












                           Appendix Y
                                
                        Memoranda of Law








































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Author's Note:

These Memoranda  of Law  have been  adapted and  updated from the
files FMEMOLAW  and 9THAPPEA  on  Richard  McDonald's  electronic
bulletin board  system (BBS).   See  references  to  MEMOLAW  and
FMEMOLAW in Chapter 11.

Richard McDonald has given his generous permission to publish the
following versions  of these documents as another Appendix in the
third and subsequent editions of The Federal Zone.

Editing, minor additions and grammatical clarifications were done
by Mitch Modeleski, also with Richard McDonald's approval.











































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                                                       Appendix Y






           IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                
           FOR THE DISTRICT OF ______________________


                         )    NOTICE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff                )
                         )                AND
                         )
vs                       )         DEMAND FOR HEARING
                         )
                         )           TO ORDER PROOF
Defendant/Citizen        )
                         )           OF JURISDICTION
                         )


TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIES:


     PLEASE TAKE  NOTICE that a hearing has been requested by the
Accused Common-Law  Citizen [DEFENDANT]  to  take  place  on  the
________ day of ___________________, 1993, at _____________ hours
in Courtroom  _______, of  the above  entitled Court  located  at
________________.


     1.   This  hearing   has  been  called  to  resolve  certain
conclusions of law which are in controversy.  The demand for this
hearing constitutes  a direct  challenge to  the jurisdiction  of
this Court  in the  instant matter  at bar.   The accused Citizen
[DEFENDANT] is aware that he has been compelled to participate in
this action  under threat  of arrest and incarceration, should he
fail to appear when ordered to do so.

     2.   The subject matter jurisdiction of this Court is not in
question here.   Rather, because the matter is criminal in nature
and involves  a compelled  performance  to  what  is  essentially
derived  from  Roman  Civil  (Administrative)  Law,  the  Accused
herewith challenges  the In  Personam jurisdiction of this Court.
The Accused  does so  on the ground that the Plaintiff has failed
to provide  an offer  of proof that the Accused is subject to the
legislative equity  jurisdiction in  which this  Court intends to
sit to  hear and determine only the facts of this matter, and not
the law, arising from a "Bill of Pains and Penalties".

     3.   It is well known that jurisdiction may be challenged at
any time  as an  issue of  law because,  absent jurisdiction, all
acts undertaken  under the color of statute or under the color of
ordinance are null and void ab initio (from their inception).


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     4.   Because the  Accused was  compelled,  under  threat  of
further damage  and injury, to enter this Court to demand relief,
this appearance is SPECIAL, and not general in nature.

     5.   The argument which follows sets forth the nature of the
controversy "At  Law".  This Court is bound by its oath of office
to  sit  on  the  Law  side  of  its  jurisdiction  to  hear  the
controversy in  a  neutral  capacity  and  to  make  a  fair  and
impartial determination.

     6.   This document,  and the  argument contained  herein, is
intended to  be the  basis for  further action  on appeal, should
this Court  fail to  afford a  complete hearing on the law of the
matter at  the noticed  request of  the Accused.   Furthermore, a
failure of this Court to seat on the Law side of its jurisdiction
to determine  this timely question will give the Accused cause to
file for a Writ of Prohibition in a higher Court.


                            ARGUMENT


     1.   The Constitution of the United States of America (1787)
is the  supreme law  of the  land.   The Constitution of State of
California must  be construed  in harmony with the supreme law of
the land;   otherwise,  the State  of California has violated its
solemn contract  with the  Union of  States known  as the  United
States of  America, and  the question  raised herein  becomes one
which is a proper original action before the Supreme Court of the
United States, sitting in an Article 3 capacity.

     2.   An  employee   of  the  Internal  Revenue  Service  has
submitted allegations  in what  amounts to  a "Bill  of Pains and
Penalties" alleging  that I,  [DEFENDANT], have somehow failed to
perform according  to the  terms of  some agreement  for specific
performance on my part.

     3.   By submitting  this Bill  of Pains  and Penalties,  the
individual in  question   has accused  [DEFENDANT] of  failing to
perform specifically  to some  legislative statute which is being
presented as  evidence of  the law.  Statutes are not laws;  they
are administrative  regulations which  are civil  in nature, even
when they  carry sanctions  of a criminal nature, unless there is
an injured party who is brought forward as a corpus delicti.

     4.   Thus, because  of this  unsupported conclusion  of law,
and because  the Internal  Revenue Service  has  administratively
decided that  the Accused is subject to the statutes in question,
the Accused  Citizen holds  that a  contrary  conclusion  of  law
exists to  challenge the  jurisdiction of this Court.  Therefore,
this Court must now sit in a neutral position, on the Law side of
its  jurisdiction,   to  hear   and  resolve   the  question   of
controversial positions of law as they affect its jurisdiction or
lack of jurisdiction In Personam.


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     5.   This argument  is intended  to serve  as both a defense
"At Law"  in this  Court, and  as the  basis of  future  actions,
should it  become necessary to appeal the question presented to a
higher judicial authority.


     6.   If the Accused Citizen is correct, and if this Court is
sitting to hear the violation of a regulatory statute, then it is
possible that  the judges  of this Court, in hearing this matter,
are acting  in an  administrative capacity rather than a judicial
capacity.   This issue  is discussed  in detail  in the  argument
which follows.


     7.   This Court is placed on NOTICE that, if it fails to sit
and hear  this issue "At Law" upon a timely request, then you may
have violated  your oath  of office  to  uphold  and  defend  the
Constitutions of  the United  States of  America (1787)  and  the
California Republic  (1849).  Such an act will serve to place you
and the  other parties  to  this  action  outside  the  realm  of
judicial immunity  and subject  to future  action by this Accused
California  Citizen.     The   Prosecutor  in   this  action   is
specifically placed  on NOTICE  that s/he  carries  no  shirttail
immunity should  s/he continue  to prosecute, in the absence of a
determination "At  Law" of  the question  presented herein before
trial.

                           JURISDICTION


     8.   In 1849, California became one of the several States of
the Union  of States  known as  the  United  States  of  America.
California is  a "Common Law" State, meaning that the Common Law,
as derived  from the  common law of England, is a recognized form
of law in the State of California.


     9.   Article 3  of the  Constitution of the United States of
America gives  "judicial" power to the various courts, among them
the District  Courts.   What is  not generally recognized is that
the District  Courts may seat in different jurisdictions.  Judges
may wear  different hats, so to speak, depending on the nature of
the case brought before them.


     10.  This Court  may sit  "At Law"  to hear crimes and civil
complaints involving  a damage  or injury which is unlawful under
the Common Law of a State;  or it may seat in equity to determine
specific performance  to a contract in equity.  Alternatively, as
a creation  of the  foreign Corporate  State, this Court may seat
administratively in  a fiction  which may  be termed "legislative
equity", under  authority to  regulate activities  not of  common
right, such  as commerce for profit and gain, or other privileged
activities.


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     11.  The Internal  Revenue Code  is  essentially  a  "civil,
regulatory statute" which was enacted in 1939 to tax and regulate
employees of  the Federal  Government and "citizens of the United
States" (i.e.,  of the  District of  Columbia), and  to set forth
rules and  regulations for  the production  of  revenue  for  the
"United States", as defined in the U.S. Constitution.

     12.  It is  an unlawful  abuse of  procedure  to  use  civil
statutes  as   "evidence  of  the  law"  in  a  criminal  matter,
particularly when  a United States Code has not been enacted into
positive law (see, specifically, 26 U.S.C. 7851(a)(6)(A)).

     13.  Both civil  and criminal  matters "At Law" require that
the complaining  party be  a victim  of some recognizable damage.
The "Law" cannot recognize a "crime" unless there is a victim who
properly claims to have been damaged or injured.

     14.  Regulatory statutes,  on the  other hand,  are  enacted
under the  police power  of  State  and  Federal  Governments  to
regulate activities  not of  common right.   All  statute law  is
inferior to,  and bound by, the restrictions of the Constitution.
These "regulatory"  statutes operate  as "law" on the subjects of
those statutes,  and violations may carry sanctions of a criminal
nature, even in the absence of a victim or injury.

     15.  A self-evident truth which distinguishes "crimes" under
the Law,  from "offenses  of a  criminal nature" under regulatory
statutes,  is   the  difference  between  Rights  afforded  to  a
defendant in  a criminal  proceeding, and "rights" available to a
defendant under "due process" in a statutory proceeding.

     16.  In the  case of  true crimes  "At Law",  the Common-Law
Citizen  [DEFENDANT]   enjoys  all   his  fundamental  rights  as
guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions, including both
"substantive" and  "procedural" due  process.   In contrast, when
regulatory offenses  "of a  criminal nature"  are  involved,  the
statutory defendant  cannot demand  constitutional rights,  since
only certain  "civil rights"  have been granted in these actions,
and only  "procedural due process", consisting of the right to be
heard on  the facts alone, is allowed.  Constitutional rights and
substantive due  process are  noticeably absent.   Therefore, the
Court must be seated in some jurisdiction other than "At Law", in
order to hear an alleged violation of a regulatory statute.

     17.  The  Accused  Common-Law  Citizen  [DEFENDANT],  hereby
places all  parties and  the Court  on NOTICE,  that he  is not a
"citizen  of   the  United   States"  under  the  so-called  14th
Amendment, i.e., a juristic person or a franchised person who can
be compelled  to perform  under the  regulatory Internal  Revenue
Code, which is civil in nature.  Moreover, the Accused Common-Law
Citizen   [DEFENDANT]   hereby   challenges   the   In   Personam
jurisdiction of  the Court  with this contrary conclusion of law.
This Court  is now  mandated to  seat on  the  Law  side  of  its
capacity to hear evidence of the status of the Accused Citizen.


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     18.  The Accused  Common-Law  Citizen  [DEFENDANT]  contends
that the  Internal Revenue Service made a false conclusion of law
in an  administrative capacity  when it first brought this action
before the  Court, and  in so doing failed to impart jurisdiction
upon this Court to seat and hear this matter in a jurisdiction of
legislative equity.

     19.  The Accused  Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT] now demands
that the  attorney for  the Plaintiff in this matter step forward
with an  offer of  proof  that  the  Accused  Common-Law  Citizen
[DEFENDANT], has  lost his  status as a Common-Law Citizen of the
California Republic,  and is  now a  "resident" of this State who
can be  compelled to perform to the letter of every civil statute
because he  is either  an immigrant  alien, a  statutory resident
(14th Amendment  citizen), a juristic person (corporation), or an
enfranchised person  (i.e., one  who has knowingly, willingly and
voluntarily entered  into an  agreement for  the  exercise  of  a
privilege or  the receipt  of a  benefit and  for  the  attendant
considerations carried  with  the  grant  of  that  privilege  or
benefit).

