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DOCTYPE='BOOK' PUBLICID='' SYSTEMID='/dtd/docbook.dtd'Building and Auditing a Trusted Network Environment with NetWare 4Building and Auditing a Trusted Network Environment with NetWare 4Novell, Inc.DisclaimerNovell, Inc. makes no representations or warranties with
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of the publisher.TYPE="VERT"Novell, Inc.122 East 1700 SouthProvo, UT 84606U.S.A.User Comment FormNovell encourages and welcomes your feedback and suggestions on ways we can improve our manuals. You can help us by sharing your comments and suggestions about how our manuals could be made more useful to you, and about any inaccuracies or information gaps they contain.Submit your comments by printing this User Comment form (click on the icon to display the form, then select "Print" from the "File" menu), filling it in, then faxing or mailing it to us.LABEL="0" FLOAT="0"User Comment FormFILEREF="ucomment.tif"PAGENUM=1 ID="BP1"PrefaceRENDERAS="SECT1"AuthorsStanley (Stash) R. Jarocki Vice President Citibank, N.A.Michael Kelch Senior Manager of IS Audit Ernst & YoungTodd Heemsoth Manager of IS Audit Ernst & YoungWalter Boyd CMA, CNE, CNI Certified Network SolutionsTim Myers Senior Software Consultant Novell Consulting ServicesPaula Moreira Senior Technical Instructor Novell EducationRich Lee Senior Research Consultant Novell ResearchEd Liebing Senior Editor Novell ResearchPAGENUM=2 ID="BP2"RENDERAS="SECT2"About the AuthorsStanley R. (Stash) Jarocki has over 25 years of experience in the data processing and telecommunications profession. He holds the position of Vice President/Director for Technology Support and Research at Citibank, N.A. Corporate Audit. He is responsible for designing and implementing the audit strategy and program for their domestic and global advanced technologies involving telecommunications, operating systems (UNIX, NetWare, Windows NT), E-mail, and others. Mr. Jarocki has held senior positions with the U.S. federal government organizations including the National Security Agency, Planning Research Corporation, Coopers & Lybrand and Bankers Trust Company. He is a Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA), Certified Data Professional and has earned his certification by the National Security Agency professional panels as an Electronics Engineer and Mathematician.Mr. Jarocki is active in the EDP Auditors Association and the Institute of Internal Auditors, especially in the area of education and standards efforts such as SAC. Mr. Jarocki is the recipient of the 1994 Wasserman Award from the EDPAA. He has lectured and taught extensively throughout the world on LAN and network computing security and control.Michael Kelch contributes 11 years of Information System Audit experience from his career at Ernst & Young. He conceived and oversaw the development of Ernst & Young's LAN Assessment process to conduct in-depth reviews of Novell NetWare 3.11 control environments. His clients included the two largest banks in Chicago as well as six Fortune 500 manufacturing companies based in the Midwest.Mr. Kelch's credentials include a B.S. in Accounting from the University of Illinois and an MBA in finance from the University of Chicago. He passed the Certified Information Systems Exam in 1986. His certifications include CPA and Certified Production and Inventory Management (CPIM). Mr. Kelch recently moved to Platinum Software Corporation as the Manager of Customer Solutions in the Financial/Cost Management Systems Division.Todd Heemsoth was a member of Ernst & Young's Information Systems Audit group in Chicago for five years, providing audit and consulting services. Most recently, he was responsible for developing Ernst & Young's Novell NetWare audit methodology, LAN assessment.PAGENUM=3 ID="BP3"Mr. Heemsoth has been a speaker on LAN concepts and auditing practices at local chapters of the IIA and the EDPAA. Mr. Heemsoth received a B.S. degree in Accounting from Purdue University. His certifications include Certified NetWare Administrator, Certified Public Accountant, and Certified Information Systems Auditor. Mr. Heemsoth recently moved to Platinum Software Corporation as a Systems Engineer in their Financial/Cost Management Systems Division.Walter Boyd is an Enterprise Certified NetWare Engineer (ECNE) and Certified NetWare Instructor (CNI). He has been actively supporting NetWare operating systems for over nine years. He teaches NetWare courses throughout the United States and consults with clients worldwide. He also writes frequently on advanced networking topics, particularly NetWare 4.Mr. Boyd holds Bachelor of Science degrees in Business Management and Economics from Brigham Young University and is a Certified Management Accountant (CMA). He is a Senior Consultant with Certified Network Solutions, a Novell Authorized Service Center (NASC) based in Salt Lake City, Utah.RENDERAS="SECT2"ReviewersWe would like to acknowledge and thank the following members of the IIA review committee and their staffs for providing feedback that was vital to this report. Members of this committee who took part in the review process are:Dominick J. Brunone Exxon Upstream Technology Computing Co.A. E. Callahan Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas CityAlan S. Oliphant Standard Life Assurance Co.William R. Clark Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.Jay H.Stott Mobil CorporationPatricia T. Herman Commonwealth of VirginiaPAGENUM=4 ID="BP4"Thomas M. Truglio AetnaStanley R. Jarocki Citibank, N.A.We would also like to thank the following reviewers from Novell:Carl AllenSteve JacksonJames BrownKevin KingdonTim PetruCraig TeerlinkDoug HaleJohn WatkinsRENDERAS="SECT1"AcknowledgmentsBuilding and Auditing a Trusted Network Environment with NetWare 4 has truly been a collaborative effort. Thanks are due first to Executive Management: to J. Warren Harding, Manager of Novell Research and Publisher of Novell Application Notes and Research Reports; to David B. Morrison, Vice President of Corporate Audit for Citibank, N.A.; and to Charles H. Le Grand of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), for his personal support and help during this research project. Special thanks go to David W. Eckert of Westinghouse Corporation for providing valuable feedback during the development of this report. Thanks also to James Brown and Tim Petru of Novell for their extensive technical contributions; to Novell's Carl Allen for initiating contact with the vendor community and internal personnel that brought the authors and companies together; and to Robb Perry, of Novell, for providing the graphics for this project.PAGENUM=5 ID="BP5"Finally, special mention and thanks are due Gamal Herbon and Ken Neff of Novell, and Stash Jarocki of Citibank, who provided the herculean effort necessary to smooth, shape, and edit this report into its final form.RENDERAS="SECT1"ForewordThe Institute of Internal Auditors is pleased to participate with Novell, Citibank, N.A., and Ernst & Young in preparing a guide for implementing security and auditing capabilities in the NetWare 4 environment. The IIA salutes the team of auditors and security specialists for their months of dedicated efforts in preparing and reviewing this report.The technology of interconnecting workstations, servers, and multiple networks is relatively young in comparison to more traditional information systems, yet already it is impacting organizations of all sizes and types. The ability to migrate to enterprise network computing on a broad scale introduces a new level of complexity previously confined to "fortress" data center systems. As mission-critical business applications are placed on networks they carry with them the need to provide internal controls, security, and auditing capabilities.The auditing profession actively participates in initiatives to define and introduce internal control as a management objective and to document a framework for meeting control responsibilities. The report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission, 1987) addressed top management, boards of directors, the auditing profession, regulatory and law enforcement bodies, the academic world, and others in recommendations to improve governance and accountability in financial reporting. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) embraced these recommendations and in 1992 released a report that defines "internal control" and documents an "Internal Control Integrated Framework" (called the COSO report). The IIA is a member of COSO and pursues a variety of efforts aimed at improving management practices and internal controls.The IIA Research Foundation released the Systems Auditability and Control (SAC) report in 1991. SAC is a major research effort designed to enhance the abilities of systems managers, designers and developers, users, and auditors in assuring a secure, controlled, and auditable systems environment. SAC has become widely recognized as the definitive reference work addressing systems risk and control issues for virtually all areas of technology. The IIA also provides "Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing".PAGENUM=6 ID="BP6"Novell and its research partners have taken the basic tenets of security, control, and auditing and applied them in developing this report. This report can be used as a guideline and knowledge base for implementing security and auditing in a NetWare 4 environment. The IIA does not endorse the control or security provisions of any vendor or product, but it does applaud the efforts of technology providers to address security, control, and auditability in their products. The IIA is also eager to cooperate with industry and technology leaders in leveraging its control and auditing expertise in the early stages of development to improve technology products before they are deployed.The project to develop this report was the first of its kind to involve the International Advanced Technology Committee of the IIA and is an example of how the auditing profession and industry can work together in addressing rapidly changing technologies. It is an important step in the direction of bringing specialized knowledge to managers, developers, users, and auditors. We thank Novell for spearheading this effort, for providing an opportunity to review the text, and for their acceptance of the changes taking place which promote the principles of quality auditing and control.Charles H. Le Grand Director of Technology Institute of Internal AuditorsRENDERAS="SECT1"About This ReportThe computing industry has changed dramatically over the past quarter century. Individuals and organizations have embraced the diverse technologies of mainframes, microcomputers, and network computing at various times and levels of operation. The transition from centralized to distributed computing has been supported by the symbiotic relationship that exists between the computing and telecommunications industries. Today nearly everyone in the business world uses some form of network computing. As the 1990s bring enhanced cable and fiber optic multimedia services to our homes, network computing will become as pervasive as the telephone and the microwave. The use of network computing technology is not without danger. The environment in which information is being retrieved, processed, transmitted, and stored is not inherently secure  especially at the workstation level. The components of networks (microcomputers, connectivity devices, and so on) were not initially built with integrated security features and thus do not provide an acceptable level of trust "out of the box." Network security features must be properly enabled and configured to maintain system confidentiality, integrity, and availability. PAGENUM=7 ID="BP7"The need for network security services is clear. From the departmental computing environments of the 1980s to the enterprise-wide networks and services of the 1990s, network operating systems are required to fulfill an ever-increasing number of business requirements. As businesses adopt the network computing paradigm, data storage is concentrated at strategic locations, while data processing is distributed throughout the organization. This leads to an increased reliance on data communications and has shifted much of the responsibility for maintaining data integrity away from trained data center personnel.This migration brings with it potential concerns, particularly with regards to security and access control. A recent information security survey of 870 CIOs conducted by Ernst & Young and Information Week revealed that over the last five years, distributed computing has increased in 93 percent of the respondent organizations. A majority of respondents (71 percent) believe that their information and data security risks have increased (Source: Ernst & Young).Building a "trusted" network environment  one that is secure and auditable  is a necessary, yet complex, undertaking. It requires two things:MARK=BULLETA good understanding of the operating systems in useA clear definition of security objectives and audit requirementsThis report focuses on the solutions available with Novell's NetWare 4 operating system for achieving a network security and auditability framework that can be used to build a trusted computing environment.Information services security personnel and auditors need to develop a cooperative, well-ordered approach to implementing, examining and analyzing enterprise network computing. This is best accomplished by establishing common goals, complementary approaches to security deployment, and audit evaluation. These factors, coupled with product knowledge and good communication with security product vendors, will facilitate effective security introduction, implementation, and maintenance.A key ingredient to an auditor's success is the availability of quality information and materials with which to complete a security review or audit. This report provides the information necessary to understand and use NetWare 4's security and audit features.PAGENUM=8 ID="BP8"RENDERAS="SECT2"Purpose of This ReportNovell Research, Citibank N.A., Ernst & Young, and the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) recognize the need for coordinated and specialized information covering NetWare 4 security and auditing concerns. In response to this need, a residency program was established to produce this report. This report contains the culmination of months of research and testing performed by the authors, and was reviewed by members of the IIA.The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the security control and auditing features in the NetWare 4 operating system. The report is divided into five chapters:MARK=BULLETChapter 1 contains an overview of network security as it relates to a trusted computing environmentChapter 2 outlines basic security, control, and audit features available in NetWare 4 that can provide a trusted computing environmentChapter 3 discusses methods for implementing and administering NetWare 4 to enable various security featuresChapter 4 presents an audit program and procedures for auditing a NetWare 4 network to ensure it is trustedChapter 5 introduces the NetWare 4 AUDITCON utilitySupplementary material included in the appendices includes a feature comparison of NetWare 3.12 and 4.x, a list of third-party security product vendors, and a list of NetWare 4 commands for gathering security-related information.The primary objectives of this report are:MARK=BULLETTo present generally accepted security practices based on the Institute of Internal Auditors' Systems Auditability and Control (SAC) Report and current industry needs To provide an understanding of Novell's approach to enterprise network operating systemsTo identify NetWare 4's security/control strengths, as well as common security implementation weaknessesPAGENUM=9 ID="BP9"To identify problems and limitations affecting the areas of security, auditing, and day-to-day operations.To find solutions for building a trusted enterprise network environmentTo establish an audit methodology and advanced audit program for NetWare 4 RENDERAS="SECT3"Targeted AudienceThis report presents and builds on a common body of knowledge regarding security and control concepts and their implementation in NetWare 4. Both overview and technical material is presented at various levels to support management's needs in understanding this technology and to direct the efforts of the information technology auditor in planning the audit. The material in this report will also help network and security administrators adopt an implementation strategy for designing a trusted enterprise computing system.RENDERAS="SECT3"Additional InformationWhile this research report is fairly comprehensive, no single document can possibly cover everything there is to know about network security. As new information regarding NetWare 4 security and auditing is updated or made available, this core of information will be supplemented by future Application Notes.A number of other excellent references on security and auditing and general network-related topics are also available. Many of these are listed in the bibliography at the end of this report.LABEL="1"PAGENUM=11 ID="BP10"Security OverviewComputer security has long been a concern for government and business. With the introduction of networks into the computer system security picture, the security issue is more important now than ever before. This chapter provides an overview of networks and network security and the various levels or classifications of security recognized by both government and business entities. It also introduces five security models that provide examples of progressive levels of protection.RENDERAS="SECT1"Historical PerspectiveTwenty-five years ago marked a change in mainframe operating systems. At that time, IBM, Digital Equipment Corporation, and others launched a major effort to implement active security within their operating systems. Representatives from government, the Department of Defense (DOD), and academia proposed features needed to build secure mainframe operating systems. "In five years we will have secure operating systems..." were the words that echoed throughout the computing industry. Over the years, industry and government have spent billions of dollars trying to achieve the elusive condition of maintaining a controlled and secure place to process, exchange, and store information.With the recent advent of rightsizing (characterized by some as "downsizing without capsizing"), and as businesses struggle to re-engineer their information systems through the use of client/server technologies, the same security problem has resurfaced. The question now echoing throughout the industry is, "Can network computing, with its mix of desktop operating systems, network operating systems, and multivendor environments, provide a secure environment with secure information?"PAGENUM=12 ID="BP11"To compound the situation, government regulations, transborder data flow laws, security concerns, privacy requirements, and telecommunications deregulation all present numerous implementation, control, and management issues. Modern businesses simply cannot afford increased security and control risks that might disable their business functions.Traditional mainframe data centers and operating systems provided fortress-like environments in which dumb terminals attached to secure hosts. The migration to distributed computing networks requires that client/server operating systems provide security capabilities equivalent to those provided by host systems. This level of security must become an integral part of network operating systems, so that a person will have to invoke access security and control before being allowed to use network resources. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are the three major elements that must be properly migrated to and supported in networks.Due to technological advances in the areas of network capacity, bandwidth, functionality, and so forth, network security can now be achieved. However, close integration between desktop and server operating systems is required in order to have a secure working environment.The NetWare 4 operating system provides a sound basis for enterprise security with an X.500-like Directory Services component. This, along with extended file system security controls, raises network security to the level of most host implementations. NetWare 4 has been submitted to the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) for C2 evaluation, and to the European ITSEC for E2 certification. In the future, a unification of Novell's desktop and network operating systems (Novell DOS, NetWare 3 and 4, and UnixWare) will provide a more cohesive operating base. However, this integration of operating systems will take time. Implementing security in a mixed environment today requires cooperative effort. By properly setting up and using NetWare 4, the following can be achieved:MARK=BULLETSingular access controlSecurity standardizationSecurity interoperabilitySecurity management (centralized and distributed)Auditability (detective and real-time)Once this is done, NetWare 4's security features can be more effectively implemented to reduce or eliminate risk and exposure.PAGENUM=13 ID="BP12"RENDERAS="SECT2"The Importance of Network SecurityNetworks have become the "backbone" of many companies. Virtually all aspects of everyday work are dependent on communications whether it be voice, data, imaging, or any combination that exists now or in the future. This is true with the usage of networks to move and process information and to provide such services as multimedia, telephony, and applications development. A review of the 1993 and 1994 budgets for various companies indicates the expansion of telecommunications (in particular networks) will be a prime source of budgetary expansion for information technology departments. The shift to the network computing enterprise model will require increased funding and major changes to the way data is handled. Thus, management, security, and auditing must form an integrated working partnership to provide the monitored control necessary for business systems.In the case of major money center banking firms, it is estimated as much as 40% of the entire information technology budget will be allocated to telecommunications and network technologies. The aggregate sum of money being spent on voice, data, and specialized communications has presently grown about 200 to 300% from the typical average of 5% of the total operating budget in the early 1980's.The expanded usage of enterprise and global networks with NetWare 4 has virtually eliminated the boundaries for information exchange. Combinations of NetWare 4 and NetWare 3.12 have given the industry the ability to downsize to new technologies offered by microcomputer-based hardware systems and to rightsize with the proper software base.However, the migration to new operating systems is not without its potential concerns, such as control and security. With the advent of rightsizing, information storage has been concentrated at strategic locations and data processing has been distributed throughout the organizations. This has increased the reliance on data communications and moved the responsibility for the information to the desktop and to the individual user. This migration will have an even greater effect in the future with the coming ability to connect to everything from home or anywhere else via the information super highway.PAGENUM=14 ID="BP13"The complexity of this paradigm is compounded by the fact that PC-based networks have grown up as "technology in a box" and wires in the wall, and have become the norm for the plug and play high tech business environments. As a result, the complexity of a company's telecommunications system, its asset value, and its importance in running mission critical business applications requires a new and unique audit approach and strategy. This strategy is examined and developed in the following sections.RENDERAS="SECT1"Major Audit and Security ConcernsTelecommunications and network technology impacts a company in many different ways. In a large company, the operation and maintenance of these technologies can require enough resources to be considered a separate company. Having the proper resources for this operation and maintenance can be the difference between doing business successfully or going out of business. Not only does this impact the bottom line, it also controls both internal and external information flow.Management and the Auditing department must realize that telecommunications growth has always been explosive in nature and that it affects all facets of a company and its clients. An overall strategy is needed to identify threats and risks, and to limit exposure to them. Poor planning prior to migrating to or building a NetWare 4 infrastructure can lead to unmanageable problems in the future. In order to minimize any threats or risks, consider the audit concerns in the following sections.RENDERAS="SECT2"Strategic PlanningEnterprise network systems require careful planning. It is important to understand the organizational structure and data flow before formulating an implementation path for a Novell NetWare 4 network environment. Chapters 3 and 4 of this report address these concerns by providing a description of the NetWare Directory Service and file system structure features. These are important factors to consider when implementing security and auditing for an enterprise-wide network business solution architecture. Networks can provide similar, if not better, solutions than are available on the current "fortress" systems. Reliability, performance, control, security, and user satisfaction can be evaluated and implemented at the necessary level of need for any company. Strategic planning is key to achieving this, and requires early involvement by both Auditing and Management.RENDERAS="SECT2"SecuritySecurity covers the five major areas listed below.PAGENUM=15 ID="BP14"MARK=BULLETUnderstanding what protection is available Identifying specific areas of possible attack Identifying suitable countermeasuresInstituting (Deploying) countermeasures Monitoring changes in the system and countermeasuresComputer system security can be divided into elements of integrity, confidentiality, and availability. These elements in turn can be combined to form a system that provides a trusted network operating system to the user. This provides the user with security equal to that provided by data processing and network control centers today. In order to understand this arrangement, a road map should be generated for every review or audit which delineates the security requirements and provisions on client machines, servers, applications, users, and interfaces. One should clearly define the architecture for the systems development on a client/server based operating environment.RENDERAS="SECT3"Encryption/AuthenticationUsing encryption/authentication technology, however advanced, as the sole source of your network security gives users a false sense of security. The use of encryption should be justified. The Audit group should help determine the need for encryption by analyzing risk and data value. NetWare 4 provides selective encryption in the areas of passwords, login procedures, and packet signature. These features are unique and address many issues being raised by concerned companies as they migrate to networks and need to retain a high level of confidentiality, integrity, and access control.RENDERAS="SECT3"Auditing and ManagementThe classical concern of whether or not proper management controls are in place is paramount. By expanding telecommunications and operational needs, security and control needs can be overly taxed and create unauditable situations.Auditor participation is crucial in early design and specification phases to ensure a proper mix of preventive, detective, and corrective management controls.PAGENUM=16 ID="BP15"Distributed computing must be audited as both a business entity and a network system. A new network audit methodology, coupled with an improved automated tool set, is needed.Security policies must define and examine all aspects of networking platforms. These include, but are not limited to, the following:MARK=BULLETClient/server systems and applicationsDomestic and international telecommunications facilitiesOperations and maintenance proceduresStrategic planning at the component level (hardware, software, communications, and people)Information services security personnel and auditors need to develop a cooperative, well-ordered approach to examining and analyzing enterprise network computing. This is accomplished by establishing common goals, complementary approaches to security deployment, and audit evaluation. These factors, coupled with product knowledge and good communication with security vendors, will facilitate effective security introduction, implementation, and maintenance.RENDERAS="SECT3"Network AnalysisAuditors must determine if the business needs of internal users and clients are being satisfied. Implementation and use of new technologies to help in the audit process must be stressed. Cost recovery, inventory control, and network re-engineering provide a foundation for Audit scrutiny.Additional concerns and specific methods to deal with them are presented in Chapter 4 of this report.RENDERAS="SECT1"Network Technology OverviewNetworks were originally designed and engineered to provide an open path of communication between devices, as suggested by the following definition.PAGENUM=17 ID="BP16"Network: A data communications system that allows a number of independent devices to communicate directly with each other over a physical communications channel for the transfer or exchange of communications, commands, and data.LABEL="1-1" FLOAT="0"A typical network is defined as a collection of devices that can communicate with each other.FILEREF="1_01net.tif"Networks were originally set up to provide services at the department level of a company. This was achieved through the use of such departmental operating systems as NetWare 2 and NetWare 3. Later, wide area connectivity allowed networks to connect and communicate with the same functionality as mainframes and data centers around the world.PAGENUM=18 ID="BP17"RENDERAS="SECT2"Network ComputingNetwork computing allows users working on different personal computers, microcomputers, or workstations to communicate with each other via the network. Users can share network resources  such as server hard disks, data, applications, and printers  and use any services provided by the network. These services include such things as large database storage and processing, external communications, specialized image processing, and so on. Beyond that, networks have interconnected desktop computing with powerful host environments.RENDERAS="SECT2"Enterprise ComputingThe next step in the evolution of network computing was the advent of global Directory Services. Users wanted to log on once and obtain access to computing and communications resources no matter where they were. NetWare 4 was developed to meet these needs and to address the security and control threats and exposures that accompany such an operating system. NetWare 4 allows users to login once to the network (rather than individual servers) and to use network resources no matter where they are located on the network. (See Appendix A for a comparison of NetWare 3.12 and NetWare 4.)RENDERAS="SECT2"RightsizingRightsizing to the NetWare and UnixWare platforms requires dealing with many security and control concerns. Thus, to achieve confidentiality, integrity, and availability goals, consider the following points:NUMERATION=ARABIC CONTINUATION="RESTARTS" INHERITNUM="IGNORE"In the next five years, as users are given powerful network computing operating systems supported by more powerful hardware and storage at the desktop, they may have to manage their own security. Will the users be ready? Will they have the right tools to effectively manage their own security? Can this security be monitored and managed remotely?As the use of NetWare 4 networks increases, will the proper tools be provided to maintain control, availability, integrity, and confidentiality?PAGENUM=19 ID="BP18"NetWare 4 provides NetWare Directory Services technology to the enterprise in addition to the classic file system services provided in NetWare 2, 3, and 4. Many companies systems will support mixed environments of NetWare versions 2, 3, and 4 for the foreseeable future. Work is being done to resolve any incompatibility problems that might arise.Operating systems can no longer be installed without security. Interconnectivity mandates security as a standard. Security features must be easily understood, implemented, and tested in a NetWare 4 environment. As more and more people are connected to the network, it is important that network security and auditability become standard. Standards must be consistent across various implementations, and control and security provisions must be in place during current or future migrations from mainframe to client/server environments.Because of constantly changing business environment and security needs, the Network operating system's security features must be compatible with other systems you might use during your transition period. Ensure that network security meets both current and future requirements and standards efforts. Resource sharing and utilization can be a real challenge in any kind of computing environment. How are resources and services effectively mapped to users? The network operating system must provide interoperability and integration with X.400 and X.500 solutions critical to your business functions.The current trend to "rightsizing" requires an integrated security model. It is important to understand what is provided by Novell and what the software and hardware industry can ultimately provide as add-ons to enhance the network operating system's security and auditability.Many businesses find themselves in the position of trying to "rightsize" in a world full of experimentation. This may include the early adoption of technologies that provide only part of the answers. Thus, non-fortress operating environments can place a tremendous burden on security and auditing departments, as they are faced with the task of reviewing a dynamic set of facilities and services which are in constant flux.RENDERAS="SECT2"PAGENUM=20 ID="BP19"Network ComponentsThis complex mixture of hardware, software, and communications can be very confusing, with a large number of relatively small components located over a large geographical area. To provide a better understanding of these components, the following sections describe their purpose and uses. This explanation is intended to familiarize the reader with the major components in a NetWare network. RENDERAS="SECT3"The Network Server and NetWareThe network server is a microcomputer that runs an operating system (such as NetWare) to control its network resources. The server is usually a microcomputer of the Intel x86 variety or RISC chip design, or a specialized "super server" such as a Tricord or NetFrame, with custom high capacity internal bus structures and large-capacity disks. The network operating system coordinates network activities, regulating who can access which files, make changes to data, and use the network resources.Instead of being stored on diskettes or hard disks in individual PCs, all network files are stored on hard disk drives located on the server(s). The storage capacity of these network disks is typically measured in hundreds of megabytes or even gigabytes. This capacity now approaches that of the central data centers that industry has come to depend on for its existence. RENDERAS="SECT3"Network WorkstationsWorkstations are the personal computers on which network users do their work. Workstations are used much like non-networked personal computers  each processes its own files and runs its own operating system (such as DOS, UNIX, or OS/2). The main difference is that network workstations can access files from more than just local drives.NetWare workstations can be diskless or disk-oriented microcomputers. They use two pieces of software to communicate with the file server: the shell, and a protocol. The shell redirects workstation requests across the network when necessary. The protocol provides a common communication mechanism between the workstation and the network server.RENDERAS="SECT3"Transmission MediaThe transmission media used to connect network stations can take on many different forms, including: MARK=BULLETCopper wire (twisted pair and coaxial)Fiber optic or fiber plasticPAGENUM=21 ID="BP20"Wireless (laser beam, infrared light, microwave, and recently a resurgence of radio wave facilities by such companies as   Motorola, Xircom, and NCR)These types of media differ in their characteristics, advantages, disadvantages, and costs.With these basic components, information flows between the workstations and the servers. On the local or departmental level, the server is the "host" computer with which the remainder of the network entities interact. The NetWare operating system provides the glue that cements the hardware and software components into a functioning whole. NetWare 4 expands on this level of connectivity to include global access and resource independence. NetWare 4 allows users and their workstations to be connected to the network comprised of different types of servers  file, print, database, application, communications, and so on. NetWare 4 also allows interconnection among any number of networks, thus forming an internetwork. The operating system itself can function as a connecting point in the internetwork through its routing capabilities. Add-on services can also provide the facilities to run backup devices, external communications via modem pooling, coordinate the functions of different types of servers (such as print or database servers), and communicate directly with mainframe computers.IDREF="FM43155"Figure 1-2 shows what enterprise-wide networking can provide and achieve today.PAGENUM=22 ID="BP21"LABEL="1-2" FLOAT="0"ID="FM43155"An enterprise-wide network opens up the network to numerous other services.FILEREF="1_02net.tif"Thus, the concept of the local PC network performing a local set of functions for its members has been extended to include the high-volume processing functions of the mainframe and wide area connectivity. Distributed or decentralized computing facilities can now be set up in areas that were once strictly the domain of mainframe and minicomputers. PAGENUM=23 ID="BP22"Geographically localized mass storage, applications, communications, and printing capabilities parallel those available from the centralized data center. As more organizations find increased computing power per dollar as a result of decentralizing, rightsizing is becoming not only a possibility, but often a necessity. In a distributed environment, data is exposed to numerous threats. The risks must be minimized by building a "trusted" network computing framework. This framework consists of meeting the requirements of trusted computer networks and systems.RENDERAS="SECT1"Trusted Computing and Networking SpecificationsTo help you understand how a trusted network environment can be implemented, the following sections summarize the "Trusted Computing and Network" specifications formalized by the U.S. Department of Defense. This is followed by a section on more widely-applicable, commercial view of trusted computing.RENDERAS="SECT2"Government/Military ClassificationsIn October 1967, the U.S. government assembled a Defense Science Board task force to address computer security safeguards to protect classified information in remote-access, resource-sharing computer systems. Their Security Controls for Computer Systems report, published in February 1970, formulated policy and technical recommendations for reducing the threat to classified information processed on remote-access computer systems.This set the groundwork for defining a trusted computer base (TCB) and evaluation criteria that could be applied to commercially available electronic data processing (EDP) systems. The criteria applied not only to the acquisition of EDP systems (and subsequently networks), but to their day-to-day operation.The classification of EDP and network systems was formulated into two distinct sets of requirements: specific security feature requirements, and assurance requirements. These requirements were codified into a set of standards entitled Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, dated December 1985 (referred to as DOD85 or the Orange Book). These standards were applied to networks in a later document published July 31, 1987, entitled Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (known as the Red Book) and its companion document, Trusted Networks Interpretation Environments Guideline, published August 1, 1990. PAGENUM=24 ID="BP23"While the government's intention was to provide security for both government and industry, the process became extremely complex. It has had success with few implementations, but those successes came about over an extended period of time. From these proceedings have emerged some highly-developed criteria for building trusted security systems. However, even these are quite complex, and are not readily understood.RENDERAS="SECT3"Classes of ProtectionThese documents describe seven progressively more restrictive classes:COLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="20*"VALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Minimal ProtectionCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"C1COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Discretionary Security ProtectionCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"C2COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Controlled Access ProtectionCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"B1COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Labeled Security ProtectionCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"B2COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Structured ProtectionCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"B3COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Security DomainsCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"A1COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Verified DesignIn turn, these classes identify various measures to fit the following six requirements:COLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="9*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="17*"VALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Security PolicyCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"An explicit and well-defined security policy must be enforced by the system.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"IdentificationCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Every subject must be uniquely and convincingly defined. Access requests must be checked.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MarkingCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Every object must be associated with a "label" that indicates the security level of the object.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AccountabilityCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"The system must maintain complete, secure records of actions that affect security. Such actions include user setup, assignment, or change of security level (privilege group), and denied access attempts.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AssuranceCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"The system must contain mechanisms that enforce security, and it must be possible to measure the effectiveness of these mechanisms.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Continuous ProtectionCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"The hardware and software mechanisms that implement security must be protected against unauthorized change.PAGENUM=25 ID="BP24"These requirements are further broken down into specific elements which, as mentioned before, are incorporated in various ways into the D, C, B, and A ratings. This breakdown is depicted in the table in IDREF="FM198611"Table 1-1 (adapted from the Appendix in DOD85).LABEL="1-1" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM198611"Table of requirements for DOD security ratings.COLS=8 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="10*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="3*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="3*"COLNAME=4 COLWIDTH="3*"COLNAME=5 COLWIDTH="3*"COLNAME=6 COLWIDTH="3*"COLNAME=7 COLWIDTH="3*"COLNAME=8 COLWIDTH="3*"NAMEST=1 NAMEEND=8 SPANNAME=SPAN1T8 ALIGN=LEFTVALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CriteriaCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class DCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class C1COLNAME=4 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class C2COLNAME=5 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class B1COLNAME=6 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class B2COLNAME=7 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class B3COLNAME=8 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class A1VALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Security Policy:Discretionary Access ControlObject ReuseLabelsLabel IntegrityExportation of Labeled InformationLabeling Human-Readable OutputMandatory Access ControlSubject Sensitivity LabelsDevice LabelsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"xxxxxxxxxCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"xxxxxxxxxCOLNAME=4 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RRxxxxxxxCOLNAME=5 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"--RRRRRxxCOLNAME=6 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"--R---RRRCOLNAME=7 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"R--------COLNAME=8 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"---------COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Accountability:Identification and AuthenticationAuditTrusted PathCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"xxxCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RxxCOLNAME=4 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RRxCOLNAME=5 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RRxCOLNAME=6 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"-RRCOLNAME=7 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"-RRCOLNAME=8 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"---COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Assurance:System ArchitectureSystem IntegritySecurity TestingDesign Specification/VerificationCovert Channel AnalysisTrust Facility ManagementTrust RecoveryTrusted DistributionCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"xxxxxxxxCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RRRxxxxxCOLNAME=4 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"R-RxxxxxCOLNAME=5 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"R-RRxxxxCOLNAME=6 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"R-RRRRxxCOLNAME=7 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"R-RRRRRxCOLNAME=8 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"--RRR--RCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Documentation:Security Features User's GuideTrusted Facility ManualTest DocumentationDesign DocumentationCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"xxxxCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RRRRCOLNAME=4 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"-R--COLNAME=5 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"-R-RCOLNAME=6 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"-RRRCOLNAME=7 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"-R-RCOLNAME=8 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"--RRSPANNAME=SPAN1T8 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"An "x" means no requirement. A "-" means this class has the same requirements as the next lower class. An "R" means this class has additional requirements over the lower classes.PAGENUM=26 ID="BP25"Currently, Class A exists in several environments, mostly oriented toward DOD-type funded projects which require ultimate security. This level of security is recommended only in the most extreme cases.RENDERAS="SECT3"Access ControlThe Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC) criteria are important security policy concepts.DAC allows the owner of a file to set the security parameters for the file. In a UNIX system, for example, a file owner can set the permission bits in the file's Access Control List.PAGENUM=27 ID="BP26"MAC means that the system automatically controls the security parameters of a file through control parameters set by the security officer  the owner of the file cannot change them. However, not all UNIX systems support MAC.RENDERAS="SECT3"Strength of MechanismThe "Evaluation Structure for Network Security Services" added the concept of a "minimum strength of mechanism assurance" requirement. The criteria for this requirement are listed in the following table:COLS=3 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="8*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="8*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="8*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Risk IndexCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Strength of Mechanism AssuranceCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Minimum EvaluationVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"0COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoneCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"1COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MinimumCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"C1COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"2COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"FairCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"C2COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"> 2COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"GoodCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"B2Once these requirements were established, manufacturers were encouraged (or mandated by incorporation of these specifications into Requests for Proposal) to produce systems which fit the various categories.RENDERAS="SECT3"EvaluationThe requirements listed in IDREF="FM198611"Table 1-1 above are very general. Many systems claim to cover various levels of these requirements. To have any real meaning, a system must be certified for a particular level. In other words, the system must be examined in great detail by a U.S. government agency and certified to operate at a certain security level. This evaluation process is a long one and it can be expensive for the system developer. The specific tests and criteria are designed for national security installations and may not be completely appropriate for commercial users. As of this writing, NetWare 4 is undergoing the C2 evaluation process at the National Computer Security Center (NCSC), and for an E2 security rating in Europe from the ITSEC.Evaluation does not guarantee that the security system is perfect. It merely indicates that the security system satisfied the agency performing the evaluation. PAGENUM=28 ID="BP27"RENDERAS="SECT2"Commercial ClassificationsThe above classifications can be grouped into a finite, functionally-oriented commercial set. Based on the government specifications, industry can select its requirements from the four levels illustrated in IDREF="FM198612"Table 1-2 below. This is a simpler, more homogeneous approach to trusted systems than the military's hierarchial structure.LABEL="1-2" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM198612"A commercial interpretation of security classifications.COLS=5 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="22*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="3*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="3*"COLNAME=4 COLWIDTH="3*"COLNAME=5 COLWIDTH="3*"NAMEST=1 NAMEEND=5 SPANNAME=SPAN1T5 ALIGN=LEFTVALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CriteriaCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class DCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class CCOLNAME=4 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class BCOLNAME=5 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class AVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Security Policy:Discretionary Access ControlObject ReuseLabelsLabel IntegrityExportation of Labeled InformationLabeling Human-Readable OutputMandatory Access ControlSubject Sensitivity LabelsDevice LabelsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"xxxxxxxxxCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RRxxxxxxxCOLNAME=4 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"R-RRRRRRRCOLNAME=5 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"---------COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Accountability:Identification and AuthenticationAuditTrusted PathCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"xxxCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RRxCOLNAME=4 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RRRCOLNAME=5 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"---COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Assurance:System ArchitectureSystem IntegritySecurity TestingDesign Specification/VerificationCovert Channel AnalysisTrust Facility ManagementTrust RecoveryTrusted DistributionCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"xxxxxxxxCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RRRxxxxxCOLNAME=4 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"R-RRRRRxCOLNAME=5 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"--RRR--RCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Documentation:Security Features User's GuideTrusted Facility ManualTest DocumentationDesign DocumentationCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"xxxxCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RRRRCOLNAME=4 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"-RRRCOLNAME=5 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"--RRSPANNAME=SPAN1T5 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"An "x" means no requirement. A "-" means this class has the same requirements as the next lower class. An "R" means this class has additional requirements over the lower classes.PAGENUM=29 ID="BP28"The classes can be defined as follows:COLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="7*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="19*"VALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class DCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Though currently available operating systems have numerous integrated security features, they are usually not enabled or "turned on" during the installation. Because of the low level of security provided by this class, we recommend this class of system be avoided.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class CCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"This is the minimum recommended set of security features that should be examined and implemented. This level constitutes a security baseline with which you can build a trusted system foundation.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class BCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Many corporations have dedicated and non-dedicated systems that manipulate and transfer sensitive data. This data, classified as financial, private, or proprietary, is a valued asset. As such, the data should be protected at a level above the normal baseline security level.A compressed Class B generalization provides features that offer a better choice of security and control considerations for these important cases. This grouping is by no means mandatory or all-inclusive; it simply offers recommended practices for handling sensitive data. These recommendations must be judiciously applied as best fits each particular case.