other terms" into two separate definitions, as follows:



                        Page 12 - 7 of 16

                                                The Federal Zone:


     Any term  used in Subtitle F with respect to the application
     of the  provisions of any other subtitle shall have the same
     meaning as in such provisions.

     -or-

     Any  term   used  in  Subtitle  F  in  connection  with  the
     provisions of any other subtitle shall have the same meaning
     as in such provisions.


Now, therefore,  does IRC  7701(a)(28)  clarify  anything?    For
example, if  there is  a different  definition of  "State" in the
provisions of  some other  subtitle, do  we now  know  enough  to
decide whether or not:

     
     (1)  that  different  definition  should  be  expanded  with
          things that  are  within  the  meaning  as  defined  at
          7701(a)(10)?  Yes or No?

     (2)  the definition  at 7701(a)(10)  should be expanded with
          things that  are within  the meaning  of that different
          definition?  Yes or No?

     (3)  all of the above are correct?

     (4)  none of the above is correct?


If you  are having  difficulty answering  these questions,  don't
blame yourself.   With all this evidence staring you in the face,
it is  not difficult  to argue  that the  confusion which you are
experiencing is inherent in the statute and therefore deliberate.

     To confuse  our separate cheering squads even more, the word
"shall" means  "may".   Squad leaders,  let's see those pom-poms.
Since this  may be  most difficult  for many  of you  to  swallow
without convincing  proof, the following court decisions leave no
doubt about  the legal  meaning of  "shall".   In the decision of
Cairo &  Fulton R.R.  Co. vs Hecht, 95 U.S. 170, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated:

     As against  the government  the word  "shall" when  used  in
     statutes, is  to be  construed as  "may," unless  a contrary
     intention is manifest.
                                                 [emphasis added]

Does the  IRC manifest  a contrary  intent?   In the  decision of
George Williams College vs Village of Williams Bay, 7 N.W.2d 891,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated:

     "Shall" in a statute may be construed to mean "may" in order
     to avoid constitutional doubt.



                        Page 12 - 8 of 16

                                                   Includes What?


In the  decision of  Gow vs  Consolidated Coppermines  Corp., 165
Atlantic 136, that court stated:


     If necessary  to avoid  unconstitutionality  of  a  statute,
     "shall" will be deemed equivalent to "may" ....


     Maybe we  can shed  some light  on the  overall situation by
treating the  terms "State"  and "States" as completely different
words.   After all,  the definition  of "United  States" uses the
plural form  twice, and  there is  no definition  of "States"  as
such.  Note carefully the following:


     The term  "State" shall be construed to include the District
     of Columbia,  where such  construction is necessary to carry
     out the provisions of this title.
                                             [26 USC 7701(a)(10)]


     The term  "United States"  when used in a geographical sense
     includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

                                              [26 USC 7701(a)(9)]
                                                                 
     So,  can   we  assume   that  the  singular  form  of  words
necessarily has  a meaning that is different from the plural form
of words?   This  might help  us to  distinguish  the  two  terms
"include" and  "includes", since  one is the singular form of the
verb, while  the other  can be  the plural form of the verb.  For
example, the  sentence "It  includes ..."  has a singular subject
and a  singular predicate.  The sentence "They include ..." has a
plural subject  and a  plural  predicate,  but  the  sentence  "I
include ..."  has a  singular subject  and predicate.    What  if
"include" is  used as  an infinitive,  rather than  a  predicate?
Recall that  the "clarification" at IRC 7701(c) contains explicit
references to  "includes" and  "including", but  not to  the word
"include".   Does this  therefore provide  us with  a  definitive
reason for deciding that the term "include" is restrictive, while
the terms "includes" and "including" are expansive?  Some people,
including this author, are completely satisfied that it does (but
not all people are so satisfied).  What if these latter terms are
used in  the restrictive  sense of  "includes only" or "including
only"?   Are you  getting even more confused now?  Welcome to the
state of  confusion (surely  a gaseous state).  Recall once again
the definition of "State" at 7701(a)(10):


     The term  "State" shall be construed to include the District
     of Columbia,  where such  construction is necessary to carry
     out the provisions of this title.
                                             [26 USC 7701(a)(10)]