     20.  Once jurisdiction is challenged, this Court must sit on
the Law  side of its jurisdiction as a neutral arbitrator, before
the allegations  of statutory wrongdoing can proceed.  Failure to
do so  may subject  the judge of this Court to charges of perjury
for violating  the oath  of office  by  refusing  to  uphold  and
protect the  rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitutions
of the California Republic and of the United States of America.

     21.  The Accused  Common-Law  Citizen  [DEFENDANT]  requests
that this  Court take  judicial notice that he has been compelled
to enter  this Court  to answer the allegation, and contends that
the allegations  are founded  upon false conclusions of law.  The
Memorandum of  Law which  follows will  set forth the position of
the Accused  Common-Law Citizen  [DEFENDANT], and the record will
show that  no evidence is before this Court which contradicts the
position of  Citizen [DEFENDANT],  except a  mere fiction of law.
This fiction  of law  cannot stand  in the  face of  a clear  and
direct challenge.


Dated                , 1993


Respectfully submitted
with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights
and  without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,




Citizen of the California Republic
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris



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                        MEMORANDUM OF LAW

                      CLASSES OF CITIZENSHIP

     1.   The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America
recognizes several  classes of  people who exist in this Union of
States, as described in Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 (1:2:3).

     2.   This Court is herewith mandated to take judicial notice
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the
Constitution of the California Republic, the Statutes at Large of
the United  States of America, and all case law presented herein,
pursuant to  the Federal Rules of Evidence, Section 201, et seq.,
and Article  4, Section 1 (4:1) of the Constitution of the United
States of America (1787).

     3.   Excluding "Indians not taxed", since they are not under
consideration in  this matter, we are left with two other classes
of individuals defined in 1:2:3 of the U.S. Constitution, to wit:
"free Persons" and "three-fifths of all other Persons".

     4.   The term  "three fifths  of all other Persons" referred
to the  Black slave population and all others of races other than
"white" who  could not and did not have Common-Law Citizenship of
one of  the several  States, at  the time  the  Constitution  was
adopted.   (For an  in-depth analysis of this fact, see the cases
of Dred  Scott vs Sanford, 19 How. 393;  U.S. vs Rhodes, 1 Abbott
39;   Slaughter House  Cases, 16  Wall. 74;   Van  Valkenburg  vs
Brown, 43  Cal. 43;   U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649;  and K.
Tashiro vs Jordan, 201 Cal. 239; et al.)

     5.   The  Thirteenth   Amendment,  officially  and  lawfully
ratified in  1865, served  only to  abolish  slavery  within  the
corporate United States.  No race other than the white race could
claim Common-Law  Citizenship of one of the several States, which
Citizenship was  afforded the  protection of  the  Constitutions.
(This is discussed in depth in Dred Scott vs Sanford, supra).

     6.   Further proof  that this  argument applies to the State
of California  is found  in Article  2, Section 1 of the Original
California Constitution (1849) which states in part: "Every WHITE
male Citizen  of the  United States, and every WHITE male citizen
of Mexico  ..."   [emphasis added].   Obviously,  this  provision
excluded all  other  races  from  being  Common-Law  Citizens  of
California and  from having  the full protection of the State and
Federal Constitutions.   This was the case even before the famous
Dred Scott  decision.   It is  most notable  that the  California
Constitution was altered after the so-called 14th Amendment so as
to delete  all references  to "white" male Citizens, and today it
refers only to "persons".

     7.   Following the  decision in  Dred Scott, supra, Congress
allegedly enacted  and ratified  the so-called  14th Amendment to
the Constitution  of the  United  States  of  America  to  afford


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"statutory citizenship"  status to those who were deemed excluded
from  this   Common-Law  status   under   the   Supreme   Court's
interpretations of  the Constitution.    This  event  unfolds  in
detail in  the case law surrounding the 13th and 14th Amendments,
with a  very significant  difference which is of great importance
to the instant matter.

     8.   Such  cases   as  the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  supra;
Twining vs New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78;  K. Tashiro vs Jordan, supra;
among many  others, all  declared that under the Law, "there is a
clear distinction  between a  Citizen of a State and a citizen of
the United States".

     9.   A famous  French statesman,  Fredrick Bastiat, noted in
the early 1800's that if freedom were to be destroyed in America,
it would result from the question of slavery and from the failure
to equate  all races  and all humans as "equals".  The Accused is
not responsible  for the  errors of  the past  and elects  not to
dwell at  length on  this subject.   However,  the so-called 14th
Amendment must  now be  discussed and,  as abhorrent  as  it  may
sound, it  is a  matter of fact and law that this is the position
(intentional or  unintentional) which  forms the basis of the law
with which we live today.

     10.  In brief,  as a  result of the 13th Amendment, the U.S.
Supreme Court  decided that  the Union  of States  known  as  the
United States  of America  was founded  by "white" people and for
"white" people,  and only  "white" people could enjoy the Rights,
Privileges and  Immunities afforded  and protected by the Federal
and State  Constitutions.  This fact is most eloquently set forth
in Dred  Scott vs Sanford, supra, in stating that "... if a black
nation were  to adopt  our Constitution verbatim, they would have
the absolute  right to  restrict the right of citizenship only to
the black population if they chose to do so ...."

     11.  To overcome  the decision  in Dred  Scott,  supra,  the
so-called 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
of America  was allegedly  ratified "at  the point of a bayonet",
and was  "declared" to  be a part of the Constitution in the year
1868.  However, an examination of the ratification by the several
States shows that various improper proceedings occurred which, in
effect, nullify  the Amendment.   "I  cannot believe    that  any
court, in  full possession of its faculties, could honestly  hold
that the  amendment was properly approved and adopted."  State vs
Phillips, 540  P.2d. 936  (1975);   see also Dyett vs Turner, 439
P.2d. 266 (1968).

     12.  Accused Common-Law Citizen [DEFENDANT] will not digress
into an  in-depth dissertation  of the  bogus ratification of the
so-called 14th  Amendment, because the only necessary point to be
made is  that the  so-called 14th Amendment had a profound effect
upon the  Union of these United States, and this effect continues
to the present time.



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     13.  The Original  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of
America (1787)  refers to  Common-Law  Citizens  of  the  several
States in  the Preamble,  in  Article  4,  Section  2,  Clause  1
(4:2:1), and  in numerous  other sections.     Always,  the  word
Citizen is  spelled with  a capital  "C" when  referring to  this
class of  Common-Law Citizen as a "Citizen of the United States",
i.e., as a "Citizen of one of the United States".

     14.  In contrast,  the so-called  14th Amendment  utilizes a
small "c"  to distinguish  this class  of citizens  whose  status
makes them  "subject to  the jurisdiction thereof" as a statutory
"citizen of the United States".

     15.  In the  law, each  word  and  each  use  of  the  word,
including its capitalization or the lack of capitalization, has a
distinctive legal  meaning.   In this  case, there  never was the
specific status  of a  "citizen of  the United  States" until the
advent of  the 1866  Civil Rights Act (14 Stat. 27) which was the
forerunner of  the so-called  14th  Amendment.    (See  Ex  Parte
Knowles, 5  Cal. 300.   The  definition of the "United States" is
discussed in the next section of this memorandum.)

     16.  Before the  so-called 14th Amendment was declared to be
a part  of the  U.S. Constitution,  there were  a number of State
"residents" who  could not  enjoy "Common-Law Citizenship" in one
of the  several States under that Constitution, because they were
not "white".   The  effect of the so-called 14th Amendment was to
give to  all those  residents a  citizenship in  the nation-state
that was  created by  Congress in  the year  1801 and  named  the
"United States"  (see 2  Stat. 103;  see also U.S. vs Eliason, 41
U.S. 291, 16 Peter 291, 10 L.Ed. 968.)  The original Civil Rights
Act of  1866 was  not encompassing  enough, so it was expanded in
the year  1964;   but the  legal effect  was the same, namely, to
grant to "citizens of the United States" the equivalent rights of
the Common-Law white Citizens of the several States.  In reality,
however,  those   "equivalent  rights"  are  limited  by  various
statutes, codes and regulations and can be changed at the whim of
Congress.

     17.  Under the  Federal and State Constitutions, "... We the
People" did  not surrender  our individual  sovereignty to either
the State  or Federal  Government.   Powers  "delegated"  do  not
equate to  powers  surrendered.    This  is  a  Republic,  not  a
democracy, and  the majority  cannot impose  its  will  upon  the
minority simply  because some  "law" is  already set  forth.  Any
individual can  do anything he or she wishes to do, so long as it
does not  damage, injure  or impair  the same  Right  of  another
individual.  The concept of a corpus delicti is relevant here, in
order to prove some "crime" or civil damage.

     18.  The case  law surrounding  the 13th and 14th Amendments
all rings  with the  same message:   "These  amendments  did  not
change the status of Common-Law Citizenship of the white Citizens
of one of the several States of the Union" (now 50 in number).


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     19.  This goes to the crux of the controversy because, under
the so-called  14th Amendment, citizenship is a privilege and not
a "Right".   (See  American and  Ocean Ins. Co. vs Canter, 1 Pet.
511;  Cook vs Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924)).

     20.  It was never the intent of the so-called 14th Amendment
to change  the status  of the  Common-Law Citizens of the several
States.   (See People  vs Washington,  36  C.  658,  661  (1869);
French vs Barber, 181 U.S. 324; MacKenzie vs Hare, 60 L.Ed. 297).

     21.  However, over  the years,  the so-called 14th Amendment
has been used to create a fiction and to destroy American freedom
through administrative  regulation.   How is  this possible?  The
answer is self-evident to anyone who understands the law, namely,
a "privilege"  is   regulatable  to  any  degree,  including  the
alteration and even the revocation of that privilege.

     22.  Since the  statutory status  of "citizen  of the United
States, subject  to the  jurisdiction thereof" (1866 Civil Rights
Act) is  one of  privilege  and  not  of  Right,  and  since  the
so-called 14th  Amendment mandates  that both  Congress  and  the
several States  take measures  to protect  these new  "subjects",
then both  the Federal  and State  governments  are  mandated  to
protect the  privileges and immunities of ONLY these "citizens of
the United States".  (See Hale vs Henkel, 201 U.S. 43).

     23.  Of course,  the amount  of protection  afforded  has  a
price to  pay, but  the important fact is that the "privilege" of
citizenship under  the so-called  14th Amendment can be regulated
or revoked  because it  is a  "privilege" and not a RIGHT.  It is
here that  the basic,  fundamental concept  of  "self-government"
turns into a King "governing his subjects".