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Class ACOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"This is generally not a commercially viable solution. Its restrictive nature is cost-prohibitive to implement, and the required overhead may seriously limit the processing and communications capabilities of the applications systems implemented on this type of platform.PAGENUM=30 ID="BP29"Novell recognizes this simplified commercial interpretation. Out of the box NetWare systems fall into Class D, because the security features are not automatically activated during installation. This means that if you install NetWare without activating any of its security features, you have a class D system. It is important to take the time to enable and take advantage of NetWare's strong security features.Later in this report, we detail the security features available with NetWare 4, and discuss how they might be structured to achieve a trusted network computing environment that can be audited to satisfy the standard Class C and several B security requirements.RENDERAS="SECT1"NetWare 4 Security ModelsSeveral levels of security can be obtained using NetWare 4. These security models are presented to provide you with examples of the functionality and service provided by each level. The models are progressive in nature, with each focusing on a greater level of protection. These are presented as a skeleton upon which to build your own security implementation. Additionally, you can view each of these models as a stopping point, depending upon the amount of risk you are willing to assume for your own system.PAGENUM=31 ID="BP30"Any attempt at presenting a complete security model presents several difficulties. If your requirements are different than the model, then the level of trust you put into your security may be disproportionate to the actual benefit you expect. This is a difficulty in working with generalized models. However, these models can be used to provide a reference point for your own security model.The five security models discussed here are:MARK=BULLETSimpleBasicProtectedAuditedSecuredAs mentioned earlier, each model builds upon the one proceeding it and covers the following points in succession:MARK=BULLETInstituting physical securityPassive warning signsPassive security measures  includes physical isolation of computer components, and using backup software and off-site storage of dataChanging default NetWare 4Active use of passwords and intruder detection in NetWareActive use of Virus detection software Education of end-users to security concernsFile system file and directory protectionRENDERAS="SECT2"PAGENUM=32 ID="BP31"Simple ModelThe simple security model is based on not knowing much about security. It can be implemented, if necessary, by an end-user, and can be started anytime. It provides a minimal layer of security. It also provides those direct actions which prevent inadvertent damage to NetWare 4 or to the server and equipment. The simple security model provides a level of security equivalent to a mid-level D commercial security classification.The simple security model is based upon having adequate backup and archival copies of application software.One of the simplest security methods is posting a sign stating, "HANDS OFF." Unfortunately, in some environments, a warning sign is not enough to prevent loss or damage. In these environments even the simple physical security provided by locking up servers and essential equipment  in places where they cannot be physically accessed  can be advantageous.The reasons for implementing physical security are relatively straightforward. You have an investment  in hardware as well as software  and you wish to have uninterrupted use of your investment. Backup software supplies some of this need. Properly using backup software in coordination with offsite storage of backup copies provides some assurance of continued usability in the event of loss. This allows you to recover data files in the event of an unexpected disaster or accident. End-users are responsible for more recorded hardware and software catastrophes than criminals or disgruntled employees. Of greater importance, end-users usually have guaranteed access to the network server via their local workstation  especially in environments where they do not have to use passwords to gain access to computer resources. Passwords only ensure that your users have access  they do nothing to prevent inadvertent access (file deletions), or subverted access in the form of computer viruses on contaminated disks. Backups are essential.Even with active methods  physical security (locked containment rooms), passwords, virus scanning  there is no substitute for education. One of the most important security measures is proper education.RENDERAS="SECT2"Basic ModelThe basic security model expands on the simple security model for local area networks, and shows an increased emphasis on user restrictions for file system and Directory Services. It segregates application and data files, seeks to reduce the risk of inadvertent or subverted access, and directs the network administrator to develop a security policy. The basic security model provides a level of security equivalent to a high class D level of commercial security. PAGENUM=33 ID="BP32"In addition to the simple security model presented above, the basic security model seeks to ensure a proper administration function  an administered network with security functions enabled, and someone to review what is actually going on.The goal of the basic security model is to enable NetWare Directory Services for both system and end-user administration. It proposes file system management for file access, and presents workstation file integrity issues as a realistic objective.In the basic security model, some attention is given to the workstation components (such as keyboards and floppy drives). The workstation is looked at to see if unauthorized users can accomplish access, and what might be done to prevent this. One suggestion for prevention of unauthorized access is the writing and implementation of a security policy. In basic security, you should be writing down ideas, and qualifying which are real threats.RENDERAS="SECT2"Protected ModelThe protected security model is actually an audited model without the professional auditors required in the audited model. Protected security turns on the NetWare 4 audit functions and begins gathering information about the system. The audit parts of this report will help you with that. The professional auditors who put together the auditing sections provide a wealth of information which will simplify many arduous tasks. The protected security model provides security equivalent to a low class C level of commercial security. The protected model relies on education. This education must be more than cursory  it requires actual "hands on" training for password protection, anti-virus procedures, and the organization's personal computer security policy.An organization's security policy becomes an important part of the network operation, and should be referenced and updated often. In the protected model, details concerning what a loss consists of should be clearly delineated in the security policy.Education extends beyond the security policy to the operating systems of both the workstation and NetWare 4 where administrators need to understand both NDS and file system administration.PAGENUM=34 ID="BP33"Floppy drives become increasingly important at the workstation level of security. In the protected model, access to workstation floppy drives can be monitored, locked with an access control device, or physically removed. Additionally, the workstation itself can be secured in a locked room when not being used. Workstations then become accessible only by trusted users.RENDERAS="SECT2"Audited ModelThe audited security model is audited by professional auditors. Network activities, installations, and premises are evaluated regularly by professional network auditors. The audited model also mandates the use of security administrators. This model also requires constant interaction between the security administrators and the end-users, as well as between the departments and the auditors. Professional auditing (outside of security), becomes the feedback loop for trusting the computer network. The audited model provides the security equivalent to medium-level class C commercial security.The major difference between the audited and protected security models is how security policy is affected by the feedback of audits. Individual administrators are responsible for implementing security policy, and the activity surrounding the network is reviewed and monitored. A workstation monitoring program is necessary with audited security. This program should include labeling and monitoring workstation cabinets and network connections. Keyboards and floppy drives are disabled (or removed and then locked in a drawer or cabinet) when they are not being used.Security policy exists as a formal document in the audited model. It should have a table of contents, numbered pages, and be under constant review to ensure all pages and updates are present. Auditors may inspect the security policy, the departmental copies, and the signature logs for those responsible for knowing and implementing security standards within the organization. Auditors should also make suggestions for new or updated inclusions within security policy.Security policy implementation can be expensive and require additional personnel, and can be awkward for department managers and end-users alike. However, if a security policy is ineffective or not implemented, there is the possibility that the electronic data components of your business will be adversely affected resulting in financial loss.PAGENUM=35 ID="BP34"RENDERAS="SECT2"Secured ModelThe secured model is different than the previous models. It is based on the premise that someone is actively trying to penetrate the network. The implementation is very different, both in hardware and in personnel as it cannot be implemented by an individual, but requires a professional administrator with security evaluation experience. While this model is not the complete solution for security, it requires network monitoring and evaluation to provide information security and network protection. The secured model provides security equivalent to high-level class C commercial security.The secure model is based upon a strict adherence to a precisely defined and implemented security policy. It is required that a complete security policy exists and has been distributed within the company. It is also essential that everyone understands their part in the security procedures. In a secured environment, there is ongoing maintenance and evaluation of deployed countermeasures. Countermeasures are based upon implementing all previous components in lower models, and upon ongoing research to determine if new security threats have achieved a status of credibility. It is also based on the continued intrusive testing of workstations, communications, network servers, and the isolation of trusted users from untrusted components in the network.The secure model can have any number of users, but is constrained by workgroup isolation, and restraints on external communication through bridges and routers. Access to the physical components of the network is hidden, indecipherably marked, and maintained in a translucent cloak of secrecy. All repairs are done with a security evaluator present.The secured model is achieved through a combination of NetWare 4's protective features and protective measures which are enabled end-to-end to continue the integrity of the network, and make it infinitely harder to attack. In the secured model, workstation monitoring is only one component of the security policy. Both workstations and servers are operated with as much security hardware and software as available. Secured routers, bridges, and telecommunications equipment is the norm, not the exception. Monitoring and administration are ongoing.PAGENUM=36 ID="BP35"RENDERAS="SECT1"NetWare Security and Audit HighlightsIn bringing the NetWare 4 operating system to market, Novell recognized that customers wanted systems that were easy to implement, provided enterprise networking and excellent performance, and offered "fortress" computing control features in a distributed network computing environment. Novell now offers extensive security and audit features in NetWare 4 which provide a strong line of defense against threats that arise from common daily errors and focused malicious attacks and network intrusions. Novell has made major strides in helping network and security administrators, auditors, and users in their quest for a secure system. Security controls are embedded into Novell's departmental network operating system  NetWare 3.12. With the advent of NetWare 4, Novell made a concentrated effort to produce a network operating system that provides a well-balanced and expandable base for enterprise-wide secure business solutions. In NetWare 4, Novell provides a secure and auditable system that can be managed on an enterprise-wide basis. However, network designers, administrators, and users must activate and use these functions to build a trusted network computing environment at both the local and global level.NetWare 4 offers flexible, multilevel security that controls access to the network and its resources. These features, which meet several requirements of the D, C, and B classes described above, can be categorized into Directory Service and file system resource management which controls security for:MARK=BULLETNetworkAccessLoginRightsAttributeFile ServerInformationPAGENUM=37 ID="BP36"These features allow the system administrator to control network security which can be implemented at the Directory Services, network, server, and file system levels to determine:MARK=BULLETWho can access the networkWhat resources (such as file system directories and files) users can accessHow users can utilize the resourcesWho can perform tasks at the server consoleTo accomplish this, NetWare 4 provides such security features as:MARK=BULLETUser identification at the individual, group, and management levelsUser authentication (service request-oriented)Password management, including password encryptionNetwork resource access control through assigned rights and   attributesConsole security to ensure only those with the proper   security equivalences have access to the server consoleFormal evaluation generally depends upon a combination of hardware and software. Since Novell chose the path of hardware independence, Novell has partnered with several third-party vendors to form strategic alliances that will provide additional security, control, and auditability. NetWare's security and control features provide the basis for building a trusted network computing system. The utilities and tools available for establishing and monitoring security are described in this report. A baseline equivalent for Level C-type security is recommended as the minimum acceptable setup for a NetWare 4 network. This is based on Generally Accepted Security Practices, the Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, and the Systems Auditability and Control (SAC) Report.LABEL="2"PAGENUM=39 ID="BP37"Security BasicsIn the network computing industry, there are various examples of computer security  password protection, virus checkers and locked server consoles are a few such examples. While these components are important aspects of implemented security procedures, they are only methods and devices belonging to a much greater endeavor  that of establishing security in the overall network environment.This chapter begins with a conceptual discussion on security issues in NetWare 4. This information details the components from which realistic security efforts must be derived, and provides a context for the reader to use while reading the various discussions on security and auditing within this report.In this chapter, both theory and application for network security are presented in a manner which allows you to discover security weaknesses and find solutions immediately. If you have an interest in network security, or if you are exploring security features in NetWare 4, you will find the basic security information in this chapter helpful.RENDERAS="SECT1"The Basis of Computer SecurityThe basis for network security comes from the simple concept of sharing. If it were not for sharing, simple isolation techniques alone would eliminate the need for any further levels of security. However, once internal and external sharing schemes are used with programs and data, implementing and maintaining security to protect the data and systems becomes a prerequisite.When implemented properly, security can be used to securely enable sharing as well as using it strictly for the purpose of disabling use or access.In today's industry, computer networks are a crucial business asset  greater than the sum of both workstations and servers combined. Modern networks are made up of several components including servers, cables, workstations, services, and peripherals. With each component comes some new technology, procedure, or consideration.PAGENUM=40 ID="BP38"Additionally, at every level of network implementation  from the workgroup to the global enterprise  we find new components and varying scalability, as well as a changing implementation paradigm as components, configurations, and administrators change. To implement complete security, each component and user will require evaluation  and often action  by a network administrator before the network can be secure. A complete network evaluation is vital to understanding and implementing proper network security.RENDERAS="SECT2"What is Security?Security, defined in its simplest form, is "freedom from danger or risk of loss; safety." Thus network security can be considered as any effort made to protect a network from danger or risk of loss  making the network safe from intruders, errors, and other threats. While this is an over-simplification, it makes the point that network managers want to keep their data and resources safe.Next, it is important to define what "trusted" means in the context of network security. The concept of "trusted" is different for different needs. For some networks, something as simple as implementing user passwords and an anti-virus program may suffice as enough to classify the network as being "trusted". However, for a Fortune 500 company running mission or business critical applications on a network, the concept of what constitutes a "trusted" network is markedly different. This advanced conception of "trusted" may require a complete network system with at least a C2 level of security (as defined in Chapter 1).Depending on the network and the importance of the data, define the amount of protection your network requires. This determines the criteria for what a "trusted network environment" is for the network. The effort and resources spent on protection should directly correlate with the value of the protected items.With this in mind, objective evaluation criteria can be applied as the basis of an effective security policy. While too much protection for an inconsequential item exemplifies waste and inefficiency, it also points out the need to examine an object's value before exploring the dangers it may be subjected to.PAGENUM=41 ID="BP39"Security can increase the difficulty of system access and use by legitimate users. By decreasing the likelihood of unauthorized system access, the burden on authorized users may be increased. When planning for network security, consider the trade-offs involved between security and the possible increased difficulty for authorized users  not just the monetary benefits. The question, "Is an item subject to attack?" always receives a "yes" answer. Thus, determining an item's value is likely to provide a better basis for security needs. Answers to such questions as "Is this item worth an attack?" and "Could someone inadvertently allow access?" provide more insight to the level of security necessary.The questions above beg for an answer on how items are valued. Certainly some valuation methods are more appropriate than others, and pertinent questions about how long one can actually do without a service must be examined.Once perceived values and potential weaknesses have been defined, it is possible to discern the credible potential for an attack. The "incredible" attack is better left to fiction writers  few intruders will attempt an impractical assault without commensurate gain. However, the inadvertent mishap is another matter well worth examining (especially in the area of providing redundancy).The successful implementation of a few practical security measures  such as file system security, regularly scheduled backups, strict login and password procedures, and so on  virtually eliminates the majority of practical assaults and inadvertent errors. Another important item to consider in this context is "Can you trust the people that have access to your network environment?"RENDERAS="SECT2"Security BasicsOnce the potential and credibility of an attack has been identified, it is time to employ a methodology to protect the network from possible attacks. Such a methodology would encompass the following points:MARK=BULLETUnderstanding what protection is available Identifying specific areas of possible attack Identifying suitable countermeasuresInstituting (deploying) countermeasures Monitoring changes in the system and countermeasuresPAGENUM=42 ID="BP40"Each of these items contributes to the protection of a network. Before you can develop or implement a useful security policy, you must know and understand what protection is available, and what that protection provides.RENDERAS="SECT2"Security PolicyA network security policy should define not only what is to be protected, but also state what constitutes a loss. Once these two items are clearly defined, the people writing and implementing the security policy should have a good idea what they are trying to accomplish. An example of a loss might be a user losing his password. In NetWare 4, end-users can forget (lose) their password. While the network system does not lose the password, the user cannot gain access to the network without the help of an administrator. In an enterprise network, this might entail end-users calling the network help desk to have their password cleared or reassigned to allow them network access. Something as simple as verifying who is calling for the new password, and making sure that the proper person is the only one receiving the new password is important. This is a situation where a specific network security policy should exist.A basic security policy defines what is to be protected in the network system. This policy must also take into account the fact that not all information about a computer network actually exists or resides inside the computer system. For example, passwords exist both inside and outside the computer system. Inside the computer, passwords are maintained at the server for reference during the login process. Outside the system, users might post their passwords on their keyboards, monitors, or paper. Security policy must cover all of these possibilities. NetWare 4's RSA authentication process provides a level of security required by most internal identification and authentication policies, but cannot maintain passwords outside of NetWare (such as passwords posted on the user's keyboard).Simply defining a loss of system integrity due to unauthorized access, system or data manipulation, or lack of availability can be quite time-consuming. Understanding what countermeasures are available and can be implemented takes even more time. To achieve a specified level of protection and trust, it is imperative that specific threats be identified and countered.PAGENUM=43 ID="BP41"RENDERAS="SECT2"Identifying ThreatsThere are four general areas of data security concerned with potential threats: MARK=BULLETPhysical (including hardware)Operating system-levelCommunicationsProceduralRENDERAS="SECT3"Physical SecurityPhysical security is directed specifically in one of two directions: outside the computer, and through ISO's OSI model of the physical layer. Most physical security is concerned with keeping equipment locked up, proper passwords implemented and enforced, and keeping unauthorized people away from network resources. Essential elements of physical security are theft prevention, tampering avoidance, and containment of signals that can be monitored.Even within subordinate areas like hardware security, there are differences between hardware containment to prevent physical theft and hardware containment to prevent tampering or inadvertent misuse. While the first can be addressed by physical security, the second is a matter of procedural security  assuming you allow someone workstation or remote access.The other area of physical security has to do with the network frame type (such as 802.3, 802.5, and so on) as identified by the IEEE where one might try restricting specific network traffic (packets) from other parts of the network or by not allowing monitoring of other addresses on the network. This may require separate physical channels for communications. There are options for anyone establishing physical security at this level.Like any data network or network operating system, NetWare 4 has one major area for attack: unauthorized access to the network. This is the primary area network administrators need to focus on, as it is extremely relevant to any discussion of security.PAGENUM=44 ID="BP42"Assuming you have effective physical security, the next threat to system integrity is unauthorized access to the network itself. This threat can be depicted in two areas: those seeking access without knowing the network (from outside), and those seeking access to the network from the network (from inside). For a discussion of outside access, read the NetWare-specific "Security Threats" section of this chapter. This section offers a less rigid treatment describing the inside attack.Both types of security attacks mentioned above pose a threat since the underlying motives are against any security policy. Attacks from someone outside might be attempted in order to siphon data from the authorized traffic of the network, or to gather information about the structure of the network itself  often in preparation for an insider attack.For someone with access to the network hardware (inside access), there are three areas of possible network attack:MARK=BULLETHardware attack where someone attaches a device to the network to gather and siphon off dataSoftware attack where workstation modules  operating systems, TSRs, and application software  are modified to gather data from the system and save it for later retrieval or to deny data or network accessMasquerade attack where the perpetrator uses the identity of an authorized user to obtain access to the networkA masquerade attack is usually performed for the purpose of searching the network structure using someone else's identity, or using one's own identity to search an unsecured network structure or data.Both of the methods for an inside attack require access to an operational workstation or network terminal. With operational hardware available, there are multiple options available to impose a security threat.Insider attacks on networks are the most common, especially if workstations are not secured. An unsecured workstation can allow a software attack. Of the two types of software attacks which can be mounted, the most common is the dictionary attack. This is when a person looks for a way in to the network usually by randomly entering possible user names and then supplying possible passwords.The other type of software attack involves more sophisticated methods. Software known as a trojan horse is loaded on the workstation and allowed to gather information about the users at login time. These programs can be very small and deceptively like other programs used in the workstation, sometimes even having the same filename.PAGENUM=45 ID="BP43"The usual options available for an inside attacker are: MARK=BULLETOperating system-level attacks (including bugs)Trojan horsesVirusesRENDERAS="SECT3"Operating System-Level SecurityIn networks, the application software uses operating system calls to function. For example, applications regularly ask the operating system to locate, store, and retrieve files. Most applications relegate these matters to the operating system to achieve a level of consistency in the manner by which programs and data are shared.In a network operating system, one expects to find a shared-resource system where information is shared between users. NetWare 4 is designed around the controlled sharing of information utilizing user-specified access controls in a highly efficient capabilities-based system architecture. The architecture provides for capability changes to be immediately enforced between the server and the client.In the NetWare 4 operating system, users have direct access to objects in the system (for example, the ability to see the directory structure, read data, or execute programs). The user's access to objects in the system is derived from the NetWare Directory Services (NDS) access specifications. In addition to NDS access specifications, file objects are covered by file access specifications. Finally, the network operating system provides security by utilizing memory access management, isolation, and both unrestricted and controlled sharing methods. While it is true that network programmers can circumvent this architecture by writing and distributing system-level programs that violate the security mechanisms, this misuse can be precluded by not allowing unauthorized individuals to install software on the network. Another method of preventing this architecture circumvention is to make a list of "approved" software (software that has been tested to not violate the network's security mechanisms), and only allow software from this approved list to be installed on the network system.This concern over possible security breaches caused by system-level programs is one of the reasons Novell sponsors programs to evaluate and certify NLMs, and provide other subordinate system level programs. PAGENUM=46 ID="BP44"There is always the potential for discovering an architectural flaw in the network or client operating system. You may hear of application software which "exploits" bugs in the operating systems. This includes client operating systems which are weak in the implementation of security functions. Bugs in recently released client operating systems are not uncommon, and can be a barrier to service, as well as leading to the possible loss of data integrity.Even if the server operating system performs well with regard to message integrity and user authentication, there is another problem which can allow someone to tamper with your network. This problem is based on user-defined access controls (DAC) and insecure workstation operating systems, and is commonly known as the trojan horse.The reason the trojan horse works is because workstation operating systems are largely unmanaged and easily assailable. The main source of prevention for the trojan horse attack is to assign correct and accurate access rights for users. This is the responsibility of the network administrator, and should not be left up to the individual user.For example, if the file rights for the LOGIN.EXE routine in the LOGIN directory were changed to [RWF], an end-user could change that LOGIN.EXE with a different LOGIN.EXE perhaps one that records users' names and passwords. The network is especially vulnerable in an environment where workstations are shared by more than one user.RENDERAS="SECT3"Communications SecurityCommunications is another area of security concern. This concern consists primarily of the following two types of attack:MARK=BULLETTappingSpoofingTapping an open telephone line in a data communications system is similar to a hardware attack except that it can be done externally, and requires no knowledge of the computer system being monitored  only of telecommunications. Wire tapping provides a high risk for attack on any system which uses telephone or wire communications. While satellite communications provide varying degrees of isolation on outbound communications, they can have problems similar to tapping on incoming signals.PAGENUM=47 ID="BP45"Spoofing is pretending to be a server or peer. It requires detailed knowledge of the system, and may be part of an insider attack. There are multiple kinds of "spoofs" that can be employed. A program can be put in place to replace the login program and gather usernames and passwords (this could be an access control breach or an attack by a disgruntled employee). Another spoof can be implemented between servers, where one server identifies itself to another server for routing and communications. If the first server begins using the spoofing server, all information routed through it can be captured.In each case, a software component is used to spoof other servers, clients, or users into believing that the software is a valid component of the communications process. Like the client trojan horse, the spoofing software can gather information without the end-users or servers knowing  unless the spoofing software is poorly written or contains bugs.In a poorly architected situation, a spoof might exist in a server component, router, or bridge without ever being detected. Almost any form of reverse authentication  from client to server  will eliminate a spoof at the server.RENDERAS="SECT3"Procedural SecurityThe final aspect of data security threats exists in the area of procedural security. Procedural security is a broad topic and requires as much detailed examination as software review. Procedural security takes its name from a concern for procedures  mounting the wrong media, booting the wrong software, or doing anything else out of the norm.For procedural security to be effective, you must have a well-defined and workable security policy implemented. Besides defining the proper security measures that need to be implemented, you must provide implementation methods that can be achieved with a reasonable amount of effort. You must also provide plans for security implementation for each and every network function that takes place in your environment (such as creating users, adding new resources, providing resource access, and so on).Implementing a successful security policy requires that you provide adequate controls for assuring that your security policy is being implemented and enforced. This takes some effort, but the payback will be worthwhile.While not a topic specific to NetWare 4, compromises in procedural security must be of major concern for a network administrator. The following example may help you better understand what a procedural security threat is.PAGENUM=48 ID="BP46"Imagine that a new user is going to be assigned to the company's database application, and this is the first time any user below the level of supervisor has been assigned to this application. If supervisors are allowed access privileges, which others are not, a review of the new user's access privileges is in order. If the security policy requires a review of a user's access privileges in this circumstance, then a failure to review these privileges for this user can be considered a procedural security compromise.Procedural security threats can encompass any of the ways we do things wrong. Hence the sheer size of the topic grows with every additional operation we perform. When defining basic procedural network security, consider the following:MARK=BULLETHow software is installedHow the system is administeredHow user rights and privileges are administeredHow the system is restoredAt the network level, procedural security requires a lot of research on the part of a security analyst. This research includes  but is not necessarily limited to  uncovering procedural flaws documented in previous systems, comparing levels of trust for different versions of operating systems, and evaluating methods of protection. Thus procedural security is a vital part of an effective overall security implementation.From the discussions above, it is evident there are many interactions between the areas of security attacks. They are not independent, nor are they isolated. In fact, anyone desiring to penetrate a computer system would likely use as many possible attacks as they had resources to muster. Thus, in viewing these areas of threat, it is important to keep in mind that for every "plausible" threat, a countermeasure is needed.RENDERAS="SECT2"PAGENUM=49 ID="BP47"Developing CountermeasuresA countermeasure is any process or device instituted to counter a security threat. Countermeasures protect some component in the network. For instance, network countermeasures could include methods of authentication for programs or cryptographic systems utilized for communicating and storing information. Additional countermeasures could include the development of audit trails within specific programs, developing threat detection mechanisms in the operating system, and developing internal consistency checks. Countermeasures can extend all the way from non-technical to esoterically complex technical methods. Countermeasures are your means for protecting your network.There are four areas for implementing countermeasure methods: MARK=BULLETPhysicalSoftwarePersonnelProceduralTo develop and deploy a new or built-in countermeasure, a network administrator must have a clear idea of what the countermeasure actually protects, how it protects, and whether the degree of protection is adequate to enforce the security policy. NetWare 4 currently provides several types of protection for the network. Knowing where this protection exists and understanding the degree of trust attributed to the protection is necessary for implementing a successful security policy.The key to instituting a countermeasure is identifying what protection is considered secure or "trusted," and why or how it is trusted. In NetWare 4, the following areas should be considered for protection even before client applications are installed on the network:MARK=BULLETLOGIN directory and executables  the process of being connected to NetWareNetWare Directory Services  what network information users are allowed to see, or find out aboutFile and Print Services  what programs users can execute, and what resources and data they can accessThe areas listed above should not be modifiable or accessible by every user. Unauthorized access can be overcome by using a combination of the Mandatory Access Controls (MAC) to control how the system data is accessed and the Discretionary Access Controls (DAC) to control what users are allowed to see and modify. PAGENUM=50 ID="BP48"NetWare 4 provides an authenticated login to assure the identity of an end-user and to stop any unauthorized user. However, you should avoid automatically accepting the workstation as being secure simply on the basis of the network authentication process. Recognizing the limitations of workstation hardware, software, and operating systems is essential to developing effective countermeasures. Understanding that workstations are one of two primary sites for unauthorized access, and taking steps to limit the chances for this access is imperative. Considering the threats to data security mentioned in the last section, we saw two basic types of network intrusion: those seeking access without knowing the network (from outside), and those seeking access into the network from a position on the network (from inside). By far the latter is more common.For most attacks to be successful, workstation access is a necessity. Workstation-based attacks can come from any attached workstation. All three of the network attacks listed above require physical access to the workstation hardware. Thus, the simplest countermeasure is to deny workstation access to those who are not authorized users, and lock up workstations when not in use. This provides a relatively effective countermeasure, similar to NetWare 4's ability to limit where a user can login from. Additionally, remote workstation access can be limited by installing and implementing the dial-back feature of NetWare Connect (or other add-on products). Enabling NetWare's audit function provides the ability to detect modem intruder attempts.There are several devices available which can be inserted into the floppy disk drive and effectively lock the front cover of the computer to the floppy drive. These mechanisms prevent the workstation from being opened or booted from diskette, and are quite effective countermeasures (especially for workstations that can't be locked up in a secure area). These devices prevent the introduction of viruses and trojan horses by unauthorized users.Additionally, workstation tampering (getting into the workstation) can be deterred by instituting a workstation security program consisting of locking workstation cabinets and periodically monitoring the workstation to assure that component devices have not been tampered with.It is important to remember that attacks on a network are not limited to unauthorized workstation users. The network may also be at risk  especially where users may inadvertently introduce viruses or install improper software at the workstation. Even network supervisors have been known to put incorrect versions of software on the network. This brings about the potential for a "denial of service" attack.PAGENUM=51 ID="BP49"In any case, the trusted operation of a workstation is based upon the integrity of data files and executables. If the data or executables become corrupt, access can be denied. The most straightforward method to implement an effective countermeasure here is to use diskless workstations with password protection and physically secure printers.For any environment where diskless workstations are not a viable option, security devices which control disk access, use of peripherals, and system booting may be more appropriate. Even this is not an entire workstation solution. There are other potential modes of access and attacks. This only highlights how susceptible workstation hardware and software is to security attacks.Workstation security can be a difficult area to prevent security breaches. There are numerous methods of subverting the local operating system to gain unauthorized access to the network. These shortcomings are one reason that Novell is participating in the C2 security evaluation with the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) as well as E2 certification in the European Community.One of the most important factors to consider for workstation attacks is the user. If the user is trustworthy and implements the workstation security features outlined in an organization's security policies, the risk of unauthorized use is greatly reduced. Trust  both of the user and the security implementation  is imperative.When security exposures are identified and suitable countermeasures have been defined and developed, they must be implemented within the computer security system. This requires completion of the three following procedures:MARK=BULLETDesign of necessary procedures Effective training of personnelProviding adequate security documentationOf these three points, training is the most important. Existing procedures are worthless if your personnel are not properly trained in executing those procedures.PAGENUM=52 ID="BP50"The final procedure  and the one with the greatest significance  is monitoring countermeasures for effectiveness. No matter how you define security, monitoring what people do, and how the system is used is as significant as all other countermeasures combined. Through the years, this has been proven, and has diversified the security function by adding an entire an additional step to security monitoring  auditing. While the rest of this chapter is devoted to security functions, it is important to note that more than half of this report is devoted to auditing.A systems audit can be invaluable to the system's security analyst. It provides checks and balances, evaluation for existing countermeasures, the potential for discovering new security threats, and the opportunity to develop new countermeasures. This provides the security analyst or network administrator the opportunity to receive input from an independent group that is not a normal part of the security group. The security administrator should work closely with the system auditors and inform them about new or additional functions.In addition to receiving input from auditors, the security administrator should continue to define and respond to suspicious events and real-time alarms, keep and analyze records, and provide active testing and evaluation of new software. In a trusted network, there is no such thing as installing out of the box software without security evaluations of access parameters, access controls, and system interaction.RENDERAS="SECT2"Conclusions About Security BasicsThe implementation of security principles leads to a concept of what a "trusted" environment actually is. For many systems, a simple password and anti-virus program may suffice for a "trusted" system (by policy). In other systems, the concept of "trusted" may have more far-reaching consequences as can be seen in the concepts set forth by the NCSC regarding security evaluations. In any case, the trust imputed to a system is delivered by some form of assurance that security features cannot be disabled or circumvented, and that they work effectively against real threats.RENDERAS="SECT1"NetWare-Specific Security Threats and CountermeasuresThe remainder of this chapter addresses various security threats and countermeasures as they apply specifically to the NetWare computing environment. Some of these countermeasures involve steps that can be taken to ensure physical security within the organization.RENDERAS="SECT2"PAGENUM=53 ID="BP51"Securing the ServerDespite Novell's best efforts to persuade network administrators to keep their NetWare servers in a locked room, there are still sites where servers are as accessible as a common workstation. Indeed, at some sites it may be difficult to locate and identify all network servers. While it is not uncommon for servers to be placed in an unused office or under a programmer's desk, this practice can be dangerous. RENDERAS="SECT2"Key DistributionOnce the server is placed in a locked room, the next item to consider is key distribution  access to the locked server room should be closely guarded. To clearly define access control to your server room, consider the following questions:MARK=BULLETWho will have keys to the room? Should master keys issued to cleaning, maintenance, electrical, telephone, and security personnel also open the door to your valuable and sensitive data? If any of the aforementioned personnel are temporary help  such as contractors or employees of an outside service organization  do you trust them with physical access to your network?Some network administrators choose to lock out everyone else and go so far as cleaning the server room themselves. The same goes for any needed repairs, where the administrator will physically watch any needed repairs being made. Some sites use card readers or biometric devices that send alarms, locations, times, and personnel identification to a security system where access is monitored and logged.Once the server has been physically secured, additional security features of NetWare may be implemented at the console such as:MARK=BULLETType "REMOVE DOS" to prevent loading of NetWare Loadable Modules (NLMs) from floppy disks.Type "SECURE CONSOLE" to restrict the loading of NLMs from anywhere other than from the SYS:\SYSTEM directory and to disable keyboard entry to the built-in debugger.Lock the file server console from within the MONITOR NLM.PAGENUM=54 ID="BP52"Disable all remote console capabilities or assign RCONSOLE a unique password. XCONSOLE uses telnet and could easily compromise the console password since telnet traffic travels as clear-text over the wire. Make sure the console password is different than the ADMIN password, and never store that password in the AUTOEXEC.NCF file on the server.Besides the potential loss of backup tapes, hard drives, or the entire server to theft, physically unsecured servers are vulnerable to NLM attacks.RENDERAS="SECT2"NLM AttacksThere are several NLM attacks in circulation with names such as Burglar, Password, Security, and so on, that let you change the ADMIN password without knowing the old password. These NLMs call the SetBinderyObjectPassword function (available in both NetWare 3 and 4) which is clearly documented in the NetWare server application programming interface (API). Since NLMs are extensions of the operating system, they are allowed to make system calls. It is the network administrator's job to know what NLMs are being loaded and what they do.RENDERAS="SECT2"Login Process SecurityThere are several things that can cause security problems or breaches during the login process. This is often considered the weakest link in a computer security system. Let's look at the most common attacks or threats that can take place during the network login process.RENDERAS="SECT3"Trojan HorseA quite destructive login program is known as a trojan horse. A trojan horse program gives the appearance of something worthwhile happening, while it is actually compromising your security. An example of a trojan horse that attacks during the login process is a program that masquerades as the real login program while keeping a hidden log of user passwords as they are entered from the keyboard.RENDERAS="SECT3"Network AnalyzerAnother thing that can be used to breach security during the login process is the network analyzer. A network analyzer can produce a list of clear-text passwords by watching for login packets. However, this kind of passive wire tapping attack is easily defeated by simply using encrypted passwords.PAGENUM=55 ID="BP53"RENDERAS="SECT3"Dictionary AttacksDictionary attacks operate as the name implies  a program can try passing every word in the dictionary as a possible password to the login program. The dictionary can contain the entire English language, foreign languages, or be a custom dictionary composed of user's names, places, favorite things, slang, and so on. Dictionary attacks are easily defeated by choosing passwords not found in any dictionary (such as using passwords with mixed letters and numbers or symbols) and enabling intruder detection. Password management and security awareness training are effective preventative measures.RENDERAS="SECT3"Brute Force AttacksA brute force attack occurs when someone tries to exhaust all possible passwords by trying them one by one (for instance, A, AA, AAA, and so on). This kind of attack is best countered by enforcing a large password length and enabling intruder detection.Intruder detection notifies the system administrator whenever an account is locked (due to invalid password attempts) and should always be enabled. Either the person logging in knows his username and password or he doesn't. Two or three bad login attempts should be the maximum allowed. Configure the server to remember the bad login attempts for at least one hour and lock the account for two hours or more. Increase these time limits as necessary to allow ample time for an investigation.A strong password management policy is critical to the security of the whole system. Since the login process involves the human element, the security depends on how the passwords are managed. Passwords must be required for all accounts. They should have a minimum length of eight characters. The system should be set to require forced password changes every 30-45 days and must be unique (these requirements can be set by the network administrator in NetWare 4). Grace logins should be limited to two or three. These limits are guidelines and should be adjusted to conform with your organization's security policy.Several books and software products address password management in detail. The Department of Defense Password Management Guideline (CSC-STD-002-85) and Password Coach by Baseline Software are two examples. Consider using these tools (or similar ones) as part of your employee security awareness training.PAGENUM=56 ID="BP54"RENDERAS="SECT3"Encryption/Algorithm AttacksAnother attack on the login process is exploiting encryption algorithm weaknesses. NetWare versions 2.15c and 3.10a or earlier that implemented password encryption had such a weakness. If a log key (a pseudo-random number issued by the server as a challenge) was a palindrome (for example, 1122334444332211), the output of the NetWare encryption algorithm would be all zeroes.An illegally modified and distributed copy of ATTACH.EXE v2.00 called KNOCK.EXE exploited this weakness (although the hacker had no idea why it worked). KNOCK.EXE repetitively attempted to attach to the server without specifying a password. Amazingly, once every 10,000 attempts or so, the user would be logged in with no password required. This event happened only when the log key was a palindrome. Novell fixed this problem in versions 2.2 and 3.11 and later by making sure the server would not issue weak log keys. Patches were also widely released on NetWire as the files SEC286.ZIP and SEC386.ZIP. This is not a threat in NetWare 4.RENDERAS="SECT3"Forged Packet AttacksA greater threat to all networks (not just NetWare) is that of forged packets. The HACK.EXE program that came from the Netherlands demonstrated that a NetWare Core Protocol (NCP) request packet could be injected into a privileged session to grant rights to the intruder. Novell introduced NCP packet digital signatures using the RSA MD4 message digest algorithm as the first step of security enhancements to counter this kind of attack. The second step encrypts the NCP packets.RENDERAS="SECT3"Print Server AttacksAnother important, but often overlooked area of security involves print server attacks. A print server processes jobs with the security level of whoever submitted the job. If a rogue print server were set up on the network, all it would have to do is wait for a job from user ADMIN, then perform whatever unauthorized functions it wants to while operating at the supervisory level! To effectively counter this kind of attack, make sure all legitimate print servers use passwords (preferably not in clear-text). The number of concurrent connections must be limited for print server accounts. Physical station address and time restrictions will help. Also consider physical security (such as locating print servers in locked rooms with servers) when setting up your network security.PAGENUM=57 ID="BP55"RENDERAS="SECT3"Login Script AttacksA personal (or user) login script attack can easily take place when a privileged user account does not have a personal login script. If another user copies a login script into the mail directory of the privileged user, whenever the privileged user logs in, the personal login script (created by the other user) now performs some unauthorized system function without the privileged user's knowledge.This attack can be countered by doing the following:MARK=BULLETCreate personal login scripts for all users (an empty login script is better than no login script)Make sure all users exit from the system login scriptRemove write and create rights (or better yet, remove all rights) for the MAIL directory from the [Public] trustee.For more information on login scripts, see the NetWare 4 documentation.RENDERAS="SECT2"Managing Administrative AccountsAdministrative accounts should be limited to a maximum of two or three trusted network administrators. There should be more than one administrator in case of an emergency. The administrative functions should be performed as an Admin-equivalent user that has a name that isn't obvious. (Admin, SUPERVISOR, and ROOT are obvious to nearly everyone.)RENDERAS="SECT2"Managing User AccountsProperly managing user accounts is an important part of network security. For starters, users should only be granted rights to those network areas they absolutely need access to.RENDERAS="SECT3"User Account PasswordsThe system users must be well educated on the importance of passwords and their use. It is virtually impossible for an administrator to analyze every user's password to ensure that passwords provide a form of deterrence from unauthorized users. In your security policy and training, set specific password guidelines and train your users in their purpose and proper implementation.PAGENUM=58 ID="BP56"For example, you might want to require the following criteria be met for every user's password:MARK=BULLETEach password must be a minimum of 8-characters (more than eight is better).Each password must be unique, and not easily discernable by others who know the user (no family names, pet names, nicknames, slang, and so on).Each password must include at least one non-alphanumeric character in the string.Passwords are not to be recorded or stored anywhere (such as in a day planner, on the workstation, under the keyboard, and so on).While these seem like easily implemented, common-sense requirements, a surprising number of networks have users "asking" for a security attack. Make it a point to educate your users in proper password usage. Proper education is the first step in preventing password theft from being an easy way to penetrate your network and modify or steal your data.RENDERAS="SECT3"User Account and Password DefaultsThe default settings for a new user account are assigned using the USER_TEMPLATE User object. If a User object named USER_TEMPLATE exists, then all users created subsequently will acquire the property values of the USER_TEMPLATE object as defaults. The USER_TEMPLATE object only