                        Page 12 - 9 of 16

                                                The Federal Zone:


Now recall the definition of "United States" at 7701(a)(9):

     The term  "United States"  when used in a geographical sense
     includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

                                              [26 USC 7701(a)(9)]
                                                                 
Title 1  and the  Code of Federal Regulations come to the rescue.
Plural forms and singular forms are interchangeable:

     170.60    Inclusive language.

     Words in the plural form shall include the singular and vice
     versa, and  words in  the masculine gender shall include the
     feminine  as   well  as   trusts,   estates,   partnerships,
     associations, companies, and corporations.

                   [26 CFR 170.60, revised as of January 1, 1961]
                                                                 
     Now, doesn't  that really clarify everything?  If "includes"
is singular  and "include"  is plural,  using the  above rule for
"inclusive language",  the term  "include"  includes  "includes".
Wait, didn't  we already  make this  remarkable  discovery  in  a
previous chapter?   Answer:   No,  in that chapter, we discovered
that "includes" includes "include".  But, now we have conflicting
results.   Didn't we  just prove  that one is restrictive and the
other is  expansive?   What gives?   Remember, also, that "shall"
means "may".   Therefore,  our rule for "inclusive language" from
the CFR  can now  be rewritten  to say  that "words in the plural
form MAY include the singular" (and may NOT, depending on whether
it is  a week from Tuesday).  If this is Tuesday, then we must be
in Belgium.  At least one major mystery is now solved.

     Does the  Code of  Federal Regulations  clarify any  of  the
definitions found  in section  7701 of the Internal Revenue Code?
The following  table lists the headings of corresponding sections
from the CFR, beginning at 26 CFR 301.7701-1:

                           Definitions
                                
     301.7701-1     Classification of organizations for tax
                    purposes
     301.7701-2     Associations
     301.7701-3     Partnerships
     301.7701-4     Trusts
     301.7701-5     Domestic, foreign, resident, and nonresident
                    persons
     301.7701-6     Fiduciary
     301.7701-7     Fiduciary distinguished from agent
     301.7701-8     Military or naval forces and Armed Forces of
                    the United States
     301.7701-9     Secretary or his delegate
     301.7701-10    District director
     301.7701-11    Social security number



                       Page 12 - 10 of 16

                                                   Includes What?


                    Definitions (continued)

     301.7701-12    Employer identification number
     301.7701-13    Pre-1970 domestic building and loan
                    association
     301.7701-13A   Post-1970 domestic building and loan
                    association
     301.7701-14    Cooperative bank
     301.7701-15    Income tax return preparer
     301.7701-16    Other terms
     301.7701-17T   Collective-bargaining plans and agreements
                    (temporary)

                                [26 CFR 301.7701-1 thru 7701-17T]

This list contains such essential topics as trusts, associations,
cooperative banks,  and pre-  and post-1970 domestic building and
loan associations.   In  fact, there are numerous pages dedicated
to these  building and  loan associations.   However,  the reader
reaches the  end of  the list  without finding  any reference  to
"State" or "United States".  Instead, the following regulation is
found near the end of the list:

     301.7701-16  Other terms.

     For a definition of the term "withholding agent" see section
     1.1441-7(a).   Any other  terms that  are defined in section
     7701 and  that are  not defined  in sections  301.7701-1  to
     301.7701-15, inclusive,  shall, when  used in  this chapter,
     have the meanings assigned to them in section 7701.

                                             [26 CFR 301.7701-16]
                                                                 
Like it  or not,  we are  right back  where we  started,  in  IRC
section 7701,  the "definitions"  section  of  that  Code,  where
"other terms"  are defined differently.  You may pass "GO" again,
but do  not collect  200 dollars.  You must pay the bank instead!
(Try changing  that rule  the next  time you  play Monopoly.  The
Monopoly bank  will, of  course,  end  up  owning  everything  in
sight.)   You are  also  free  to  search  some  6,000  pages  of
additional  regulations   to   determine   if   the   fluctuating
definitions  of   the  terms  "State"  and  "United  States"  are
clarified anywhere  else in  the  Code  of  Federal  Regulations.
Happy hunting!