     24.  One can  be called a "freeman", but that was a title of
nobility granted  by the  King.   To be really free encompasses a
great deal more than grants of titles and privileges.

     25.  Over the  years since  1787,  because  our  forefathers
would have  rather fought  than bow to involuntary servitude, the
"powers that  be" have  slowly and  carefully used  the so-called
14th Amendment and the Social Security Act to force primary State
Citizenship into  relative extinction, in the eyes of the courts.
Nevertheless, this  class of  Common-Law Citizens  is not extinct
yet;   it is  simply being  ignored, in  order  to  maintain  and
enlarge a revenue base for Congress.

     26.  Since the  State of California has been mandated by the
14th Amendment  to protect  the statutory "citizens of the United
States", and since the People in general have been falsely led to
obtain "Social Security Numbers" as "U.S. citizens", the State of
California under prompting by the Federal Government has used the
licensing and  registration of  vehicles  and  people  under  the
"equal protection"  clause for the "Public Welfare" to perpetuate
a scheme  of revenue enhancement and regulation.  This scheme has


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been implemented,  in part,  by promoting  the fiction  that  the
Common-Law "Citizens  of a  State of the Union of several States"
can be regulated to the same degree as statutory "citizens of the
United States".

     27.  I,  [DEFENDANT],   contend  that   both  the  State  of
California and  the Federal  Government  (known  as  the  "United
States") are  committing an  act of  GENOCIDE upon the Common-Law
State  Citizens   of  the  several  States  by  perpetrating  and
perpetuating the  "fiction of  law" that  everyone is a statutory
"citizen of the United States".

     This allegation is now discussed by proving exactly what the
"United States" means and in what capacity it now operates.


                  WHAT IS THE "UNITED STATES"?

     28.  As we  begin, it  must be  noted that  this  Common-Law
Citizen alleges  "fraud" by  the State and Federal Governments in
their failure  to inform  the people  that they  are all included
(through the  use of a fiction of law) in that statutory class of
persons called "citizens of the United States".

     29.  The  use   of  this  fiction  of  law  is  particularly
abhorrent in  view of  the fact that, when arbitrarily applied to
everyone, the  States  lose  their  sovereignty,  the  Common-Law
Citizens of  the State  lose their  fundamental rights,  and  the
"citizens  of  the  United  States"  lose  the  guidelines  which
established their  "civil rights".   The net effect is that these
actions have lowered everyone's status to that of a "subject".

     30.  There is  a clear  distinction between  the meanings of
"United States"  and "United  States of  America".  The people of
America have  been fraudulently  and purposely  misled to believe
that these terms are completely synonymous in every context.

     31.  In fact,  in Law  the term  "United States  of America"
refers to  the several  States which are "united by and under the
Constitution";     the  term   "United  States"  refers  to  that
geographical area  defined in  Article 1,  Section 8,  Clause  17
(1:8:17) and  in Article  4, Section  3, Clause  2 (4:3:2) of the
Federal Constitution.

     32.  In  1802,   the  "Congress  Assembled"  incorporated  a
geographical area  known as  the "United  States".   The  "United
States" is,  therefore, a  nation-state  which  is  separate  and
unique unto itself.  Furthermore, even though the "United States"
is not  a member  of the "Union of States united by and under the
Constitution", it  is bound  by that Constitution to restrict its
activities in  dealing with  the  several  States  and  with  the
Common-Law Citizens  of those  States.  Under 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 of
the Constitution of the United States of America (1787), Congress
has exclusive  power to legislate and regulate the inhabitants of


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                                                       Appendix Y


its geographical territory and its statutory "citizens" under the
so-called 14th  Amendment, wherever  they are "resident", even if
they do inhabit one of the 50 States of the Union.

     33.  The term  "United States"  has always  referred to  the
"Congress Assembled",  or to  those geographical areas defined in
1:8:17 and  4:3:2 in  the U.S.  Constitution.   The proof of this
fact is found in the Articles of Confederation.

                     ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

     Whereas the  Delegates of  the United  States of  America in
     Congress Assembled  did on  the fifteenth day of November in
     the year  of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy
     Seven, and in the Second Year of the Independence of America
     agree to  certain Articles  of Confederation  and  perpetual
     union between the States of ....

     ARTICLE I.   The  title of  this confederacy  shall be  "The
     United States of America".

     ARTICLE II.  Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and
     independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which
     is not  by this  confederation expressly  delegated  to  the
     United States, in Congress Assembled.


     NOTE:   The term  "UNITED STATES"  as  used  therein  refers
expressly to "Congress Assembled" on behalf of the several States
which comprise the Union of States (now 50 in number).

     34.  As can readily be seen from the quote below, with three
separate and  distinct definitions  for the term "United States",
it becomes  absolutely necessary  to separate and define each use
of this  term in law.  It is equally as necessary to separate and
define to  whom the  law applies  when there  are two  classes of
citizenship existing  side-by-side, with  separate  and  distinct
rights, privileges  and immunities  for each.   Such  a  separate
distinction is  not made  in the Internal Revenue Code.  Citizens
of the California Republic are nowhere defined in this Code or in
its regulations, but are expressly omitted as such and identified
indirectly at best (see 26 U.S.C. 7701(b)(1)(B)).

     The term  "United States"  may be used in any one of several
     senses.   It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying
     the position  analogous to  that of  other sovereigns  in  a
     family of  nations.   It may  designate territory over which
     sovereignty of  the United  States extends, or it may be the
     collective name  of the States which are united by and under
     the Constitution.
                                                                 
             [Hooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]
                              [65 S.Ct. 870, 880, 89  L.Ed. 1252]
                                                 [emphasis added]


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     35.  The term  "United States", when used in its territorial
meaning, encompasses  the areas  of land  defined in  1:8:17  and
4:3:2, nothing  more.   In this respect, the "United States" is a
separate Nation  which is  foreign with  respect  to  the  States
united by and under the Constitution, because the "United States"
as such  has never  applied for  admission to the Union of States
known as  the "United States of America".  Accordingly, statutory
"citizens  of  the  United  States",  who  are  "subject  to  the
jurisdiction  thereof",   are  defined  in  the  wording  of  the
so-called 14th  Amendment and of The Civil Rights Acts.  At best,
this so-called Amendment is a "private Act", rather than a public
act, which  designates a  class of  people who  are unique to the
territorial jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, the Federal
Territories and Possessions, and the land which has been ceded by
the Legislatures  of the 50 States to the foreign nation-state of
the "United  States" for  forts, magazines,  arsenals and  "other
needful buildings"  (see 1:8:17  and 4:3:2).   Collectively, this
territorial jurisdiction  is now  termed "The  Federal  Zone"  to
distinguish it  uniquely from  the nation as a whole and from the
50 States  of the Union.  The "nation" can, therefore, be defined
as the mathematical union of the federal zone and the 50 States.

     36.  The District  of Columbia  is technically a corporation
and is  only defined  as a  "State" in  its own  codes and  under
International Law (e.g., see 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10)).

     37.  The several  States which  are united  by and under the
Constitution are  guaranteed a  "Republican" (or  "rule of  law")
form of  government by  Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution.
However, the  foreign nation-state created by Congress and called
the "United  States", in its territorial sense, is a "legislative
democracy" (or  "majority rule"  democracy) which  is governed by
International Law rather than the Common Law.

     38.  The U.  S. Supreme  Court has  ruled that  this foreign
nation has  every right  to legislate  for its  "citizens" and to
hold subject  matter and  in personam  jurisdiction, both  within
(inside) and  without (outside)  its territorial boundaries, when
legislative acts call for such effects (Cook vs Tait, supra).

     39.  As a  foreign nation  under International law, which is
derived from Roman Civil Law (see Kent's Commentaries on American
Law, Lecture  1), it  is  perfectly  legal  for  this  nation  to
consider its  people as  "subjects"  rather  than  as  individual
Sovereigns.   The  protections  of  the  State  and  the  Federal
Constitutions do  not apply  to these  "subjects" unless there is
specific  statutory  legislation  granting  specific  protections
(e.g., The Civil Rights Act).  The guarantees of the Constitution
extend to  the "United  States" (i.e.  the federal  zone) only as
Congress has made those guarantees applicable (Hooven, supra).

     40.  California is  a Republic.  How does this International
Law come  into play  in the  California Republic?   The answer to
this question is presented in the following section.


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                                                       Appendix Y


                       FAILURE TO DISCLOSE

     41.  Because only "white" people can hold primary Common-Law
State Citizenship  under the  Constitution,  Congress  created  a
different  class   of  "citizen"   and  then  legislated  rights,
privileges and immunities which were intended to be mirror images
of  the   Rights,  Privileges   and  Immunities  enjoyed  by  the
Common-Law Citizens of the several States.

     42.  Unfortunately, the  nation-state of the "United States"
(District of  Columbia) is a democracy and not a Republic.  It is
governed basically  under authority  of International Law, rather
than  the   Common  Law,  and  its  people  hold  citizenship  by
"privilege" rather than by "Right".

     43.  Certain power-mad  individuals, commonly known today as
the Directors  of the  Federal Reserve  Board and the twelve (12)
major international  banking families,  have used  the  so-called
14th Amendment  to commit  "legal genocide"  upon  the  class  of
Common-Law Citizens  known as the Citizens of the several States.
This has  been accomplished by the application of Social Security
through fraud,  deception and  non-disclosure of  material facts,
for the  purpose of  reducing the Union of States to a people who
are once  again enslaved  by puppet  masters, in  order to gather
revenue for the profit of international banks and their owners.

     44.  It is  a fact  so well known  and understood that it is
indisputable,  that  "any  privilege  granted  by  government  is
regulatable, taxable  and subject  to any restrictions imposed by
the legislative acts of its governing body", including alteration
and even revocation by that governing body.

     45.  If necessary  to do  so, the  Accused [DEFENDANT]  will
submit an  offer of  proof to show that the "Social Security Act"
is in  fact a  private act  applying only to the territory of the
"United States",  acting in  its limited  capacity,  and  to  its
statutory "citizens  of the  United States",  under the so-called
14th Amendment.   Yet,  this act has been advertised and promoted
throughout the  several States  of the  Union as being "mandatory
upon the public in general", rather than a "private" act.