applies to new users created in the same container. Each container (Organization or Organizational Unit) may have its own USER_TEMPLATE object. The initial default is to not require a password for a new user. Once a password is required, several related options are available (the defaults are shown in parenthesis). These include minimum length (5), whether the password must be changed and how often this change is required (90 days), whether the password must be unique (no), whether the user can change the password (yes), how many times a user can log in using an expired password (grace logins), and the number of incorrect login attempts allowed (7). We recommend that these parameters be modifed to fit your specific security requirements.PAGENUM=59 ID="BP57"RENDERAS="SECT3"Security EquivalencesA user can be set as "Security Equivalent" to any other object in the Directory tree. The security equivalent assignment is intended for use in temporarily assigning NDS or file system rights. Long term rights assignments should be made explicitly. Every object is security equivalent to all containers that are part of its complete name. This is why every object automatically acquires any rights assigned to a superior container. Since these rights are acquired through security equivalence and not through inheritance, they are not subject to inherited rights filters.The operating system uses the "Security Equivalent" property of the User object to track several automatic rights assignments. When a user is added to the membership list of a Group object or the occupant list of an Organizational Role object, the Group or Organizational Role is listed in that user's security equivalence.Security equivalence is not transitive. This means that if Tom is security equivalent to Jill, and Jill is security equivalent to Bob, Tom is not security equivalent to Bob through Jill. Security equivalence only grants Tom those rights that Jill is explicitly granted (not those rights that Jill is granted through security equivalences).RENDERAS="SECT1"Other Security SuggestionsThere are a few other security suggestions you can follow in order to provide better security for your network. These suggestions are:MARK=BULLETLimit concurrent connections to one per user account.Set up LOGIN time and station restrictions.Do not allow clear-text passwords in the login process. (SET ALLOW UNENCRYPTED PASSWORDS = OFF)Immediately disable or delete user accounts of terminated employees or other inactive users.Perform virus scanning as frequently as backups.PAGENUM=60 ID="BP58"Keep current with the released versions of the NetWare OS and client software.Use the SECURITY utility periodically to discover potential problems and take appropriate action.Remote server administration (from a workstation on the network or from a PC using a modem) can provide greater server security, as the server keyboard and monitor can be removed and the server locked in a secure location. The following administrative activities can be performed using a remote console:MARK=BULLETScanning directories and editing text files in both NetWare and DOS partitions on a server.Transferring files to a server.Bringing down or rebooting the server.Installing or upgrading NetWare on a remote server.RENDERAS="SECT2"Password EncryptionNetWare contains a feature that controls the use of encrypted passwords. The "Allow Unencrypted Passwords" command can be used to encrypt passwords and enhances password integrity by helping to ensure that passwords are not intercepted and used by unauthorized individuals. The default value for this command is OFF. When this parameter is set to OFF, all passwords are encrypted. When this parameter is set to ON, unencrypted passwords are allowed, but not required.The following are the recommended settings:MARK=BULLETIf any NetWare servers are running NetWare 3.1x on an internetwork, use OFF. If NetWare servers on the internetwork are running versions of NetWare below NetWare 3.0 and you leave the default to OFF, some users may have problems logging in.If the internetwork has NetWare servers running NetWare 2.12 and above, the NetWare 3.1x utilities can be copied to these NetWare servers and this parameter can be set to OFF. If the NetWare 3.1x utilities are not copied to the NetWare 2.x servers, set this parameter to ON.PAGENUM=61 ID="BP59"RENDERAS="SECT2"Secure ConsoleThe SECURE CONSOLE utility allows authorized operators to use the console while preventing the following from occurring:MARK=BULLETNLMs being loaded from any directory other than SYS:SYSTEM. This keeps anyone from loading an invasive NLM from a server's floppy disk drive.Keyboard entry into the operating system debugger. This restricts the ability to directly access data on the server.Anyone other than the console operator changing the date and time. Some security and accounting features depend on date and time for their enforcement.Another feature available for securing the server console is the "Lock Server Console" option in the MONITOR utility. When used, keyboard entry to the server console is prevented until the Admin password is entered.RENDERAS="SECT2"Intruder DetectionThe NetWare 4 operating system provides various options that (when activated) help to detect incorrect login attempts and lock out the User object attempting access. This intruder detection/lockout feature can be set to detect an unauthorized user trying to gain access. This feature is administered at the Organization (O) and Organizational Unit (OU) levels. Controllable settings for intruder detection include the number of incorrect passwords attempted for a user, the time interval over which the attempts may occur, whether the account will be locked after detection, and the time interval that the account will remain locked. The attacker must use a valid username or the attempt is ignored by the operating system.RENDERAS="SECT2"Logging Out of Unattended WorkstationsAnother easy to implement countermeasure is that of training your users to log out whenever they leave their computers. If you prefer an alternative to having users always log out, provide a secure utility that automatically locks the computer whenever it detects a defined period of inactivity. (Several good locking utilities that are easily configurable and network ready are available from third-party vendors).PAGENUM=62 ID="BP60"LABEL="3"PAGENUM=63 ID="BP61"Implementing and Administering NetWare 4 SecurityThis chapter provides guidelines for setting up network security. It begins by providing the actions required to meet the baseline for each of the security models introduced in Chapter 1. We recommend that your implementations surpass these baselines based upon your specific needs.This chapter also contains information on setting up proper security for NetWare Directory Services and for the file system. These are important, but often overlooked items when defining and implementing network security.RENDERAS="SECT1"NetWare 4 Security Model ImplementationThere are certain actions that are required to achieve a baseline level of each of the NetWare 4 security models. After defining network security needs, implement the corresponding security model. Again, these are minimum baselines.In the NetWare 4 Security Model Actions in IDREF="FM42171"NetWare 4 security model actions. IDREF="FM42171"Figure 3-1, the requirements for each security model are listed. As you progress to the next higher level of security, remember that each higher level requires the implementation of all of the lower level security models as well. This means that if you implement the basic model, you must implement all the actions for the simple model in addition to the actions required for the basic model.PAGENUM=64 ID="BP62"LABEL="3-1" FLOAT="0"ID="FM42171"NetWare 4 security model actions.FILEREF="3_01chrt.tif"RENDERAS="SECT1"NetWare 4 SecurityNetWare 4 has two distinct levels of security: file system security and NetWare Directory Services (NDS) security.File system security affects access to files and directories located on the various volumes. This type of security provides control of the application programs and their data files. The NetWare 4 file system security is essentially the same as file system security in NetWare 3.1x. A few attributes have been added for the new data compression and data migration features, and some terminology has been changed, but the functionality remains the same: to provide users with control and access to file system directories and files.NetWare Directory Services securityPAGENUM=65 ID="BP63" affects management of the NDS database and its objects. It is used strictly for managing the objects and their properties. The functions of NDS security are similar to those Supervisor functions not related to the file system in previous versions of NetWare. Examples of these functions are creating users, editing login scripts, and creating printers and print servers. In NetWare 3.1x, they also included such tasks as assigning trustee rights and creating a workgroup manager or a console operator.As shown in IDREF="FM51222"Figure 3-2, these tasks have been separated from the general "Supervisor" account and can be distributed to various users on the network. In NetWare 4, the default account that receives these rights initially is the ADMIN account (the first user account created when the first NetWare 4 server is installed).LABEL="3-2" FLOAT="0"ID="FM51222"Comparison of the SUPERVISOR account and the Admin account.FILEREF="3_02splt.tif"PAGENUM=66 ID="BP64"Generally, file system and NDS security do not affect each other and are independent of one another. In fact, one of the features of NetWare 4 is the ability to separate file system administration from NDS administration. The user who administers the NDS tree and its objects can be separate from the file system administrator. You can also have different administrators for different parts of the tree, different volumes, directories, or files. NetWare 4 security is extremely flexible in the subdivision of administration. This is necessary since we are now dealing with global networks that need multiple administrators. For example, imagine a network with offices in New York and Dusseldorf. You would not want the Dusseldorf administrator to have to manage the entire network over a wide area link. In addition, the New York administrator probably knows his environment and users better and thus can serve their needs better than the Dusseldorf administrator.With the flexibility in NetWare 4 security, you have the ability of creating many different types of administration structures. These could range from local to centralized global administration. This section will help you understand what the features are and how you can setup a trusted working environment. In the sections that follow, we will:MARK=BULLETReview security concepts which affect file system and NDS security.Review file system security and note the differences in implementation in NetWare 4.Introduce NDS security.Discuss the default security assignments NetWare 4 makes for certain events like server installation and user creation.Discuss what additional file system security assignments are needed for a functional network.Discuss what additional NDS security assignments are needed including:Proper distribution of Directory tree administration (including how to prevent cutting off administration from branches)Creating special purpose usersHow and to what types of objects these assignments can be madePAGENUM=67 ID="BP65"RENDERAS="SECT2"Security Concepts ReviewBefore delving into NDS security per se, we need to review the following concepts which affect both file system and NDS security in NetWare 4:MARK=BULLETTrustee AssignmentsInherited RightsInherited Rights FilterSecurity EquivalenceEffective RightsOn a network, users must be granted rights in order to use resources. Users never automatically "get" rights. They cannot access resources like files and directories unless they have been granted a trustee assignment. Trustee assignments can be made to such resources as files and directories, User objects, Server objects, Volume objects, and so on. In NetWare 3.x and below, the "trustee" (the object granted the rights) was typically a user or a group. In NetWare 4, besides User and Group objects, trustees may be Organizational Role objects, the [Public] trustee (to be discussed in depth later on), other leaf objects, or container objects. Essentially, any object can be made a trustee of another object even if this does not seem practical a printer being made a trustee of a Volume object does not make sense, but it can be done and definitely should be avoided.It is impractical to have to assign each user rights to every network resource, file, or NDS object. For that reason, NetWare 4 makes it easy by allowing for the downward "flow of rights." This flow of rights is known as inheritance. Rights assigned to a directory in the file system continue to flow down the directory structure until they are reassigned. In NDS security, rights assigned to a container flow down to subordinate containers and leaf objects until they are reassigned or filtered.We can prevent the inheritance or flow of rights down a file system directory structure or NDS Directory tree through the use of an inherited rights filter (IRF). An IRF revokes allowable rights and affects all users. Only users with explicit trustee assignments at the level where an IRF is invoked may access that level.PAGENUM=68 ID="BP66"The user may also have rights assigned to his own User object, Group objects he may be a member of, and Organizational Role objects he may be an occupant of. A user may gain rights to files and the NDS tree through security equivalence to other objects. When User A is security equivalent to another user, User A receives rights only to the objects or files the other user has explicit trustee assignments to. NetWare 4 evaluates most of the possible sources of rights as security equivalences. For users these include groups they belong to, Organizational Roles they are occupants of, explicit security equivalences, parent containers up the tree to the [Root], and the [Public] trustee.RENDERAS="SECT1"NDS Security Concepts and FeaturesA well laid out NDS design facilitates network use and administration in the same way that a well designed file system directory structure facilitates efficient file access. In order to exploit the capabilities of NDS, the network administrator must understand NDS objects, object and property rights associated with the NDS objects, and the best way to use these objects to implement both NDS and file system rights. This section will explore these topics.RENDERAS="SECT2"NDS ObjectsThe NDS database is similar to the NetWare 3 bindery in many respects. NDS still has objects, properties, and values. However, NetWare 4 has twenty standard objects. NDS objects are either container or leaf objects. The four container objects are [Root], Country, Organization, and Organizational Unit. They are called container objects because, as the name implies, they can contain other objects. NDS container objects provide for the hierarchical structure of the NDS database. The general model is similar to the file system directory structure. An NDS directory tree is composed of one [Root] object, usually several levels of the other container objects, and many leaf objects. Similarly, the tree outside your window has roots (NDS [Root] object), several different-sized branches (NDS container objects), and many leaves (NDS leaf objects). NDS contains sixteen standard leaf objects. These standard leaf objects include Users, Groups, Print Servers, and Print Queues, as well as the twelve additional leaf objects listed below:MARK=BULLETAFP ServerPAGENUM=69 ID="BP67"AliasComputerDirectory MapNetWare ServerOrganizational RolePrinterProfileVolumeUnknownBindery ObjectBindery QueueEach NDS object (both container and leaf) has a specific set of properties associated with it. More than 120 separate properties are defined within the Directory Services Schema.The particular subset of these properties associated with a given object class define how that object can operate within the NetWare 4 network. For example, the Login Script property is defined for the object's Organization, Organizational Unit, Profile, and User. Only these objects have login scripts. Some properties, such as the ACL (Access Control List), apply to all objects. You can find a table containing all of the NDS objects and their associated properties in Appendix A of the NetWare 4 Utilities Reference Manual. In this chapter, we examine the User object in detail, but the general principles involved apply to every other object as well. The NetWare 4 User object has 59 user-accessible properties defined for it. They are listed below:Properties of the NDS User objectTYPE="VERT"Account BalanceAccount LockedAccount Reset TimeAllow Unlimited CreditPAGENUM=70 ID="BP68"Allow User to Change PasswordBack LinkBindery PropertyCityCommon NameDay Between Forced ChangesDefault ProfileDefault ServerDescriptionE-Mail AddressFax NumberFull NameGroup MembershipHigher PrivilegesHome DirectoryIncorrect Login AttemptsIntruder AddressLanguageLast Login TimeLast NameLimit Grace LoginsLocationLogin DisabledLogin Expiration Date and TimeLogin ScriptLogin TimeLogin Time RestrictionsMailing Label InformationMaximum ConnectionsMinimum Account BalanceMinimum Password LengthNetwork Address RestrictionNetwork AddressesObject ClassObject Trustees (ACL)Organizational Unit (Department)Password Expiration Date and TimePostal (Zip) CodePAGENUM=71 ID="BP69"Postal Office BoxPrint Job ConfigurationPrinter ControlPublic KeyRemaining Grace LoginsRequire a PasswordRequire a Unique PasswordRevisionSecurity EquivalencesSee AlsoServer HoldsState or ProvinceStreetTelephoneTitleType Creator MapUID (User ID)RENDERAS="SECT2"NDS Object and Property RightsThe NDS database allows for as many levels of access as you want to create and manage. These access levels are controlled through object and property rights. NDS object rights are used to control who can perform administrative functions such as creating, deleting, or renaming an object. NDS property rights are used to control who can examine, use, or change the values of the various properties of an object. The five object rights are listed in IDREF="FM82588"Table 3-1.LABEL="3-1" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM82588"NDS object rightsCOLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="15*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RightCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DescriptionVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Supervisor (S)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants all access privilegesCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Browse (B)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants the right to see the object in the Directory treeCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Create (C)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants the right to create new objects below this object in the Directory tree (this right can only be assigned to a container object)COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Delete (D)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants the right to delete the object from the Directory treeCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Rename (R)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants the right to change the name of the objectPAGENUM=72 ID="BP70"The Browse right is the only NDS object right that is generally granted to users. The other object rights are used to manage the objects in the tree. The Supervisor object right implicitly grants the other four object rights as well as the Supervisor property right to "All Properties" (this is explained later). It should also be noted that deletion of an object requires the Write property right to "All Properties" in addition to the Delete object right.As stated above, property rights are used to control how a trustee object can access the values of the various properties of an object. They are listed in IDREF="FM19107"Table 3-2.LABEL="3-2" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM19107"NDS property rightsCOLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="15*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RightCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DescriptionVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Supervisor (S)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants all rights to the propertyCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Compare (C)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants the right to compare any value to a value of the property. With the Compare right, an operation can return True or False, but you cannot see the value of the property.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Read (R)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants the right to read values of the property. The Read right includes the Compare right.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Write (W)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants the right to add, change, or remove any values of the property. The Write right includes Add Self.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Add/Remove Self (A)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants a trustee the right to add or remove itself as a value of the property. This right is only meaningful for properties that contain object names as values, such as group membership lists and mailing lists.The Supervisor object right automatically allows the Supervisor property right for All Properties.PAGENUM=73 ID="BP71"Rights can be granted to every property by using an "All Properties" assignment. Rights can also be granted to individual properties by using a "Selected Properties" assignment. Rights granted to a "Selected Property" will override any rights granted to "All Properties". The default rights granted to a user for her own User object are: MARK=BULLETBrowse object right to itselfRead property right to all properties Read and Write to Login Script and Print Job Configuration propertiesThese rights allow a user to see herself in the NDS tree, read the value of every property, and change the values of the Login Script and Print Job Configuration properties. You must grant both R and W because an individual property right assignment overrides the All Properties assignment. If you wanted to give a user the ability to manage other properties, you would grant the RW rights for these properties. This might be reasonable for the telephone or address related properties. If you do not want a user to be able to change their login script or print job configuration, simply remove the selected properties assignment for that property and the rights will revert to those granted to all properties.The Group Membership, Object Trustees (ACL), and Security Equivalences properties should be closely monitored because they are directly related to both NDS and file system security. Only object supervisors should possess the RW rights to these properties.RENDERAS="SECT2"Access Control ListThe Access Control List is to NDS what the Directory Entry Tables are to the file system. Whereas file system trustee assignments are stored in the Directory Entry Tables, NDS trustee assignments are stored in a property every object in the Directory tree contains, known as the Access Control List (ACL) property. The ACL is a property just like the Email Address or Telephone Number are properties. The ACL indicates which objects have been made an explicit trustee of an object and which rights they have been granted. The ACL lists who has access to a particular object or properties, not what the object might have rights to.The ACL also contains the IRF for the object. The Write property right to the ACL of any object allows for complete control of the access to that object and is the highest level of right that can be granted to an object. Thus, this right should be carefully monitored.PAGENUM=74 ID="BP72"RENDERAS="SECT2"Objects as TrusteesAny object can be a trustee of itself or of any other object in the Directory tree. Typical trustee objects are the four container objects [Root], Country, Organization, and Organizational Unit and the leaf objects User, Group, and Organizational Role. Unless you have particular need for elaborate security, there is no need to develop an elaborate NDS security structure. A few simple settings should be adequate to enable users and administrators to fully exploit the capabilities of NetWare 4. Because there are more ways to grant or acquire rights within NDS and within the file system, people perceive NetWare 4 as difficult to learn and to administer. Do not be intimidated by the variety of ways in which NDS and file system rights can be granted. The default rights assigned by the operating system will usually prove sufficient. The few exceptions to this rule are discussed below.RENDERAS="SECT2"Containers as TrusteesA new concept in NetWare 4 security is the ability to assign both file system and NDS rights to containers. When rights are assigned to a specific container, all subcontainers and objects within that container receive these rights. In effect, if a container is listed in an object's complete NDS name, then is automatically acquires any file system or NDS rights that have been granted to that container.To simplify understanding of this concept, think of containers as "natural groups" since their members do not have to be added to a group membership list, but they cannot be excluded either. Objects within a container receive an "implied" security equivalence to that container. Trustee assignments of the container are treated by the operating system just like trustee assignments of groups. This has been called "ancestral inheritance" which is a misnomer because it has nothing to do with inheritance in NetWare terms. Inheritance in NetWare terms means that rights can be blocked by an IRF. You cannot place an IRF on the user to prevent receiving the rights from containers they belong to. A better term to describe this might be tree-positional rights. These are rights which are received by virtue of an object's position in the Directory tree.PAGENUM=75 ID="BP73"In the following example, the OU=Acctg receives an explicit trustee assignment to SYS:APPS\ACCTG. All users in OU=Acctg and below also receive this assignment. This would be similar to creating a group called Acctg, making everyone a member, and then assigning the group the same file system rights (see IDREF="FM52919"Figure 3-3).LABEL="3-3" FLOAT="0"ID="FM52919"Using containers to assign files rights. FILEREF="3_05acct.tif"Granting rights to containers is generally done to assign file system rights. However, there are situations when NDS rights are assigned as well. An example of this is a container receiving the [ R] property right to its Login Script property. This enables all users within that container to run the container login script because they have rights to it (see IDREF="FM35208"Figure 3-4).PAGENUM=76 ID="BP74"LABEL="3-4" FLOAT="0"ID="FM35208"Using a container to assign NDS rights.FILEREF="3_06cont.tif"Let's look at another example that may help clarify the assignment of container object rights. Say that the OU=Acctg is assigned [B ] to OU=Mktg. All users within OU=Acctg will receive the same rights. Lisa's rights to OU=Mktg are therefore [B ], as seen in IDREF="FM75375"Figure 3-5.PAGENUM=77 ID="BP75"LABEL="3-5" FLOAT="0"ID="FM75375"Objects below a container inherit the container's rights.FILEREF="3_07cont.tif"Now consider what happens if an IRF is added to the picture. If, for instance, an IRF is placed on any object below OU=Mktg, such as at CN=FS1, the rules of inheritance then apply (see IDREF="FM25361"Figure 3-6),because rights are being filtered out which have been granted at a higher level.PAGENUM=78 ID="BP76"LABEL="3-6" FLOAT="0"ID="FM25361"An IRF blocks inherited rights.FILEREF="3_08irf.tif"RENDERAS="SECT2"The [Public] TrusteeThe [Public] trustee is a unique trustee. It is not an object, but a trustee assignment whose assignments are received by anyone requesting authentication to the network even prior to logging in.Use caution when assigning [Public] trustee assignments, as the [Public] trustee's rights are given to all network users as soon as they are attached to the network. Because it is not necessary to login to receive these trustee assignments, you should make no assignments to the [Public] trustee other than the defaults provide by NetWare 4 during the installation process. Initially, [Public] is granted the Browse right at the [Root] of the Directory tree. This enables everyone to use the Change Context (CX) command to move around the tree to find their correct context for logging in. Avoid assigning excessive rights to the [Public] trustee because any actions performed by a user using only the [Public] access will not be recorded by the NetWare 4 Auditing Utility (AUDITCON).PAGENUM=79 ID="BP77"RENDERAS="SECT2"Determining Effective Rights for NDSFor every NDS object, a user's effective rights to that object are determined by all of the following:MARK=BULLETExplicit trustee assignments made to the object for that userplusAny explicit trustee assignments made to any of the user's security equivalents (Groups, Organizational Roles, [Public], and containers it belongs to including [Root])plusAny inherited rights from trustee assignments for source objects other than those for whom explicit trustee assignments have been made, minus any rights revoked by the IRF.RENDERAS="SECT2"Default NDS RightsAn acceptable NDS security structure is easily implemented because most of the necessary rights are automatically assigned as the objects are created. IDREF="FM23095"Table 3-3 below lists the rights assigned as each object is created and the rational behind that assignment.LABEL="3-3" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM23095"NDS installation defaultsCOLS=3 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="8*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="13*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Event-ObjectCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Rights AssignedCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ReasonVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AdminCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[S    ] object to [Root]COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the user Admin to administer every object in the tree. This user will have Supervisor object rights to every object in the tree through inheritance unless that right is blocked at a lower level.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[Public]COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[B    ] object to [Root]COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Rights assigned to [Public] are passed to every object in the tree, whether authenticated or not. This means that every person who has established a connection to the tree can see every object in the tree unless an IRF intervenes.PAGENUM=80 ID="BP78"It should not be necessary to grant additional object rights to the user beyond the Browse right. This Browse right only allows a user to see the object in the Directory tree. An administrator may not want anyone to see which objects exist in a Directory tree before a user is logged in. In this case, the administrator may reassign [Root] the Browse object right instead of [Public].LABEL="3-4" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"NDS defaults for installation of a serverCOLS=3 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="6*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="10*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="10*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"TrusteeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NDS RightsCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"File System RightsVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CreatorCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[S  ] object rights to Server objectCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[Root]COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[R ] property rights to each Volume object's Host Server Name property and Host Volume Name propertyCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[Public]COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[R ] property rights to Server's Network Address propertyCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Container volumes are installed intoCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[R ] property rights to Login Script property of that containerCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[R F] to SYS:PUBLIC[R F] to SYS:DOC (optional)[RWCE F] to SYS:NOVINI (optional)The creator of a server automatically receives the Supervisor object right. This right also allows him or her to administer the file system because [S  ] to a Server object implies [S  ] to the file system. This administrative control over the file system and NDS can be separated by assigning the Supervisor object right for the Server object to the file system administrator and assigning only [BR] object rights and [ R] property rights to the NDS administrator.NDS needs to identify which server the volumes belong to, so it assigns [Root] the Read property right to the Host Server Name property. Because a volume's NDS name can be different from the name assigned to it during volume creation, it also assigns Read to [Root] for the Host Volume Name property.PAGENUM=81 ID="BP79"Enough file system rights are automatically assigned to the container the volumes were installed into so that users within that container can login and map drives properly. The optional file system assignments refer to the installation of ElectroText and the NetWare 4 computer-based tutorial (CBT). If these are selected during server installation, file system rights are automatically assigned to the container the server is installed in.LABEL="3-5" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"NDS defaults upon creation of a userCOLS=3 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="6*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="10*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="10*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"TrusteeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NDS RightsCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"File System RightsVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[Root]COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[B ] object rights to User object (only assigned if IRF has blocked the right)[ R] property rights to Network Address[ R] property rights to Group MembershipCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"UserCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[BR] object rights to itself[ R] to All Property Rights[ RW] property rights to Login Script property[ RW] property rights to Print Job Configuration propertyCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[SRWCEFMA] to its home directory if one was selected at creation timeCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[Public]COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"[ R] property rights to Default Server propertyCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"When the user is created, he receives enough rights to modify his login script and his print job configurations. If you do not want your users to modify their login scripts, you must revoke that right. The rights assigned to [Root] and [Public] enable all users to have read-only access to those properties.RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=82 ID="BP80"Assigning Additional NDS RightsUsing NetWare 4's default NDS rights assignments allows users created in the same container as the server to login and use other system resources defined in the same container (such as print queues). The default installation is typical for organizations where the users will be in the same container as their most frequently accessed server. However, there may be scenarios where an administrator needs to assign additional NDS rights. Typical examples of this include the following:MARK=BULLETDividing the tree's administrationAssigning profile login scriptsCreating Directory Map objectsAllowing users to login as aliases in containers other than where their original object is stored.Establishing special types of users such as mailing list administratorsRENDERAS="SECT2"Dividing Subtree AdministrationBecause the NDS database is a global database (that is, it contains the information for the entire network), it may have containers representing geographically diverse organizations. It is usually more convenient to use local NDS and file system administrators than to have only one central administrative authority. There are three general ways of dividing subtree administration: using one administrator per branch, using multiple administrators per branch, or using a "workgroup" type assistant administrator. The manner you prefer will depend on the needs of your organization.RENDERAS="SECT3"Single AdministratorDepending on the security requirements of your organization, you may require only one user to have administrative rights to a particular branch. If this is the case, it may be necessary to cut off any rights inherited by the original Admin user. To do so, complete the following steps.NUMERATION=ARABIC CONTINUATION="RESTARTS" INHERITNUM="IGNORE"Assign the subtree administrator as an explicit trustee of the container to be administered:[SBCDR] object rights and [SRCWA] property rightsMake sure you assign all rights, not just [S  ], to ensure that total administration of a branch is still possible even if [S  ] is filtered by an IRF.Revoke inherited rights so the original Admin does not inherit rights to the container.Set the IRF for the container to [B ] object rights and PAGENUM=83 ID="BP81"[ R] property rights.Do not revoke the Browse object right as you may still want to allow other users to see that part of the tree.Remove any trustee assignments to the container for the original Admin user.Ensure that the subtree administrator has [S  ] object rights to himself, and then remove any trustee assignments for the original Admin so he may not restrict the subtree administrator's rights.LABEL="3-7" FLOAT="0"A single administrator.FILEREF="3_12adm.tif"It is imperative that you assign explicit trustee assignments which include [S  ] before revoking the [S  ] right using the IRF. If you attempt to revoke the [S  ] right without any explicit trustee assignments, the utilities will prevent you from doing so. However, it is still possible to lose total control over a branch of the tree if the only user with the [S  ] explicit trustee assignment is deleted.PAGENUM=84 ID="BP82"There is a procedure in place that allows network Admin's to regain control over a branch, but it requires the intervention of Novell technical support (calling 1-800-NETWARE at a cost of $150 per incident).RENDERAS="SECT3"Multiple AdministratorsIf your organizational needs call for multiple administrators per branch, then you will need to grant each administrator the appropriate rights to the container. Do this by completing the following steps:NUMERATION=ARABIC CONTINUATION="RESTARTS" INHERITNUM="IGNORE"Assign each subtree administrator as an explicit trustee of the container to be administered:[SBCDR] object rights and [SRCWA] property rightsMake sure you assign all rights, not just [S   ], to ensure that total administration of a branch is still possible even if [S   ] is filtered by an IRF.If the original Admin is not going to administer this branch, then revoke inherited rights so the original Admin does not inherit rights to the container.Set the IRF for the container to [B ] object rights and [ R] property rights.Do not revoke the Browse object right because you may still want to allow other users to see that part of the tree.If the original Admin is not going to administer this branch, then remove any trustee assignments to the container for the original Admin user.If the subtree administrators need to be independent of each other (i.e. they cannot manage each other), then ensure that each sub-tree administrator has [S  ] object rights to himself, and then remove any other user's trustee assignments for each subtree administrator and block inherited rights by setting the IRF of each independent subtree administrator to [B ] object rights and [ R] property rights.RENDERAS="SECT3"PAGENUM=85 ID="BP83"Workgroup ManagerYour organization may have security needs that require central administration but also allow for workgroup or departmental management. As seen in the first example, it is possible to cut off administrative control to a branch of the tree. It is therefore imperative to set up security so that if the administrator of a branch leaves the company under unfavorable circumstances, the resources in that branch can still be administered.To prevent cutting off administrative control from a branch of the tree, complete the following steps:NUMERATION=ARABIC CONTINUATION="RESTARTS" INHERITNUM="IGNORE"Assign the workgroup manager as an explicit trustee of the container to be administered:[BCDR] object rights and [RCWA] All Properties rights[CR] ACL Property rightsReassignment of the ACL property rights override the rights assigned to All Properties rights, preventing the workgroup manager from changing trustee assignments to the container.Ensure Admin has explicit trustee assignment to the container by assigning:[SBCDR] object rights[SRCWA] All Properties rightsAssign Admin an explicit trustee assignment to the workgroup manager.[SBCDR] object rights[SRCWA] All Properties rightsRevoke all inherited rights except B to the workgroup manager so that the workgroup manager does not inherit rights to manage himself.IRF   [B ] object rights onlyReassign the workgroup manager's rights to himself so that he cannot assign himself more rights. This gives the workgroup manager the same rights to manage himself that a user has by default.[B  ] object rights[ R ] All properties[ RW] Login script property[ RW] Print job configuration[CR ] ACL propertyPAGENUM=86 ID="BP84"LABEL="3-8" FLOAT="0"Workgroup manager.FILEREF="3_13_adm.tif"What makes this scenario work is the workgroup manager's inability to change trustee assignments for a container through restricted access to this container's ACL property.RENDERAS="SECT2"Assignment of Profile Login ScriptsProfile login scripts are used when groups of users need common working environments. These users may be in different containers. The profile login script allows them to share a login script. In order to run a profile login script, users who have it assigned to them need to be able to read the login script property of the Profile object. The Profile object can have file system rights assigned to it. These rights do not pass to the user. They are there so that the Profile object can execute the INCLUDE and DISPLAY commands of a login script which require reference to a file.There are no default rights assigned to a Profile object upon its creation. Assign these rights by completing the following steps:PAGENUM=87 ID="BP85"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Create the Profile object.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Fill in the profile login script property.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"For each user who will run the profile login script, assign the profile as their profile login script.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Make each user who will run the script a trustee with the       [B ] object right and the [ R] Login script property right. It is usually easier to assign these rights to the container in which the users are located or to a Group object.RENDERAS="SECT2"Directory Map ObjectsDirectory Map objects are used for mapping to a pointer to a directory rather than a directory itself. When using Directory Map objects, users must be able to read the properties that point to the actual directory. You must ensure that the user has the [ R] All Properties rights to the Directory Map object. Since there are no default rights assigned to a Directory Map object upon its creation, these rights will need to be explicitly assigned. Again, for Directory Map Objects it usually easier to assign these rights at the container or group level. The Directory Map object can also have file system rights assigned to it. These rights are not automatically passed to the user. However, if users are assigned as security equivalent to a Directory Map object the system administrator can easily relocate an application as well as reassign the file system rights of those users by simply changing the values of the Directory Map object.RENDERAS="SECT2"Alias LoginsIn NetWare 4.01, a user may have an Alias object created for it. When a user logs in as an Alias object, the user runs the system login script belonging to the container the Alias is in. If you create a user Alias in a different container than an original object, you need to assign the Alias object rights to run the new container's login script. To do so, assign the Alias object [R ] to the container's Login Script property. In a future version of NetWare 4, this will change so that an Alias of a user will execute the container login script of the original user.RENDERAS="SECT2"PAGENUM=88 ID="BP86"Special Users: Mailing List AdministratorThe mailing list administrator role is repetitive to set up. Since the user will be managing properties of individual User objects, assignment must be made to individual users. You are unable to assign the administrator to a group of users because then he or she would be managing the properties of the Group object rather than the User objects. You also may not assign rights to the mailing list administrator using the All Properties rights selection because that would include too many rights (including the ACL property).Following is a list of rights that the mailing list administrator would typically assign for each User object he or she is responsible for:TYPE="VERT"Email address[R W]TYPE="VERT"Phone number[R W]TYPE="VERT"Fax number[R W]TYPE="VERT"Address[R W]It is important to understand the implications of assigning the [R W] right through the All Properties option. Remember that "All Properties" includes the object ACL property. The [ W] right to an object's ACL property controls who can change trustee assignments to that object. As we discussed earlier, this is the most powerful right that an object trustee can have. Someone with the [ W] right to the ACL property can also assign others rights to the directory. If we were to make this assignment, the mailing list administrator would have more rights than were originally intended.RENDERAS="SECT2"Effects of NDS Rights on File System RightsNDS rights do not "flow" into the file system. The only exception to this rule involves the Server object. Anyone with the Supervisor object right or Write property right for the ACL property will automatically have the Supervisor file system right to every volume attached to that server.RENDERAS="SECT2"NDS Rights Needed for PrintingNetWare 4 printing is managed similarly to NetWare 3.1x printing. Management is done through users and operators. No NDS rights are required. To manage a print server, you need to be a print server operator. To manage print queues, you need to be a print queue operator. To print to a printer or print queue, you need to be a print queue user. PAGENUM=89 ID="BP87"By default, the container the queue is created in is made a print queue user. All users within that container can therefore print to the queues in their own containers.RENDERAS="SECT1"File System SecurityFile system security in NetWare 4 is essentially the same as it was with NetWare 3.1x. There are three minor changes:MARK=BULLETThe Inherited Rights Mask (IRM) is now referred to as the Inherited Rights Filter (IRF), but it behaves the same way as the IRM.Additional attributes (marked by an asterisk in IDREF="FM79204"Table 3-8 and IDREF="FM56978"Table 3-9) and attribute status flags (see IDREF="FM72248"Table 3-10) have been added to accommodate the new data migration and file compression features of NetWare 4.Rights assigned to user home directories at user creation time now include the Supervisory file right as well as all other rights.LABEL="3-6" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"File system directory rights for NetWareCOLS=3 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="23*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Right NameCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AbbreviationCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MeaningVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SupervisorCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants all rights to the directory, its files, and its subdirectories. The Supervisor right overrides any restrictions placed on subdirectories or files with an Inherited Rights Filter. Users who have this right in a directory can grant other users Supervisor rights to the directory, its files, and its subdirectories.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ReadCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the directory to be opened and read.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"WriteCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"WCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows users to open and write files. Displaying existing files is not possible without Read authorization.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CreateCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows users to create directories and files. Write authorization is required in order to write data to any created file. If the user has Write and Create authorization, he can create a file and write data into this file. As soon as the file has been closed, it can no longer be read or modified without Read authorization.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"EraseCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ECOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows users to delete a directory, its files, and subdirectories.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ModifyCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows users to change directory and file attributes (with File Scan). This also grants the right to rename the directory, its files, and its subdirectories. This does not grant the right to modify any file's contents.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"File ScanCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"FCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows users to see files.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Access ControlCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ACOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows users to change directory trustee assignments and the Inherited Rights Masks for directories. This also allows users to modify file trustee assignments. Users can grant any right (except Supervisory) to any other user, including rights that they themselves have not been granted.PAGENUM=90 ID="BP88".LABEL="3-7" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"File system file rightsCOLS=3 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="23*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Right NameCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AbbreviationCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MeaningVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SupervisorCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Grants all rights to the file. Users who have this right can grant any file right to another user and can modify all the rights in the file's Inherited Rights Mask.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ReadCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the file to be opened and read.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"WriteCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"WCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the file to be opened and written to.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CreateCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the file to be salvaged, after the file has been deleted.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"EraseCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ECOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the file to be deleted.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ModifyCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the file's attributes to be changed, and the file to be renamed. This does not allow the contents of the file to be modified.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"File ScanCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"FCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the file to be seen when viewing the contents of the directory.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Access ControlCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ACOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the file's trustee assignments and Inherited Rights Mask to be modified. Users who have this right can grant any right (except Supervisory) to any other user, including rights that they themselves have not been granted.PAGENUM=91 ID="BP89".LABEL="3-8" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM79204"File system directory attributesCOLS=3 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="23*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AttributeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AbbreviationCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MeaningVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"*Don't CompressCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DcCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Added to a directory, this attribute keeps all files within the directory from being compressed.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Delete InhibitCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DiCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Prevents users from erasing directories even when they have been granted the Erase trustee right. If the user has been granted the Modify trustee right, he can remove this attribute from the directory.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"*Don't MigrateCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DmCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Added to a directory, this attribute will not allow files within the directory to be migrated to secondary storage.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"HiddenCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"HCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Hides directories from DOS DIR scans. NetWare's NDIR program will display these directories if the user has appropriate File Scan rights.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"*Immediate CompressCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"IcCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Added to directories, this attribute alerts the file system to compress a file as soon as the operating system can handle the action.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NormalCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Normal flags a directory as Read/Write and nonshareable. It removes most other flags.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"PurgeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"PCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"When this attribute is assigned to a directory, NetWare will automatically purge all files in the directory after they have been deleted.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Rename InhibitCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RiCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Prevents users from renaming directories even when they have been granted the Modify trustee right. However, if the user has been granted the Modify trustee right, he can remove this attribute from the directory in order to rename the directory.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SystemCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Hides directories from DOS DIR scans and prevents them from being deleted or copied. NetWare's NDIR program will display these directories as System if the user has appropriate File Scan rights..LABEL="3-9" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM56978"File system file attributesCOLS=3 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="23*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AttributeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AbbreviationCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MeaningVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Archive NeededCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ACOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Identifies files modified after last backup. NetWare assigns this bit automatically. This is DOS's Archive bit.