     The only way out of this swamp is to rely on something other
than the  murky gyrations  of conflicting,  mutually  destructive
semantic mishmash.    That  something  is  The  Fundamental  Law:
Congress can  only tax  the  Citizens  of  foreign  States  under
special and  limited circumstances.   Congress  can only  levy  a
direct tax  on Citizens  of the  50 States  if that  tax is  duly
apportioned.   Congress can only levy an indirect tax on Citizens
of the 50 States if that tax is uniform.  These are the chains of
the Constitution.  Read Thomas Jefferson.



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     The historical  record documents  undeniable proof  that the
confusion, ambiguity and jurisdictional deceptions now built into
Title 26  were deliberate.   This  historical record provides the
"smoking gun"  that proves  the real  intent was  deception.  The
first Internal  Revenue Code was Title 35 of the Revised Statutes
of June  22, 1874.   On  December 5, 1898, Mr. Justice Cox of the
Supreme Court  of the  District of  Columbia delivered an address
before the  Columbia Historical  Society.   In this  address,  he
discussed the history of the District of Columbia as follows:

     In June 1866, an act was passed authorizing the President to
     appoint three commissioners to revise and bring together all
     the statutes  ....   [T]he act  does not  seem, in terms, to
     allude to  the District  of Columbia,  or even to embrace it
     ....   Without having  any express  authority to do so, they
     made a  separate revision  and collection  of  the  acts  of
     Congress relating to the District, besides the collection of
     general statutes  relating to the whole United States.  Each
     collection was  reported to  Congress, to  be  approved  and
     enacted into  law ....   [T]he  whole is enacted into law as
     the body  of the statute law of the United States, under the
     title of Revised Statutes as of 22 June 1874.

     [T]he general  collection might  perhaps be considered, in a
     limited sense  as a  code  for  the  United  States,  as  it
     embraced all  the laws  affecting the  whole  United  States
     within  the   constitutional  legislative   jurisdiction  of
     Congress, but there could be no complete code for the entire
     United States, because the subjects which would be proper to
     be regulated  by a  code in  the States are entirely outside
     the legislative authority of Congress.

                  [District of Columbia Code, Historical Section]
                                                 [emphasis added]

     More than half a century later, the deliberate confusion and
ambiguity were  problems  that  not  only  persisted;  they  were
getting worse by the minute. In the year 1944, during Roosevelt's
administration, Senator  Barkley made  a speech from the floor of
the House of Representatives in which he complained:

     Congress is  to blame  for these complexities to the extent,
     and only to the extent, to which it has accepted the advice,
     the  recommendations,  and  the  language  of  the  Treasury
     Department, through its so-called experts who have sat in on
     the passage  of every  tax measure  since  I  can  remember.
     Every member  of the  House Ways  and  Means  Committee  and
     member of the Senate Finance Committee knows that every time
     we have  undertaken to  write a  new tax bill in the last 10
     years we  have started  out with  the  universal  desire  to
     simplify the  tax laws and the forms through which taxes are
     collected.   We have attempted to adopt policies which would
     simplify them.   When  we have agreed upon a policy, we have
     submitted that  policy to  the Treasury  Department to write



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     the appropriate  language to  carry out  that policy;    and
     frequently the Treasury Department, through its experts, has
     brought back  language so complicated and circumambient that
     neither Solomon  nor all  the wise  men of  the  East  could
     understand it or interpret it.

               [Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session]
               [Vol. 90, Part 2, February 23, 1944, pages 1964-5]
                                                 [emphasis added]

     You have,  no doubt,  heard that  ignorance of the law is no
excuse for  violating the  law.   This  principle  is  explicitly
stated in  the case  law which defines the legal force and effect
of administrative  regulations.   But, ambiguity and deception in
the law  are an  excuse, and  the ambiguity in the IRC is a major
cause of  our ignorance.  The average American cannot be expected
to have  the skill  required to navigate the journey we just took
through the  verbal swamp  that is the Internal Revenue Code, nor
does the  average American  have the time required to make such a
journey.   Chicanery does  not make  good  law.    The  rules  of
statutory construction fully support this unavoidable conclusion:

     ... [I]f  it is  intended that  regulations  will  be  of  a
     specific and  definitive nature  then it  will be clear that
     the only  safe method  of interpretation  will be  one  that
     "shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to
     suppress subtle  inventions and evasions for the continuance
     of the mischief ...."