     46.  The effect  in law is that, when Common-Law Citizens of
the several States apply for and receive Social Security Numbers,
they voluntarily  surrender their  primary Common-Law Citizenship
of a  State and  exchange it  for that of a statutory "citizen of
the United  States".   It is  most interesting that any State has
the power  to "naturalize"  a non-Citizen,  but today everyone is
naturalized   as "citizens of the United States" under purview of
the so-called  14th Amendment.   The  long-term  effect  of  this
procedure is  that the  Common-Law white  State Citizens  are  an
endangered species,  on the  verge of  extinction, and  only  the
"subject class citizens" will survive to be ruled at the whim and
passion of  a jurisdiction which was not intended by our Founding
Fathers or the Framers of the original U.S. Constitution.


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                     JURISDICTION OF THE COURT


     47.  Section 1  of the  so-called 14th  Amendment has  had a
far-reaching effect  upon  the  several  States  of  this  Union,
because Congress mandated that it would protect its new statutory
"citizens" and  that each  of the  States would also guarantee to
protect these special "citizens".


     48.  This Nation was founded upon the fundamental principles
of the  Common  Law  and  self-government,  with  limited  actual
government.   In contrast,  the "subjects" of the "United States"
are considered  to be incapable of self-government and in need of
protection and regulation by those in authority.


     49.  The majority  of statute law is civil and regulatory in
nature, even when sanctions of a criminal nature are attached for
alleged violations.


     50.  Among the  rights secured  by the  Common  Law  in  the
Constitution in  "criminal" cases  are  the  right  to  know  the
"nature and  cause" of  an accusation,  the right  to confront an
accuser, and  the right  to have  both substantive and procedural
due process.


     51.  It is  a fact  that the  District  Court,  in  Internal
Revenue cases,  DOES NOT  disclose the  nature and  cause of  the
accusation, does not afford "substantive" due process, and rarely
produces a "corpus delicti" to prove damage or an injured party.


     52.  The final  proof is that the rights given to an accused
in an  Internal Revenue  case are  "civil  rights",  rather  than
Constitutional  Rights.     The   District  Court   can  hear   a
Constitutional question,  but it  cannot rule  upon the merits of
the  question,   because  the  Constitution  does  not  apply  to
regulatory statutes.   They  are set  in place  to  regulate  and
protect the  statutory "citizens of the United States" who cannot
exercise,  and   are  not   given,  the   right   of   individual
self-government.


     53.  The Federal  Constitution mandates  that  "counsel"  be
present at  all phases of the proceedings.  In contrast, District
Court  often  conducts  arraignment  proceedings  without  either
counsel for  the defense  or counsel  for the  prosecution  being
present.





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                                                       Appendix Y


                           CONCLUSION


     54.  This Court  is proceeding under a jurisdiction which is
known to  the Constitution, but which is foreign to the intent of
the Constitution,  unless applied to those individuals who do not
have Common-Law  access by "Right" to the protection of the State
and Federal Constitutions.

     55.  Whether this  jurisdiction be  named International Law,
Admiralty/Maritime Law,  Legislative Equity, Statutory Law or any
other name,  it is  abusive and  destructive  of  the  Common-Law
Rights of  the Citizens  of the several States. The Constitutions
of the  California Republic  and the  United  States  of  America
mandate that  these rights  be guaranteed  and protected  by  all
agencies of government.  This is the Supreme Law of our Land.

     56.  The limit  of police power and legislative authority is
reached when a statutory "law" derogates or destroys Rights which
are protected  by  the  Constitution  and  which  belong  to  the
Common-Law Citizens  of the  several States  who can  claim these
Rights.

     57.   [DEFENDANT] is a white, male Common-Law Citizen of the
Sovereign California  Republic.   This declaration  of status  is
made openly and notoriously on the record of these proceedings.

     58.  As an  individual whose  primary Common-Law Citizenship
is of the California Republic, [DEFENDANT] claims all the Rights,
Privileges  and   Immunities  afforded   and  protected   by  the
Constitutions of the California Republic (1849) and of the United
States of America (1787), as lawfully amended.

     59.  [DEFENDANT] has never, to the best of his knowledge and
belief, knowingly,  intentionally and voluntarily surrendered his
original status as a Common-Law Citizen of the several States, to
become a  so-called 14th Amendment Federal citizen who is subject
to the jurisdiction of the "United States".

     60.  This Court  is proceeding in a legislative jurisdiction
which allows  a "civil" statute to be used as evidence of the Law
in a  "criminal proceeding",  and affords  only  "civil  rights",
"procedural due  process" and  the right to be heard on the facts
evidenced in the statute, rather than the Law and the facts.

     61.  It is  now incumbent  upon the Court to seat on the Law
side of  its jurisdiction  and to  order the  plaintiff to  bring
forth an  offer of  proof that  the Accused  [DEFENDANT]  can  be
subjected to a jurisdiction which uses civil statutes as evidence
of the fundamental Law in criminal cases, which refuses to afford
all Rights  guaranteed by  the Constitution  and available to the
Accused in  criminal matters,  and which practices procedural due
process to the exclusion of substantive due process, wherein only
the "facts" and not the "facts and Law" are at issue.


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     62.  Should the  prosecution fail  to bring forth proof that
the Accused  [DEFENDANT] has surrendered his original status as a
Common-Law "California State Citizen" for one that is essentially
in  "legislative/regulatory  equity",  then  this  Court  has  no
alternative but  to dismiss  this matter of its own motion in the
interests of justice, for lack of jurisdiction.



Dated            , 1993


Respectfully Submitted




Citizen of the California Republic
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris





































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                                                       Appendix Y


           C E R T I F I C A T E   O F   S E R V I C E


     I, [DEFENDANT],  under penalties  of perjury, declare that I
am a  California Citizen,  domiciled in  the California Republic,
and a  Citizen of  the several  States united  by and  under  the
Constitution of  the United  States of America (see 4:2:1).  I am
not a "citizen of the United States" (District of Columbia) nor a
subject of Congress under the 14th Amendment, nor a "resident" in
the State  of California  who seeks  or who is otherwise is under
the protection of the so-called 14th Amendment.


     It is  hereby certified that service of this notice has been
made on  the Plaintiffs  and other interested parties by personal
service or by mailing one copy each thereof, on this ________ day
of __________________,  1993, in  a sealed envelope, with postage
prepaid, properly addressed to them as follows:



The Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, District of Columbia
Postal Zone 20530/tdc

[others as listed here]


Dated                , 1993


Respectfully submitted
with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights
and  without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,




Citizen of the California Republic
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris















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                                                The Federal Zone:


[from 9THAPPEA.DIR\APPEAL.DOC]



              STATEMENT OF STATUS AND JURISDICTION


     The Appellant  [DEFENDANT],  who  enjoys  the  status  of  a
Caucasian Citizen  of the  California  Republic  with  Common-Law
rights by  birth as a member of the sovereign political body (see
Dred Scot  vs Sanford,  19 How.  393, 404)  and who  enjoys these
unalienable Common-Law  rights by  virtue of  his birth, is not a
"citizen  of   the  United   States"  under  the  so-called  14th
Amendment.   Thus, jurisdiction  is invoked  per the Magna Carta,
Chapters 61,  63;  the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776;
the Preamble  to  the  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of
America, 1787;   Article  3, Sections  1 and  2, and  Article  6,
Section 2  of the  Constitution for the United States of America,
(1787);   the California Civil Code, Source of Law, Section 22.2;
the California  Code of  Civil  Procedure,  Section  1899;    and
Marbury vs Madison, 5 U.S. 368 (1803).



































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                                                       Appendix Y


                            ARGUMENT

                                I
                                
    THE 14TH AMENDMENT WAS NOT PROPERLY APPROVED AND ADOPTED
          ACCORDING TO THE MANDATES OF THE CONSTITUTION
                     AND THE MAXIMS OF LAW;
  IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE WHITE CITIZENS OF THE SEVERAL STATES,
            AND DID NOT AUTHORIZE CONGRESS TO ABOLISH
   THE INTENT AND MEANING OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION (1787)
    OR TO CREATE A NEW CONSTITUTION UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT,
          THEREBY DEPRIVING THE APPELLANT [DEFENDANT],
                 A WHITE DE JURE STATE CITIZEN,
    OF HIS UNALIENABLE RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY.


                              POINT 1

     The Appellant  [DEFENDANT] was  indicted and convicted under
the purview  of the  so-called 14th  Amendment.   Therefore,  the
constitutionality and  application of this so-called amendment is
brought squarely before this Court.


     The so-called  14th Amendment is invalid, in that it was NOT
properly approved  and adopted  according to  the  provisions  of
Article 5 of the Constitution (see House Congressional Record for
June 13,  1967, pages  15641-15646, incorporated  fully herein by
reference and attached as exhibit "A").


     The Fourteenth  Amendment was forced upon the people "at the
point of  a bayonet"  and by  the coercion that resulted from not
seating various  senators who  would not  vote in  favor  of  the
so-called amendment,  and various  other improper proceedings too
numerous to  mention here  (for details, see 28 Tulane Law Review
22;  11 South Carolina Law  Quarterly 484).  It is apparent that,
once a  fraud is  perpetrated, the fraud enlarges from the effort
to maintain  illegitimate power  and to  conceal its legal effect
upon the invalidity of the so-called 14th Amendment.


     The so-called 14th "Amendment" cannot and does not terminate
the Constitutional  intent of  de jure  State Citizenship  of the
Appellant [DEFENDANT].  There is ample evidence that no court has
ever  held  that  this  "Amendment"  was  properly  approved  and
adopted.   See, in  particular, State  vs Phillips,  540 P.2d 936
(1975);  Dyett vs Turner, 439 P.2d 266 (1968).


                                
                                
                                
                                                  [continued ...]


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                            POINT 2:
                                
                THE ACCUSED'S DE JURE CITIZENSHIP
                      CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY
                                
                                
     The presumed  14th Amendment  is illegally  applied  to  the
Appellant [DEFENDANT],  a male  Caucasian born  in the  State  of
Illinois and  now a Citizen of California.  The Appellant was not
within the intent or meaning of the so-called 14th Amendment.


     It may  be stated, as a general principle of law, that it is
     for the  legislature to  determine  whether  the  conditions
     exist which warrant the exercise of power;  but the question
     as to  what are  the subjects  of its exercise, is clearly a
     judicial question.   One may be deprived of his liberty, and
     his constitutional  rights thereto  may be violated, without
     actual imprisonment or restraint of his person.

                    [In re Aubrey, 36 Wn 308, 314-314, 78 P. 900]
                                                 [emphasis added]

     The most  important thing  to be determined is the intent of
Congress.  The language of the statute may not be distorted under
the  guise  of  construction,  so  as  to  be  repugnant  to  the
Constitution, or  to defeat  the  manifest  intent  of  Congress.
United States vs Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 94 L.Ed. 457, 460;  United
States vs Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 82 L.Ed. 413, 58 S.Ct. 353.