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Copy InhibitCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CiCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Restricts the copy rights of only users logged in from Macintosh workstations. Even if these users have been granted Read and File Scan trustee rights at the directory or file level, they will not be able to copy the file. If the user has the Modify right, he can then modify this file attribute to allow copying.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"*Don't CompressCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DcCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Keeps data from being compressed. This attribute overrides settings for automatic compression of files not accessed within a specified number of days.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Delete InhibitCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DiCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Restricts the delete rights of only users logged in from Macintosh workstations. Even if these users have been granted the Erase trustee right at the directory or file level, they will not be able to copy the file. If the user has the Modify right, he can then modify this file attribute to allow deleting.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"*Don't MigrateCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DmCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Prevents files from being migrated from the server's hard disk to another storage medium.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"HiddenCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"HCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Hides files so they can't be seen using the DIR command. They can be seen if a user with File Scan rights uses the NDIR command.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"IndexCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ICOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"This indicates to the NetWare operating system that this file's FAT entries are to be indexed in server memory for faster file access. NetWare 4 will automatically index any file with more than 64 File Allocation Table (FAT) entries.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"*Immediate CompressCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"IcCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Sets data to be compressed as soon as a file is closed.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NormalCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"While there is not an N attribute bit for file attributes, if you flag a file as N(ormal) this will flag the file as Read/Write (see Read/Write below). This is the default setting for files.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"PurgeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"PCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"When this attribute is assigned to a file, NetWare will automatically purge the file after it has been deleted.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Rename InhibitCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RiCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Prevents the file name from being modified.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Read OnlyCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RoCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Prevents a file from being modified. This attribute automatically sets Delete Inhibit and Rename Inhibit.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Read WriteCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RwCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows you to write to a file. All files are created with this attribute.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ShareableCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows several users to access a file simultaneously. This attribute is normally used with the Read Only attribute, so that a file being used by other multiple users cannot be modified.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"System FileCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SyCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Hides these files from DOS DIR scans and prevents them from being deleted or copied. NetWare's NDIR program will display these directories as System if the user has appropriate File Scan rights.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Transactiona lCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"TCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows a file to be tracked and protected by the Transaction Tracking System (TTS).COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Execute OnlyCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"XCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Prevents the file from being copied, modified, or backed up. This attribute cannot be removed unless the file is deleted. Used for program files such as .EXE or .COM files.PAGENUM=93 ID="BP90".LABEL="3-10" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM72248"New file attribute status flags in NetWare 4COLS=3 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="23*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AttributeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AbbreviationCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DefinitionVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CompressCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CoCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Status flag that indicates the file is compressed.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Can't CompressCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CcCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Status flag that indicates the file cannot be compressed because of limited space savings.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MigratedCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"This status flag indicates that the file has been migrated.RENDERAS="SECT2"Determining File System Effective RightsThe method for determining file system effective rights is the same as determining them in NetWare 3.1x. The only additional considerations are who can be a trustee. For file system rights, a user's effective rights to a directory are determined by:MARK=BULLETThe Supervisory right to a directory, which allows all rights to a directory and all subsequent subdirectories and files below that directory. The Supervisory right cannot be reassigned nor can it be revoked by an IRF.Any explicit user trustee assignments to a directory.PAGENUM=94 ID="BP91"Any explicit user trustee assignments made for a group or organizational role the user is a member of, security equivalent to, or container it is a member of.Any inherited rights from trustee assignments for the objects other than those for whom explicit trustee assignments have been made, minus any rights revoked by the IRF for that directory.File system rights may be assigned at the directory and the file level. Rights assigned to directories are automatically assigned to all files in that directory. Rights assigned to specific files overwrite any rights inherited from the directory level.RENDERAS="SECT1"Assigning Additional File System RightsThe criteria for assigning additional file system rights in NetWare 4 is very similar to that for previous versions of NetWare. The system administrator will have to assign additional file system rights for:MARK=BULLETApplications and data files users need access toUsers that are not installed in the same context as the server and thus do not acquire file system rights to SYS:PUBLICRENDERAS="SECT2"Applications and Data FilesWhen installing new applications on a server, file system rights must be assigned so that users may access them. In addition, remember that users need a separate area to store data files, which they need access to these as well. This is usually done by assigning a home directory for each user.RENDERAS="SECT2"Users Not in the Same Context as the ServerBy default, the Read and File Scan rights are assigned for SYS:PUBLIC to the container the server is installed in. If users are created outside of this container, they will not inherit these rights. These file system rights must be assigned elsewhere in order for users to execute the drive mappings of the default login script. PAGENUM=95 ID="BP92"The same problem occurs when users attach to a server other than the one installed in their context. When drive mappings in a login script do not specify the server (as is the case of the default login script), drive mappings will be attempted on the server the user attached to when logging in. This may not be the server these mappings are desired on. Thus it is usually a good practice to prevent the default login script from running and to explicitly control the drive mappings involved.RENDERAS="SECT2"Where to Assign File System RightsWith NetWare 4 you have more choices on where to assign rights. You can assign rights to containers, Groups, Organizational Roles, Users, and the [Public] trustee. Where rights are assigned depends on what your organization needs.RENDERAS="SECT3"[Root]In a small network environment where all users may need access to all servers, file system rights to SYS:PUBLIC may be assigned at the [Root] object. In addition, rights to common applications like WordPerfect or Lotus 1-2-3 may be assigned to the [Root] object. In this case, all users will acquire these rights. This is a prime example of tree-positional rights. All users will acquire these rights because of their position in the tree. Rights assigned to a container are implicitly assigned to all objects under that container. In this specific instance, the container is [Root], so all objects in the entire tree will acquire these rights.Assigning rights at the [Root] eliminates redundancy in making trustee assignments. It also allows users to easily run common applications from different servers if their primary server is down.On larger networks, assigning file system rights at the [Root] object may be efficient by allowing users that travel from one location to another to map to applications that are running locally rather than having to use their applications over a wide area network (WAN).However, administrators may not want to assign extensive NDS rights at the [Root] object because these rights will be received by all users. Remember that most NDS rights are management rights and users other than the administrator do not require these rights. The most likely NDS right to be assigned at the [Root] is the Browse right so that users may see the other objects in the tree. This done automatically during the server installation when the [Public] trustee receives the Browse right to [Root].PAGENUM=96 ID="BP93"RENDERAS="SECT3"OrganizationAssigning rights to an Organization object is similar to assigning them at the [Root] level. Rather than assigning rights network-wide (where the network may be spread around the globe), rights assignments may be segregated by divisions or locations designated by the Organization (O) object. The advantage of assigning rights to an Organization object rather than to the [Root] here would be the unnecessary rights assignment for O=Japan to the servers located in Australia, France, and the U.S.The same argument described under NDS rights assignments to [Root] applies to NDS rights assigned at the Organization level.RENDERAS="SECT3"Organizational UnitThe use of Organizational Unit objects starts to provide additional flexibility in rights assignments. File system rights assigned at the OU level are common for servers shared on a departmental basis. Rights to more applications and data files will be assigned at the Ous closer to the User objects.For example, when accounting applications are shared by both the A/R and A/P departments (each of which has its own OU under the OU=Accounting), the assignments could be made in the parent OU of the two departments.Try to maximize the amount of rights assigned to containers since all users automatically receive these rights. However, for the same reason, be careful not to assign too many rights to containers.RENDERAS="SECT3"Group or Organizational RoleWhen you are unable to assign rights at the container level due to the sensitivity of the data, it may be necessary to create Group and Organizational Role objects for such assignments. File system rights to these objects are also practical for specialized servers, such as an application server or database server where only a subset of all users need access to the file system. Remember to add the necessary users to the Organizational Role or Group.RENDERAS="SECT3"Directory Maps and ProfilesEven though these have a property called "Rights to the File System," this is not a proper way to assign rights. File system rights granted to Directory Maps and Profiles are not transferred to users mapping to the Directory Map object or to those using the Profile Login Script.PAGENUM=97 ID="BP94"RENDERAS="SECT2"Assigning File System RightsNetWare file system rights may be assigned in the following ways:MARK=BULLETOn the Volume objectAs trustee of a root directoryAs trustee of a subdirectoryAs trustee of a fileThrough User, Group, Organizational Role, or container objectsFile system rights can be granted by using the following utilities:MARK=BULLETThe NWAdmin GUI utilityThe NETADMIN text-based utilityThe FILER menu utilityThe RIGHTS command line utility:FORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"RIGHTS [path] [+|-] rights [NAME|GROUP]=LABEL="4"PAGENUM=99 ID="BP95"Auditing NetWare 4 SecurityThe NetWare 4 operating system offers the LAN administrator, security officer and auditor a platform with integrated control and security features. This provides the opportunity for enhanced auditing and real-time monitoring of the network. These include the ability to create a single sign-on/resource control environment and real-time auditing using the AUDITCON utility and NetWare's command language and Windows-based administration functions.This chapter describes an overall strategy for performing various levels of audit and review. After discussing a typical audit approach for a NetWare network, it provides control concerns, audit procedures, and overview questions for planning an audit in several common control objective categories.Our methodology stresses the use of disciplines such as engineering, system analysis, and good business practices, combined with standards promoted by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) SAC report, the EDPAA's Control Guidelines, and industry-specific regulations. It is also recommended that classic audit considerations for distributed data centers, telecommunications, and systems be applied to the network environment. These are the underpinnings of what will be discussed in this chapter.No single document can provide definitive answers to all problems that may be encountered. This report seeks to give the auditor and security administrator guidance and a logical approach that can be applied on a day-to-day basis. Thus it focuses on medium- to high-risk issues. RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=100 ID="BP96"Initial ConcernsThe use of networks and client/server technology has taken on a major emphasis in corporations of all sizes. Networks have been accepted as the platform of choice for mission-critical and sensitive systems. In fact, they have become the backbone of many organizations which rely on them on a day-to-day basis. In short, networks have come into their own as valued business assets.Along with this acceptance comes the need to efficiently manage and control these "valued assets." Auditors must therefore carefully examine the setup, administration, control, and management of these systems, much as they have with UNIX and other operating systems. To ascertain auditing needs, it is also important to determine what types of systems are currently in use and what will be used in the future.To perform a review of the NetWare 4 operating system, you will need a clear understanding of: MARK=BULLETThe corporation's organizational structureThe corporation's data flowNetWare Directory ServicesNetWare file/directory servicesTo provide security, control, and auditability, organizations must balance the features that are provided with the corporate architecture, policies, and the needs of the end-user. It is important to evaluate these elements based on access control demands, performance, efficiency, and information requirements. Controls need to be assessed and promulgated that assure the proper reliability and security performance of all components: desktop operating system, server operating system, and network operating system.Consequently, one needs to focus on the following when determining the necessary auditing process: MARK=BULLETWhat is the purpose of the security review or audit?How does one set the scope of such an effort?What are the objectives?What platform(s) should be examined? What are the corporate policies, procedures, and standards?Is management directly involved with the process?PAGENUM=101 ID="BP97"Is the physical security sufficient?What is the status of the system security and controls?Is critical and sensitive data protected and well managed?Are system resources properly secured and auditable?Are system operation and maintenance procedures in place?Are appropriate techniques and procedures available to audit the entire system? Does system design maximize the use of NetWare 4 control and security features? Is business continuity a corporate prime objective and mandate?Is there a tested business continuity plan?Give careful consideration to systems that overlap (share common interfaces), and to those that handle critical functions, large assets, or sensitive information.RENDERAS="SECT2"Exposure and RiskToday, information systems are accessed not only by users within the corporation, but also by others from the outside. These external users are quite often unknown or not under direct control of the organization. It is quite common for users to have no knowledge of where the systems they access are physically located. In light of such external access, the traditional methods of security involving physical, application, and operating systems must be updated to encompass this new environment.With connectivity, internetworking, user friendliness, and open systems being goals for supporting companies through the use of networks, one must be aware of the possibility of "outsiders" or "hackers" trying to access asset valuable systems. Every PC with a direct connection or modem is a potential "listening" node or tool for misuse on the network and a threat to applications and data stored in a company's systems.PAGENUM=102 ID="BP98"As organizations evolve, the distinction between data processing and data communications becomes less precise. Client/server application systems are heavily dependent on properly designed networks. Most data communications equipment is no longer dedicated to an application, but serves as an exchange path for many applications to interoperate. This requires an integrated approach to security and auditing. For example, from a Network Control Center (NCC) the network allows virtually any user location to be logically connected to any computer application. This is critical to such businesses as international banking, where the customer base is geographically dispersed, constantly moving, and globally connected. The authorization and review process should support, not hinder, this real-time user need for flexibility.Therefore, auditing in the network computing environment must provide one with the ability to monitor, collect, and review user activities, system-wide options, and defaults of NetWare Directory Services (NDS) and individual servers and the resources that they provide.The audit methodology presented in this chapter is derived from established mainframe/minicomputer and microcomputer practices, as well as those strictly oriented to the network environment. Careful attention has been taken to include the latest proposed audit considerations being looked at by various governing bodies.These auditing considerations are but a small microcosm of what one finds in the larger world of telecommunications departments. To insure proper coverage, it is important that all areas be considered especially those that involve unchecked and undocumented growth potential, such as networks. Audit efforts must therefore be redirected and refocused to closely scrutinize telecommunications and its assets.The Auditing Department must gain insight into these areas by:MARK=BULLETParticipating actively in the initial planning and strategy meetingsReviewing internal and external plans and technical materialBringing the knowledge of control and security to bear on the various projectsActive involvement in these areas is the key factor.PAGENUM=103 ID="BP99"RENDERAS="SECT1"A Typical Network Audit MethodologyMany methods can be used to analyze the security of a network environment. To bring mainframe technology skills to bear on this audit, a Host Out/Workstation In (HOWI) method was developed. The HOWI method capitalizes on the fact that the discrete components that make up the network can be directly mapped to mainframe/minicomputer functions then analyzed, reviewed, and audited along classic pragmatic lines. For example, the auditor or security administrator can deal with servers and workstation structures as highly compartmentalized processing, storage, or communications units. The HOWI approach provides a simplified analysis of the LAN framework. To understand network computing, you first need to review the components that make up the network system(s). Begin the examination with the server ("host") computer and work your way through the various components to the end-user workstation. During this examination, you should formulate answers to the following questions on a component-by-component basis:MARK=BULLETWhat is the component's function?What are the security/control functions it provides?What are the performance requirements imposed on this unit?How does this unit interface with the previous and next unit in line? Is this unit critical to the operation of the network?This set of questions is the starting point for the auditor to see what network computing is about. From here, you should follow standard system analysis principles, applying what you have already learned and experienced to network technology. The following sections detail a range of considerations for networks. Our examination of the individual components (hosts, servers, workstations, specialized services, and interconnections) focuses on their individual contribution to processing, storing, and moving data. We also consider their ability to work in combination with each other. Significant in this approach is that security/control will first be reviewed on a platform or device basis, as well as with the interlocking relationships (the security interface).To begin, it is important to clearly define the principal components of a network computing environment. These components are: PAGENUM=104 ID="BP100"MARK=BULLETThe serverThe transmission system and media componentsThe workstationsThe operating system software (NetWare, DOS, OS/2, UNIX, and so on)This delineation shows each component consists of hardware and software which can contribute to the control and security of data both locally and remotely.Given the presence of microprocessors in almost every piece of electronic equipment, you must realize that microprocessors can also be programmed to add or circumvent controls that may be in place in other parts of the system. An example is a communications server that can be programmed to either allow or not allow a user to communicate with the outside world, or that restricts outside sources from accessing the network. The network computing environment, therefore, permits many of the present host-bound security functions to reside on equipment not locally attached or even geographically present. The network becomes both the transportation agent and the control agent in one bundle. Using the method of following the data flow and access control mechanisms from the host (server) out to the workstation gives you a complete picture of the in place controls and those that are needed.The increased use and dependence on decentralized, networked computing systems dictates the need for active audit involvement.RENDERAS="SECT2"The Purpose of an AuditBusinesses perform audits for many reasons. Internal auditors perform audits to comply with regulatory requirements, to identify process improvement opportunities, or to measure compliance with internal standards. External auditors perform information systems audits to support their opinion on a company's financial statements or their evaluation of a company's internal controls. The exact approach and procedures an auditor employs depends upon the objective of the audit.PAGENUM=105 ID="BP101"Another purpose of an audit is to detect activities that may compromise the security of the system. When unauthorized access is attempted (whether successful or not), or when activities occur that violate system security or controls, an audit is essential. The following activities are candidates for inclusion in a security audit:MARK=BULLETAuthenticating usersAccessing the systemChanging the configuration of the systemCircumventing the audit trailsInitializing the systemInstalling programsModifying accountsTransferring information into or out of the systemOnce established at the desired level, security tends to deteriorate over time. Reasons for this lie in the dynamics of the computer use and the complexity of the environment. Typical factors are:MARK=BULLETNew files created by usersNew users granted access to the systemFile ownership changes, but trustee rights are not changedUser responsibility changes, requiring changes to user/group trustee rightsTemporary access granted, but not revoked on a timely basisNew applications or releases installedSecurity auditing encompasses two different activities:MARK=BULLETDay-to-day security monitoring tasks. This monitoring should be part of the security administrator's responsibility. Full-time security administrators should perform these tasks every day, while part-time administrators may elect to do the monitoring on a less frequent basis.Periodic security auditsPAGENUM=106 ID="BP102". Periodic reviews and audits may be performed by internal or external auditors. Periodic reviews may be performed annually or less frequently, depending on the size and security needs of an organization.In this chapter, we are describing "periodic" audits and security reviews that take place in companies on a predetermined basis by internal or external auditors or security administrators. To perform their duties, these individuals must determine the status of the control and security posture of the operating environment. To do this, auditors must use the command language, utilities, and audit facilities to capture and analyze information that describes the features of the area being examined at any given moment, as well as over a designated period of time. The examiners can use this information to document changes to NetWare 4 or identify unauthorized use of resources in the NetWare 4 environment on a day-to-day basis and at specified times.The auditor typically would not be responsible for reviewing daily or weekly audit trail information, other than exception reports to identify unauthorized activities. We do encourage auditors to develop templates that mirror the company's security architecture and policies, and which can be used to determine the compliance of the platform that is being looked at. This validates the need for having the network audit function turned on and having it acquire the right amount of information continuously.RENDERAS="SECT2"Setting the Scope of the AuditThe size and complexity of today's global network environments require an audit approach as detailed as that applied to data processing. This section lays the groundwork for the dissection of this business entity. An initial step in the audit of a network is to determine the scope of the audit. Depending on the system and its business purpose/function, stage of development, and communications/processing environment, you can choose different review perspectives:MARK=BULLETDevelopmentOperationalCompliancePAGENUM=107 ID="BP103"Applications layered on networks introduce risks into the network computing system in which they operate. Further, user requirements based on these applications affect performance requirements and, therefore, the access demands and security risks of the network. Depending on the type of audit conducted, the auditor should determine if the network is properly designed, if its performance is adequate, and if it adheres to the security practices defined as acceptable.For example, an audit should determine the effects a malfunction of a network component (for instance, a communications server) might have on the system, the user, the application, and most importantly on the business itself. Controls to ensure proper security performance and reliability of all network components must be assessed.Accordingly, the following considerations should be addressed during a network audit:MARK=BULLETIs the network cost-effective? Is its operation and design consistent with the project system development life cycle?Is physical security sufficient to safeguard equipment and information, as well as the personnel operating or using the system?Is critical data protected from loss or damage? Is sensitive data protected from unauthorized exposure?Is management providing the appropriate direction, policies, and standards for effective network computing service?Is compliance with established policies and standards regularly monitored?Are appropriate hardware and software techniques being used to ensure network reliability?Are controls sufficient to ensure that access to the network is limited to authorized users?Are network utilities and management programs properly controlled?Is the system meeting user requirements? Are facilities available to measure performance?Is there a methodology in place to ensure sufficient resources (capacity planning)?PAGENUM=108 ID="BP104"Are there any operational procedures to ensure that system-critical functions are available?Does the network design afford sufficient flexibility and resilience to limit disruption?Does backup exist in case of media failure?Is there a business-related contingency backup plan, or is the network included in a larger plan?Is there any methodology for enforcing policy guidelines?RENDERAS="SECT2"Organization AnalysisA review of the installed and planned telecommunications facilities indicates that the audit universe can be formidable. The diversity of equipment and the systems used to service domestic and international operations of companies goes beyond just voice and data communications. It also includes data/audio combinations, videotext, satellite, and fiber optic specialty circuits, which may or may not be owned and operated by the company. Individuals sometimes numbering in the hundreds or thousands and departments are involved on a daily basis with running these systems. Business has become a global issue. Some firms today are operating internal telecommunications networks that rival those of some of the common carriers in complexity and size. Furthermore, there may not be one central network management structure that controls this resource in all countries and all business lines.Therefore, to audit this entity one must:MARK=BULLETUnderstand the organizational entities providing telecommunications servicesDetermine the resources and services that are providedDetermine the telecommunications assets of the organizationEstablish an audit methodology for each service and its components which delineates the controls that are needed to eliminate or minimize the risks and exposuresPAGENUM=109 ID="BP105"RENDERAS="SECT2"Types of AuditsBefore we discuss control concerns and audit procedures for NetWare 4 environments, we need to establish a framework for categorizing these concerns and procedures. We have classified the different information system audits into three categories:MARK=BULLETSecurity ReviewSystem AuditApplication/Product AuditThe following descriptions of these categories include a few examples of the types of concerns and procedures relevant to them.RENDERAS="SECT3"Security ReviewThe security review determines the security posture of the area. It seeks to determine the compliance to baseline security and control standards that have been specified by corporate policy and legal/regulatory mandate. It is a snapshot of the current conditions.Auditors may perform a security review as part of a regulatory audit or an external audit. During a security review, the auditor establishes that the NetWare control environment and administrative practices meet a predetermined and "commercially acceptable" level of compliance.The auditor evaluates the security review results independent of the layered business functions and applications. The auditor is concerned with the platform setup and control/security needs as it pertains to the technology. Procedures primarily include inquiry and observation. The scope typically includes:MARK=BULLETPhysical security and environmentBackup, recovery, and contingency planningSystem accessPAGENUM=110 ID="BP106"RENDERAS="SECT3"System AuditA system audit is more comprehensive than a security review and typically includes testing procedures to support inquiries and observations. Process improvement studies or compliance audits usually include the detail and scope of a system review.A system review usually assesses these categories:MARK=BULLETPolicies, procedures, and standardsPhysical security and environment Backup, recovery, and contingency planningSystem operations, maintenance, and troubleshootingSystem accessResource utilizationSoftware development, acquisition, and maintenancePrior to evaluating the results of a system audit, the auditor must understand the business functions supported by the NetWare environment. The auditor's understanding of the business function's significance allows him or her to evaluate identified weaknesses and risks.RENDERAS="SECT3"Applications AuditThe applications audit is a highly focused audit that highlights the control and security concerns and issues indicative to the application. These control and security issues can significantly change the baseline security strategy. At this audit level, a cost analysis for application security is also necessary. Auditors perform an application audit primarily to assess the integrity, availability, and/or confidentiality controls and practices supporting a specified application. First, the auditor identifies specific application controls. Next, the auditor determines how NetWare controls and practices impact those application controls. The extent of the NetWare audit procedures is closely tied to the specific application's controls and practices. The auditor evaluates the NetWare system audit results in conjunction with the application audit results.PAGENUM=111 ID="BP107"Once the particular type of audit or review activity has been decided upon, one can focus upon the environmental situation and expand the audit steps as appropriate.COLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="9*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="16*"VALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DevelopmentCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Strategic planning, developmental, and implementation project participation and review.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"OperationalCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Network's operating and maintenance environmentCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ComplianceCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Network's adherence to company standards, peer utilization, contingency planning, and good business practices.Thus, an auditor approaches the complex telecommunications arena from several different directions, optimizing the approach and reorienting the focus to fit the particular circumstance. This is then matrixed with the responsible organizations or individuals.RENDERAS="SECT1"The Typical Audit ApproachThe various types of NetWare audits can follow standard audit methodologies. The auditor can partition large tree structures to audit or review only that portion of the tree that corresponds to the auditee's working environment. The steps that have been tested over the past several years are:MARK=BULLETDetermine the audit objectives and conductPerform preliminary analysis and audit planningGather detailed informationAnalyze and assess the network environmentPrepare the audit report or action planThese steps are described in general terms below.RENDERAS="SECT2"PAGENUM=112 ID="BP108"Audit Objectives and ConductHowever, before embarking on an audit or security review, it is important to set objectives and direction. Audit and security reviews need to be individually tailored. Some network computing components will receive more or less attention, depending on the type of review and the complexity of the overall environment. For example, in a development audit, the auditor may recommend security provisions and performance parameters be incorporated during the network's development. By contrast, in an operational audit the reviewer will determine whether the installed network complies with the original design and current requirements.Every network should meet a set of functional requirements based on these factors:MARK=BULLETCorporate standards, policies, and procedures (including federal, state, and local governmental requirements)The network's computing component specificationsEnd-users' needsAn organization's policies, organizational structure, and needs have an impact on the audit. Identifying these elements helps the auditor further define audit objectives:MARK=BULLETCorporate policies and standards - Review the corporate policies and standards that apply to decentralized computing, networks, and network services.Network management - Review the management structure of the network and department and corporate network service organization. Does the management structure provide effective service? Is there a methodology in place to determine the efficiency of management?Network functionality/requirements - Review the network system's functionality in terms of applications, types of data, and importance to the company.User requirements - What are the user requirements for existing and future services? If these are not defined clearly, or if they are based on estimates of current usage patterns (not projected growth), strategic planning for the future cannot be done effectively. If these are monitored improperly, network failure can result.The auditor must identify individuals responsible for the network, the interconnecting network, and related elements. Areas of responsibility include:PAGENUM=113 ID="BP109"MARK=BULLETDesignOperations and maintenanceInterface with users, MIS, and telecommunications staffSecurityThese individuals should receive a copy of the audit report at the conclusion of the audit. Determination of who receives these reports may differ from company to company, but the information provided here should be used for a basis in determining audit report distribution.Another audit objective is to determine whether the network functions as it was designed and meets the design and usage requirements. This requires that the auditor:MARK=BULLETCatalog all components and examine their performance levelsEvaluate all security provisions (detection, prevention, correction, and recovery)Assess threats to the network and the controls in place to reduce risksTo accomplish these objectives, the auditor must gather data and documentation regarding the network computing environment and its components. This is done by communicating with the individuals responsible for system and network platform.RENDERAS="SECT2"Preliminary Analysis and Audit PlanningThrough observation and inquiry, the auditor gathers information to establish an overview of how NetWare supports the auditee's business functions. Audit planning includes a preliminary risk assessment and establishment of the audit's scope. At this point, the auditor will gather information to understand the network environment, including:MARK=BULLETCorporate standards and organizationHardware -  servers, routers, wiring, network interface cards, and so forthPAGENUM=114 ID="BP110"Software -  workstation operating systems, gateways, e-mail, applications, and so forthCommunications -  wide area, remote dial-in, and multi-platformPeople -  users and support communityHistorically, an auditor defined the scope of a NetWare audit in terms of a server or a departmental network with several servers. In the NetWare 4 environment, the auditor will want to define the scope of a NetWare audit by defining the objects that support the auditee's business. If the company has properly designed their NDS tree, the auditor can restrict the review to objects within a particular organization or organizational unit. In the NetWare 4 environment, the auditor's basic planning objective becomes finding the answer to this question:What controls and administrative procedures support the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of objects (in the defined Organizational Unit) which support the auditee's business functions?However, you cannot ignore objects outside of the auditee's organizational unit, since administrators could grant them access to objects that are included within the scope of the audit. For example, suppose you are conducting an audit of the general ledger system residing on a NetWare server's volume FIN. The financial server and volume FIN reside under the Accounting organizational unit in the NDS tree. Your review would primarily focus on controls over resources (objects) within the Accounting Organizational Unit (OU). Mary resides in the information systems unit and has access to the FIN volume to support accounting. As part of the review, you will want to look at the integrity of Mary's login ID.RENDERAS="SECT2"Detailed Information GatheringData gathering can be the most difficult task in the audit review process. Documentation and records are not normally a part of the operating scenario. If they do exist, they may not be properly maintained or are dispersed throughout the organization, making them hard to find.Well-planned interviews of responsible individuals should be conducted to supplement documentation. Ideally, the auditor should collect and review:PAGENUM=115 ID="BP111"MARK=BULLETThe original network requirements definition, based on the feasibility study, the proposed design and alternatives, the trade-off study, and final decisionsDesign standard, criteria, approach, and documentationDevelopment and implementation plansNetwork operations and maintenance plans and proceduresTesting criteria, plans, procedures, and resultsThe original and current configurations and configuration change controlsPerformance standards, reports, history, trends, and the applied measurement techniquesIdentification of critical or vulnerable network elements and controls to lower riskAudit trails and analysis tools for the networkContingency and disaster recovery plansInventory of applications and network usersAnalysis of security requirements for current and proposed applicationsInventory and analysis of current and proposed circuitsNetwork personnel training programTo gather and document how the auditee has installed and configured NetWare 4, the auditor will use the following tools:MARK=BULLETNetWare 4 commands and utilitiesThe NetWare 4 AUDITCON utility and templatesThird-party reporting toolsPAGENUM=116 ID="BP112"After analyzing the reports generated with these tools and any additional information that is available, the auditor interviews NetWare administrative personnel to obtain a thorough understanding of NetWare administration procedures and controls. The audit procedures and control questions in the next section will help the auditor gather information.We have prepared a list of NetWare 4 commands to facilitate information gathering (see Chapter 6). In addition, Appendix B lists some third-party reporting products that you might want to use to facilitate gathering information.RENDERAS="SECT2"Analysis and AssessmentA thorough understanding of the corporation's data processing and network environment is invaluable to the auditor. This includes an understanding of the system's life cycle and any completed or planned changes, integrations, consolidations, or expansions. For example, if a current mainframe application is to be moved to a decentralized network facility, the auditor would perform a development audit of the new system, rather than an operational audit of the existing operation. This would save time and allow redirection of efforts to critical issues at the earliest possible time of development.While time-consuming, the analysis phase can be the key to a successful audit. The auditor should ensure that the design meets all computing and communications requirements, as well as complies with any applicable regulations. The development and implementation plans should stress control and security, performance, and reliability as primary aspects to be monitored. The network's hardware, software, and network configuration must be accurate, current, and readily available to the authorized operations and maintenance personnel. No changes should be permitted without first ensuring that they will not affect current capabilities or security levels and structure. Provisions for reverting to the prior configuration should be available in case it is needed. Next, the auditor analyzes this information to identify risks and opportunities for improvements. The control concerns in the next section will help the auditor evaluate the findings. However, Novell has designed NetWare 4 as a flexible network operating system capable of meeting the needs of many organizations. The auditor should evaluate compensating controls and the company's unique environment before concluding that a finding is a weakness or before providing a recommendation to the auditee. As always, auditing requires a proper balance of professional skepticism and judgment. PAGENUM=117 ID="BP113"RENDERAS="SECT2"Audit Report or Action PlanAs a minimum, the audit report should highlight significant weaknesses and provide recommendations customized to the particular situation. Novell has positioned NetWare to support communication between end-users. NetWare has become an important building block in end-user computing environments. Experience indicates that end-user environments continue to evolve. Proper training and sharing of experiences improves end-user productivity through better controls and administrative practices. As an auditor, you can play an important role in this evolution by communicating your observations and conveying solutions you have observed in other departments. Timely feedback is of greater importance since end-user environments change quickly. The auditor can usually issue an informal action plan more quickly than a formal audit report.RENDERAS="SECT2"Standards ComparisonOnce a network is operational, a set of standards is needed against which performance can be measured and reported. These standards must be understandable and upgradable. They must be strict enough to ensure user satisfaction, but not so rigid that they damage morale or incur excessive costs. Performance standards can satisfy users and corporate management, but still not provide for ease of use, auditability, security, or versatility of the network computing system. A network can perform effectively and efficiently, yet be extremely vulnerable to security breaches.RENDERAS="SECT2"Analysis of WeaknessesThe design review is likely to raise questions about suspected weaknesses. If data gathering was inadequate or key points were missed during review, it is critical to conduct other interviews to see if there are additional data sources that can be accessed. As usual, risks should be matched against controls to see if controls are inadequate or missing.RENDERAS="SECT2"Backups and WorkaroundsIn addition to controls, networks need backup and workaround features. It is vital that the backup system you use for your network be compatible with NetWare 4 (preferably Novell certified). Without a proper and functioning NetWare interface, numerous weaknesses are introduced and systems become vulnerable. PAGENUM=118 ID="BP114"Furthermore, workaround measures to aid users in performing their work need to be implemented, documented, and tested. These measures should be assessed to determine:MARK=BULLETWhether they have been tested recentlyWhether they can be implemented quicklyWhether they provide full or partial backupHow long they might serve the needWhat other service(s) might be affected, and how severely, if the backup is implementedFor some components, the auditor should look within the network to reduce risks. For example, if the mean time to restore service after interruption is long, the auditor may want to consider the adequacy of maintenance contracts and procedures. Also, since companies rely increasingly on networks for processing and communications, it is imperative to have contingency and disaster recovery plans which are tested and maintained under the jurisdiction of qualified professionals.RENDERAS="SECT2"Documenting the FindingsThe audit report should fully document all findings. The report should describe the audit and identify:MARK=BULLETThe target network, or portions thereofThe responsible parties, specifying those interviewedThe purpose, scope, and objectives of the reviewThe approach takenThe documentation reviewedKey findingsGood areas of control/security that might be useful to other networksEfficiencies and cost savingsPAGENUM=119 ID="BP115"Weaknesses and recommendationsThe analysis and documentation should then be reviewed with the responsible individuals preferably prior to release to management. A cover letter attached to the audit report should schedule when management should respond. To maintain the constructive momentum, this review period should be limited to no more than 10 working days.RENDERAS="SECT1"Audit Procedures and OverviewAn audit program should collect and maintain information which can be analyzed to detect potential and actual violations of a system security policy. For auditing to be meaningful, every installation should have system security policies and procedures in place. These guidelines set the baseline by which you audit the network environment. You can then define a security violation as any change to the security of the system or any attempted or actual violation of the system's access control or resource use for accountability.The detailed audit procedures outlined in this chapter are divided into numerous strategic areas:MARK=BULLETPlatform definitionTechnology controlsNetWare operating systemSystem accessSystem operations, maintenance, and troubleshootingResource utilizationBackup, recovery, and contingency planningThese NetWare 4 audit procedures provide a detailed, question-based look at networks. They are not intended to be static, but rather to provide a flexible instrument for stimulating new areas of investigation. The following sections detail the audit issues to be considered when reviewing network computing environments.PAGENUM=120 ID="BP116"RENDERAS="SECT1"Platform DefinitionThe initial phase requires that you gather information that clearly defines the platform (hardware, software, Directory Services layout, and communications) that is being used or will be used by the system. To accomplish this, we provide the following sets of questions and references, grouped according to the platform.RENDERAS="SECT2"HardwareThe objective here is to gather and analyze information pertinent to defining the hardware platform, as well as identifying any inherent exposures or risks.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETRequest a wiring diagram of the complete network.List the manufacturer, type, and quantity of servers, workstations, and other microcomputers in use.List the purpose of each computer (development, production, or specialized server).List peripheral connections (shared disks, printers, and so on).RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETDoes the corporation have a defined standard for acceptable hardware platforms?Does the platform meet the set standards of the corporation?How many users are in the department being audited?Is the current hardware adequate to meet the information processing needs of the users?Is hardware shared between departments? If so, which servers and workstations are shared and with which departments?Is there a mechanism in place to monitor resource utilization? Have minimum-maximum criteria been provided for resource utilization?PAGENUM=121 ID="BP117"Should expansion occur, would the current hardware be sufficient? If not, is it easily upgradable?Is there adequate supervision regarding the use of equipment (who is authorized to use it, who is responsible for repairs, upgrade, and so forth)?Are there any known problems (repetitive or significant) with any vendor's equipment?Are equipment trouble calls being recorded and reviewed? Are maintenance service agreements adequate to support the department's anticipated level of business continuity? Are the hardware and peripherals readily available from suppliers?Is the hardware documentation complete and easy to understand?Do users receive adequate training in the proper use of the hardware?RENDERAS="SECT2"SoftwareThe objective here is to gather and analyze information pertaining to the operating system, utilities, and application-specific software in use. Risk and exposure assessment associated with individual applications will be applied against the base operating environment.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETDetermine the server operating system and version level being used (for instance, Novell NetWare 4.01, 3.12, 2.2, or any combinations).Determine the workstation operating systems and version levels being used (MS-DOS 6.2, Novell DOS 7.0, OS/2 2.1, UnixWare 1.1, and so on).List the security packages currently in place, along with any security controls developed in-house.Identify the application software installed on the server(s) spreadsheets, databases, word processors, programming languages and compilers, utilities, debuggers, tools, internally-developed programs, and so on.PAGENUM=122 ID="BP118"Review the software being used on the network to determine compliance to existing standards and copyright laws.Determine and validate software licensing agreements and inventories.Determine if there are any corporate policies regarding the monitoring of software usage/creation on the network. Verify that this monitoring is performed on a regular basis to ensure license agreements are not being violated.RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETIs a wide range of software available for the hardware selected?Will current software packages and applications run on new hardware selected?Is the addition of software controlled? Are automated procedures in place to maintain program change control?Do users develop their own software? If so, are there requirements for approval, testing, and documentation?Have any of the workstation operating systems been modified?How knowledgeable are users in the use of the software available? Is adequate training provided?Is software documentation kept up to date?Does an active virus checking program exist and is it being used?Is newly-purchased software tested before it is implemented?Are new software revisions tested before being put into production?Does the software meet all of the users' expectations and requirements?Is the software user-friendly?Is the software readily available and reliable?PAGENUM=123 ID="BP119"Does the software allow for the easy exchange of data with other application software?Is the software well documented and easy to understand and maintain?Does the software provide audit trails or logs?Is software source code available or encrypted?RENDERAS="SECT2"Network CommunicationsThe network communication facilities provide for the timely transfer of information. Controls and security must be in place to assure that integrity, privacy, and message authentication is in existence and is operating properly. In today's open environments, it is especially important to maintain a secure communication scenario when external access is unidentifiable or undefined.The objective here is to ensure that adequate controls exist over information transmitted to and from the microcomputer workstation. Sensitive data should be protected from being changed or intercepted.