     At 3:26 PM on December 23rd, the "American Luftwaffe" carried out another bombing run. Six B-26s from the 322nd Bombardment Group, a unit of the Ninth Air Force, were nearing their secondary target. Despite the crystalline clarity of the day, the flight leader had somehow failed to locate their primary target, the town of Zulpich, Germany. After consulting his maps, though, he decided that he was close to Lammersum, another German town that was also a legitimate target. He decided to proceed with the bomb run on Lammersum.
     From 12,000 feet, the six bombers dropped a total of 98 250-pound bombs, using their top-secret Norden bombsights for precise targetting. Twelve tons of high explosives whistled down and pulverized the small town. Another successful mission accomplished, the B-26s banked and returned to their base in England. Below, in Malmedy, Belgium, the survivors of their attack, Belgian civilians and GIs from the 30th Infantry Division, screamed futile imprecations at the departing bombers. 37 Americans and scores of Belgians died in the attack.
     General Hobbs, commanding the 30th Infantry Division, telephoned an Air Force general to berate him for yet another fatal screwup. This was not the first time that the Ninth Air Force had bombed American ground forces. It wasn't even the first time that they'd bombed the 30th Infantry Division. The Air Force general apologized and promised that it wouldn't happen again. But his superiors later denied that any error had occurred. And over the next five days, there were four more mistaken bombings.
/Air-Ground Coordination
      Tactical air support fell into two broad categories: "close air support" missions, in which fighter-bombers attacked individual tanks, trucks, artillery pieces, or even soldiers; and missions in which medium bombers attacked installations immediately behind the front.
     Close air support was delivered at low altitudes. For this and other reasons, there were a variety of coordinating mechanisms in place. Air liason officers sometimes accompanied ground forces and maintained direct radio contact with the pilots during combat. This proved to be the best means of coordinating actions; the ground forces could immediately advise the fighters of their positions and needs. A less satisfactory system involved the use of identification panels, orange strips of cloth that ground units would lay on the ground to identify themselves to air forces. Sometimes the pilots would fail to recognize the panels, and attack friendly units. Sometimes German units would use captured panels, further confusing things.
     Greater problems were experienced with the medium bombers. Their missions were assigned and controlled from England; they were not in radio contact with ground forces during their flights. After all, since they attacked enemy installations miles behind the front, there was no need for radio coordination. Unfortunately, it's easy to get lost in the air. The real earth is not as well-marked as a map. Next time you travel by air, bring along a map and try to locate yourself by looking out the window. It's hard! Now imagine doing it with people shooting at you, and you'll see why there were so many errors./