     Citizenship is  a status  or condition, and is the result of
both act and intent.  14 C.J.S. Section 1, p. 1130, n. 62.

     14th Amendment  federal citizenship  is a  political  status
which constitutes  a privilege   which may be defined and limited
by Congress,  Ex Parte  (ng) Fung  Sing, D.C. Wash. 6 F.R.D. 670.
There  is   a  clear   distinction  between   federal  and  State
citizenship, K.  Tashiro vs  Jordan, 256 P. 545, 201 Cal. 239, 53
A.L.R. 1279, affirmed 49 S.Ct. 47, 278 U.S. 123, 73 L.Ed. 214, 14
C.J.S. 2, p. 1131, n. 75.

     The  classification   "citizen  of  the  United  States"  is
distinguished from  a Citizen  of one  of the  several States, in
that the  former  is  a  special  class  of  citizen  created  by
Congress, U.S.  vs Anthony,  24 Fed  829  (1873).    As  such,  a
"citizen of  the  United  States"  receives  created  rights  and
privileges from Congress, and thus has a "taxable citizenship" as
a federal  citizen  under  the  protection  and  jurisdiction  of
Congress, wherever  such citizens  are "resident".  Cook vs Tait,
265 U.S.  47 (1924),  44 S. Ct. 447;  11 Virginia Law Review 607,
"Income Tax  Based Upon  Citizenship".  This right to tax federal
citizenship is  an inherent  right under  the rule  of the Law of
Nations, which  is part  of the  law of  the "United  States", as
described in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 (1:8:17) and Article


                        Page Y - 22 of 40

                                                       Appendix Y


4, Section  3, Clause 2 (4:3:2).  The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 732.
The federal  government has absolutely no authority whatsoever to
tax the  Citizens of  the several  States for  their Citizenship.
The latter have natural rights and privileges which are protected
by the  U.S. Constitution  from federal  intrusion.  These rights
are inherent from birth and belong to "US the People" as Citizens
of one  of the  several States  as described  in  Dred  Scott  vs
Sanford, 19  How. 393.   Such  Citizens are  not under the direct
protection or  jurisdiction of  Congress, but  they are under the
protection of the Constitutions of the States which they inhabit.

     The Act  of Congress  called the  Civil Rights  Act, 14 U.S.
Statutes at  Large, p.  27,  which  was  the  forerunner  of  the
so-called 14th  Amendment, amply shows the intent of Congress, as
follows:


     ... [A]ll  persons born in the United States and not subject
     to any  foreign power,  excluding  Indians  not  taxed,  are
     hereby declared  to be  citizens of  the United  States, and
     such citizens  of every  race and  color ...  shall have the
     same right in every state and territory of the United States
     ... to  full and  equal benefit  of all laws and proceedings
     for the  security of  person and  property as  is enjoyed by
     white citizens ....
                                                 [emphasis added]

This was the intent of Congress, namely, not to infringe upon the
Constitution or the status of the de jure Citizens of the several
States.   The term  "persons" did  not include  the white de jure
State Citizens.  It was never the intent of the 14th Amendment to
subvert the authority of the several States of the Union, or that
of the  Constitution as it relates to the status of de jure State
Citizens.   See People  vs Washington,  36 C.  658,  661  (1869),
overruled on other grounds;  also French vs Barber, 181 U.S. 324;
MacKenzie vs Hare, 60 L. Ed. 297.

     The so-called  14th Amendment  uses language very similar to
the  Civil   Rights  Act  of  1866.    Harlan  J.  explained  his
interpretation of  its meaning  in  a  dissenting  opinion  which
quoted from  the scorching  veto message  of  President  Johnson,
Lincoln's successor:   It "comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific
States, Indians  subject to  taxation, the people called Gypsies,
as well  as the  entire race  designated as  blacks,  persons  of
color, negroes,  mulattoes and  persons of  African blood.  Every
individual of  those races  born in  the United  States is made a
citizen thereof."   Elk vs Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 114, 5 S.Ct. 41,
28 L.Ed. 643;  see also In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274.

     In light  of the  statement by  Chief Justice  Taney in Dred
Scott vs Sanford, 19 How. 393, 422, in defining the term persons,
the Judge  mentioned "...  persons  who  are  not  recognized  as
citizens ...."  See also American and Ocean Ins. Co. vs Canter, 1
Pet. 511,  which also  distinguishes  "persons"  and  "citizens".


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These were the persons who were the object of the 14th Amendment,
to give  citizenship to  this class  of native born "persons" who
were "resident" in the several States, and to legislate authority
to place  races other  than the  white race  within  the  special
category of "citizen of the United States".

     It was  the intent  of the  so-called amendment that de jure
Citizens  in   the  several  States  were  not  included  in  its
terminology because they were, by birthright, Citizens as defined
in the  Preamble, and  could receive  nothing from this so-called
amendment.  See Van Valkenburg vs Brown, 43 Cal. Sup. Ct. 43.

     Congress  has   adopted  this  definition  of  "person",  as
previously described,  so that the Internal Revenue Code would be
constitutional.  See McBrier vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
108 F.2d 967, Fn 1 (1939).  Thus, Congress has absolute authority
to regulate  this de  facto entity created by an Act of Congress,
this juristic  person who  is not given de jure State Citizenship
by birth.

     Since the  term "citizen  of the  United States" was used to
create and  distinguish a  different class of citizen in the 14th
Amendment, this  term has  been widely  used in  various  revenue
acts, e.g.,  Tariff Act  of August  5, 1909, Section 37, c. 6, 36
Stat. 11;   Act  of September 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 756;  Revenue Act
of November 23, 1921, 40 Stat. 227;  the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 and  26 C.F.R.  1.1-1(b).  These all had a specific meaning,
which did  not include a Citizen of one of the several States who
had no  franchise with the federal Government (i.e., the District
of Columbia).   In  fact, the  Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620,
Title I, Section 3, (3) states:


     (3)   Any citizenship requirement which excludes any citizen
     of the United States.


     This specifically  means that  the Original  Social Security
Act, created  in 1935,  did not  change  one's  citizenship  upon
obtaining a  SSN.  The original Title VIII of the Social Security
Act was  repealed by  P.L. 76-1, Section 4, 53 Stat. 1, effective
February 11,  1939.   Then the  substance was  added to  the 1939
Income Tax  Code at Sections 1400-1425.  Currently, the substance
of the repealed section can be found in the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code at  Sections 3101-3126.   This  repealing,  in  effect,  has
voided the  original intent  and meaning,  and replaced it with a
new intent  and meaning.   This  new intent is unconstitutionally
applied to  the Appellant,  a de  jure State  Citizen, who  is  a
member of  the posterity  as identified  in the  Preamble to  the
Constitution for  the United  States of America.  This new intent
has never  been addressed  by any  court, as  it relates  to  the
deprivation of State Citizenship.




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                                                       Appendix Y


     All changes  made after  the fact, under the Social Security
Act as  it relates to citizenship, are null and void due to fraud
(specifically, non-disclosure).   Congress  does not now, nor has
it ever  had, the  authority to  take Citizenship  away from  the
Appellant, a Citizen of the several States, without his knowledge
and informed consent.

     The error  occurs when,  through  economic  duress  and  the
failure to  disclose to  Appellant  [DEFENDANT]  the  liabilities
associated with a Social Security Number, a de jure State Citizen
is compelled "at the point of a bayonet" to give up a Citizenship
that was  derived by  birth and  blood.   By obtaining  a  Social
Security Number,  such a  State Citizen  becomes,  in  effect,  a
second-class citizen under the so-called 14th Amendment, in order
to obtain work to purchase necessities to sustain life.

     The so-called  14th Amendment was not intended to impose any
new restrictions  upon Citizenship,  or to  prevent  anyone  from
becoming a  Citizen by  fact of birth within the United States of
America, who  would thereby  acquire Citizenship according to the
law existing  before its  adoption.   "An amendatory act does not
alter the rights existing before its adoption." Billings vs Hall,
7 Cal.  1.   Its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of
free negroes  and to  put it beyond doubt that all blacks as well
as whites  were citizens.  U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18
S.Ct. 456,  42 L.Ed. 890;  Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U.S.)
36, 21  L.Ed. 394;   Strauder  vs West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25
L.Ed. 664;   In re Virginia, 100 U.S. 339;  Neal vs Delaware, 103
U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567;  Elk vs Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 5 S.Ct. 41,
28 L.Ed.  643;   Van Valkenburg vs Brown, 43 Cal. 43, 13 Am. Rep.
136;  (numerous other cites omitted).

     The First  Clause of  the so-called  14th Amendment  of  the
Federal Constitution made negroes "citizens of the United States"
and citizens  of the  State in  which they  reside,  and  thereby
created two classes of citizens: one of the United States and the
other of the State.  4 Dec. Dig. '06, page 1197;  Cory vs Carter,
48 Ind.  327, 17  Am. Rep.  738;   and it  distinguishes  between
federal and state citizenship, Frasher vs State, 3 Tex. App. 263,
30 Am. Rep. 131.

     Nothing can  be found in the so-called 14th Amendment, or in
any  reference  thereto,  that  establishes  any  provision  that
transforms Citizens  of any  state into  "citizens of  the United
States".  In the year 1868 or now (1992), the so-called amendment
created no  new status for the white State Citizens.  White State
Citizens are  natural born  Citizens, per  Article 2,  Section 1,
Clause 5  (2:1:5) and,  as such,  they are  fully entitled to the
"Privileges and  Immunities" mentioned  in Article  4, Section 2,
Clause 1  (4:2:1), as  unalienable  rights.    These  unalienable
rights cannot be overruled or abolished by any act of congress.





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     The birthright  of the Appellant [DEFENDANT]'s de jure State
Citizenship  cannot   be  subordinated  merely  because  Congress
desires more  power and  control over  the people,  in  order  to
create a  larger revenue  base for  the profit of certain private
individuals.  Oyama vs California, 332 U.S. 633.


     State citizenship,  as defined,  regulated and  protected by
     State  authority,  would  disappear  altogether,  except  as
     Congress might  choose to  withhold the  exercise of powers.
     The tendency  of Congress,  especially since the adoption of
     the  recent   amendments,  has  been  to  overstep  its  own
     boundaries and  undertake duties  not committed to it by the
     Constitution.