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETDefine the network topology (bus, token ring, star, hubbed, and so on).Document the connection media for the network. Include network and data flow diagrams and organizational charts as a minimum. Identify the servers and attached client workstations.Identify all communication links (that is, types of telecommunication lines) and their destinations.Identify the telecommunications being provided, and attempt to determine the quality and reliability of local loop facilities.Determine if communications closets, patch cords, locks, modems, and so forth are secured from unauthorized access.Define any gateways, asynchronous communications servers, and gateways which allow remote communications. PAGENUM=124 ID="BP120"Determine the level of verification performed to identify and authenticate a remote access. This could include user IDs and passwords, callback, or biometrics.Evaluate the risk of line tapping or electromagnetic signal emanations.Consider gaining control of the resources; test remote access by dialing in to the system. Determine that internal controls are adequate to prevent incomplete transmission, misrouting, unauthorized message alteration, unauthorized disclosure, and message duplication.RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETHow are nodes interconnected?Which users have access and to what type of information?What type of information is being accessed by the user or department being audited?How much data is shared or accessed?Are logins and passwords required to gain access to the network? Is password encryption turned on? Who is responsible for network management?Are network logs maintained for problem tracking? Are these reviewed by management on a regular basis?Is the use of external modems for dial-out connections by microcomputers those directly connected to internal backbone networks limited?Are any microcomputers/workstations capable of downloading data from and uploading data to a host? If so, is management approval required to perform these functions?Are bulletin boards or electronic mail used? If so, list them.PAGENUM=125 ID="BP121"Are Internet connections allowed? If so, are they properly fire-walled (preventing unauthorized access from outside sources) using widely accepted practices?Are gateway machines used? If so, for what purpose (for instance, to isolate machines from intruders)?Do gateways have audit, control, and security functions?For data used by other departments, are proper reconciliations in place to ascertain the integrity of the data?How is the accuracy and completeness of a data transmission assured?What is the procedure for authenticating messages?Is access to the server restricted to only those persons assigned to its maintenance and operation?Is packet signature being used?RENDERAS="SECT2"User CommunityThe objective here is to identify the members of the workgroup that uses the network.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETIdentify all users that are allowed to login to the network. Determine if they are legitimate users. Identify the Directory Services tree structure. Determine if the network under review is accessible by other networks.Compare the users to other workgroups within the organization to determine if there is any redundancy.RENDERAS="SECT2"PAGENUM=126 ID="BP122"ApplicationsThe objective here is to verify that management is exercising proper use of existing controls to meet the baseline security architecture over the installation, maintenance, and use of applications. Poor controls can result in bad data, erroneous software logic, improper assumptions or models, decisions based on incorrect information, and incomplete audit trails.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETIdentify all applications developed in-house.Identify all applications purchased from external vendors.Determine the tasks performed by the applications.Define user responsibilities within applications.Determine if any application-based security exists.Review the procedure for testing new applications and the most appropriate NetWare settings for those applications prior to their implementation.RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETAre users writing their own programs in high-level languages?How well are the developed applications meeting user needs?How much planning is done prior to development?Are plans for development of an application documented, reviewed, and approved by management?Are all users of the applications involved in the planning, developing, and testing of an application?Are adequate audit trails and controls developed for the applications?Are these audit trails controllable by the users?Is testing performed on all applications? At what stages of development?Is documentation provided for users? What is included in documentation?Does documentation outline security and control procedures?PAGENUM=127 ID="BP123"How are changes or enhancements to applications initiated?Are changes or enhancements documented, reviewed, and approved?How extensive is testing performed on changes or enhancements?Who is making changes to applications?How often and why are changes being made?Are changes made in the production environment?If there is a development environment, how is the production environment updated?Which users have access to the development, testing, and production environments? What rights are granted to programmers and administrators in each environment?RENDERAS="SECT2"Corporate Policies, Procedures, and StandardsIt is critical to determine that adequate policies, procedures, and standards exist to serve as a basis for establishing accountability and responsibility for network information systems.The objective here is to establish guidelines for a corporate security policy and architecture. This will ensure that management is providing adequate administrative control and supervision over the information processing environment.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETObtain and review the corporate standards and procedures governing the use of networks.Obtain and review the corporate security policy.Obtain an organizational chart and job descriptions.Investigate the possibility of a user being defined more than once on the network, but belonging to different organizations or organizational units.PAGENUM=128 ID="BP124"Determine whether the procedure for authorizing and defining users to the network (as well as deleting them) is appropriate.RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETHas a copy of the organization's network policies, procedures, and standards been issued to all users?Have information systems policies, procedures, and standards been developed for the network environment? Have the network policies, procedures, and standards been approved by management?Have the network policies, procedures, and standards been distributed to all departments and personnel affected by them?Are there guidelines for hardware, software and communications acquisitions?How is purchasing done (such as through a central department)?How are new systems justified?Are there guidelines for program and system documentation?Are there guidelines for computer operations?Are there guidelines for software development?Are there guidelines for compatibility of data communications, data sharing, and transferring data?Are there policies and procedures establishing responsibility and accountability for data ownership, support, system integrity, and monitoring?Does a business continuity plan exist? Is it tested?Were the users part of the business continuity planning effort?PAGENUM=129 ID="BP125"Are the backup procedures and contingency plans current and communicated to users? Are responsibilities assigned for system recovery?What are the guidelines for security, confidentiality, and privacy of data?What information is allowed for access and how is it communicated between systems?Is there a formal user training program?What are the audit and management trails required with respect to applications and data communications?RENDERAS="SECT1"Technology ControlsBoth physical and operational security of workstations are important. Intruders can gain access to a system from a workstation which a user has left logged on, or through any PC that has an automatic login sequence. To protect the system from intruders, the following technology aspects should be considered.RENDERAS="SECT2"Operational SecurityThe objective is to assure physical access to the server and network components is properly restricted. RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETDetermine if users are automatically logged off when the workstation is not in use after a period of time?Determine if timeout features are available on the workstations and if they are used consistently? Determine if a security package is used to restrict unauthorized users from accessing the system?Determine if encryption software is available and being used?Obtain and review all batch files and sign-on sequences.PAGENUM=130 ID="BP126"RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETWho is the security administrator?Are utilities available to the common user?What are the guidelines and characteristics of passwords used on the system?RENDERAS="SECT2"Physical SecurityUnauthorized physical access to the server and network components could result in the destruction of computer equipment and disruption of network availability. Physical security and environmental controls ensure that information systems services are protected from unauthorized access and are provided a safe environment. These controls verify that systems and work areas are equipped with appropriate detection and suppression systems to prevent unauthorized changes to software or hardware, or deliberate attempts to damage computer software or hardware components. They also protect against the effects of a natural disaster.Restrict access to the server to personnel responsible for maintenance and administration of the network system. Critical network hardware such as the server, database server, gateway server, network bridges, and routers should be in a secured location.Protect the server and other critical network hardware from environmental hazards such as fire, flood, and other natural or malicious threats. Locating this hardware in a secure environment will help minimize the effects of these hazards and threats. Consider a location that has systems or facilities in place to prevent, detect, and suppress the potential effects from these exposures.Properly securing the wiring panels will reduce the risk of an unauthorized individual accessing the network and the information that is moving through the network.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETDetermine what physical security is in place over the microcomputer/workstation environment.PAGENUM=131 ID="BP127"Evaluate the physical security over the network equipment (server and network equipment), including door locks, badge readers, special enclosures, or other forms of physical access controls.Review the use of locks, cables, anchor pads, alarms and other access controls which, if used, would limit access to the computer equipment, internal circuit boards, software, printers, and so on.Determine if adequate fire, smoke, and water detection devices are used, together with the necessary means of extinguishing fires and removing smoke and water.RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETHave reasonable precautions been taken to adequately secure the server and other network components?Is access to the server restricted to only those persons assigned to its maintenance and operation?Are power surge protectors used?Is a UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) system being used?Is the server keyboard being locked?Does the installation use SFT (System Fault Tolerance) technology to prevent system outages?Are procedures in place to switch to a backup server if the primary should fail?Is the physical site relatively safe from environmental threats?Is encryption used to secure links carrying sensitive information?Who is responsible for the security of the server and other critical network hardware?Is access to the server or other critical network hardware restricted to personnel responsible for maintenance and administration of the network?PAGENUM=132 ID="BP128"What physical security is in place over the microcomputer or workstation environment?Is the server and other critical network hardware (for example, gateways, bridges, and routers) located in a secured area such as a locked room?Is the room that contains the server and other critical network hardware equipped with adequate systems and facilities to provide reasonable protection from threats such as fire, floods, and malicious acts? Determine if adequate fire, smoke, and water detection devices are used, together with the necessary means of extinguishing fires and removing smoke and water.Is the room that contains the wiring panels secured?Is encryption used to secure links carrying sensitive information?RENDERAS="SECT2"Workstation Operating SystemsThe following are considerations for determining how secure the workstation operating system environment is.MARK=BULLETIs a security package installed to prevent unauthorized access by intruders? Is the security software developed in-house or is it application based?Are batch files (such as DOS workstation AUTOEXEC.BAT files) reviewed?Is there a security administrator for the workstation systems?Are logs maintained to provide audit trails or to track problems which may occur? What types of logs are used?RENDERAS="SECT1"NetWare Operating SystemThis section contains procedures and questions the auditor can use to review a site's installation and use of Novell's NetWare operating system.PAGENUM=133 ID="BP129"RENDERAS="SECT2"Network EnvironmentThe key objective here is to get a complete picture of each system's working environment by determining the total makeup of the key processing units and the users of the system.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETObtain a login ID and password for an account with Administrator equivalence. If this request is denied, you may need to have the network administrator assist you in obtaining the appropriate reports or listings.Obtain a list of all login IDs (users), groups, and trustee assignments.Have the administrator execute the CONFIG command at the server console to display the configuration of the network boards installed in the server.Obtain the AUTOEXEC.SYS or AUTOEXEC.NCF file and identify the commands that are executed when the server is booted. This will also identify the printer mappings.Obtain a list of network server statistics such as Cache Misses, Cache Hits, and Thrashing Count.Obtain a list of users who logged in and out of the server.Compile a list of the current directory structure.Compile a list of file attribute assignments.Obtain a list of security conflicts residing in NDS that can be potentially compromising to system security.Obtain a copy of the server error log.Obtain a listing of the "Default Account Balance/Restrictions" for the server.Obtain a listing of user login scripts.Obtain a listing of the system login script.PAGENUM=134 ID="BP130"Obtain a listing of the default login scripts.Obtain the network architecture and administration procedure manual.Identify the current NetWare version being used.RENDERAS="SECT2"NetWare 4 Options and DefaultsThe options and defaults selected during NetWare 4 installation can affect the effectiveness and integrity of the network. It is important to know how these options and defaults affect daily use of the network.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETReview the company's and department's procedures for initiating and approving changes to the NetWare options/defaults.Examine the procedures for periodically reviewing the NetWare options/defaults. Through observation and inquiry, determine that the NetWare options/defaults are being regularly reviewed by appropriate personnel.Review procedures used to implement changes to system-wide options and defaults.Determine if the above procedures ensure that changes are tested, reviewed, documented and authorized by the network administrator prior to being used in production.Determine if multiple servers are used. If so, verify that the above procedures are in place for each server on the network.RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETWhat NetWare options/defaults have been selected by the installation?Who is responsible for deciding what NetWare options to implement or modify?Has the Intruder Detection option been turned on?Has disk space allotted to each user been limited?PAGENUM=135 ID="BP131"Who, besides the network administrator, can execute the NetWare administrative utilities to implement and modify NetWare's system-wide options?Who is responsible for reviewing changes to system-wide options for accuracy, completeness, and propriety?Does anyone regularly review the system-wide options/defaults in effect?Who is responsible for system auditing?Is AUDITCON turned on?What are the basic AUDITCON templates that have been implemented?RENDERAS="SECT1"System AccessControlling system access is the best way to provide security for the network environment. The following sections provide information on auditing the system to keep your system access as secure as possible.RENDERAS="SECT2"Control of Administrator AccessIt should be stressed that the NetWare operating system is only as secure as the system or security administrator makes it and maintains it. The auditor needs to obtain a list of "privileged" users and determine their working needs and relationships.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETObtain a list of users that have Admin rights: either being security equivalent to Admin, having the Supervisor object right to [Root], or having the Supervisor object right to the O or OU under review. (Appendix C on NetWare 4 commands provides information on how to accomplish this.)Review password and connection settings of all Admin equivalent User objects to ensure that these objects are appropriately secure.Determine the installation's procedures for assigning Admin equivalence to users, and determine if the proper level of approval is obtained.PAGENUM=136 ID="BP132"Determine if an adequate audit trail of activities is maintained for actions performed in the SYS:SYSTEM directory.RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETWho is the security administrator (Admin)?Is there more than one security administrator/Admin equivalent user?How often is the password for Admin (or Admin equivalent) changed?Are different passwords used on different servers? Do servers have different security administrators?Are emergency passwords available?Do administrators (including the security administrator) have a login ID and a password different from that of the Admin account?Are the activities of administrative users monitored by an appropriate individual separate from the system group?RENDERAS="SECT2"Deleting the Admin ObjectUpon installation of the first server in a tree, NetWare 4 automatically creates a login ID (User object) named "Admin". By default, Admin is initially granted the Supervisor object right to the [Root]. This effectively gives Admin all rights to every object and property in the Directory tree. Logging in as Admin enables the installer to create the rest of the Directory tree. Once the necessary organizational structures are in place, container administrators can be created to control specific portions of the tree. Once these "local" administrators are set up, the original Admin object can be deleted. As a safety precaution, however, first create a backup global administrator User object and grant it all object rights to the [Root] (do not use security equivalence). There should be at least one administrator for each container in the tree (including [Root]).In NetWare 4, an Inherited Rights Filter (IRF) can restrict Admin's access to objects added to the tree subsequent to installation. However, explicit NDS rights assignments in a container cannot be filtered out by an IRF. For each new Organizational Unit created in the tree, the container administrator User object should be explicitly assigned all object rights to the OU. Failure to create a backup administrator User object can lead to a scenario where no one can control access to all or part of the tree.PAGENUM=137 ID="BP133"RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETList users that have Supervisor object rights and/or all object rights to [Root] and to the Organizational Unit being audited.Has the network administrator created backup administrator login IDs?Before establishing IRFs, are precautions taken to assure that the proper User object has Supervisor object rights for that container?Is establishment of IRFs limited to restricted personnel (such as properly trained administrators)?RENDERAS="SECT2"Login/Password AdministrationThe NetWare Directory Services database contains access control information about user logins/password security, trustee security, Directory Services security, and file attributes security. This database is distributed on servers across the network. Unauthorized access to this database, as well as to other system files, could compromise security.Normal user access to the system is provided by through the login process. A login is associated with a valid user ID and password. The administration of these logins, user IDs, and passwords ensures that only authorized users can access the system.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETReview the information obtained from the AUDITCON utility for every known volume. Be careful of hidden volumes.Evaluate the appropriateness of the password length, change frequency, concurrent connections and number of users with supervisory privileges.Evaluate the effectiveness of passwords selected.Review the users for unused logins.PAGENUM=138 ID="BP134"RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETWhat are the department's procedures for defining new users, for modifying user Account Restrictions or deleting users from the system? Determine that appropriate approvals are obtained.Are user access request forms used to obtain approval from management for access to the system?What users have the ability to enter the system without providing a password?Are users using easy to guess or ineffective passwords?Are passwords required for all users?Is password aging used?Are users restricted as to the times they can use the system?Are users restricted as to the stations they can access the system from?Has NetWare's Accounting feature been installed?Are system access security violations monitored? How often, and by whom, is the review performed?RENDERAS="SECT2"User Account and Password PoliciesUser accounts and passwords are one step toward ensuring network resources are secured. The policies and procedures pertaining to the administration of user accounts and passwords play an important part in providing confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data and resources contained on the network.Assigning private passwords to users will authenticate the user to the network and provide user accountability. As a general rule, users of data and resources should be uniquely identified. Group login IDs and passwords do not allow specific identification of users.PAGENUM=139 ID="BP135"RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETAscertain what the department's procedures are for defining new users, for modifying user account restrictions, and for deleting users from the network.Determine whether user account policies address the following:Generation and assignment of password to new usersAppropriateness of selecting passwordsSharing or disclosure of passwordsTimeliness of removing or disabling usersTemporary user accountsAre user access request forms used to obtain approval from management for obtaining access to the network? Determine that appropriate approvals are obtained.Who is responsible for determining which NetWare options to implement or modify?Is the AUDITCON utility configured to record security violations?Are system access security violations monitored?How often and by whom are security violation reviews performed?RENDERAS="SECT2"User Templates for Account and Password DefaultsNetWare 4 allows the use of User Templates as the form used to enter default user information. A user template can be set up within an Organization or Organizational Unit. Each time a new user is created, the administrator will be asked if the User Template should be applied to the new User objects. The User Template contains many user properties, such as password settings, account settings and departmental information.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETDetermine if User Templates are used. If not, determine what default settings are used for new users added to NDS.PAGENUM=140 ID="BP136"Evaluate the appropriateness of the default settings in the User Template (or of the settings used for new users if a User Template is not used). Each setting should be evaluated against baseline parameters appropriate for the organization:Password levelMinimum password lengthPeriodic password changesPassword change frequencyGrace logins allowedUnique password required settingPassword required settingAccount levelAccount enabled/disabledAccount expiration dateLogin time restrictionsStation restrictionsConcurrent connectionsReview the organization's procedures for initiating and approving changes to the NetWare user account and password defaults.Review the organization's procedures for periodically reviewing the NetWare user account and password defaults.Determine whether the NetWare user account and password defaults are being reviewed by on a periodic basis and by the appropriate personnel.Determine who can access the NETADMIN utility to change user account and password defaults.RENDERAS="SECT2"PAGENUM=141 ID="BP137"User Account and Password AnalysisAlthough NetWare contains many user account and password level features, it is very important that these features be implemented to support a secure environment. Correctly implementing NetWare security features will help to ensure the following:MARK=BULLETOnly authorized users can gain access to the network.Unauthorized users will not gain access by guessing an authorized user's password.Authorized users can access the network only at certain times of the day (as authorized).Temporary login IDs will be disabled on a timely basis.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:Determine the following regarding each User object in the organization under review. Evaluate each question to determine if the security setting is appropriate based on the functions or responsibilities performed by the user.MARK=BULLETAre passwords required?Are users using passwords that are easy to guess or ineffective?What is the minimum password length?Are passwords required to be changed on a periodic basis?Are unique passwords required?Are users restricted as to the times they can use the network?Are users restricted as to the stations they can use?Are users allowed grace logins? If so, how many grace logins are allowed?Are temporary accounts assigned an account expiration date?Are any users able to enter the network without providing a password?RENDERAS="SECT2"PAGENUM=142 ID="BP138"Password EncryptionBy default, passwords are encrypted when transmitted over the wire. However, setting the "SET Allow Unencrypted Passwords" command to ON allows use of unencrypted passwords. Typically, there will be an entry in the AUTOEXEC.NCF file setting this parameter to ON.The following are the recommended settings:MARK=BULLETIf any NetWare servers on an internetwork are running NetWare 3.1x, use OFF.If the internetwork has NetWare servers running NetWare 2.12 and above, the NetWare 3.1x utilities can be copied to these servers and this parameter set to OFF.If the NetWare 3.1x utilities are not copied to the NetWare 2.x servers, set this parameter ON. (If NetWare servers on the internetwork are running versions of NetWare below NetWare v3.0 and you leave the default to OFF, users may have problems logging in.)RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETObtain a listing of the AUTOEXEC.NCF file.Determine if the "SET Allow Unencrypted Passwords" command is contained in the AUTOEXEC.NCF file.Evaluate the use of the SET Allow Unencrypted Passwords command based on the versions of NetWare in use on the internetwork under review.RENDERAS="SECT2"Intruder DetectionNetWare provides various options that, when activated, help to detect unsuccessful login attempts. The intruder detection/lockout feature can be set to detect when an unauthorized user may be trying to gain access. Based on how this feature is implemented, the User object could be locked out from the system. The User object could only be used again to access the network after it is enabled by an administrator. This feature is administered at the Organization and Organizational Unit level.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETDetermine if the intruder detection/lockout feature has been implemented in each Organization and Organizational Unit under review.PAGENUM=143 ID="BP139"At each O or OU level, evaluate the following to determine if the parameter settings are appropriate based on the organization under review:Are intruders being detected?What is the Incorrect Login Attempts setting?What is the Bad Login Count Retention Time setting?What is the Length of Account lockout setting?Is AUDITCON configured to record intruder detection lockouts?Are procedures in place to ensure that AUDITCON reports are reviewed to determine if User objects are locked out by the intruder detection feature?Do the same User objects consistently get locked out by the intruder detection feature?Is there a reporting mechanism in place to track User objects that are consistently locked out by the intruder detection feature?RENDERAS="SECT2"Server Console SecurityThe server console is most secure when the server is located in a protected location where no one can reboot it. The SECURE CONSOLE command adds an additional level of security. This console command allows authorized operators to use the console while preventing the following from occurring:MARK=BULLETNLMs loading from any directory other than SYS:SYSTEM. This prevents someone from loading an invasive NLM from a server's floppy drive.Keyboard entry into the operating system debugger. This restricts the ability to directly access data on the server.Anyone other than the console operator from changing the date and time. Some security and accounting features depend on date and time stamps for their enforcement.Another feature to secure the server console is to use the "Lock Server Console" option in the MONITOR utility. When used, this command prevents keyboard entry to the server console until the Admin password is entered.PAGENUM=144 ID="BP140"RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETObtain a listing of the AUTOEXEC.NCF file.Determine if the SECURE CONSOLE command is contained in the AUTOEXEC.NCF file.Evaluate the use of the SECURE CONSOLE command based on the environment under review.Determine if the "Lock Server Console" option is used within the MONITOR utility.RENDERAS="SECT2"Remote Access to Server ConsoleNetWare allows administrators to manage a server remotely, either from a workstation on the network or from a PC using a modem. The following tasks can be performed using a remote console:MARK=BULLETInvoke console commands as you would at the server console.Scan directories and edit text files in both NetWare and DOS partitions on a server.Transfer files to a server.Bring down or reboot the server.Install or upgrade NetWare on a remote server.A remote console can provide greater server security, because the server keyboards and monitors can be removed and the server locked in a secure location. However, security can also be compromised if appropriate controls are not in place to ensure that only appropriate individuals can gain access to a remote console.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETDetermine whether the LOAD REMOTE command is included to the AUTOEXEC.NCF file.PAGENUM=145 ID="BP141"Is the "-E" option included in the LOAD REMOTE command and an encrypted key used in the AUTOEXEC.NCF file in place of the plain text password?If remote console sessions are available from a PC with a modem, determine if the call-back parameter is used when loading the asynchronous connection NLM (RS-232).RENDERAS="SECT2"Access to Critical System FilesThe file system directory structure contains the "locks" to the information in files; trustee rights are the "keys." Trustee rights flow down within the directory structure. To have an effective right to information, the directory must allow that right and the trustee must also have the right. Too many rights for users can result in an uncontrollable environment.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETDetermine which file system directories contain sensitive and mission critical files, applications, or data.Review users with excessive rights in critical system directories such as SYS, SYS:SYSTEM, SYS:PUBLIC, and SYS:LOGIN.Locate the NET$ACCT.DAT file and ensure that it is protected from unauthorized access.Examine Directory Rights Masks using the NETADMIN utility and determine if the maximum rights are set appropriately.Examine group and trustee assignments specified within each critical or sensitive file system directory. Discuss any discrepancies with the system administrator.Investigate users that have greater access than R,F to files in directories other than their own home directory.Check to ensure that users in a container have only R,F rights in the servers' public directories.PAGENUM=146 ID="BP142"RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETAre all critical files that could cause system disruptions stored in the SYS:SYSTEM directory?Are all trustee rights assignments removed from the SYS:LOGIN directory for all users?Is the protection scheme for the directory and files adequate to restrict use of critical/sensitive files?Do any users have excessive rights in critical directories?RENDERAS="SECT2"Secure Access to Files and DirectoriesAn insecure network contains inappropriate or insufficient trustee assignments to files, subdirectories, programs, and so on. Lack of adequate restrictions allows unauthorized users to modify files, replace programs, and rename directories. It also allows for unintentional damage from mistakes made by authorized users. In general, the most restrictive permissions should be placed on all files and directories.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETObtain and review a listing of all file system directories and their contents.Using the above listing, find and investigate duplicate commands.Review the installation's procedures for testing assignment of trustee rights to directories and files. Determine who is in charge of reviewing the logic prior to adding them into production.Review users' path statements to ensure that system directories are checked before local directories.Use the FILER command to review directories for *.EXE and *.COM programs to determine that the organization is not at risk of any copyright violations. Also consider reviewing *.BAT files for rename commands.RENDERAS="SECT3"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETHow are trustee rights assigned to a user tested?PAGENUM=147 ID="BP143"Are changes to trustee rights monitored and reviewed? Who is performing this review and how often?What are the installation's procedures for maintaining and defining trustee rights?Who has the ability to assign, modify, or delete trustee rights? Ensure that appropriate approvals are obtained.RENDERAS="SECT2"NetWare Directory Services RightsIn addition to securing access to directories and files, it is important that security over NDS be administered appropriately. In previous versions of NetWare, trustee assignments to files and directories could only be made to users or groups. In NetWare 4, both NDS and file system rights are granted to trustees, and trustees can be any NDS object, not just users or groups. To have a secure network environment, the assignments of object and property rights must be effectively managed.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETFor each object class, determine which objects are critical to the operation of the network or sensitive in nature.For each critical or sensitive object, determine the object rights assigned to all trustees.Are the object rights to critical or sensitive objects assigned to trustees appropriate based on the job function or purpose trustee?For all objects, list the trustees that have supervisor rights. Are these assignments appropriate?Determine which trustees have Write rights to the Server objects contained in the current context.For each critical or sensitive object, determine the property rights assigned to each trustee. Is the assignment of property rights appropriate?Are the object property rights Write, Add or Delete Self, and Supervisor assigned to object properties appropriate?PAGENUM=148 ID="BP144"RENDERAS="SECT2"Access Control Lists (ACLs)All NDS objects have a property known as the Access Control List (ACL). The ACL property warrants special examination because it controls access to both the object and its properties. For both the objects and its properties, it lists who has rights (trustees) and what those rights are (rights assignments). The ACL lists who has access to the particular object or properties; it does not list what the object might have rights to.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETFor sensitive or critical objects, determine if any trustees have the Write right to the ACL of the object.RENDERAS="SECT1"System Operations, Maintenance and TroubleshootingGood system operation, maintenance and troubleshooting controls ensure that appropriate standards, procedures, and practices are followed to control the implementation of a new or changed network operating system. They ensure the authorized use of the software. They also monitor changes to system software parameters so that the information processing environment continues to support information confidentiality, integrity, and availability.RENDERAS="SECT2"Network Documentation and SchematicsAdministrators should maintain documentation and schematics describing how the network was designed and implemented. Documentation facilitates timely, effective maintenance and troubleshooting. The network documentation should be easily accessible and should include:MARK=BULLETServer settings (INSTALL and SET selections; use installation worksheet)Server startup file (AUTOEXEC.NCF and STARTUP.NCF) listingsServer name, network address, NetWare version and serial numberLogin/profile script listingsWorkstation configurations (NET.CFG file listings)Drivers installed at the server and workstationsPAGENUM=149 ID="BP145"Hardware models, including computers and peripheralsNDS Directory tree listingsNDS partitions and their locationsIn addition, a list of significant applications supported by each server and their server volume location should be included in the documentation.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETIs network documentation (including schematics) maintained?Is the network documentation reviewed periodically and kept up-to-date?RENDERAS="SECT2"Startup File Usage and DocumentationWhen the server is booted, SERVER.EXE runs two files:MARK=BULLETSTARTUP.NCF loads the server's disk drivers and some SET parameters. This file is usually located on the disk from which the NetWare operating system is loaded. For example, if you load NetWare from the C:\NETWARE.40 directory, the STARTUP.NCF file will be found there.AUTOEXEC.NCF stores the server name and internal IPX network number, loads the network drivers and settings for the network boards, binds the protocol to the installed drivers, and loads other NLMs. It also loads time synchronization elements unless a separate TIMESYNC.CFG file has been created. The AUTOEXEC.NCF file is found in the servername_SYS:\SYSTEM directory.Administrators should use the startup files to select server settings and to install drivers and NLMs. They should avoid performing these functions at the console command line. Including setup commands in the startup files improves consistency between server loads. Server settings (SET command) not set during startup or at the command line will assume their default values.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETDiscuss or observe the server load process with administrators.PAGENUM=150 ID="BP146"Verify that administrators do not manually set options or install programs at the command line.RENDERAS="SECT2"Workstation Configuration and Documentation (NET.CFG)The NET.CFG file is used to configure workstation drivers, select VLMs to load, and establish a preferred server/tree connection. If the DOS Requester installation program is used, the NET.CFG file resides in the C:\NWCLIENT directory at the workstation.The NET.CFG file contains a number of headers where specific configuration information is stored. These headers include:COLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="9*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="17*"VALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MOREINFO="NONE"Link Driver drivernameCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Contains configuration settings for the network interface board.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MOREINFO="NONE"Link SupportCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Includes non-default settings for the LSL.COM file (only necessary when running TCP/IP or NetWare/ IP protocols).COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MOREINFO="NONE"Protocol TCPIP (or NWIP)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Only used when running TCP/IP or NetWare/IP protocols.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MOREINFO="NONE"NetWare DOS RequesterCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Should include preferences such as the preferred NDS tree and preferred context to simplify user login.WSUPDATE.EXE updates files on multiple drives and subdirectories from files on the server. Using this program assures that NetWare workstation programs are properly updated when multiple copies exist. This program can be run from the command line or from the login script. WSUPDATE compares date and time stamps of the source and destination files. If the destination files are older than the source files, WSUPDATE will update the destination files. You can also create a log file to verify that changes are made.WSUPGRD.EXE is a program used to upgrade dedicated-IPX LAN drivers to corresponding ODI drivers. This program can be run from the command line or from the login script.PAGENUM=151 ID="BP147"RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETDetermine that administrators establish user preferences in the NET.CFG file.Determine whether administrators use WSUPDATE or a similar utility to update workstation software.RENDERAS="SECT2"Login/Profile Script Organization, Documentation, and UseLogin scripts automatically set up a user's workstation environment whenever the user logs in to the network. NetWare 4 offers three types of login scripts. The system login script is executed first. It applies to all users in the container in which it resides. The profile script, executed next, can be shared by users across containers. User login scripts, executed last, are unique to the user.With NetWare 4, network drive mappings can be set up at the Organization or Organizational Unit level, at the Profile object level, at the Group object level, or at the personal login script level. The level depends on how global the mappings are for applications and common directories. Directory Map objects can make applications easier to access and require fewer changes when applications are moved to another server, volume, or subdirectory.The INCLUDE login script command executes a subscript as part of the login script that is being processed. The subscript can be a separate text file that contains valid login script commands, or it can be a login script that belongs to a different object. Use INCLUDE sparingly to simplify problem resolution.Maintaining many individual user login scripts can be time consuming. Therefore, include as much customizing information as possible in the system login scripts, which are fewer in number and easier to maintain. To facilitate maintenance, avoid using user login scripts. To prevent unauthorized modification of login scripts, only administrators should have rights to the Login Script property.Documentation within a login script makes problem resolution easier and reduces maintenance time. Use comment statements to provide explanatory notes in the login script.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETReview system, profile, and user login scripts with the administrator.PAGENUM=152 ID="BP148"Verify that login script design promotes the use of system and profile scripts to facilitate maintenance and troubleshooting.Verify that only administrators have property rights to maintain login scripts.Determine whether the user login script is well documented.RENDERAS="SECT2"Network AddressingBy default, the NetWare 4 installation program generates random network addresses for new servers and verifies they are unique within your network. However, in a large network, it will be easier to manage if there is a system for assigning network addresses. Divisions or departments within the organization can be assigned ranges of addresses, so network administrators do not have to contact a corporate IS Department every time they have to bring up a new server.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedure:MARK=BULLETDetermine whether network addresses are pre-allocated for large networks.RENDERAS="SECT2"Use of NetWare Help FacilitiesNetWare 4 supports several types of on-line help facilities:COLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="9*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="17*"VALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Server consoleCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Type MOREINFO="NONE"HELP [console command]COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Menu utilitiesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Context sensitive help via <F1> keyCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS workstationCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Command line help; for example, MOREINFO="NONE"RIGHTS /?COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Windows workstationCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"General help, plus ElectroText utility for viewing on- line documentationAdministrators and users should be familiar with the help facilities and encouraged to use help facilities.PAGENUM=153 ID="BP149"RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETVerify that help facilities are properly installed by attempting to use them.Discuss the use of help facilities with administrators and selected users.RENDERAS="SECT2"File System OrganizationAdministrators should design and implement the file system to facilitate security maintenance, troubleshooting, and file backups. The NetWare 4 server installation automatically creates three subdirectories under the servername_SYS volume: LOGIN, PUBLIC, and SYSTEM.The installation process also makes language subdirectories (such as NLS\ENGLISH) under these directories. The NLS directory contains all the UNICODE tables used for languages. The actual subdirectory created under NLS depends on which language you have installed. These language subdirectories are important for NetWare utility access, because they contain the help and message files for the utilities.Since all users have access to the SYS:LOGIN directory, it should contain only programs used for logging into the network. We recommend removing any programs from the LOGIN directory that are not used for logging in.All users also have access to the SYS:PUBLIC directory. It should contain only programs for general use. Remove any programs from the PUBLIC directory that are not NetWare utilities intended for use by general network users.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETList the file system directory structure for volumes being audited.Determine that the directory structure properly segregates files:programs and data operating system and user application programs static programs and customizable tables/programsDetermine that files requiring similar trustee access are generally grouped together.PAGENUM=154 ID="BP150"If files have different data migration or backup frequencies, verify that they are grouped together.Does the LOGIN directory contain any programs other than what is necessary for logging into the network?Does the NetWare PUBLIC directory contain any programs other than NetWare utilities and programs used by general network users?RENDERAS="SECT2"Data Migration and ArchivingAvailable disk space should be monitored regularly and a log kept to track disk usage over time. Available space on a NetWare volume can be viewed using the FILER, NETADMIN, and NWAdmin utilities. This information helps when deciding how to best use various disk space management options, such as adding a new hard disk, compressing files, and migrating data to an off-line archival system.NetWare 4's data migration feature enables servers to automatically transfer infrequently-used data to an off-line storage device such as an optical disk or tape drive. After the data is migrated, it still appears to users to reside on the volume from which it was migrated. Administrators can initially set up the percentage of disk space they want to always have free on the server. When this capacity threshold is reached, data is moved to the storage device on a file-by-file basis using a Least Recently Used (LRU) algorithm. Migrated files can be retrieved if needed.One implementation of data migration is the High Capacity Storage System (HCSS). HCSS allows you to place an optical disk library into the NetWare file system so that files are automatically moved when the capacity threshold is reached.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETList statistics for selected volumes. Are volumes over- or under-utilized? Do administrators track this information daily or weekly to determine usage trends? Determine whether the site uses data migration to archive files. If so, for which volumes? What are the thresholds?List volumes supported by High Capacity Storage Systems (HCSS).PAGENUM=155 ID="BP151"List HCSS thresholds and determine their reasonableness.RENDERAS="SECT2"Remote Console ManagementA remote console allows administrators to manage servers from a workstation on the network or from a standalone PC that has a modem. Administrators can thus perform critical and sensitive functions on the server without physically being in the same location as the server. This allows for timely response for troubleshooting or maintenance.In a secure environment, all servers should keep their consoles locked to avoid unauthorized access either remotely or directly.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETList server NLMs. Is REMOTE.NLM loaded?Do administrators use RCONSOLE to maintain the server from a network workstation or from a standalone computer via a modem?Are the server consoles locked at all times?RENDERAS="SECT2"Group StructureAssigning users to a Group object allows them to share trustee assignments of the Group object, regardless of where those users exist in the Directory tree. Administrators should use groups to simplify security maintenance when users exist in separate containers but require similar trustee assignments.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedure:MARK=BULLETReview the membership list of each group to determine if it is appropriate.Review trustee assignments for objects in the audit scope. Be alert for situations where trustee assignments could be consolidated using the Group object.RENDERAS="SECT2"PAGENUM=156 ID="BP152"Multiple NDS TreesIn most cases, a company should have only one NDS tree rather than several separate trees. Since each NDS tree has its own database of objects that is not visible from any other tree, NDS data cannot be shared across trees. Multiple trees may also require redundancies (such as defining the same user on each tree) that complicate maintenance activities. RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETDetermine whether the company uses multiple NDS trees.Does the company need to share data (resources) across trees?Have administrators of different NDS trees coordinated their tree structure to facilitate potential future consolidation?RENDERAS="SECT2"NDS Tree DesignWhen designing NDS trees, each level added to the tree can increase the length of a user's context. The shorter the users' contexts are, the fewer problems users will have remembering them. Five or fewer levels should be sufficient for most trees.Administrators should design an NDS tree that will not change frequently. This will reduce administrative tasks on the tree.Having duplicate User objects for the same person will cause problems with network administration, rights, and contexts. An Alias object can be used to represent a resource that most users in the tree need to access. By placing an Alias for the object at the top of the tree, the Alias can provide a short name that is easy for all the users to remember.Naming objects and their properties in a standard, consistent manner will make browsing and searching in NDS easier and more precise.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETDetermine the number of levels in the NDS tree.Has the tree been designed to be fairly static? Do users have User objects defined in more than one location?Do administrators assign Aliases to simplify object naming?PAGENUM=157 ID="BP153"Do objects and properties follow a standardized naming convention?RENDERAS="SECT2"Object Property CompletenessNDS objects have properties that contain information about that object. For example, for a User object this information may include the user's telephone number and physical address. For a printer, it could include the physical location of the printer and the fonts it supports. The NDS schema defines mandatory properties for each object class. Administrators should maintain property information to support troubleshooting and maintenance activities. RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedure:MARK=BULLETReview significant object properties and determine if the information is up to date.Review significant object properties that have no values.RENDERAS="SECT2"Directory Services Change LogsIn addition to file modifications, trustee modifications, and requests to manipulate queues, the AUDITCON utility will record modifications to Directory Services objects. Since network problems often relate to recent changes in the system, administrators in conjunction with the auditor can use these change records to facilitate problem resolution.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETDetermine that AUDITCON's audit tracking capability is turned on and recording events necessary for troubleshooting.Verify that administrators have read access to audit data and audit history files. Discuss how administrators use audit records to support problem resolution activities.PAGENUM=158 ID="BP154"RENDERAS="SECT2"Network Availability, Response Time, and Problem ReportingMeasuring network availability and response time allows administrators to more easily identify problem areas. Following are some of the standard network statistics available at the server console via the MONITOR utility:MARK=BULLETCPU Utilization. Utilization above 80% for a single process is excessive.Cache Utilization. If the percentage of cache "hits" falls below 90% over a long term, add more RAM to the server.Network Driver statistics. Statistics regarding the number of packets received/sent, the number of packets discarded, and so on can be useful in network analysis and troubleshooting. Refer to the network driver statistics section in the NetWare 4 Utilities Reference for more information.Administrators should track statistics such as these daily or weekly to help them predict the need for additional resources before performance degradation occurs or the server becomes unavailable. Tracking network performance statistics is a distinguishing aspect of successful network maintenance. Inspecting network hardware components and performing maintenance procedures on a periodic basis will help ensure that information services are not interrupted.Network administrators should keep a log of network problems and how they are resolved. These logs should be reviewed periodically to assure that problems are properly resolved. Problem tracking allows administrators to share experiences and identify problem trends that may indicate a larger root cause.Defining a process whereby users can contact a central point to report all network problems can decrease the time for problem resolution and minimize lost productivity. This process should include positive feedback upon resolution.