       [Statutes and Statutory Construction, by J. G. Sutherland]
           [3rd Edition, Volume 2, Section 4007, page 280 (1943)]

The Supreme  Court has  also agreed,  in no  uncertain terms,  as
follows:

     ... [K]eeping in mind the well settled rule that the citizen
     is exempt  from taxation unless the same is imposed by clear
     and unequivocal language, and that where the construction of
     a tax  law is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in favor
     of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid.

                         [Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. vs McLain]
                            [192 U.S. 397 (1903), emphasis added]

     In the  interpretation of  statutes levying  taxes it is the
     established  rule   not  to   extend  their  provisions,  by
     implication, beyond  the clear  import of the language used,
     or to  enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not
     specifically pointed  out.    In  case  of  doubt  they  are
     construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor
     of the citizen.
                                                                 
                     [United States vs Wigglesworth, 2 Story 369]
                                                 [emphasis added]



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     On what  basis, then, should the Internal Revenue Service be
allowed to  extend the  provisions of  the IRC  beyond the  clear
import of  the language used?  On what basis can the IRS act when
that language  has no  clear import?   On  what basis  is the IRS
justified in  enlarging their operations so as to embrace matters
not specifically  pointed out?   The  answer  is  tyranny.    The
"golden" retriever has broken his leash and is now tearing up the
neighborhood to fetch the gold.  What a service!

     Consider for  a moment the sheer size of the class of people
now affected  by the  fraudulent 16th  Amendment.   First of all,
take into  account all  those Americans who have passed away, but
who paid  taxes into  the Treasury after the year 1913.  How many
of those  correctly understood  all the  rules, when  people like
Frank R.  Brushaber were  confused as early as 1914?  Add to that
number all those Americans who are still alive today and who have
paid taxes  to the  IRS because they thought there was a law, and
they thought  that law  was the  16th Amendment.  After all, they
were told as much by numerous federal officials and possibly also
their parents, friends, relatives, school teachers, scout masters
and colleagues.  Don't high school civics classes now spend a lot
of time  teaching students  how to  complete IRS  1040 forms  and
schedules, instead of teaching the Constitution?

     Donald C.  Alexander, when  he was  Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, published  an official statement in the Federal Register
that the  16th Amendment  was the  federal  government's  general
authority to tax the incomes of individuals and corporations (see
Chapter 1  and Appendix  J).   Sorry, Donald, you were wrong.  At
this point  in time, it is impossible for us to determine whether
you were  lying, or  whether you  too were a victim of the fraud.
Just how  many people  are in  the same  general class  of  those
affected by  the fraudulent  16th Amendment?   Is it 200 million?
Is it  300  million?    Whatever  it  is,  it  just  boggles  the
imagination.   It certainly  does involve  a very large number of
federal employees who went to work for Uncle Sam in good faith.

     It is  clear, there  is a  huge difference  between the area
covered by  the federal  zone, and  the area  covered by  the  50
States.   Money is a powerful motivation for all of us.  Congress
had literally  trillions of  dollars to  gain by  convincing most
Americans they  were inside  its revenue base when, in fact, most
Americans were  outside its revenue base, and remain outside even
today.  This is deception on a grand scale, and the proof of this
deception is  found in  the statute  itself.  It is no wonder why
public relations  "officials" of  the IRS  cringe  in  fear  when
dedicated Patriots  like Godfrey  Lehman admit,  out loud  and in
person, that  he has  read the law.  It is quite stunning how the
carefully crafted  definitions of  "United States"  do appear  to
unlock a  statute that  is horribly  complex and deliberately so.
As fate  would have  it, these carefully crafted definitions also
expose perhaps  the greatest  fiscal fraud  that  has  ever  been
perpetrated upon  any people  at any  time in  the history of the
world.  It is now time for a shift in the wind.



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