                   [16 Albany Law Journal 24 (1877), (Exhibit B)]


     A citizen  may not  have his de jure citizenship taken away,
Richards vs Secretary  of State, (9th Cir) 752 F.2d 1413, (1985);
Afroyim vs  Rusk,   387 U.S.  253, 87  S.Ct. 1660, 18 L.Ed.2d 757
(1967);   Baker vs  Rusk, 296  F. Supp.  1244 (1969);   Vance  vs
Terrazas, 444  U.S. 252,  100 S.Ct.  540, 62  L.Ed.2d 461 (1980);
U.S. vs  Wong Kim  Ark, 169  U.S. 18  S. Ct.  456, 42  L.Ed.  890
(1898).



                              POINT 3


     In the  formation of  the Constitution for the United States
of America,  care was  taken to  confer no power upon the federal
government to  control and  regulate Citizens  within the several
States, because such control would lead to tyranny.

     By the Constitution, Congress was to be a representative of,
and an extension of the Several States only for external affairs.
Congress was  forbidden to  pass municipal  laws to  regulate and
control de  jure Citizens  of a  State of the Union of the United
States  of   America.    This  is,  without  a  doubt,  the  true
construction of the intent of the Constitution.

     That Congress  has no  authority to  pass laws  and bind the
rights of  the Citizens  in the several States, beyond the powers
conferred by  the Constitution, is not open to controversy.  But,
it is  insisted that  (1) under  the  so-called  14th  Amendment,
Congress has  power to  legislate for, and make a subject of, the
Appellant [DEFENDANT]  through secret  interpretations of the law
and (2)  by force of power, laws are enacted in order to control,
by force  and fraud, the Nation and the People within the several
States for  the purpose  of raising revenue for the profit of the
Federal Reserve banks and their private owners.



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     No  rational   man  can   hesitate  to   believe  that   the
deprivations of  Citizenship and  the abuses  of the Constitution
are not  derived from  the Federal  Reserve Act.  No one can deny
that Congress has thereby attempted to abolish the classification
of de  jure Citizen of a State of the Union of the United States,
so that a ever larger revenue base can be maintained.


     ...  nor   would  the   government  suffer  a  loss  of  his
     withholdings.

             [[DEFENDANT]'s Pre-Sentence Report, [DATE], page 10]


This  establishes,  without  a  doubt,  that  the  United  States
government is  only concerned  about raising revenue under forced
extraction by  the withholding  system, which was prompted by the
Federal Reserve  banks at  the  instigation  of  Beardsley  Ruml,
former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

     Congress, through  Social Security  and the  so-called  14th
Amendment, cannot  do indirectly  what the Constitution prohibits
directly.   If Congress,  by pseudo  power,  can  legislate  away
[DEFENDANT]'s status  as a de jure Citizen of the several States,
so might Congress exclude all of [DEFENDANT]'s unalienable rights
as protected and guaranteed by the Constitution.

     Social Security and the Federal Reserve banks, by creating a
fictitious debt, have re-instituted an insidious form of slavery.
All slavery has its origin in power, thus usurping a jurisdiction
which  does   not  belong  to  them  and  which  is  against  the
unalienable rights of the appellant [DEFENDANT].

     Our Constitution  is a  restraint upon government, purposely
provided and  declared upon consideration of all the consequences
which it prohibits and permits, making restraints upon government
the rights of the governed.  This careful adjustment of power and
rights makes  the constitution what it was intended to be and is,
namely, a  real charter of liberty which deserves the praise that
has often  been given  to it  as "The  most wonderful  work  ever
struck off  at any  given time  by the brain and purpose of man."
Block vs  Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135.

     Thus, this  court must  uphold the principles upon which the
Constitution was  founded;   it must  be held  to  guarantee  not
particular  forms   of  procedure,  but  the  very  substance  of
individual rights  to life,  liberty and  property.  Basic "State
Citizenship" is  the absolute  bulwark against "National Tyranny"
as is  fostered and applied through the so-called 14th Amendment.
Nowhere in  the debates,  papers or any court decision written by
anyone does it state that the Constitution authorizes Congress to
destroy the State Citizenship of the Appellant [DEFENDANT].




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     Prior to  the Federal  Reserve Act, no political dreamer was
ever wild  enough to  think of  breaking  down  the  lines  which
separate the  States, and of compounding the American People into
one common  mass of  slaves.   Yet,  this  is  exactly  what  has
happened under  Social Security,  by creating  a revenue base for
the collection  of interest on a fictitious national debt owed to
the Federal Reserve, in other words, slavery to the national debt
under the so-called 14th Amendment.

     The status  of "de  jure  State  Citizen"  is  [DEFENDANT]'s
property.   When the  application of  Social Security annihilates
the value  of any  property and  strips it  of its attributes, by
which alone  it is  distinguishable as  property,  the  Appellant
[DEFENDANT], a de jure State Citizen, is deprived of it according
to  the   plainest  interpretation  of  the  5th  Amendment,  and
certainly within the Constitutional provisions intended to shield
[DEFENDANT]'s personal  rights and  liberty from  the exercise of
arbitrary government power.

     This is  a case  of "suspect  classification"  in  that  the
Appellant [DEFENDANT]  is "saddled  with such disabilities ... as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian process
...." 411  U.S. 2,  28.  Thus, the devolution of [DEFENDANT]'s de
jure Citizenship  into the  classification of a de facto juristic
person under  the so-called  14th Amendment  is such  a  "suspect
classification" and must be reviewed in the light of the original
intent of  our Founding  Fathers in  establishing  the  Union  of
several States in the first place.

     Citizenship  under   the  so-called   14th  Amendment  is  a
privilege granted  by Congress,  i.e., a  civil status conferring
limited rights  and privileges,  not a birthright that is secured
by the Constitution.  [DEFENDANT], a white de jure State Citizen,
by virtue  of his  birth in  one of  the several States, received
that which  cannot be  granted by Congress, nor can Congress make
void a Citizenship status which he derived by birth and by blood.

     ... [A]nd no member of the state should be disfranchised, or
     deprived of  any of  his  rights  or  privileges  under  the
     constitution, unless  by the law of the land, or judgment of
     his peers.

           [Kent's Commentaries, Vol.  II, p. 11, 1873, 12th ed.]

     There can  be no  law, statute  or treaty  that  can  be  in
conflict with  the intent  of the original founding constitution.
For, if  this were  permitted to occur, the founding Constitution
would be  a nullity.    The  original  Constitution  of  1787  is
perpetual, as  is the  Citizenship that is recognized by it.  See
Texas vs  White, 7  Wallace 700.  If any legislation is repugnant
to the  Constitution, this Court has the eminent power to declare
such enactments  null and  void ab initio (from their inception).
See Marbury vs Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-180 (1803).



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     The rule  that should  be applied  is that  laws, especially
foundational laws such as our Constitution, should be interpreted
and applied  according to  the plain import of the language used,
as it  would have  been the intent and understood by our Founding
Fathers.   The so-called  14th Amendment has been used to distort
and  nullify   the  purposes   and  intent  of  the  foundational
Constitution, for  the ulterior  motive of  giving  pseudo  power
where no  such power  was granted  or intended,  and  where  such
pseudo power was specifically denied in the Constitution.

     This has  resulted  in  the  complete  annihilation  of  the
balance of  checks, so  desired by  our Founding Fathers.  One of
these was  the sovereignty  of the  people.  At the present time,
the "United  States", under  Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17, has
extended its  pseudo authority  to abolish  the status of de jure
State Citizens,  and to  render [DEFENDANT]  a "federal"  citizen
under the so-called 14th Amendment who is more apply described as
a subject of Congress and a "federal" resident within the several
States.     This  has   had  the   unlawful  effect   of  denying
[DEFENDANT]'s birthright to be a free born de jure State Citizen,
as was the intent of the original Constitution.

     The so-called  14th Amendment  did not authorize Congress to
change either  the Citizenship  or the  status of Citizens of the
several States.   "They  are unaffected by it."  U.S. vs Anthony,
24 F. 829.  Yet, through deliberate misinterpretation of the Act,
Congress has  by statute  overruled and  voided the Constitution.
This was  done at  the prompting of the Federal Reserve banks and
their private owners.

     In application,  Congress and the Federal Reserve banks have
utilized  the   so-called  14th   Amendment  as   a  totally  new
Constitution, solely  for the benefit of the Federal Reserve, and
to the detriment of Appellant [DEFENDANT], a sovereign Citizen of
the California Republic.

     This Union  of the United States of America was founded upon
the principles of the Christianity and the common law.  Force and
fraud cannot  prevail against  the will  of the  people  and  the
Constitution.   The legislative  intent  of  the  so-called  14th
Amendment was  only to  grant citizenship  to a distinct class of
people, not  to create  a new  constitution.    This  court  must
determine whether  the "act"  was properly  approved and adopted.
State vs  Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 942 (1975).  If it was properly
approved and  adopted, this  court must  also determine  if it is
also  being  unconstitutionally  applied  against  the  Appellant
[DEFENDANT], a de jure State Citizen of California.

     The abuses  heaped upon  the Appellant,  a California  State
Citizen, only  foretell the  impending doom  and  downfall  of  a
centralized government.   Our  Founding Fathers  understood this,
and the  Constitution was  written so  that this would not occur.
But, to  the great  shame of  the judicial system,  they have let
the thirst for power prevail over the Constitution.  (Exhibit A)


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     Hitler used National Social Insurance to control and enslave
the people of Germany.  Likewise, the "United States" (Article 1,
Section 8,  Clause 17)  is doing  the same thing here in America.
(Perhaps now  it should  be spelled  "Amerika").   When is enough
enough?   When will the courts quit playing "ostrich", pull their
heads out  of the  sand, see  what is  happening and  correct the
situation before  it is  too late.   The camel of tyranny now has
its nose and its two front legs under the tent.

     Congress has  passed the 14th Amendment under force of arms,
included the  municipal code of the District of Columbia into the
United States  Codes, and  made various secret interpretations of
the acts,  never inquiring whether they had authority to proceed.
But, can  this Court  also undertake  for itself  the same sundry
constructions?   The Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches
have all  repeatedly acknowledged that our particular security is
in the  possession and  adherence to  the  written  Constitution.
Yet,  by  various  and  sundry  constructions  and  the  wrongful
application of  the acts  of Congress,  the House  and Senate are
attempting to  turn the Constitution into a blank piece of paper,
with complete judicial approval.

     [DEFENDANT], a  de jure  natural State  Citizen, is  in full
possession of  personal and  political rights,  which the "United
States" (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17) did not give and cannot
take away.   Dred Scott vs Sanford, 19 How. 393, 513;  Afroyim vs
Rusk, 387  U.S. 253;   U.S.  vs Miller, 463 F.2d 600.  Nor is the
Appellant a  de jure  State Citizen restrained by any enumeration
or definition  of his  rights or  liberties.   The so-called 14th
Amendment did  not impair  or change  the status  of the  de jure
Citizens of  the several States of the Union of the United States
of America.   To  imply that  an act  of Congress  supersedes and
makes null  and void  the Constitution  for the  United States of
America, is blatantly and demonstrably absurd.  This construction
cannot be enforced or adopted by any legal authority whatsoever.