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETIs the network unavailable on a regular basis?Are administrators analyzing and reporting network availability and response time?PAGENUM=159 ID="BP155"Are performance statistics maintained and reviewed? Do these statistics meet the corporate "percentage of availability" standards or guidelines?Are all information services problems logged, assigned to specific persons, and tracked to resolution?Do administrators review problem logs periodically?RENDERAS="SECT2"Review of Server Logs and Disk ErrorsNetWare's system message logs are contained in DOS text files stored in the server's SYS_servername:SYSTEM directory:MARK=BULLETThe SYS$LOG.ERR file records security violations, system messages, and alerts that appear on the server console.The VOL$LOG.ERR file records volume errors.The TTS$LOG.ERR file stores data backed out by TTS.These files should be reviewed periodically to identify and resolve problems on a timely basis. The default log file state setting of "1" causes the log files to be deleted when they reach the overflow size limit (default is 4 MB). Changing the state setting to "2" will rename the log files rather than deleting them. Error logs should be archived and cleared on a periodic basis.Another area to monitor closely is disk errors. When a media error or disk channel hardware problem prevents NetWare from reliably writing a block of data to the disk, the Hot Fix feature marks the block "bad" and rewrites the data to the Hot Fix Redirection Area. If the number of "Redirected blocks" is increasing over time, or if the number of "Redirected blocks" is more than half of the number of "Redirection blocks" available, it can indicate potential disk drive problems. These and any other disk errors should be investigated immediately, since such errors can lead to a failed file system and loss of data. By checking regularly for disk errors, administrators can replace a disk before it causes data loss.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETReview the current error logs with the administrator.PAGENUM=160 ID="BP156"Discuss the extent and timeliness of the error log review with the administrator. Assess the administrator's ability to understand and respond to error messages.Review server, volume, and TTS log file state settings. Are they set to "2" so that log files will be renamed rather than deleted when they reach the overflow size limit? Review the log file overflow size for reasonableness.Verify that error logs are archived and cleared on a periodic basis.Review the number of "Redirection Blocks" available and the number of "Redirected Blocks." Is the number of Redirected Blocks increasing over time? Is the number of Redirected Blocks more than half of the number of Redirection Blocks?Does the administrator periodically perform disk drive surface tests, or at least perform the test prior to installing NetWare volumes?RENDERAS="SECT2"Displaying Alert MessagesA number of NetWare SET parameters control the display of alert messages on the server console. Below are the server console SET commands and their defaults:MARK=BULLETDisplay Spurious Interrupt Alerts = ON. These alerts indicate that a network board or disk controller is not communicating correctly with the operating system. However, this usually does not mean the system will not work. Display Lost Interrupt Alert = ON. These alerts indicate that the system board has detected a lost hardware interrupt. Display Disk Device Alerts = OFF. These alerts display information such as when a disk device is added, deleted, mounted, activated, and so on. Display Relinquish Control Alerts = OFF. These alerts indicate NLM processes that are not relinquishing control frequently enough.Display Old API Names = OFF. These alerts display the names of outdated API routines that an NLM is using (displayed as the NLM is loading).PAGENUM=161 ID="BP157"All of the SET commands described above can be placed in the STARTUP.NCF file or set through the SERVMAN utility at the server console.A number of other SET commands can be set through the SERVMAN utility. These include:MARK=BULLETMinimum File Cache Buffer Report Threshold = 20. Shows how few cache buffers the server needs before issuing a warning that they are low (setable between 0 and 1000).Volume Low Warn All Users = ON. Sends a warning to all users when volume space is low.Volume Low Warning Threshold = 256. Sets the number of available disk blocks before the volume triggers a low disk space warning (setable between 0 and 1000).Volume Low Warning Reset Threshold = 256. Sets the number of disk blocks available before the volume's warning trigger is reset (setable between 0 and 1000).RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedure:MARK=BULLETReview the message alert settings. Determine whether the following recommended settings are in place:TYPE="VERT"Display Spurious Interrupt Alerts = ONDisplay Lost Interrupt Alert = ONDisplay Disk Device Alerts = ONDisplay Relinquish Control Alerts = ONDisplay Old API Names = ONMinimum File Cache Buffer Report Threshold = 100Volume Low Warning Threshold = 512Volume Low Warning Reset Threshold = 512RENDERAS="SECT2"Maintenance NotificationAdministrators should inform users of scheduled and unscheduled maintenance in a timely fashion. Downing the server while users are logged in will disrupt those users' work and can cause them to lose data.PAGENUM=162 ID="BP158"RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedure:MARK=BULLETDetermine whether administrators notify users via memos, voice mail, E-mail, or NetWare BROADCAST messages when scheduled or unscheduled maintenance is to be performed.Assess the timeliness of these notifications.RENDERAS="SECT2"Clearing Workstation ConnectionsClearing a workstation connection while the user is active on the network can disrupt the user's work and can cause the user to lose data. Users should be encouraged to log out when they leave the office.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETDetermine whether administrators obtain user authorization prior to clearing workstation connections.Determine whether administrators automatically clear logins extending overnight.This can be a dangerous practice. For example, clearing the Chief Financial Officer's connection at midnight as he or she finalizes the merger plan may not be wise.RENDERAS="SECT1"Resource UtilizationResource utilization ensures that procedures and practices are followed to control and monitor the efficiency, effectiveness, and utilization of network services. For many people, performance is not the most important aspect of a network service. When forced to prioritize the different functions of a network server, most of Novell's customers will rank reliability and security as the two most important, with performance coming in a close third. Of course, each of these areas is important, and no one likes to prioritize them or wants to exclude one for the other. But it's important that tuning for the sake of performance not be allowed to compromise reliability and security.PAGENUM=163 ID="BP159"RENDERAS="SECT2"Server Memory CapacityThe more RAM available for disk caching in a NetWare server, the faster the response time. RAM access is many times faster than even the fastest hard disks, so the more data buffered in the RAM cache, the faster each workstation will receive data. We recommend having at least 16 megabytes of RAM on each server. If you have 1 gigabyte of hard disk space, or 25 or more workstations, consider installing up to 32 megabytes of RAM.Name Space support for non-DOS volumes (OS/2 HPFS, Macintosh, or UNIX/NFS) requires additional RAM according to the following formula:FORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE".032   volume size (in MB) / block sizeUpgrading the server to a 486 or above will increase network speed. When upgrading, also consider configuring the server with at least 16 megabytes of RAM, an EISA bus architecture, and a SCSI hard disk controller.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETDetermine how much RAM is installed in each server. Review the memory needs of the installation.Identify any servers with 386 or less powerful processors. Discuss the feasibility of upgrading these servers to a 486 or above.RENDERAS="SECT2"File CompressionNetWare 4's file compression feature can help extend the amount of disk space available on a volume. It allows NetWare to compress files as they are saved to the hard disk or after inactivity for a preset period of time. NetWare automatically decompresses the files when they are retrieved. Enabling file compression reduces disk space usage by compressing rarely-used files (up to one-third of their original size). Frequently-used files should not be compressed since compressing files has a slight impact on file access speed. NetWare 4's disk compression algorithm is set up to compress data as a low-priority background process. This occurs when the server is not busy performing anything else, or at the time of day specified by the administrator. Thus, compression speed is not critical, but compression integrity and decompression speed are high factors.PAGENUM=164 ID="BP160"The SET parameters dealing with disk compression (along with their defaults) are as follows:MARK=BULLETCompression Daily Check Starting Hour = 0. Shows what time during the day the disk compression algorithm begins its search for any files that match the number of days set in the Days Untouched Before Compression parameter.Compression Daily Check Stop Hour = 6. Shows what time during the day the disk compression algorithm ends its search for any files that match the number of days set in the Days Untouched Before Compression parameter. Minimum Compression Percentage Gain = 2. Defaults to 5%, but can be set up to 50%.Enable File Compression = ON. Enables compression. The server will need 32 KB of cache memory available to be used as overhead for the actual file compression process. When set to OFF, this volume will not compress the files and any files marked to be compressed will be queued until compression is turned back on again.Maximum Concurrent Compressions = 2. If the server has multiple volumes, this command allow them to compress at the same time (this can affect performance, however).Convert Compressed To Uncompressed Option = 1. Allows control over compressed/uncompressed files on the server (0=compressed only, 1=leaves compressed if accessed once during the "untouched" phase, and 2=always leaves files uncompressed).Decompress Percent Disk Space Free To Allow Commit = 10. Allows you to set how much disk space needs to be free in order to change compressed files to a decompressed state (defaults to 10%). If the percentage exceeds this number, new files marked for compression will not be compressed. Decompress Free Space Warning Interval = 31 min 18.5 sec. Shows how long between alerts warnings will be given.Deleted Files Compression Option = 1. Allows you to set how files will be compressed (0=do not compress files, 1=compress files on the next day, and 2=compress files immediately).PAGENUM=165 ID="BP161"Days Untouched Before Compression = 7. Allows you to set how many days you want files to wait before compressing them.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETReview server compression settings for reasonableness. Verify whether compression is enabled at server level (default is ON).List volume information. Has the administrator enabled file compression for the appropriate volumes?Are file and directories appropriately flagged for compression?Display file compression results sorted by file size and also by date last accessed.Are files grouped to allow compression options to be maintained at the directory level?It is not necessary to separate application files from data files for compression, because the "SET Days Untouched Before Compression" parameter eliminates the compression of regularly-used applications or data.RENDERAS="SECT2"Block SuballocationBlock Suballocation has been implemented in NetWare 4 to prevent wasted disk space due to setting a large disk block size and having parts of the last allocated block remaining unused. Block suballocation allows small files, or that part of a file which exceeds the volume's default block size, to share a disk block with other files. Thus, NetWare can store more files in a smaller space on a NetWare volume. The installation process enables block suballocation by default.Suballocation allows multiple file endings to share a disk block. The unit of allocation within a suballocated block is a single sector (512 bytes), which means that up to 128 files can share a single 64KB block. By using suballocation, the maximum loss of data space per file is 511 bytes, which would only occur when a file had one more byte than could be allocated to a full 512-byte sector. Suballocation nearly eliminates the penalty of using larger disk allocation units and allows much larger disk channel transactions. This helps optimize the disk channel and cache around the 64KB disk allocation unit.PAGENUM=166 ID="BP162"From a performance standpoint, suballocation enhances the performance of write operations within the operating system by allowing the ends of multiple files to be consolidated within a single write operation. But this minor improvement is counterbalanced by the overhead of managing the suballocation process.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETList volume information. Has the administrator enabled block suballocation for the appropriate volumes?RENDERAS="SECT2"Purgeable SpaceNetWare saves deleted files on the volume until they are purged. Users can salvage their own unpurged, deleted files. Purging can occur two ways:MARK=BULLETWhen a user uses a utility to force purging of files.If the disk runs out of free space, NetWare automatically purges the files that were deleted first.The second method is preferred because it provides extended access to accidently deleted files. However, if the user requiring free space has no delete rights to the deleted files occupying free space, NetWare will not allow them to use the space and they will receive a volume full message even though free space exists.The SERVMAN utility can be used to set the file delete wait time to a time exceeding the tape backup interval. This assures that deleted files will be backed up before purging and automatic purging will occur regularly to free space.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:Review the server console settings. Determine that the following purge/salvage settings are in place:MARK=BULLETSET Immediate Purge Of Deleted Files=ONSET File Delete Wait Time=backup intervalPAGENUM=167 ID="BP163"RENDERAS="SECT2"Improving Disk PerformanceOverall disk performance depends on the type of hard disk drives and controllers being used. SCSI hard disk controllers are much faster than the IDE controllers and drivers used on many servers. Adding a SCSI controller can significantly decrease data access times.A number of NetWare parameters can affect disk performance. However, proper tuning of these parameters should be done only by knowledgable administrators or network technicians. More information can be found in the Novell Application Notes' ongoing series of articles on NetWare 4 server tuning and optimization.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETDoes the server use SCSI hard disk controllers?Review file cache and read/write settings. Are the settings reasonable based upon NetWare server usage?RENDERAS="SECT2"Dismounting Rarely-Used VolumesEach volume that is mounted takes up memory and reduces the memory available to file caching. Consider leaving test volumes or rarely used volumes dismounted to reduce server overhead.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETAre there any test volumes or other volumes that are rarely used?Do administrators dismount rarely used volumes during periods of non-use?RENDERAS="SECT2"NDS Partition PlacementAdministrators can replicate NDS partitions (distinct portions of the Directory tree) on different servers across the network. If users currently use a WAN link to access particular NDS information, access time and WAN traffic can be decreased by placing a replica containing the needed information on a server that users can access locally. Distributing replicas among servers on the network allows quick and reliable access, as information will be retrieved from the nearest available server containing the specified information.PAGENUM=168 ID="BP164"RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETCompare the network configuration to partition location.Determine that portions of the NDS users often access are located on a NDS partition on a local server.RENDERAS="SECT2"Time Synchronization IssuesBy default, non-Secondary time servers use NetWare's Service Advertising Protocol (SAP) to announce their presence on the network. The SAP method allows for quick installation and changes to time servers without regard to the network layout. The SAP method also generates additional network traffic. The larger the network, the more network traffic is generated by the time server SAP broadcasts.Alternatively, the administrator can assign specific time source servers that a particular server should contact for time information or polling. This custom configuration method eliminates nonessential network SAP traffic, as well as errors associated with accidental reconfiguration.Additionally, when using the SAP method, accidently setting a new time source server's time to a future time can disrupt network time. You should set new time source servers a minute or two behind the network synchronized time. If a new time source server is set to a time in the future, no NDS updates will be accepted.Gross changes to time will also create an audit record. When you boot the server, TIMESYNC may set the time and then place in the audit record an indication that the time is set.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETReview the organization and placement of time servers. Have time servers been organized to minimize network time synchronization traffic?Is this a large network where servers come and go? If so and time servers are using the SAP method, discuss the benefits of using the custom configuration method for configuring time servers. If using the SAP method, do change control procedures require new time source servers to be set several minutes behind the network synchronized time?PAGENUM=169 ID="BP165"RENDERAS="SECT2"Packet Burst and LIPSupport for Novell's Packet Burst protocol is built in to the VLM client software and to the NetWare 4 operating system. Use of Packet Burst improves transfer of messages over an internetwork by converting packets to multipacket messages.The Large Internet Packet (LIP) feature allows increased throughput over network bridges or routers by increasing packet size when Ethernet or Token R.ring architectures allow larger packets to be sent over the network. Increasing packet size can increase server performance. If the network boards in your server can transmit more than 512 bytes of data per packet, you can increase the Maximum Physical Receive Packet Size to the largest packet size supported by your network board.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETDetermine whether the workstation NET.CFG files are configured to enable the Packet Burst protocol.If Packet Burst is not enabled and users communicate across wide area networks or slow, long-distance links, verify that administrators have considered using the Packet Burst protocol.If users communicate across intermediate routers, verify that administrators have considered using LIP.RENDERAS="SECT2"Network Interface CardsThe network interface card (NIC) settings for a workstation must match the settings you place under the Link Driver heading in the NET.CFG file. For servers, the NIC settings are placed in the AUTOEXEC.NCF file.The type of NIC used can affect the overall performance of a network. Network board considerations include the type of network board (8-, 16-, or 32-bit), as well as the board driver. 8-bit NICs were designed for XT-class computers, but will still function in newer 386 and 486 workstations. 386 or higher workstations are so fast that they will wait for data from slower 8-bit NICs. This is particularly noticeable if you are using data-intensive network applications.PAGENUM=170 ID="BP166"Changing from 8-bit to 16-bit NICs in 386 or higher workstations will result in speed improvements and could enhance user productivity. EISA (Extended Industry Standard Architecture) based servers can accommodate 32-bit network cards and disk controllers, as opposed to ISA (Industry Standard Architecture) based servers, which can accommodate 16-bit cards. Adding an EISA server with 32-bit NICs and disk controllers will increase network speed by 10 to 25 percent. We recommend considering an EISA-based server.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures and Questions:MARK=BULLETDo any 386 or 486 workstations connected to the network use 8-bit network interface cards (NICs)?Determine the type of servers installed and discuss their appropriateness for handling the network workload.RENDERAS="SECT2"CablingOne of the biggest items of concern when dealing with networks is the physical layer, which includes cabling. Considerations regarding cabling include attenuation, bandwidth, impedance, and crosstalk. The major cabling types in use today include unshielded twisted pair (UTP), shielded twisted pair (STP), coax, and fiber optic.Depending on the type of cabling currently in use, installing new cabling can provide more bandwidth for transferring data. For example, upgrading to 10Base-T from older 2 Mbps Arcnet cable provides 10 Mbps of bandwidth. The speed increase will be very noticeable to the users.RENDERAS="SECT3"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETDetermine whether the network wired with older cabling. Discuss the feasibility of upgrading to newer cable.RENDERAS="SECT1"Backup, Recovery and Contingency PlanningThe objective here is to ensure that adequate plans exist for backing up critical network resources and for the timely and logical recovery of information services after unanticipated interruptions. The following items should be considered for proper backup and recovery of microcomputer environments.PAGENUM=171 ID="BP167"RENDERAS="SECT2"Audit Procedures:MARK=BULLETObtain and review a copy of the backup and recovery procedures and/or the contingency plan.Evaluate the procedures used to back up the network to ensure the proper information is being backed up as needed.Consider whether backups are performed when data is changed, such as every work day.Review retention of backups.Review evidence of successful recovery testing.Review the installation's procedures for recovering a lost disk on the server.Determine the network availability/criticality needs if there is an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) attached. Consider brownouts and power fluctuations.Identify and evaluate the propriety of information being sent to an off-site location.Determine if networks are included in the master disaster recovery plan and if the plan is periodically and successfully tested.Evaluate the provisions for restoring operations after a disaster. Consider restoration of equipment and service, including files.RENDERAS="SECT2"Overview Questions:MARK=BULLETWho is responsible for backup and recovery of network system files, application programs, and data files?Are business applications and sensitive or mission-critical data (memos, spreadsheets, and so on) stored on the network?How often is the data stored on the network backed up?PAGENUM=172 ID="BP168"If users accidentally delete a file from the network, would the administrators know how to recover that file using the SALVAGE command?Has any of the data stored on the network ever been lost, not recovered on a timely basis, or not recovered at all?Would users be inconvenienced or unable to respond to customers if the company's data was lost since the last backup?Is regular and systematic backup of files required of sensitive and/or crucial applications and data?Who determines the methods and frequency of backups of critical information stored?What type of media is being used for backups? Are backup tapes and software stored in an area physically apart from the server?Is off-site storage used to maintain backups of critical information required for processing operations to continue?Does the company's backup software allow one to back up the bindery (NetWare 2 and 3) and/or Directory Services (NetWare 4)?Does the frequency of backups provide the ability to restore data that is sufficiently current for your business needs?Does the network administrator maintain multiple generations of backup files?Are copies of important application programs, data files, and supporting documentation stored at a remote location?Are backup logs maintained that track backup media, the files backed up on the media, the date and time of the backups, and where the backup media is stored?Are backup media properly labeled?Are copies of backup logs sent off-site with the backup media?PAGENUM=173 ID="BP169"Are important business applications such as accounting systems processed on the network?Is there a reporting or regulatory requirement to maintain copies of important business application data files at specific points during the year such as quarter end and year end?Are the data files for important business applications backed up at specific times during the year such as quarter end and year end?Are periodic partial restores from back-up media performed?Does the company or department have written, organization-specific, procedures that document the process of restoring data files?Are critical database application files processed on the server? If so, have these files been flagged as transactional (T) to invoke NetWare's TTS?Is the server and critical network hardware connected to an uninterruptible power supply (UPS)?Is the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) inspected on a regular basis to help ensure that it is functioning properly?Is the server and uninterruptible power supply (UPS) configured to automatically power down the network in a reasonable time period after power is lost?In the event of equipment failure, are sufficient resources available for continued operations, either on- or off-site?Are user needs prioritized so that hardware can be redistributed when units are out for repair?Is there sufficient documentation, describing files and recovery method, to perform a recovery in case of disaster or loss of software, data, or key personnel?Who is responsible for developing, maintaining, or reviewing the contingency plan for this network?Has a network contingency plan been developed?PAGENUM=174 ID="BP170"Is the network contingency plan reviewed and tested periodically to ensure that it reflects the current environment?Has the network contingency plan been communicated to all users involved in the plan and all users who use the network?RENDERAS="SECT1"Other Audit ConsiderationsAs described in earlier chapters, certain security features within the NetWare operating system afford the system administrator a means of building a trusted network system. This includes effectively recording system-wide activities. System administrators can select and adjust these features to secure and control the network, as well as monitor and analyze critical aspects. Also, the condition of these features can be readily checked during the data gathering phase of the audit.LABEL="5"PAGENUM=175 ID="BP171"Using the AUDITCON UtilityAs networks become more complex, the issue of system integrity increases in importance. The ability to audit the network to verify confidentiality, integrity, and availability is a cornerstone feature of NetWare 4.This chapter provides information about the auditing capability of the NetWare 4 AUDITCON utility and describes the network administrator's part in setting up auditing. It also focuses on the procedures an auditor follows to audit NDS and the file system.Specifically, this chapter explains how to do the following: MARK=BULLETSet up auditingCustomize the auditing environmentSelect auditing eventsCreate auditing reportsMaintain audit filesRENDERAS="SECT1"NetWare 4 AuditingAuditing is the process of examining an organization's records and systems to assure information is properly protected, handled, and managed and meets the corporate policies for security. NetWare 4 auditing functionality is provided by the AUDITCON utility, which is protected by a confidential password. The auditing feature records specific NetWare Directory Services (NDS) and file system actions, called events, performed on the network.It is important to note that in NetWare 4.01 AUDITCON is a public utility, found in the SYS: PUBLIC directory of each NetWare server. It is a compressed file structure and must be protected accordingly.PAGENUM=176 ID="BP172"Auditing tracks the following types of information:MARK=BULLETUser actionsResource usageFile system security and access control.NetWare 4 auditing adds credibility to complex network environments by serving as a checks and balances system. As a network grows and more users are added, many factors can cause security to deteriorate and allow unauthorized access to the network or to sensitive information such as:MARK=BULLETControl becomes decentralized as core users are given specific security responsibilities.Users create new files without setting the appropriate level of security. New users are granted access to the system, increasing the complexity of the security structure.File ownership is changed without corresponding changes being made to trustee rights.The job responsibilities of a user change, requiring changes to user/group trustee rights.Temporary access is granted, but not revoked, on a timely basis.New software applications or releases are installed, requiring access restrictions.Data collected during the auditing session can be used to: MARK=BULLETDetermine corporate security policy violationsDetermine if computing and communications mistakes are occurringDetermine if procedures are being followed.Determine who is performing tasks at the NetWare server levelTroubleshoot problems on the networkPAGENUM=177 ID="BP173"In addition to providing information necessary to reducing security risks, auditing also provides valuable information relating to network resources and troubleshooting. For example, the network administrator can use the auditing information to reconstruct events leading up to a crash or disaster.RENDERAS="SECT2"Reasons to Audit the NetworkAuditing minimizes security risks, provides valuable information about resource usage, and serves as a troubleshooting aid. Network auditing provides invaluable information about the system to the auditor and network administrator(s) who need data to validate the integrity of the information and its processing in the client/server networks, just as financial auditing statements can give a company's annual report credibility.The importance of network auditing is exemplified in the following circumstances:MARK=BULLETGovernment contracts where security at a company must be certifiedFinancial institutions regulated by the SECConfidential departments such as Human Resources and AccountingRENDERAS="SECT2"The Auditing ProcessThe first step in the auditing process is to select the individuals that will be assigned the status of auditor. The number of people needed depends on the size of the organization and the network that services it. Ordinarily an auditor is assigned to an individual volume. However, in large centralized installations an individual such as a security administrator can audit several volumes from a single location.Security administrators and auditors should be individuals who do not have a privileged status or a vested interest in the operation of the system. They should be independent and able to function in such a manner that they verify the integrity of the network without bias. They should not be responsible for the network or for the area to be reviewed. PAGENUM=178 ID="BP174"LABEL="5-1" FLOAT="0"The auditing process.FILEREF="5_01proc.tif"The auditor should be more experienced than the average network user and should be knowledgeable about the network topology, network structure, NDS, and file system services that are being audited. The auditor should have information about the structure of the company's organization, data flow, file system, and NDS tree. The auditor can then use generally accepted auditing principles to help management clarify the audit goal and design an audit plan to accomplish the goals.Auditing is a privileged function and should be controlled by management. It is also important that management support this function and that it be aware of the results on an ongoing basis.After the auditor is selected and the goals of the audit are determined, the network administrator: MARK=BULLETSets up the auditor's environmentPAGENUM=179 ID="BP175"Enables auditing for the appropriate container or volume, and assigns an auditing passwordGives the auditing password to the designated auditorForgetting the audit passwords can cause a serious problem. Without a password for a volume or a container, one is unable to access the audit files and backup/recovery requires one to delete the volume or container and restore it from a backup. This is a very costly process.When given the auditing password, the auditor assumes full responsibility for auditing the specified container or volume. The auditor performs the following auditing tasks:MARK=BULLETSets up auditing by changing the password and configuring the auditing environment.Selects events to audit.Creates reports.Maintains the audit files.The auditing process includes the creation of audit files by the system. When the network administrator enables auditing, AUDITCON automatically creates files to record the audited events and the auditor's actions.AUDITCON creates separate files for each container and volume in which auditing is enabled. At the NDS level, the data is stored in the Audit Data files. At the volume level, the data is stored in the Audit Data records of the Audit History file. The auditor maintains the audit files and uses the data collected in the files to create reports.RENDERAS="SECT2"The Network Administrator's RoleThe network administrator prepares the network environment for auditing. Network administrators should be limited to doing audits only for troubleshooting purposes the primary auditing responsibility should be given to the auditor.PAGENUM=180 ID="BP176"Before passing the audit responsibility to the auditor, you must set up the auditor on the network, enable auditing, and give the auditing password to the auditor.To set up the auditor on a NetWare 4.01 network, one needs to:MARK=BULLETCreate a User object for the auditor and assign the appropriate rights.Create a home directory for the auditor to store report files in.Map a drive to the directory that contains the auditing executable program files (SYS:PUBLIC).Make sure the Browse right has been assigned in each container that needs to be audited.Provide the auditor with the one time use password.RENDERAS="SECT1"Enabling AuditingYou can enable auditing to track events in NDS and in the file system.When auditing is enabled for the NDS container it is enabled for that container only it is not enabled for subordinate containers. Likewise, when auditing is enabled for a volume, it is enabled for that volume only. This reduces overhead on other volumes.At the NDS container level, events relate to the use of NDS. For example, the NDS container level is the appropriate choice when the goal is to monitor the creation of User objects.At the volume level, events relate to the use of files and directories, queues, or NetWare servers. For example, the volume level is the appropriate choice when the goal is to track the number of times a certain user opens a specific file.RENDERAS="SECT2"Enabling Auditing for an NDS ContainerTo enable auditing for an NDS container, do the following: PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the DOS prompt, type the following: FORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"AUDITCON MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>
PAGENUM=181 ID="BP177"The "Available Audit Options" menu appears. The current NetWare server and volume appear at the top of the screen.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Audit Directory Services".The "Audit Directory Services" menu appears. The session context appears at the top of the screen.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) Change the context by doing the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Change Session Context".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type the context of the container for which auditing is being enabled and press
MOREINFO="NONE" <Enter>.The "Audit Directory Services" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Audit NDS tree".A list of containers appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Highlight the container to be audited and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<F10>. The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Enable Container Auditing".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type a password for the container and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>. PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, retype the password and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Notify the auditor of the password.RENDERAS="SECT2"Enabling Auditing for a VolumeThe procedure for enabling auditing at the volume level is similar to enabling auditing at the NDS container level. The difference is that menu selections pertain to the volume being audited.To enable auditing at a volume level, do the following: PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the DOS prompt, type the following: FORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"AUDITCON MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>
PAGENUM=182 ID="BP178"The "Available Audit Options" menu appears. The current NetWare server and volume appear at the top of the screen.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Enable Volume Auditing".A list of volumes appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Highlight the volume to be audited and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<F10>.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditor Volume Login". PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type a password for the volume and press <Enter>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, retype the password and press <Enter>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Notify the auditor of the password.RENDERAS="SECT1"Customizing the Auditing EnvironmentThe auditing environment is the auditor's work space. In the same way that you configure the network to help accomplish administrative tasks, the auditor configures the auditing environment to optimize his ability to accomplish auditing tasks. To set up the Auditing environment the auditor does the following:MARK=BULLETAccesses auditing functionality by running AUDITCON and logging in to the appropriate NDS container or volumeChanges the auditing passwordCustomizes the auditing environmentAccesses auditing functionalityIn addition to the standard network login, the auditor must use the AUDITCON login procedure to access the auditing capabilities at either the NDS container or the volume. PAGENUM=183 ID="BP179"A password is needed for each container or volume the auditor wants to audit. The next step the auditor takes to establish independence is to change the auditing "password" for the NDS container and volume to be audited. This provides security for the auditing data and adds credibility to the network.Take precautions against forgetting or losing the auditing password as stipulated above.RENDERAS="SECT2"Changing the Audit Password for an NDS ContainerTo change the auditing password for an NDS container, do the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the DOS prompt, type: FORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"AUDITCON MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>The "Available Audit Options" menu appears. The current NetWare server and volume appear at the top of the screen.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Audit Directory Services".The "Audit Directory Services" menu appears. The session context appears at the top of the screen.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) Change the context by doing the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Change Session Context".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type the context for the container to be audited and press
MOREINFO="NONE" <Enter>.The "Audit Directory Services" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Audit NDS tree".A list of containers appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Highlight the container to be audited and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<F10>.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditor Container Login".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type the current auditing password and press <Enter>.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditing Configuration".
PAGENUM=184 ID="BP180"The "Auditing Configuration" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Change Audit Password".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type the current password and press
MOREINFO="NONE" <Enter>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type the new password and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, retype the new password and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.RENDERAS="SECT2"Changing the Auditing Password for a VolumeTo change the auditing password for a volume, do the following: PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the DOS prompt, type the following: FORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"AUDITCON <Enter>The "Available Audit Options" menu appears. The current NetWare server and volume appear at the top of the screen.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditor Volume Login".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type the current auditing password and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditing Configuration".The "Auditing Configuration" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Change Audit Password".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type the current password and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type the new password and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, retype the new password and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.RENDERAS="SECT2"Customizing the Auditing ParametersAfter changing the password, the auditor has complete control of the auditing environment and the files that contain the auditing records.PAGENUM=185 ID="BP181"LABEL="5-2" FLOAT="0"Customizing the auditing environment.FILEREF="5_02envr.tif"The auditor can set numerous parameters which map the corporate security policies and generally accepted security practices to determine how auditing works in the volume or container being audited. These parameters include options to:MARK=BULLETSet the size limit of the Audit Data file.Set a file size threshold beyond which AUDITCON sends warning messages to the NetWare server console and the system log file.Allow more than one auditor to log in to the volume or container at the same time. (NetWare 4.01 requires an auditor to login into each volume or container separately. NetWare 4.1 will allow single log in functionality.)Send broadcast warning messages to all users or to the console.Require a dual-level password to change Auditing settings.PAGENUM=186 ID="BP182"Set a volume to dismount or disable event recording when the Audit Data file reaches its size limit or an unrecoverable write error occurs.Set the frequency for warning messages to be sent to the NetWare sever console when the audit file is full.RENDERAS="SECT3"Customizing Auditing at the NDS Container LevelTo customize the auditing environment at the container level, do the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the DOS prompt, type the following: FORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"AUDITCON MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>The "Available Audit Options" menu appears, as shown in 
IDREF="FM64306"Figure 5-3. The current NetWare server and volume appear at the top of the screen.
PAGENUM=187 ID="BP183"LABEL="5-3" FLOAT="0"ID="FM64306"Available Audit Options menu. FILEREF="5_03audt.tif"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Audit Directory Services".The "Audit Directory Services" menu appears. The session context appears at the top of the screen.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) Change the context by doing the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Change Session Context".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type the context for the container to be configured; then press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.The "Audit Directory Services" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Audit NDS Tree".A list of containers appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Highlight the container to be audited and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<F10>.
PAGENUM=188 ID="BP184"The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditor Container Login".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type the auditing password and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditing Configuration". The "Auditing Configuration" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Audit Options Configuration".The "Audit Configuration" form appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Enter the setting for the option you want to change and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Repeat step 10 for each option you want to change.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"When you have completed the changes, press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Yes" to save the settings.RENDERAS="SECT3"Customizing Auditing at the Volume LevelTo customize the auditing environment at the volume level, do the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the DOS prompt, type the following: FORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"AUDITCON <Enter>The "Available Audit Options" menu appears. The current NetWare server and volume appear at the top of the screen.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditor Volume Login".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the prompt, type the auditing password and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditing Configuration".The "Auditing Configuration" menu appears.
PAGENUM=189 ID="BP185"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Audit Options Configuration".The "Audit Configuration" form appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Type the setting for the option you want to change and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Repeat step 6 for each option you want to change.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"When you have completed the changes, press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Yes" to save the settings.RENDERAS="SECT2"Selecting the Events to AuditAfter configuring the environment and returning to the Auditing Configuration menu, the auditor can log in to different NDS containers and volumes to select the events to be audited. These selections should be based on auditing goals and focus.At the NDS container level, the auditor can choose to audit by an NDS event or by user. At the volume level, the auditor can choose to audit by event, by files or by user.In addition, the auditing function includes options for managing the auditing environment at both the container and volume level.PAGENUM=190 ID="BP186"LABEL="5-4" FLOAT="0"Selecting the events to audit.FILEREF="5_04evnt.tif"Examples of events an auditor might be interested in recording:MARK=BULLET"Reads" of a database to see if invalid users attempt to read a file(s) "Change password" to check if passwords were changed after hours when a security breach may be suspected"Login/Logout" to track trends of login/out during odd hoursRENDERAS="SECT3"Global This selects all events, regardless of which user performs the event or in which file or directory the event occurs throughout the volume.PAGENUM=191 ID="BP187"RENDERAS="SECT3"User and File/DirectoryTo create an audit record a flagged event must be performed by the flagged user.Example: File Close-User and File causes the auditing system to record an event when a flagged user closes a flagged file.RENDERAS="SECT3"User or File/DirectoryOnly one of two conditions has to be met to create an audit record: either the flagged event occurs, or the flagged user performs the event.Example: Delete Directory-User or Directory causes the auditing system to record every time a flagged user deletes any directory, and every time a flagged directory is deleted by any user.RENDERAS="SECT2"Auditing Options for NDSIDREF="FM594391"Table 5-1 lists auditing options that are available at the NDS container level.LABEL="5-1" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM594391"Auditing options for NDSCOLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="15*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"OptionCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ExplanationVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit by DS EventsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Gives the auditor a list of NDS events. The auditor can select the events to be audited. When auditing is turned on for an event, all occurrences of the event within the container are recorded.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit by UserCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Gives a list of NDS objects. The auditor can select the users to audit from the list by selecting the user's name and pressing <f10>. If auditing is turned on for a user, a record is entered in the Audit Data file each time the user performs an audited even.To select events to audit for a container, do the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Log in to the container to be audited.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditing Configuration".The "Auditing Configuration" menu appears.
PAGENUM=192 ID="BP188"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) Select "Audit By DS Events".A list of available NDS events appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Highlight the event to be audited and press <F10>.The tag for that event changes from "audit off" to "AUDITED".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"When you have completed your selection, press <Esc>.A confirmation box appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Yes" to save the changes.At the NDS container level, events are audited within the audited container only auditing does not record actions that occur at higher levels of the NDS tree. Auditing records events for leaf objects within a container, not for Organizational Units within the container. PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) Select "Audit By User".A list of available NDS users appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Highlight the user to be audited and press <F10>.The tag for that user changes from "audit off" to "AUDITED."PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"When you have completed your selections, press <Esc>.A confirmation box appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Yes" to save the changes.Use the "Audit by User" option in volume auditing to track events initiated by users (including SUPERVISOR) within the bindery context.The "Audit by User" option will not flag NDS users.PAGENUM=193 ID="BP189"RENDERAS="SECT2"Auditing Options For a VolumeIDREF="FM594392"Table 5-2 lists auditing options that are available at the volume level.LABEL="5-2" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM594392"Auditing options for a volumeCOLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="15*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"OptionCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ExplanationVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit by EventCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"File/Directory EventsMARK=BULLETCreate or delete a directoryOpen, close, read, and write filesIncludes file or directory activity such as directory create or delete, and file open, close, read, and write requests. Events can be audited globally (all files and directories are audited for the event regardless of user), by user or file (the event is recorded only when it applies to an audited user or file), or user and file (the event is recorded when it applies to and audited user in an audited file or directory).QMS EventsTracks activities affecting print queues, such as requests to create or destroy a queue.Server EventsAudits requests, such as mounting a volume or bringing down a NetWare server, that affect a specific server. Server events are audited globally (all instances of the audited event are recorded).User EventsIncludes activities such as logging in, logging out, and logouts changing, trustee assignments and creating or deleting users.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit by File/DirectoryCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Gives a list of all files and directories. The auditor can select the files and directories to be audited. When a file or directory is audited, a record is added to the Audit Data file each time an audited event occurs for that file or directory. If a parent directory is set to "Audited," it has the same effect as browsing up one level in the NDS tree and setting the actual directory name as audited.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit by UserCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Gives the auditor a list of users in the bindery context. When auditing is activated for a bindery user, a record is entered in the Audit Data file each time the user performs an event that is audited. This only applies to file system events.Auditing tracks volume activities by the following:PAGENUM=194 ID="BP190"MARK=BULLETEventsFile system (file and directory) eventsNDS eventsServer eventsUser eventsFiles and directoriesUsers. (This option is for tracking the system events for bindery users who attach to a NetWare 4 server and use file services.)RENDERAS="SECT2"Selecting Events to Audit for a VolumeTo select events to audit for a volume, do the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Log in to the volume to be audited.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditing Configuration".The "Auditing Configuration" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) Select "Audit By Event".The "Audit By Event" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select a type of event from the following options: 
TYPE="VERT"Audit By File Events
TYPE="VERT"Audit By NDS Events
TYPE="VERT"Audit By Server Events
TYPE="VERT"Audit By User EventsA list of available event options for the type of event you selected appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Highlight the event to be audited and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<F10>.The tag for that event changes from "audit off" to "AUDITED."PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Repeat step" b" for each item to be audited.