     The municipal  jurisdiction of  Congress does  not extend to
the Appellant or to his property.  This is the case because he is
a de  jure State  Citizen of  the several  States.  The municipal
jurisdiction of Congress only extends to the limits as defined in
the Constitution itself (see 1:8:17 and 4:3:2).


     Where rights are secured by the Constitution there can be no
     legislation or rule making which would abrogate them.

                               [Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436]


Thus, the Citizenship of the Appellant as a Citizen of California
must be  upheld by the preceding positive statement and decree by
the U.S. Supreme Court.  This court must uphold this principle of
law.
                                


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                               II

         THE PREAMBLE AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
                  ARE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT.
               THEREFORE, CONGRESS CANNOT DEPRIVE
     A WHITE STATE CITIZEN OF HIS DE JURE STATE CITIZENSHIP
                  AS A MEMBER OF THE POSTERITY,
           AS WAS THE INTENT DEFINED IN THE PREAMBLE.


                             POINT 1

     The  Preamble  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  State
declares the intent and purpose of the covenant:


     We the  People of the United States, in Order to form a more
     perfect   Union,    establish   justice,   insure   domestic
     Tranquility, provide  for the  common defence,  promote  the
     general Welfare,  and secure  the Blessings  of  Liberty  to
     ourselves and  our Posterity,  do ordain  and establish this
     Constitution for the United States of America.
                                                       [Preamble]


Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, expounded
on the importance of this Preamble:


     The importance of examining the preamble, for the purpose of
     expounding the  language of  a statute,  has been long felt,
     and universally conceded in all judicial discussions.  It is
     an  admitted   maxim  in   the  ordinary   course   of   the
     administration of justice, that the preamble of a statute is
     a key  to open  the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs,
     which are  to be  remedied, and the objects, which are to be
     accomplished by  the provisions  of the statute.  We find it
     laid down  in some of our earliest authorities in the common
     law;   and civilians are accustomed to a similar expression,
     cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.  Probably it has
     a foundation in the exposition of every code of written law,
     from the  universal principle  of interpretation,  that  the
     will and  intention of the legislature is to be regarded and
     followed.   It is  properly resorted  to,  where  doubts  or
     ambiguities arise  upon the  words of the enacting part; for
     if they  are clear  and unambiguous, there seems little room
     for interpretation,  except in   cases leading to an obvious
     absurdity,  or  to  a  direct  overthrow  of  the  intention
     expressed in the Preamble.

          [Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States]
            [Joseph Story, Vol. 1, De Capo Press Reprints (1970)]
                                              [at pages 443, 444]



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     With the  authority of  Justice Story,  then, we examine the
wording of the Preamble as to the term "Union".  The term "Union"
as used  in the  Preamble is  evidently the  one declared  in the
Declaration of  Independence (1776)  and organized  in accordance
with "certain  articles  of  Confederation  and  Perpetual  Union
between the  States" which  declared that  "the  Union  shall  be
perpetual."  See Texas vs White, 7 Wallace 700.

     The Union  of the  States never  was a purely artificial and
     arbitrary relation.   It  began among Colonies, and grew out
     of common  origin, mutual  sympathies,  kindred  principles,
     similar  interest,  and  geographical  relations.    It  was
     confirmed  strengthened  by  the  necessities  of  war,  and
     received definite form, and character, and sanction from the
     Articles of  Confederation.  By these the Union was solemnly
     declared to  "be perpetual."   And  when these Articles were
     found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the
     Constitution was  ordained "to  form a  more perfect union."
     It is  difficult to  convey the  idea of  indissoluble unity
     more clearly  than these words.  What can be indissoluble if
     a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not?

     But the  perpetuity and  indissolubility of the Union, by no
     means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence,
     or of the right of self-government by the States.  Under the
     Articles  of   Confederation   each   State   retained   its
     sovereignty, freedom,  and independence,  and  every  power,
     jurisdiction, and  right  not  expressly  delegated  to  the
     United States.   Under  the Constitution, though, the powers
     of the  States were  much restricted,  still, all powers not
     delegated to  the  United  States,  nor  prohibited  to  the
     States, are  reserved to  the States  respectively or to the
     people.   And we have already had occasion to remark at this
     term, that "the people of each State compose a State, having
     its own  government, and  endowed  with  all  the  functions
     essential to  separate and  independent existence," and that
     "without the  States  in  union,  there  could  be  no  such
     political body  as the United States."  Not only, therefore,
     can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to
     the States,  through their union under the Constitution, but
     it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the
     States, and  the maintenance  of their  governments, are  as
     much within  the design  and care  of the maintenance of the
     National  government.     The   Constitution,  in   all  its
     provisions, looks  to an  indestructible Union,  composed of
     indestructible States.

     When, therefore,  Texas became one of the United States, she
     entered into  a indissoluble  relation.  All the obligations
     of perpetual  union, and  all the  guarantees of  republican
     government in the Union, attached at once to the State.  The
     act which  consummated her  admission  into  the  Union  was
     something more  than a compact;  it was the incorporation of
     a new  member into  the political  body.   And it was final.


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     The  union  between  Texas  and  the  other  States  was  as
     complete, as  perpetual, and  as indissoluble  as the  union
     between the  original  States.    There  was  no  place  for
     reconsideration, or  revocation, except  through revolution,
     or through consent of the States.

          [Texas vs White, 7 Wallace, at pages 723 to 726 (1886)]

     Similarly, the  term "establish",  as used  in the Preamble,
means to fix perpetually:

       STAB'LISH ...

       1.      To set and fix firmly or unalterable;  to settle
               permanently.

               I will establish my covenant with him for an
               everlasting covenant.  Gen. xvii

       2.      To found permanently;  to erect and fix or settle;
               as, to establish a colony or empire.

       3.      To enact or decree by authority and for permanence

       4.      To settle or fix;  to confirm.

       5.      To make firm;  to confirm;  to ratify what has
               been previously set or made.

               Do we then make void the law through faith?  God
               forbid: yea, we establish the law.  Rom. iii.

                 [An American Dictionary of the English Language]
                              [Noah Webster (1828), reprinted by]
             [Foundation for American Christian Education (1967)]

     ESTABLISH.   This word occurs frequently in the Constitution
     of the  United States,  and it  is there  used in  different
     meanings:

       1.      to settle firmly, to fix unalterable;  as to
               establish justice, which is the avowed object of
               the Constitution ...

       2.      To settle or fix firmly;  place on a permanent
               footing;  found;  create;  put beyond doubt or
               dispute;  prove;  convince ...

                     [Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at page 642]

     Thus, if the Union is perpetual, then so too is the founding
law upon  which that Union was predicated in the first place, and
so too is the unalienable Citizenship recognized therein.



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                              POINT 2

                         THE ORGANIC LAW
                  AND THE UNION FOUNDED THEREON
                          ARE PERPETUAL


     The founding  law of  the nation  is the perpetual authority
upon which  the continued  existence  of  the  nation  itself  is
predicated.     As  such,  the  founding  law  carries  universal
authority  and   cannot  be   overthrown  or   subverted  without
repudiating the very existence of the nation established thereby.


     ORGANIC LAW.   The  fundamental law,  or constitution,  of a
     state or  nation, written  or unwritten;  that law or system
     of laws  or principles  which defines  and  establishes  the
     organization of  its government.  St. Louis vs Dorr, 145 Mo.
     466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 LRA 686, 68 Am St Rep 575

     [Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., West Pub. (1968), p. 1251]


     The  authority   of   the   organic   law   is   universally
     acknowledged;   it speaks  the sovereign will of the people;
     its injunction  regarding the  process of  legislation is as
     authoritative as  are those  touching the  substance of  it.
     Suth. Statutory Construction, 44, note 1. "This Constitution
     ... shall  be the supreme law of  the land ...."  Article 6,
     Constitution of the United States (1787).


     That the  people have  an original  right to  establish, for
     their  future  government,  such  principles  as,  in  their
     opinion, shall  be most conducive to their own happiness, is
     the basis  on which  the  whole  American  fabric  has  been
     erected.   The exercise  of the  original right   is  a very
     great exertion,  nor can  it, nor  ought it to be frequently
     repeated.   The principles,  therefore, so  established, are
     deemed fundamental.   And  as the authority, from which they
     proceed, is  supreme, and  can seldom act, they are designed
     to be permanent.


     The original  and supreme will organizes the government, and
     assigns, to  different departments, their respective powers.
     It may either stop here;  or establish certain limits not to
     be transcended by those departments.


     The government  of  the  United  States  is  of  the  latter
     description.  The powers of the legislature are defined, and
     limited;     and  those  limits  may  not  be  mistaken,  or
     forgotten, the constitution is written.  To what purpose are


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                                                       Appendix Y


     the powers  limited, and  to what purpose is that limitation
     committed to  writing, if  the limits  may, at  any time  be
     passed by those intended to be restrained?  The distinction,
     between a  government with  limited and unlimited powers, is
     abolished, if  those limits  do not  confine the  persons on
     whom they  are imposed,  and if  acts  prohibited  and  acts
     allowed, are  of equal  obligation.  It is a proposition too
     plain to  be contested,  that the  constitution controls any
     legislative act  repugnant to  it;  or, that the legislature
     may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.


     Between these  alternatives there  is no middle ground.  The
     constitution  is   either   a   superior,   paramount   law,
     unchangeable by  ordinary means,  or it  is on  a level with
     ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable
     when the legislature shall please to alter it.


     If the  former part  of the  alternative  be  true,  then  a
     legislative act  contrary to the constitution is not law: if
     the latter  be true,  then written  constitutions are absurd
     attempts, on  the part  of the  people, to limit a power, in
     its own  nature illimitable.   Certainly  all those who have
     framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the
     fundamental  and   paramount  law   of   the   nation,   and
     consequently the  theory of  every such  government must be,
     that  an   act  of   the  legislature,   repugnant  to   the
     constitution, is void ....


     If then  the courts are to regard the constitution;  and the
     constitution  is   superior  to  any  ordinary  act  of  the
     legislature;   the constitution,  and not such ordinary act,
     must govern the case to which they both apply.


     Those  then   who  controvert   the   principle   that   the
     constitution is  to be  considered, in court, as a paramount
     law, are  reduced   to the necessity of maintaining that the
     courts must  close their  eyes on  the constitution, and see
     only the law.