PAGENUM=195 ID="BP191"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"When you have completed your selections, press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc>.A confirmation box appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Yes" to save the changes.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) Select additional events by choosing from the following event options:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Audit by File/Directory" to audit by files or directoriesorPERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Audit By User" to audit by users.A list of available files and directories or of available users appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Highlight the item to be audited and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<F10>.The tag for that item changes from "audit off" to "AUDITED".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Repeat step "c" for each item to be audited.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"When you have completed the selections, press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc>.A confirmation box appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Yes" to save the changes.RENDERAS="SECT2"Auditing Event GuidelinesIDREF="FM30449"Table 5-3 lists auditing goals and the selections the auditor makes to achieve each goal. All of these events affect the file system, except where noted below. LABEL="5-3" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM30449"Auditing event guidelinesCOLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="15*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"GoalCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"What to AuditVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Justify resourcesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Writes to an application fileUse of print queuesCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Diagnose performance problemsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"File opens to an application that is slowCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Determine holes in securityCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Changes to ACL (NDS)File opens of sensitive filesCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Determine if a user has accessed unauthorized areasCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"File opens in the audited areasFile writes in the audited areaFile opens by an audited userCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Determine NetWare server securityCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Login security (NDS)Volume mounts and dismountsNetWare server eventsCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit file securityCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"File reads and writesFile creations and deletionsPAGENUM=196 ID="BP192"RENDERAS="SECT1"How to Use the Auditing InformationThe following cases illustrate situations where auditing is helpful. These cases also illustrate how to:MARK=BULLETJustify the purchase of another word processor license.Locate a potential security breach.Locate and correct a trustee rights problem.Monitor volumes being dismounted or mounted.Determine if a workgroup manager is abusing his or her rights. Monitor changes in partitions and replicas.Case 1:The network administrator is told to justify the purchase of another word processor license.PAGENUM=197 ID="BP193"The auditor flags the word processor file for OPEN by all users and counts the number of accesses to that file. The resulting information gives the network administrator an idea of how many people use the word processor program and how often. The persons responsible for purchasing can then decide whether the need is great enough to buy another license based on number and frequency of accesses.Case 2:The auditor helps the network administrator find a potential security breach.The network administrator finds that some of the console parameters have changed in the past few days. The auditor may be asked to check the server events and RCONSOLE accesses within the past week to determine who has gained access to the server console.Case 3:The auditor helps the network administrator find and correct a trustee rights problem.A user says that he cannot access a database program that he used to have rights to. The auditor searches the auditing records, determines that the rights to the database directory have been changed, and tells the network administrator that the rights were changed on a certain date and by whom.Case 4:The network administrator wants reports on volume mounts and dismounts.The administrator has the auditor flag the Volume Mount and Volume Dismount under Audit by Event server events. Each time the volumes are mounted or dismounted for that server, auditing records the event.Case 5:The network administrator suspects a workgroup manager of abusing power and changing users' rights.The administrator has the auditor flag the User object in the container with the Change in ACL flag under the Audit by NDS Events menu. When the user makes any change to trustee assignments or ACLs, the auditing file reflects the change.PAGENUM=198 ID="BP194"Case 6:The network administrator wants to monitor changes in NDS partitions and replicas.The auditor goes to the Audit by DS Events menu and flags the following: MARK=BULLETAdd PartitionChange Replica TypeJoin Partitions Remove PartitionsRemove ReplicasSplit PartitionsThese events must be flagged on the parent container for each partition that the network administrator wants to monitor.RENDERAS="SECT2"Creating Auditing ReportsThe auditor is responsible for managing the data collected in the audit files and communicating the results to management.With AUDITCON, the auditor can create reports to be printed or to be viewed online. To get the pertinent information from the audit files, the auditor does the following:MARK=BULLETCreates, edits, and applies filtersSends data to a DOS text file to be printedViews audit data onlineNo data appears in the report until events are selected and actions have occurred on audited events.PAGENUM=199 ID="BP195"The Audit Data file can include an enormous amount of information. Providing management with all the information, however, could obscure the important findings in the data. To avoid this, the auditor can create a report filter to make the presentation and interpretation of audit data more meaningful. The auditor uses report filters to extract specific information from the Audit Data file, based on the requirements of the report. Once a filter is created, it can be saved in the Edit Filter list and used again.LABEL="5-5" FLOAT="0"Creating auditing reports.FILEREF="5_08rprt.tif"PAGENUM=200 ID="BP196"When creating reports, the auditor has the option of using an existing filter, modifying an existing filter, or creating a completely new filter. The auditor can create a filter to satisfy the information needs of each situation. With this list of filters to select from, the report task becomes streamlined. LABEL="5-4" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"Report filter optionsCOLS=2 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="5*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="15*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"OptionCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ExplanationVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Report by Date/TimeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the auditor to enter a period in which the system should create a report. All recorded events that fall within the dates and times entered appear in the report.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Report by EventCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the auditor to select the type of audited events to be included in the report. If this option is selected, AUDITCON prompts for selection from the types explained below. Events are dependent on the files and directories, and users included in or excluded from the report.File EventsFiles events to be included in the report are selectable in the report column where the events are marked "Audited".QMS EventsQueue events to be included in the report are selectable in the report column where the events are marked "Audited".Server EventsServer events to be included in the report are selectable in the report column where the events are marked "Audited".User EventsUser events to be included in the report are selectable in the report column where the events are marked "Audited".COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Report Exclude Paths/ FilesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the auditor to specify files or directories to exclude from the report. Press <Ins> and type the name of a file or a directory to be excluded. All other audited files and directories are included.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Report Exclude UsersCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the auditor to specify the name of an audited user to exclude from the report. Pres <Ins> and type the name of a user to be excluded. All other audited users are included.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Report Include Paths/ FilesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the auditor to specify files or directories to include in the report. Press <Ins> and type the name of a file or a directory to be included. All other audited files and directories are excluded.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Report Include UsersCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Allows the auditor to specify the name of an audited user to include in the report. Press <Ins> and type the name of a user to be included. All other audited users are excluded.PAGENUM=201 ID="BP197"RENDERAS="SECT3"Creating a Report FilterTo create a report filter, do the following: PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Log in to the NDS container or volume.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditing Reports".The "Auditing Reports" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Edit Report Filters".The "Edit Filter" list of previously created filters appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Press
MOREINFO="NONE" <Insert>.The "Edit Report Writer" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select the audited events or period of time to include in, or exclude from the report. PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Complete the selections and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc>.The "Edit Report Filter" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc>.A confirmation box appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Yes" to save the filter.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Delete the default name and type a name for the filter; then press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.
PAGENUM=202 ID="BP198"The new filter is now included in the Edit Filter list. The filter option creates a file called FILTER.ARF at the root of SYS.RENDERAS="SECT3"Editing a Report FilterChanges to existing filters can be made through the Edit Report filters option. To edit a report filter, do the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Log in to the NDS container or volume.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditing Reports".The "Auditing Reports" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Edit Report Filters".The "Edit Filter" list of previously created filters appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select a filter to be edited.The "Edit Report Filter" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select the audited events or time periods to include in or exclude from the report.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Complete the selections and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc>.The "Edit Report Filter" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc>.A confirmation box appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Yes" to save the changes.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"At the Save filter changes prompt, press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.RENDERAS="SECT3"Sending Audit Data to FilesTo print the audit report, the auditor must first send the data to a DOS text file.PAGENUM=203 ID="BP199"For the security of the auditing data, the audit files are always open and the data collected in the audit files is unreadable by standard text editors. When the auditor selects the option to create a report, the system converts the unreadable data into a DOS text file. The auditor can then print the file and use a DOS text editor to edit it.You need to consider the security of the audit data when sending the data to a DOS text file. If the auditor does not specify a destination directory for the file, the system copies it to the auditor's home directory; the file can then be accessed by any user with the Supervisory right to that directory. To ensure the integrity of the audit data, the files should be copied to a local directory or floppy disk drive.When sending the audit data to a DOS text file, the auditor can choose to use a filter or to send the data without a filter. The auditor can also create new filters or edit existing filters at this time, rather than going to the Edit Report Filter option to make the changes. RENDERAS="SECT3"Sending Audit Data to a FileTo send audit data to a DOS text file, do the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Log in to the NDS container or volume.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditing Reports".The "Auditing Reports" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Report Audit File".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Specify the destination for the file:At the prompt, type a destination path and the filename for the audit file and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.orPress 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter> to copy the report to a default file in the auditor's home directory.A list of filters appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) Create a new filter by doing the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Press
MOREINFO="NONE" <Insert>.
PAGENUM=204 ID="BP200"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select the audited events or period of time to include in or exclude from this report and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc>.The "Save Filter" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select one of the following options:
TYPE="VERT"Discard Filter Changes
TYPE="VERT"Save filter changes
TYPE="VERT"Use filter without saving changesPERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) At the prompt, type a name for the new filter to be saved and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Enter>.A list of filters appears. If a new filter was saved, that filter is included on the list.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) Edit a filter:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Highlight the filter to be edited and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<F10>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"For the procedure to edit a filter, see "Editing a Report Filter" in this section.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select a filter.The audit event data is sent lo the DOS text file.RENDERAS="SECT3"Viewing a ReportThe auditor can also apply a filter when viewing a report online. This is another opportunity to tailor the report depending on the needs of the audience.To view a report online, do the following: PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Log in to the NDS container or volume.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditing Reports".The "Auditing Reports" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "View Audit File".A list of filters appears.
PAGENUM=205 ID="BP201"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) Create a new filter by doing the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Insert>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED" Select the audited events or period of time to include in or exclude from this report and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc>.The "Save Filter" menu appears.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select one of the following options:
TYPE="VERT"Discard Filter Changes
TYPE="VERT"Save filter changes
TYPE="VERT"Use filter without saving changesPERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"(Optional) Edit a filter by doing the following: PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Highlight the filter to be edited and press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<F10>.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"For the procedure to edit a filter, see "Editing a Report Filter in this section.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select a filter.The audited events appear at the bottom of the screen.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Press the arrow keys to scroll through the report.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Press 
MOREINFO="NONE"<Esc> to exit the report.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example of Creating Auditing ReportsNetWare 4 provides the auditor with auditing and reporting functionality which was not integral to NetWare 3. The following section describes a typical scenario that an auditor might find experience. RENDERAS="SECT3"ScenarioThe general manager has just called you to discuss the results of the audit sessions, specifically security issues. The auditor needs to view the ACL and Security Equivalence information online to discuss it with the general manager.PAGENUM=206 ID="BP202"RENDERAS="SECT3"ProcedureTo ensure that your auditing report includes auditing events, complete the following in NDS as network administrator:MARK=BULLETMake changes to any user's ACL.Change any user's security equivalence.Rename any object.Complete the following to view the auditing report online and to get the information the general manager has requested.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Log in to the Directory Services container.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Auditing Reports".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "View Audit File".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Create the appropriate filter.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"View the report online.RENDERAS="SECT1"Maintaining Audit FilesAUDITCON creates the following audit files when auditing is enabled at the volume or NDS container level:MARK=BULLETAudit Data file (NET$AUD.DAT)Audit History file (AUD$HIST.DAT)Audit Configuration file (NET$AUD.CFG)PAGENUM=207 ID="BP203"LABEL="5-6" FLOAT="0"Maintaining audit files.FILEREF="5_10mntn.tif"The Audit Data file keeps records of all audited transactions at both the NDS and Volume level. the auditing configuration that is set (recorded in the NET$AUD.CFG file) determines the type of records entered into the Audit Data file.The Audit Data file operates like a system log and error file records are automatically entered into the file whenever an audited event occurs.At the NDS container level, the Audit Data file also includes the records of the auditor's activities, such as auditor logins and logouts, and auditing configuration changes.This information is hidden in the root of the volume audited. This information is stored in the NDS database files, which are replicated throughout the network. The Audit Data file and Audit History file store auditing data for the volume, whereas the NDS audit data is stored in the NDS database files. The NDS auditing data is replicated everywhere the partition is replicated.PAGENUM=208 ID="BP204"The auditor is responsible for maintaining the audit files.As auditing continues, the audit files include more and more records of audited events. Like the log files on the NetWare server, these files do not circle back on top of themselves. When audit files get full, two different events can occur under NetWare 4.01: the system stops processing, or the audit process is stopped. The auditor should select the latter and stop the auditing function. It is also recommended that the auditor set a warning when the audit file threshold is reached. This allows one to stop the auditing at a predetermined size less than the maximum audit file size and perform appropriate archiving of the file. NetWare 4.1 will have automatic archiving. The space required to record the auditing events is as follows: MARK=BULLET12 bytes per volume-audited event28 bytes per NDS-audited eventBe sure to set the maximum file sizes in AUDITCON to prevent the audit files from unnecessarily filling volume space.RENDERAS="SECT2"Audit FlagsAuditing attaches flags or attributes to each file, directory, and NDS object that is flagged for auditing. The following are important characteristics of the auditing flags:MARK=BULLETThe attributes are invisible to all users and applications except AUDITCON.Since the attributes are invisible, they are not backed up.The attributes can only be changed through specific, encrypted NCP calls.The only way to disable volume auditing (or recover from a lost password) is to do the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Back up the file system.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Delete the volume with INSTALL.PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Create the volume.
PAGENUM=209 ID="BP205"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Restore the files from the backup copy.This procedure will remove all auditing data and flags from the volume.NDS must also be recreated to remove the auditing information. RENDERAS="SECT2"Audit Files Maintenance OptionsAuditing provides several options the auditor can use to maintain the audit files at the NDS container and volume level. For example, when files reach their size limits (established by the auditor when setting up the auditing environment), the auditor should archive the files at the appropriate record retention period. From the Audit Files Maintenance Options menu, the auditor can maintain the files by selecting from the following options:MARK=BULLETSelect "Close Old Audit File" to close old data files and allow others access to them.Select "Copy Old Audit File" to copy an old audit file to a file or directory as a compressed, non-readable file.Select "Delete Old Audit File" to delete the old audit file.Select "Display Audit Status" to display basic information about the audit files.Select "Reset Audit Data File" to reset the Audit Data file and move the existing data to the old Audit Data file. This data overwrites the data in the old file. The original Audit Data file records the same events as before.Select "Reset Auditing History File" to move the existing data in the Audit History file to the old Audit History file. This data overwrites the data in the old Audit History file.RENDERAS="SECT2"Resetting the Audit Data FileTo reset an Audit Data or Audit History file, do the following:PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Log in to the NDS container or volume.The "Available Audit Options" menu appears.
PAGENUM=210 ID="BP206"PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Audit Files Maintenance".The "Audit Files Maintenance" menu appears. PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Reset Audit Data File" or "Reset Auditing History File".PERFORMANCE="REQUIRED"Select "Yes" to reset the file.The current contents of the file move to the old audit file and previous records in the old audit file are deleted. The original audit file size and audit record count are reset to zero.RENDERAS="SECT1"SummaryThe auditing function of NetWare 4 helps increase the integrity of network data by tracking network events. Auditing data can be used to determine if procedures are being followed and who is performing tasks at the NetWare server level.AUDITCON allows auditors to specify the parts of the system to be monitored and provides functions for outputting auditing data for management review. AUDITCON also monitors the activities concerned with identification, access, and modification of network resources.The network administrator role is to set up the auditor's environment or, the network and enable auditing for the appropriate NDS container or volume. Once this has been completed, the network administrator gives the auditing password to the auditor, who assumes responsibility for auditing. The auditor changes the auditing password to ensure that the auditing data is secure. The auditor configures the auditing environment, sets the events to be audited. and manages the auditing data.The auditing capability of AUDITCON provides reassurance to management and other parties interested in the security and integrity of the network. Each company should know that a user's access to and use of network resources is appropriate and authorized and that the system is operating appropriately.LABEL="A"PAGENUM=211 ID="BP207"NetWare 4 Feature ComparisonNetWare 4 is the most advanced and powerful network operating system available today. This release represents the ninth generation of NetWare development. It adds a whole new dimension to network computing, extending network services and making network management easier than ever.For critical business data to be viably handled on a network, the underlying platform must be robust enough to handle network-wide administration and management. It must also provide ample security to protect sensitive corporate information.NetWare 4 allows better management control, easier maintenance, and more flexible security options than any other network operating system currently available. It is the ideal platform for today's sophisticated networking needs, and it will continue to support those needs as network computing evolves in the future.This appendix provides a comparison of NetWare 3.12 and NetWare 4 features.RENDERAS="SECT1"NetWare Feature ComparisonIDREF="FM56407"Table A-1 provides a comparison of features common to NetWare 4 and NetWare 3.12, as well a listing of many features new with NetWare 4.LABEL="A-1" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM56407"Feature comparison between NetWare 4 and 3.12.COLS=3 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="17*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="8*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="8*"NAMEST=1 NAMEEND=3 SPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ALIGN=LEFTVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"FeatureCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NetWare 4COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NetWare 3.12SPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"OPERATING SYSTEM ARCHITECTURECOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Maximum number of user connections per serverCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"1000COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"250COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"User configuration (stratification)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 250, 500, 1000COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 250COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Maximum number of server connections per client workstationCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"50 (configurable in client VLM)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"8COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Object-based global naming serviceCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (NetWare Directory Services)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Single login to networkCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MEMORY AND DISK REQUIREMENTSCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Minimum server memory requirementsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"6 MBCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"4 MBCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Optional Ring 3 memory protectionCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Dynamic Ring 3 reinitialization on failureCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Continuous Ring 0 operation on Ring 3 failCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Hard disk space used by operating systemCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"12 to 60 MBCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"9 MBSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"FILE SYSTEM AND STORAGECOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Read-ahead cacheCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Intelligent data compressionCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Support for data migration hardware (optical jukebox, read/write optical, and so on)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Real-time Data Migration - High Capacity Storage System (HCSS)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NETWORK SECURITYCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Restrict login to specific Medium Access Control addressesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (optional)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Compression directory and file attributeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Migration directory and file attributeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AUDITCON SECURITY AUDITINGCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"File system auditingCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NDS event auditingCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Independent network auditorCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Independent auditor passwordCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Multiple auditorsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit user security transactionsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit user file transactionsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit supervisor transactionsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit file creation statisticsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit directory creation statisticsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Audit volume statisticsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Transaction logsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Filter transaction logsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Transaction monitoring/automatic log updatesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ASPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NETWORK MANAGEMENTCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Determine who has console/supervisor privilegesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"View console operation statusCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"View supervisor equivalent statusCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"View hierarchical Directory treeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Remote console session securityCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Remote console modem callbackCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NETWARE DIRECTORY SERVICESCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Maximum number of tree levelsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"15COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Object orientedCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Directory object creation (user, volume, alias, organization, print server, queue, printer group, computer, directory map, bindery objects, and so on)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Extensible schema (set of objects and attributes)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (programmed)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Maximum number of attributes per objectCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Unlimited (default set of attributes per object type)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Maximum length of attribute fieldsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"UnlimitedCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Partition databaseCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (logical subtree)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Physical location of partitionsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"One or more serversCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"User-definable partitionsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Partitions replicated across multiple serversCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Root partition replicatedCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Read-only partitionsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Read/Write partitionsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Background authenticationCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Background synchronizationCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Protocol independentCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Unicode enabledCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"External name service synchronizationCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Object and property access rights (add, delete, rename, move, read, compare, list, modify, browse)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Name searching (white paging)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Topical searching (yellow paging)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ASPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"TIME SYNCHRONIZATIONCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"International time zone supportCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Daylight Savings Time supportCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"User-configurable time synchronizationCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Single reference time serverCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (optional use of external atomic clock)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Multiple primary time serversCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Multiple secondary time serversCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"BACKUP SERVICESCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Workstation backupCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (DOS, OS/2)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NETWORK PRINTINGCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Maximum shared printers per print serverCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"256COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"16COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"RAM used on workstation-attached network printerCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"4,976 bytes (parallel)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"5,488 bytes (serial)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"4-20 KBCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NETWORK UTILITIESCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Approximate number of utilitiesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"50 (consolidated)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"130SPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"IMAGING (Optional Service)COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Attribute searchCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Image manipulationCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Distributed data migration (Mass Storage System - MSS)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Image compressionCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Content document architectureCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"APPLICATION PROGRAM INTERFACES (APIs)COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Image Enabled NetWare (optional Kodak services)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Hierarchical storage (data migration)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Document management servicesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (post 4.0 release)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLSCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Large Internet Packet (LIP)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CLIENT SUPPORT AND INTEROPERABILITYDOSCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Modular client "requester" architectureCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (VLM)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (VLM)COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Number of files stored on a DOS workstation by the network operating systemCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"20 (4 plus 16 optional VLMs)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"20 (4 plus 16 optional VLMs)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Conventional memory (640KB area) used (Use of XMS/EMS supports built in; small footprint when used)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"53KB (requester, IPXODI, LSL, LAN driver)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"53KB (shell, IPXODI, LSL, LAN driver)COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Additional conventional memory used with packet burst (Use of XMS/EMS supports built in; small footprint when used)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"53KBCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"53KBCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Extended memory supportCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"LPT ports on clientCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"LPT1 - LPT9 (VLMs support)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"LPT1 - LPT3SPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"WindowsCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Windows 3.0 NetWare ToolsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (expanded user tools)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (basic user tools only)COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Windows 3.1 NetWare ToolsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (expanded user and admin. tools)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (basic user tools only)COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Packet burst included with Windows clientCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (requester)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (requester)COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Load client software after WindowsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Login under WindowsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"UNIXCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NeXT workstation supportCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CLIENT UTILITIES FOR NETWARE ADMINISTRATIONSupported PlatformsCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"WindowsCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (3.1 only)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (3.1 only)COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"OS/2 2.0 Presentation Manager (PM)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Supervisor Administrative FunctionsCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Single administrative tool for networkCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (Windows, PM)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NoCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"File system (move, copy, trustees, salvage, rights)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, Windows, PMCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, WindowsCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Directory services (create/delete objects; edit attributes)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, Windows, PMCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Search NDS DirectoryCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, Windows, PMCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Move objects in Directory Services treeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, WindowsCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Directory Services securityCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, Windows, PMCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Directory Services partition managementCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, WindowsCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Printing (queues, printers, print servers)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, WindowsCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, WindowsSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"End User ToolsCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Change/Set Directory Services contextCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, Windows, PMCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Browse Directory ServicesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, Windows, PMCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"User tools work with both bindery and Directory ServicesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, Windows, PMCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"N/ACOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Change file rights and attributesCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, Windows, PMCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOSCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"LoginCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, Windows, PMCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, WindowsCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Client installCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOS, PMCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOSSPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NETWORK INTERFACE CARD SUPPORTClientCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Ethernet default frame typeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"IEEE 802.2COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"IEEE 802.2COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NDIS protocol stack supported (via ODINSUP)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Third-party drivers supportedCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (approx. 150 included in box)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (Novell drivers only included in box)SPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ServerCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Ethernet default frame typeCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"IEEE 802.2COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"IEEE 802.2COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Third-party drivers supportedCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (approx. 150 included in box)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Yes (Novell drivers only included in box)SPANNAME=SPAN1T3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DOCUMENTATIONCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Available on CD-ROMCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Windows-based documentation viewerCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"YesPAGENUM=218 ID="BP208"PAGENUM=219 ID="BP209"LABEL="B"PAGENUM=221 ID="BP210"Security Product Vendor InformationFrom its inception, Novell has realized that strategic partnering is important to providing the customer full product line support. This is especially true in the area of network security and control. Because of the many components that make up a typical network, the user and network provider are confronted with any choices for security which cover the client to the server. One could easily look at security solutions for the client workstation, the server, and the enterprise network and its many components. However, it is important to narrow the focus and choose products judicially that serve individual needs.Novell currently has a Security Strategic Alliance with the following companies:MARK=BULLETAmerican Telephone & TelegraphCordant, Inc.Computer AssociatesDATAMEDIA, Inc.Digital Equipment CorporationLAN Support Group, Inc.Blue Lance, Inc.ENIGMA LOGICHUGHES Aircraft CompanyRAXCOKPMGIntrusion Detection, Inc.PAGENUM=222 ID="BP211"MERGENT International, Inc.SecureWareSEMAPHORE Communications CorporationTREND Micro Devices, Inc.IDREF="FM14108"Table B-1 contains information on various security and auditing products that are currently available for use with NetWare 4. All of the products listed on the following pages are available for purchase and are in use by several major corporations (both in the U.S. and internationally).Disclaimer: Novell neither endorses the listed products nor deems this list to be complete. This product listing is offered only as a sample of the variety of third-party products that are currently available to help you build a trusted NetWare 4 network environment.LABEL="B-1" PGWIDE=1 TOCENTRY="1"ID="FM14108"Security and auditing productsCOLS=3 CHAROFF="50" CHAR="" ALIGN="LEFT"COLNAME=1 COLWIDTH="11*"COLNAME=2 COLWIDTH="8*"COLNAME=3 COLWIDTH="14*"VALIGN="BOTTOM"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"CompanyCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ProductCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"FeaturesVALIGN="TOP"COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ALADDIN Software Security Inc.350 Fifth AveSuite 7204New York, NY 10118Tel: 800-223-4277Tel: 212-564-5678Fax: 212-564-3377COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NetHASPNetHASP - hardware keyCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET Software protection through Hardware Privacy & Authentication Components - NetHASP hardware key and small software program. Only one hardware key is needed to active a protected program. Installation of key not location bound. Limits number of stations accesses to software Limits number of activations permitted each program. Protests up to 112 programs. Full DOS & Windows support.NetWare and Net-BIOS LAN protocol compatible.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Blue Lance, Inc.1700 West Loop SouthSuite 1100Houston, Tx 77027Attn: Satish KinraTel: 713-680-1187Fax: 713-622-1370COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"LT Auditor 4.0+COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET Novell 2.2,3.11 NLM certified Novell 4 Beta end of 1 QTR 1994 On-line auditing Server Centric Software Metering Hardware Inventory Configuration management US Navy StandardCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Cordant, Inc.Information Security Division11400 Commerce Park DriveReston, VA 22091-1508Tel: 800-843-1132Tel: 703-758-7000COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"AssureSecures standalone and Novell workstations - under C2 evaluation at NCSC.COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Hardware/Software-Based Security:MARK=BULLETDOS and Windows Pcs: Notebooks, Laptops, DesktopsIdentification/AuthenticationDiscretionary Access ControlObject ReuseAuditingBoot ProtectionSingle Sign-On to NetWarePublic Key EncryptionDigital Signature AlgorithmSmart Card (NIST Certified)Secure CommunicationAutomatic DES EncryptionVirus PreventionCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Cordant, Inc. (continued)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Assure ServerNLM that works in conjunction with Assure to provide end-to-end security in a NetWare environment.COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLETNetWare CertifiedCentral Security AdministrationNIC CheckingAttachment AuditingSupervisor NotificationNon-Assure Workstation LockoutCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Cordant, Inc. (continued)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Assure BasicSecures standalone and Novell Workstations.COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Software-Based Security:MARK=BULLETDOS and Windows PCs: Notebooks, Laptops, DesktopsIdentification/AuthenticationDiscretionary Access ControlObject ReuseAuditingBoot ProtectionSingle Sign-On to NetWarePublic Key EncryptionDigital Signature AlgorithmSmart Card (NIST Certified)Virus ProtectionCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DATAMEDIA Corporation20 Trafalgar SquareNashua, NH 03063Attn: SECUREcard MarketingTel: 603-886-1570Fax: 603-598-8268Info@datamedia.comCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SECUREcardCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET DOS & Windows PC's Identification & Authentication (I&A) Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Auditing Common Sign-On & Network Isolation Central Site AdministrationCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DATAMEDIA Corporation (continued)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SECUREcard/100COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET Personal Privacy & SecurityCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DATAMEDIA Corporation (continued)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SECUREcard/200COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET Software based security for PCs. Option for smart card I&A and hardware enhanced protection.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DATAMEDIA Corporation (continued)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SECUREcard/300COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET Hardware add-in controller board. Configuration control, token based I&A and network isolation.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"DATAMEDIA Corporation (continued)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SECUREcard/400COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET Combination of 200/300 features to provide Workstation Security beyond C2.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"ENIGMA LOGIC2151 Salvio StreetSuite 301Concord, CA 94520Tel: 510-827-5707Fax: 510-827-2593Attn: John R. MuirCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SafeWord for NovellCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLETDial-Up & Access ControlUser Authentication via non- replayable "dynamic" passwordsDES based password "token" (handheld cards)Multi-vendor token compatibleAudit Compatible with NetWare 2.x, 3.x, UNIX, MVS, VMS, and MS-DOSCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Intrusion Detection, Inc.217 East 86th StreetSuite 213New York, NY 10028Attn: Robert KaneTel: 212-360-6104Fax: 212-427-9185COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"The Kane Security AnalystCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLETKnowledge-based NetWare Windows GUI Security testingCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"LAN Support Group, Inc.2425 FountainView DrSuite 390Houston, Tx 77057Attn: David PulaskiTel: 800-749-8439Tel: 713-789-0881Fax: 713-977-9111COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Bindview+NCS ConsoleSIM - Server Information ModuleWAM - Workstation Asset ManagementCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET LAN Management, Audit, Security/Control Package. NetWare 2.x,3.x certified NetWare 4 Bindery compatible Extensive Data Gathering & Reporting features. Multi-format data presentation and capture - Spreadsheet, Database, Dossier Broad Hardware & Software Inventory Module - Integrated into reporting facility Auditor Traveling License available 4.0 Migration tool NetWare 4.1 Beta 2nd. Qtr 1994 Server Auditing Module 2 QTR 1994 Rules-Based Security NLM 3 Qtr 1994 Standard for several Big 6. Standard for Major money center banks.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MERGENT International70 Inwood RoadRocky Hill, CT 06067-3441Tel: 203-257-4223Fax: 203-257-4245Attn: Kathleen GarlascoCOLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Domain/DACSCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET Centralized security management. Includes PC/DACS for DOS, which secures point of entry and provides access control, encryption, boot protection, time out, virus protection and more. Supports all popular LANs. Provides audit controls. Transparent to end-user. Supports DOS and Windows PCs.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MERGENT International (continued)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Net/DACSCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET Supports Novell NetWare (all versions) Includes PC/DACS for DOS Integrates PC/DACS security with NetWare's security. Provides audit controls. Peer-to-Peer Administration Single-Sign-On to network. Transparent to end-user. Supports DOS & Windows.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MERGENT International (continued)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SSO/DACSCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET Multi-platform Single-sign-on to any network or server. Reduces or eliminates need for multi-passwords. Password management. Supports DOS & Windows. Automate & customize sign-on.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NetWork Enhancement Tools, Inc.(NETinc)20218 Bridgedale LaneHumble, Tx 77338Tel: 713-446-2154Fax: 713-540-8652COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NETMenu NETMenu LAN Toolkit COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLETAllows only trusted users and groups to shell outTrue access control (local and remote)Create multi-level securityAudit user activitiesSoftware license metering and controlScreen blanking with NetWare encrypted password controlAutomatic log outs and log insUnlimited users per server licenseDOS and Windows supportOver 70 programs in a neat packageCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NetWork Enhancement Tools, Inc. (continued)COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"NETSentry COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLETLAN administrator's helperLogout inactive users with knowledge of their operating environmentSecure idle workstationsEasy administrationException handlingOrderly shutdown capabilityFully configurable PCX screen blankersThird-party screen blankers supportedFull-featured audit rail listingNetWare compatibleCustomizableDOS and Windows supportEncrypted password supportedCOLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"SEMAPHORECommunications Corporation2040 Martin AvenueSanta Clara, CA 95050Tel: 408-980-7750Fax: 408-980-7769COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"Network Security System (NSS)Network Encryption Unit (NEU)Network Security Center (NSC)COLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET Node to Node and Site-to-Site data transmission security. Supports:a:all popular LAN Protocols at Network Layer.b: all variants of NetWare Data Link Layer encapsulation.c: simultaneous Layer 2 Layer 3 traffic Using RSA and DES, provides: Authentication; Access Control; Key Management; Encryption. User Operations unchanged. Works with existing LAN/WAN configurations. Cross-vendor products unaffected. Scaleable to very large networks. Operates at full Ethernet bandwidth.COLNAME=1 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"TREND Micro Devices, Inc.2421 West 205th StreetSuite D-100Torrance, Ca 90501-1462Tel: 310-782-8190Fax: 310-328-5892COLNAME=2 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"StationLockStationLock LANPackCOLNAME=3 ROTATE="0" MOREROWS="0"MARK=BULLET Hardware plug and play security card. Virus protection Access Control Recovery Control Resource Management Encryption to DOS workstations Audit trail Central Site Administration & AuthenticationPAGENUM=232 ID="BP212"LABEL="C"PAGENUM=233 ID="BP213"NetWare 4 Commands for AuditorsThe following NetWare 4 commands can be used to assist auditors in obtaining information to produce initial documentation for a single server running the NetWare 4 operating system. These commands will help gather pertinent information for understanding the audit reports produced by AUDITCON. For scripts that can be used on NetWare 2 and 3 operating version please refer to the Novell Cooperative Research Report titled NetWare Security: Configuring and Auditing a Trusted Environment. For additional details on these commands and others with their various options that might be used by one managing the security of the system or auditing it, see the NetWare 4 Utilities Reference Manual and the NetWare 4 Concepts Manual. RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=234 ID="BP214"NVERRENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to determine the version of software running on your server and workstation.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NVERRENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"Link Support LayerLAN DriversProtocol StackIPX API VersionSPX API VersionVLMAttached ServersFile Server Operating System VersionWorkstation Operating SystemRENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NVERFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"DOS: V5.00