          [Marbury vs Madison, 1 Cranch 137, at pages 176 to 178]









                                                  [continued ...]


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                               III


     AN INDICTMENT IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION,
             IF IT USES WORDS OF NUMEROUS MEANINGS,
                SO AS TO BE VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS,
                SO THE DEFENDANT IS UNCERTAIN OF
                  SECRET AND SPECIFIC MEANINGS,
                 THEREBY BEING DENIED A DEFENSE.


     1.   The indictment  utilizes the  term  "resident"  as  its
jurisdictional statement, without any further clarification.

      "The jurisdiction of a federal court must affirmatively and
distinctly appear  and cannot  be helped  by presumptions  or  by
argumentive inferences  drawn  from  the  pleadings."  Norton  vs
Larney, 266  U.S. 511,  515, 45  S. Ct. 145, 69 L.Ed. 413 (1925).
Accord, Bender  vs Williamsport  Area Schools  District, 475 U.S.
534, 106  S.Ct. 1326, 1334, 89 L.Ed.2d 501, rehearing denied, 106
S.Ct.  2003  (1986);    Nor  can  a  contester's  allegations  of
jurisdiction be  read in  isolation from  the complaint's factual
allegations, Schilling  vs Rogers,  363 U.S.  666, 676,  80 S.Ct.
1288, 4  L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960), nor can jurisdiction be effectively
established by  omitting facts which would establish that it does
not exist.   Lambert Run Coal Co. vs Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258
U.S. 377,  382, 42  S.Ct. 349,  66 L.Ed.  671 (1922).    Nor  can
jurisdiction be  "gleaned from  the briefs  and arguments" of the
Plaintiff.   Bender, supra,  106 S.Ct. at 1334.  The burden fully
to demonstrate jurisdiction clearly falls on the Plaintiff, and a
failure fully  to define the conditions creating some nexus under
the ambiguous term "resident" is an error.

     The  requirement   to  prove  jurisdiction  is  particularly
important when  the government  of a  foreign state  (the "United
States") brings  criminal charges  against a  Citizen of  another
State.

     Where  jurisdiction   is  denied  and  squarely  challenged,
jurisdiction cannot  be assumed to exist "sub silentio" but  must
be proven.  Hagans vs Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533, n. 5;  Monell vs
N.Y., 436  U.S. 633.   Mere  "good faith" assertions of power and
authority (jurisdiction)  have been  abolished.  Owen vs Indiana,
445 U.S.  622;   Butz vs  Economou, 438  U.S. 478;   Bivens  vs 6
unknown agents, 403 U.S. 388.

     An indictment  is "vague"  if it does not allege each of the
essential elements of the crime with sufficient clarity to enable
the defendant  to prepare his defense.  U.S. vs BI-CO Pavers, 741
F.2d 730  (1984).  Where the defendant must guess at its meaning,
it is  vague and  violates the  first essential  element  of  due
process.  See Connolly vs General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).



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                                                       Appendix Y


     It is  an elementary  principle of  criminal pleading,  that
     where the  definition of an offense, whether it be at common
     law or  by statute,  "includes  generic  terms,  it  is  not
     sufficient that  the indictment  shall charge the offense in
     the same  generic terms  as in  the definition;  but it must
     state the  species;   it must  descend to the particulars. 1
     Arch. Cr. Pr. and Pl. 291.

                [U.S. vs Cruikshank, La. 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1872)]
                                                 [emphasis added]


                               IV

            26 U.S.C. SECTION 7203, IN AND OF ITSELF,
    IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN AN INDICTMENT AND CONVICTION,
     WHEN NO OTHER STATUTE IS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN VIOLATED.


     26 U.S.C.  7203, in  and of  itself,  does  not  describe  a
triable offense,  nor does  it state  any basis for any crimes or
public offenses,  so as to confer jurisdiction for any issue that
is triable  as a  "misdemeanor".   On the  contrary, as  will  be
shown, jurisdiction is absent.


     Sec.  7203.    Willful  Failure  to  File  Return,    Supply
     Information, or Pay Tax.

     Any person  required under  this title  to pay any estimated
     tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made
     under authority  thereof to make a return, keep any records,
     or supply  any information,  who willfully fails to pay such
     estimated tax  or tax,  make such return, keep such records,
     or supply  such information at the time or times required by
     law and  regulations, shall,  in addition to other penalties
     provided by  law, be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and,  upon
     conviction thereof,  shall be  fined not  more than  $25,000
     ($100,000 in  the case  of a corporation), or imprisoned not
     more than  1 year,  or both,  together with the costs of the
     prosecution.  In the case of any person with respect to whom
     there is  a failure  to pay  any estimated tax, this section
     shall not  apply to such person with respect to such failure
     if there  is no  addition to  tax under section 6654 or 6655
     with respect to such failure.

                                                 [26 U.S.C. 7203]


     IRC 7203  fails to  provide any definition of any offense by
failing to  charge any  statutory crime  in any  language of  any
statute.




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                                                The Federal Zone:


     The language  of 26  U.S.C. 7203,  in and of itself, and any
alleged violation  as propounded  in Appellee's indictment, fails
to be  fully descriptive  of  any  offense  or  crime.    It  is,
therefore, fundamentally impossible to violate Section 7203 since
this Section,  in and of itself, does not include or refer to any
specific statute  that could  provide a nexus for prosecution, as
is clearly shown in U.S. vs Menk, 260 F. Supp. 784:


     But,  rather,   all  three   sections  referred  to  in  the
     information,  sections   4461,  4901,   and  7203,  must  be
     considered together  before a  complete  definition  of  the
     offense is  found.   Section 4461  imposes a  tax on persons
     engaged in  a certain  activity;   section 4901 provides the
     payment of  the  tax  shall  be  a  condition  precedent  to
     engaging in the activity subject to the tax and Section 7203
     makes it  a misdemeanor  to engage  in the  activity without
     first having  paid the  tax, and provides the penalty. It is
     impossible to  determine the  meaning or  intended effect of
     any one  of these  three sections  without reference  to the
     others.
                            [U.S. vs Menk, supra, emphasis added]

     Contrary to the accusatory pleadings, 26 U.S.C. 7203, in and
of itself,  is not  a statute  subject to  violation since  it is
nothing more  than a  penalty clause for some undefined franchise
obligation.   Section 7203,  upon which the Appellee's indictment
is based,  fails to provide a complete definition of any offense,
and therefore,  in and  of itself,  it fails  to state properly a
claim upon  which probable  cause could  predicate.  As the Court
stated in U.S. vs Menk, supra:


     The Court  of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly
     held that  an indictment  or information is sufficient which
     defines a  statutory crime  substantially in the language of
     the statute  if such  language is  fully descriptive  of the
     offense.

                                     [U.S. vs Menk, supra at 786]

Section 7203  contains no  such descriptive language, nor does it
identify any other statutes.

     It cannot be said that Section 7203 imposes a tax on persons
engaged in  a certain  activity, nor  can it  be said  that  7203
provides that  the payment  of  the  tax  shall  be  a  condition
precedent to  engaging  in  the  activity  subject  to  the  tax.
However, 7203  makes it  a misdemeanor  to engage in the activity
without having  first paid  the tax, and provides the penalty. In
addition, 7203  makes it a misdemeanor not to file a return, keep
records or  supply information  that may  be required  by several
other statutes and regulations, which specifically determine that
activity and crime.


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                                                       Appendix Y


     Because  the   activity  in  the  Appellees'  indictment  is
undefined, Section  7203 is  not, in  and of  itself, a basis for
prosecution, and there is no probable cause of action against the
Appellant.   Similarly, it is impossible to determine the meaning
or intended  effect of  Section 7203  without having reference to
other possibly  applicable and as yet undefined sections of Title
26, U.S.C.

     Plainly and  simply, Section 7203 is only a penalty statute,
and by  itself cannot  stand without  reference to other statutes
and or  regulations.   An IRS  agent stated on the record that no
other statutes  were violated  or identified  as such  before the
grand jury (CR June 28, 1988, p. 13, lines 5-12).

     Thus the  indictment is  vague and  the court is in error in
sustaining the indictment and conviction.



                                V


    THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD "PERSON" USED IN SECTION 7203,
     AS DEFINED IN 7343 FOR CHAPTER 75, WHICH INCLUDES 7203,
              CANNOT BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE SOMEONE
      OTHER THAN THE INDIVIDUALS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 7343.


     The words  used in  a statute  cannot be extended beyond the
clear meaning  and intent  of the  legislative body which created
the statute.

     The courts,  in construing  the words of any statute, cannot
include someone  other than  the ones  described in that statute;
to do  so would be like extending the law that controls the speed
of an  airplane propeller to include a pedestrian walking along a
path in a forest.

     Chapter 75, which contains Section 7343, carries the heading
"Crimes, Other Offenses, and Forfeitures".  Section 7343 states:


     Section 7343.  Definition of term "person."

     The term  "person" as  used  in  this  chapter  includes  an
     officer or  employee  of  a  corporation,  or  a  member  or
     employee of  a partnership, who as such officer, employee or
     member is  under a  duty to  perform the  act in  respect of
     which the violation occurs.
                                                 [26 U.S.C. 7343]






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                                                The Federal Zone:


     This section  was previously  found in  Section  150,  which
referred only  to corporation tax returns.  This was the original
intent of  Congress.   Thus, Section 7806 is brought to bear upon
the application of this section.  Section 7806 States:


     Sec. 7806.  Construction of title.

     (b)  Arrangement and Classification.

     No inference,  implication, or  presumption  of  legislative
     construction shall  be  drawn  or  made  by  reason  of  the
     location or  grouping of any particular section or provision
     or portion  of this  title, nor shall any table of contents,
     table of  cross references, or similar outline, analysis, or
     descriptive matter relating to the contents of this title be
     given any legal effect.  The preceding sentence also applies
     to the  sidenotes and  ancillary  tables  contained  in  the
     various prints of this Act before its enactment into law.

                                              [26 U.S.C. 7806(b)]

Thus,  26  U.S.C.  7203  does  not  apply  to  the  Appellant,  a
California State  Citizen, because  such individual  Citizens are
not within  the purview of Chapter 75.  Therefore, the indictment
must fail.



                           CONCLUSION


     For the  forgoing reasons,  the Accused's conviction must be
reversed, with  an affirmative  declaration that the Accused is a
de jure  California State Citizen, and a member of the Posterity,
as defined  in the  Preamble to  the Constitution  for the United
States of America.



Respectfully submitted
with explicit reservation of all my unalienable rights
and  without prejudice to any of my unalienable rights,





[DEFENDANT]







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