Link Support Layer:Version 2.01

Lan Drivers:
Board 1:Xircom Pocket Ethernet Adapter III
  Version:   1.04
  Frame type:ETHERNET_802.3
  Maximum frame size:1514 bytes
  Line speed:   10 Mbps
  Interrupt number:7
  Port number:0378-037a
  Node address:   [80C72EA562]

Protocol Stack:
PAGENUM=235 ID="BP215"  Description:IPX Internetwork Packet Exchange
  Version:   2.11
  Network address:[01030000]
  Binding Information:Board 1  Protocol ID = 0

  IPX API version:   3.30
  SPX API version:   3.30

  VLM: Version 1.02 Revision A using Extended Memory

Attached file servers:

Server name:  GEORGIE
Novell NetWare 4.01 (July 12, 1993)

Server name:  DBDUDE
Novell NetWare 4.01 (July 12, 1993)RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=236 ID="BP216"NLIST SERVER /BRENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view a list of the bindery servers on your internetwork and information about those servers.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NLIST SERVER /B RENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"List of active NetWare servers known to attached serverThe server network addressThe server network nodeThe status of user's connection to active serverRENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NLIST SERVER /BFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"Object Class: server
Known to Server: GEORGIE
Active NetWare Server =The NetWare Server that is currently running
Address= The network address
Node   = The network node
Status= The status of your connection

Active NetWare Server   Address     Node    Status
-----------------------------------------------------
311TEST                 [ 1084117] [      1]
386-CLASS3              [ 1CAFFCA] [      1]
386-CLASS3A             [ 1CAFFFC] [      1]
GEORGIE                 [2BC97DB9] [      1] Default
SVE-ASYNC               [C1FF4035] [      1]
SVE-CM                  [C1F0003C] [      1]
SVL-ADMIN               [C0054141] [      1]
YOICKS                  [ 1FD03D1] [      1]
ZAUGG_DOUGLAS_A         [ 110DDDD] [      1]
A total of 9 server objects was found.RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=237 ID="BP217"NLIST SERVERRENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view a list of servers within the current NDS context.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NLIST SERVERRENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"The current NDS contextThe NetWare server name located in the contextThe server network addressThe server network operating system versionThe network operatorRENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NLIST SERVERFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"Searching:O=DBMAIN
Object Class:  server
Current context: O=DBMAIN
NetWare Server= The server name
Address       = The network address
Version       = The server version
Operator      = The network operator

NetWare Server   Address   Version   Operator
------------------------------------------------ 
CN=DBDUDE        [2C741194] Novell   Net
CN=DB2           [2C73CE22] Novell   Net
CN=DB1           [2C73CE26] Novell   Net
CN=GEORGIE       [2BC97DB9] Novell   Net
CN=SRD           [ 10302FF] Novell   Net
CN=PRV-MAIL-SERV [ 1FFBA94] Novell   Net
CN=mba           [ 1030202] Novell   Net
A total of 7 server objects was found in this context.
A total of 7 server objects was found.RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=238 ID="BP218"NDIR /VOLRENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view information about the default or pathed volume.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NDIR  [path] /VOLRENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"The file server and volume located in the path.The total volume space (in kilobytes).The space used by files (including file data,information in the File Allocation Table, and information in the directory table).Deleted space not yet purgeableThe space remaining on the volume.The space available to the user.Maximum directory entries.Available Directory entriesSpace used if files were not compressed.Space used by compressed filesSpace saved by compressing filesUncompressed space used.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NDIR /VOLFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"Statistics for fixed volume GEORGIE/SYS:
Space statistics are in KB (1024 bytes).

Total volume space:                       339,104  100.00%
Space used by 2,162 entries:              148,992   43.94%
Deleted space not yet purgeable:                0    0.00%
                                          ----------------
Space remaining on volume:                190,112   56.06%
Space available to TODDH:                 190,112   56.06%
Maximum directory entries:                 14,848
Available directory entries:                7,118   47.94%
PAGENUM=239 ID="BP219"Space used if files were not compressed:  192,143
Space used by compressed files:            67,683
                                          ----------------
Space saved by compressing files:         124,460    64.77%
Uncompressed space used:                  111,997RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=240 ID="BP220"NLIST VOLUMERENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view the file server volumes defined within the current NDS context.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NLIST VOLUMERENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"The current NDS contextThe volume name located in the context.The server where the volume is located.The physical volume name.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NLIST VOLUMEFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"Searching:O=DBMAIN

Object Class: volume
Current context: O=DBMAIN
Volume name    = The name of the volume
Host server    = The server where the volume is located
Physical volume= The physical volume name

Volume Name      Server      Physical Volume
----------------------------------------------- 
CN=DBDUDE_SYS    DBDUDE      SYS    
CN=DBDUDE_VOL1   DBDUDE      VOL1   
CN=DB1_SYS       DB1         SYS    
CN=DB2_SYS       DB2         SYS    
CN=GEORGIE_SYS   GEORGIE     SYS    
A total of 5 volume objects was found in this context.
A total of 5 volume objects was found.RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=241 ID="BP221"NDIR /DO /SUBRENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view all available information about the directories in the default or pathed directory.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NDIR [path]  /DO /SUB  RENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"The file server and volume located in the path.The directories contained in the path.The directory's Inherited Rights Filter.The  user's Effective Rights to this directoryThe date the directory was created.The ID of the user who created the directory.The above for all sub-directories contained within each directory.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NDIR H:\*.* /DO /SUBFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"NDIR is searching the directory.  Please wait...
Directories      = Directories contained in this path
Filter           = Inherited Rights Filter
Rights           = Effective Rights
Created          = Date directory was created
Owner            = ID of user who created or copied the file

DBDUDE/SYS:APPS\*.*
Dir   Filter     Rights     Created       Owner 
---------------------------------------------------------
WP60 [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 8-19-93 7:53p [Supervisor]
QP30 [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 8-19-93 7:57p [Supervisor]
             2  Directories

DBDUDE/SYS:APPS\WP60\*.*
Dir   Filter     Rights     Created       Owner
--------------------------------------------------------
DATA [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 8-19-937:53p [Supervisor]
             1  DirectoryRENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=243 ID="BP223"NDIR /ARENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view information about each file in the default or pathed directory.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NDIR [path]  /ARENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"The file server, volume and directory contained in the default or pathed drive.The files contained in the path.The size of the file.The date file was last updated.The ID or user who created or copied the file.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NDIR /AFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"NDIR is searching the directory.  Please wait...
Files            = Files contained in this path
Size             = Number of bytes in the file
Last Update      = Date file was last updated
Owner            = ID of user who created or copied the file

GEORGIE/SYS:*.*
Files             Size   Last Update    Owner
---------------------------------------------------------
DP.BAT              82  10-12-93 11:16a  ED
DPSG.EXE       427,338   6-22-92  1:20p  ED
HELPTEXT        22,448   6-22-92  1:15p  ED
NOVELL.EXE   3,318,660   6-24-93  2:26p  N/A
QCOPY           13,660   4-07-92  6:00a  Myron
READ.ME          7,753   6-10-92 10:50a  ED
RIGHTS.TXT      10,749   8-27-93  2:40p  STASH
GUIDE.DOC       13,660   4-07-92  6:00a  TODDH
XCOPY.BAT           12  10-08-92  4:50p  Myron
XCOPY.EXE       13,660   4-07-92  6:00a  Myron

5,062,834 bytes (2,899,968 bytes in 177 blocks allocated)
            10  FilesRENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=245 ID="BP225"NDIR /RRENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view information about each file and directory in the default or pathed directory.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NDIR [path]  /RRENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedRENDERAS="SECT3"FilesTYPE="VERT"The file server and volume contained in the default or pathed drive.The files contained in the path.The DOS file attributes.The NetWare file attributes.The Compression/Migration status.The Inherited Rights Filter.The user's Effective Rights.The ID or user who created or copied the file.RENDERAS="SECT3"DirectoriesTYPE="VERT"The file server and volume contained in the default orpathed drive.The directories contained in the path.The directory attributes.The Inherited Rights Filter.The user's Effective Rights to the directory.The date directory was created.The ID or user who created or copied the file.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NDIR /RFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"NDIR is searching the directory.  Please wait...
Files            = Files contained in this path
DOS Attr         = DOS file attributes
NetWare Attr     = NetWare file attributes
Status           = Compression/Migration status
Filter           = Inherited Rights Filter
Rights           = Effective Rights
Owner            = ID of user who created or copied the file

GEORGIE/SYS:*.*
Files     DOS Attr  NetWare Attr Status Filter     Rights
---------------------------------------------------------
DP.BAT    [Rw---A] [-----------] ---   [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 
DPG.EXE   [Rw---A] [-----------] Co-   [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 
HE.BAT    [Rw---A] [-----------] Co-   [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 
NOV.EXE   [Rw---A] [-----------] Co-   [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 
QCOPY     [Rw---A] [-----------] Cc-   [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 
READ.ME   [Rw---A] [-----------] Co-   [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 
RIG.TXT   [Rw---A] [-----------] Co-   [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 
GO.TXT    [Rw---A] [-----------] Co-   [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 
XCOPY     [Rw---A] [-----------] Cc-   [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 
COP.BAT   [Rw---A] [-----------] ---   [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 
COPY.EXE  [Rw---A] [-----------] Cc-   [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 

Directories      = Directories contained in this path
Attribute        = Directory attributes
Filter           = Inherited Rights Filter
Rights           = Effective Rights
Created          = Date directory was created
Owner            = ID of user who created the directory

GEORGIE/SYS:*.*
Dir    Attrib   Filter     Rights    Created       Owner
---------------------------------------------------------
APPS   [-----] [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 4-12-93 3:16p GEORGIE
KELCH  [-----] [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 8-30-93 9:11a ED
LOGIN  [-----] [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 4-12-93 8:35a SUPERVISOR 
STASH  [-----] [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 8-26-93 8:24a ED
SYSTEM [-----] [--------] [SRWCEMFA] 4-12-93 8:35a SUPERVISOR 
NEFF   [-----] [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 8-18-93 9:41a KELCH
USERS  [-----] [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 4-12-93 8:55a GEORGIE
V      [-----] [SRWCEMFA] [SRWCEMFA] 9-29-93 1:32p ED

5,062,834  bytes (2,899,968  bytes in 177 blocks allocated)
            10  Files
             8  DirectoriesRENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=247 ID="BP227"NLIST USER /ARENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view a list of users logged into the current NDS context.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NLIST USER  /ARENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"The current NDS context.The user's connection number.The login name of the user.The network address.The network node.The time when the user logged in.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NLIST USER /AFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"Searching:  O=DBMAIN   
Object Class: user
Current context: O=DBMAIN
Conn      = The server connection number
*         = The asterisk means this is your connection
User Name = The login name of the user
Address   = The network address
Node      = The network node
Login time= The time when the user logged in

User Name   Address     Node
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Admin      [ 1030000] [      1B1E436C]
ED         [ 1030000] [      1B1E436C]
Macan      [E0F0C94D] [      1B1E3D02]
*TODDH     [ 1030000] [    80C72EA562]
A total of 4 user objects was found in this context.
A total of 4 user objects was found.RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=248 ID="BP228"NLIST USER /BRENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view a list of users defined to the default or specified server.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NLIST USER  /B=[server name]RENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"The default or specified server.The user login nameThe full name of the userThe account is disabled statusThe date the account will expireThe passwords are required settingThe date the password expiresThe unique password required settingThe minimum password lengthThe maximum concurrent connections, 0 if no limitRENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NLIST SERVER /B=GEORGIEFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"Object Class: user
Known to Server: GEORGIE
Login name= The user login name
Full name = The full name of the user
Dis       = Yes if the account is disabled
Expires   = The date the account will expire
Pwd       = Yes if passwords are required
Expires   = The date the password expires
Uni       = Yes if unique passwords are required
Min       = The minimum password length
Conn      = The maximum concurrent connections, 0 if no limit

Login Name  Dis  Expires  Pwd Expires  Uni  Min  Conn
---------------------------------------------------------
SUPERVISOR  No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
ADMIN       No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
STASH       No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
NEWUSER     No  12-25-93  No 0-00-00   No   0    2
KVANE       No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
IAUDIT      No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
KELCH       No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
ISPY        No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   5    0
JGOODGUY    No   0-00-00  No 1-05-93   No   6    0
MACAN       No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
DBMAINADMIN No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
BLAKE       No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
RICH        No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
MARIA       No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
GAMAL       No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
KEN         No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
TODDH       No   0-00-00  No 0-00-00   No   0    0
A total of 17 user objects was found on Preferred Server GEORGIE.RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=250 ID="BP230"RIGHTS /TRENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view the trustee list of a file or directory in the default or pathed directory.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"RIGHTS [path] /TRENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedRENDERAS="SECT3"FileTYPE="VERT"The file server and volume.The user trustees to the file.The user's trustee rights.The group trustees to the file.The group's trustee rights.RENDERAS="SECT3"DirectoryTYPE="VERT"The file server and volume.The user trustees to the directory.The user's trustee rights.The group trustees to the directory.The group's trustee rights.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputRENDERAS="SECT3"FileFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:\TODDH>RIGHTS *.* /TFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"GEORGIE\SYS:TODDH\GL1231.DOC
User trustees:
     CN=TODDH.O=DBMAIN            [ R    F ]
----------
No group trustees have been assigned.
PAGENUM=251 ID="BP231"RENDERAS="SECT3"DirectoryFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>RIGHTS /TFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"GEORGIE\SYS:PROD\ACCOUNT
User trustees:
     CN=ISPY.O=DBMAIN             [ R    F ]
     CN=Myron.O=DBMAIN            [ R    F ]
----------
Group trustees:
     CN=ACCOUNTING.O=dbmain       [ RW   F ]RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=252 ID="BP232"NLIST GROUPRENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view groups contained within the current NDS context.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NLIST GROUPRENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"The current NDS context.The group contained in the NDS context.The group description.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NLIST GROUPFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"Searching:  O=dbmain 
Object Class: group
Current context: O=dbmain
Group name = The name of the group
Description= The description of the group

Group Name                 Description
--------------------------------------
CN=ACCOUNTING 
CN=FINANCE
Two group objects were found in this context.

Two group objects were found.RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=253 ID="BP233"NLIST ORGANIZATION SHOW "LOGIN SCRIPT" RENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view the login scripts of organizations within the current NDS context.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NLIST ORGANIZATION SHOW "LOGIN SCRIPT"RENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"The current context.The organizations within the current context.The organization's login script associated with each organization.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NLIST ORGANIZATION SHOW "LOGIN SCRIPT"FORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"Searching:  [Root]
Current context: [Root]
Organization: O=DBMAIN

Login Script:
map ins s1:=georgie_sys:\public
map ins s3:=georgie_sys:\apps\pdox40
map ins s16:=georgie_sys:\apps\wp60
map H:=georgie_sys:\users\%LOGIN_NAME\PDOX
-------------------------------------------
Organization: O=Europe

Login Script:
map ins s1:=georgie_sys:\public
-------------------------------------------
                 
A total of 2 organization objects was found in this context.
                 
A total of 2 organization objects was found.RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=254 ID="BP234"CX /T /ALLRENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view the NDS tree within the current NDS context.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"CX /T /ALLRENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"Directory Services MappingRENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>CX /T /ALLFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"*** Directory Services Mapping ***

[Root]
  O=DBMAIN
      CN=DBDUDE
      CN=Admin
      CN=DBDUDE_SYS
      CN=DBDUDE_VOL1
      CN=mba
      CN=Kelch
      CN=Macan
      CN=Blake
      CN=Q3
    OU=NEW1
      CN=DbMainAdmin
      CN=public
    OU=new2
      CN=USER_TEMPLATE
      CN=glip
      CN=TODDH
      CN=HP2
      CN=ACCOUNTING
      CN=q4
  O=US
      OU=Audit
         OU=Chicago
         OU=GeorgeSYS
            CN=ChiEE
         OU=NewYork
            CN=NYEE
         CN=AuditAdmin
         CN=public
      OU=Tax
      OU=Consulting
   O=Europe
      CN=EuropeAdminRENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=256 ID="BP236"NLIST ORGANIZATION SHOW "DETECT INTRUDER" RENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view the "Detect Intruder" settings for organizations within the current NDS context.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NLIST  ORGANIZATION SHOW "DETECT INTRUDER"RENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"The current contextThe organizations found within the current context.The "Detect Intruder" settings associated with each organization.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NLIST ORGANIZATION SHOW "DETECT INTRUDER"FORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"Searching:  [Root] 
Current context: [Root]
Organization: O=DBMAIN
Detect Intruder: False
-------------------------------------------------
One organization object was found in this context.
One organization object was found.RENDERAS="SECT1"PAGENUM=257 ID="BP237"NLIST GROUP SHOW "MEMBER" RENDERAS="SECT2"PurposeUsed to view the groups defined within the current NDS context and the members of each group.RENDERAS="SECT2"SyntaxFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"NLIST GROUP SHOW "MEMBER"RENDERAS="SECT2"Information ProvidedTYPE="VERT"The current NDS contextThe groups within the current NDS contextThe group members associated with each group.RENDERAS="SECT2"Example Command and OutputFORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"MOREINFO="NONE"F:>NLIST GROUP SHOW "MEMBER"FORMAT="LINESPECIFIC"Searching:  O=dbmain
Object Class: group
Current context: O=dbmain
Name: CN=ACCOUNTING
Member: ED
Member: GAMAL
Member: KELCH
Member: STASH
Member: HEEMSOTH
One group object was found in this context.

One group object was found.LABEL="D"PAGENUM=259 ID="BP238"BibliographyRENDERAS="SECT1"SecurityIBM International Technical Support Center. 1989. Communications Security: "IN-HOUSE" Cable and Line Considerations. Document Number ZZ81-0232 (December).IBM International Technical Support Center. 1989. Introduction to System and Network Security: Considerations, Options, and Techniques. Document Number GG24-3451.Institute of Internal Auditors. 1993. Codification of Standards for The Professional Auditor. Institute of Internal Auditors. 1991. Systems Auditability and Control. Jamieson, Roger, and Graham Low. 1989. "Security and Control Issues in Local Area Network Design." Computer and Security Volume 8 Number 4: 305-316.Levy, Steven. 1984. Hackers - Heros of the Computer Revolution. Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday.Pfleeger, Charles P. 1989. Security in Computing. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.Stoll, Clifford. 1989. The Cuckoo's Egg. New York: Doubleday.CSC-STD-001-83, Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria. December 1985.NCSC-TG-001, A Guide to Understanding Audit in Trusted Systems. June 1, 1988.PAGENUM=260 ID="BP239"NCSC-TG-017, A Guide to Understanding Identification And Authentication in Trusted Systems. September 1, 1991NCSC-TG-024, A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: Language for RFP Specifications and Statements of Work - An Aid to Procurement Initiators. June 30, 1993.164-000030-015, NetWare Security: Configuring and Auditing a Trusted Environment. A Novell Cooperative Research Report, Novell Research, 1991RENDERAS="SECT1"NetworksBates, Regis J. "Bud". 1994. Disaster Recovery for LANs. McGraw-Hill, Inc.Berson, T.A. 1989. Local Area Network Security. Springer-Verlag.Comer, Douglas E. 1988. Internetworking with TCP/IP - Principles, Protocols, and Architecture. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.Conard, James W., ed. 1989. Handbook of Communication Systems Management. Boston: Auerbach Publishers Inc.Conard, James W. ed. 1989. Handbook of Communication Systems Management - 1989 Yearbook. Boston: Auerbach Publishers Inc.Day, Michael, and Ken Neff. 1991. Troubleshooting NetWare for the 386, M&T Books.Derfler, Frank Jr. 1991. PC Magazine Guide to Using Netware, Ziff-Davis Press."EDP Auditor Journal, The." Illinois: The EDP Auditors Foundation, Inc., Volume III, 1989.Fitzgerald, Jerry. 1993. Business Data Communications - Basic Concepts, Security, and Design. New York: John Wiley and Sons.Herbon, Gamal B. 1994. Designing NetWare Directory Services . M&T Books.Jensen, Randall W. and Charles C. Tonies. 1979. Software Engineering. Prentice-Hall.PAGENUM=261 ID="BP240""LAN Technology." 501 Galveston Dr., Redwood City, CA.: M&T Publishing, Inc., all issues.Liebing, Edward. 1993. NetWare User's Guide. M&T Books.Martin, James, et al. 1989. Local Area Networks - Architectures and Implementations. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.Perlman, Radia. 1992. Interconnections. Addison-Wesley.Stallings, William. 1990. The Business Guide to Local Area Networks. Carmel: Howard W. Sams and Company.479-000063-001, Network Backup, Novell Research, 1990164-000032-004, Special NetWare 4.0 Edition, NetWare Application Notes April 1993, Novell Research, April 1993.